For me, ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of what exists’; and ‘existence’ is the primitive concept of ‘being’. ...given the modern perspective, we understand that reality in-itself lacks any forms. Perhaps you can give some insight into this. — Bob Ross
To me, to take a ‘realist’ account, in the medieval sense, is to necessarily posit that the a priori ways by which we experience is a 1:1 mirror of the forms of the universe itself; and I have absolutely no clue why I should believe that. — Bob Ross
Because of the definition in play for the conception of reality, which is a category, having all the real as schemata subsumed under it, re: “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time).…”
The parenthetical is wrong: a thing can exist and not be given to the senses. Without the parenthetical the statement is a contradiction, re: there could be a thing in reality but is not.
YEA!!!
(Does the happy dance, feet just a’flyin’, enough to make Snoopy jealous, I tell ya)
But, and again from a high level, what I'm calling attention to the sense in which the mind constructs reality on an active basis moment by moment.
If you agree with me that the forms of reality are really attributed by our cognition; then they are not ‘real’ (in the realist’s sense) but rather transcendentally ideal; and this would be a position which is neither nominalist nor realist (in the sense of those terms as you defined them). — Bob Ross
For Peirce, universals are real because they represent tendencies or patterns in nature that guide how things behave. His realism is grounded in his belief that the regularities of the world, such as the laws of logic or nature, are not arbitrary constructs of the human mind but are real features of the universe.
while something real may be said to exist, reality encompasses a broader domain of truths, including abstract concepts like laws of nature or mathematical objects, which don’t exist in a material sense but are still real because they hold independently of personal opinion.
The relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. — Russell, the World of Universals
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless.
I think this vision of 'what is', is at the heart of both philosophy and mysticism, and that we generally don't see 'what is' (tathata in Buddhist philosophy) because of that sense of otherness.If you see "what is" then you see the universe, and denying "what is" is the origin of conflict. The beauty of the universe is in the "what is"; and to live with "what is" without effort is virtue. — J. Krishnamurti
My understanding is limited, and deploys a limited concept of ‘real’ in order to construct my conscious experience. — Bob Ross
Through reason, pure reason, which is purely self-reflective, I can know that reality must be far more than what the understanding determines it to be. — Bob Ross
you are using the concept of ‘reality’ which is a transcendental category of the understanding; and deny, for some reason, the concept as understood by self-reflective reason—by meta-cognition. — Bob Ross
My other point, now, would be that our self-reflective reason has the ability to understand, just like it can about other transcendental things, that the true concept of reality cannot be identical to that category of the understanding which you refer; because something can be which is not sensed. — Bob Ross
If you deny this, then the very concept of ‘reality’, as a category of the understanding, is not real; nor anything which is not currently being sensed; nor anything else transcendentally determined. — Bob Ross
….how can something which isn’t real cognize something which is? — Bob Ross
Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. — Bob Ross
“Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. — Bob Ross
The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. — Bob Ross
This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’
Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (; — Bob Ross
Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross
The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”. — Bob Ross
The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions. — Bob Ross
It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.
Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
"The thing in itself" is a space alien
Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. — Bob Ross
My apologies on the long delay on my reply! I had intended to reply to this another time as I had some other conversations in play, and only remembered this recently.
If we say 'experience' here is 'empirical data', then I'm fine with this. Our thoughts, memories, etc are all 'experience', but I suppose not define here
True 'non-empirical' based experiences are what we would call 'instincts'.
A JTB theory of knowledge has long been countered by "The Gettier Problem".
What is apriori knowledge if apriori is simply instinct? The moment a baby kicks, it knows what its like to kick through its empirical sensations. The moment a child learns about ''the number 1' its now empirical knowledge. 'Apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. It doesn't make any sense.
All bodies are extended is something we empirically learn by experience, not anything we are born with.
Its similar, but not exactly the same. The most like apriori is distinctive knowledge
There is no instinct to do math in any base. It takes time for this to develop in humans.
I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well. — Bob Ross
Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; — Bob Ross
whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one. — Bob Ross
You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience. — Bob Ross
This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. — Bob Ross
“1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). — Bob Ross
This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross
The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data. — Bob Ross
What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential. — Bob Ross
Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves — Bob Ross
You're using math, but as I'll note, I still don't see that as knowledge independent of experience.
The apriori of a fish would be very different from a human.
I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.
A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience...Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.
...
What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge.
I noted that math is the logic of discrete experience. But it still needs to be learned through experience.
This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross
A fun and poetic saying, but it does not make logical sense
All empirical data is from your brain Bob. All experience is in your brain.
How can one have experience and also not have experience?
Ok, Mww, I see your point now: “reality” cannot include the a priori modes of cognizing it; so our a priori faculties are not technically “real” in that sense, but must be grounded ontologically in something which allows for those faculties to exist—we just can’t know definitively what that is (viz., I do not know myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself). — Bob Ross
Sorry I didn't see this: I wasn't linked to it. Philosophim, I am not going to make your argument for you (: — Bob Ross
I think you are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge which one has independently of ever having experienced anything; and I am partially to blame to for that: I was misusing the term a while back. — Bob Ross
a posteriori knowledge is knowledge which is grounded in empirical data, and is, thusly, about reality; whereas a priori knowledge is about how we perceive reality. — Bob Ross
Taking space as another example, the axiom in geometry that “the shortest path between two points is a straight line connecting them” is a proposition that is true in virtue of the way we experience as opposed to what we experience — Bob Ross
I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.
Then the root of our disagreement there is merely semantical: that’s not usually what an “instinct” means. For example, Webster’s is “a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason”. — Bob Ross
The point that I was making with “applicable” vs. “distinctive” knowledge, is that it doesn’t preclude a priori knowledge; and it would be applicable knowledge in your theory (assuming I grant our theory in its entirety). — Bob Ross
Space data is not empirical—you are using the terms to loosely. There are aspects of your experience which your brain produces as a matter of how it is pre-structured to represent vs. the actual empirical data it is representing. — Bob Ross
I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; and I can’t tell if you agree with that or not — Bob Ross
That type of discussion requires good references.
Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?
On a narrow account, “experience” refers to sense experience, that is, to experiences that come from the use of our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste. However, this narrow account implies that justification based on introspection, proprioception (our kinesthetic sense of the position and movements of our body), memory, and testimony are kinds of a priori justification. And if we had different senses, like those of bats (echolocation) and duck-billed platypuses (electrolocation), experiences based on those senses would provide a priori, not empirical, justification on this account which takes a priori justification to be independent of experiences based on the senses we have.
Suppose there is a significant difference between a priori and empirical justification. This still does not tell us what the basis of a priori justification is
What truly separates the two?
As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical
So if I am blind and have no sense of touch, it is true in virtue of the way I experience?
Everything else that we reason about in our head has its root in empirical experience. We create identities, memories, and then have the innate ability to part and parcel those memories into ideas, imagination, dreams, and other thoughts. But to say they are 'true'? What exactly about them is true Bob?
How does a person who has no senses understand space?
(Development of spatial development in babies)
There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. — Bob Ross
Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?
“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. — Bob Ross
How can one have experience and also not have experience?
I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; — Bob Ross
We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; — Bob Ross
memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data. — Bob Ross
What truly separates the two?
I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction? — Bob Ross
a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience). — Bob Ross
In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. — Bob Ross
As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences. — Philosophim
Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form). — Bob Ross
On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. — Bob Ross
How does a person who has no senses understand space?
Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person. — Bob Ross
Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing. — Bob Ross
but you seemed to divide this experience between the empirical and non-empirical. This is where I'm confused.
What you seem to be claiming, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that someone knows what space is before they've experienced it
How is knowledge gained apriori?
I agree with this notion, but I'm not sure that's what Kant actually believes
If you've never experienced space or its concepts, you don't know it.
"Inner senses" is a misnomer.
I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection?
I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical. — Bob Ross
By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them. — Bob Ross
If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. — Bob Ross
So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). — Bob Ross
— Bob Ross
No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori. — Bob Ross
you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. — AmadeusD
It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality. — Bob Ross
How is knowledge gained apriori?
Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways. — Bob Ross
I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. — Bob Ross
Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. — Bob Ross
there's a current philosopher, Lawrence BonJour, who writes about role of a priori knowledge and philosophical rationalism. As it happens, I've found a rather good and quite brief video on BonJour's ideas, by a professor of philosophy, which you can review here. — Wayfarer
If reality is 'what is', then isn't anything we experience reality?
…
The problem is this assumes that experiences apart from the empirical are not reality. Every experience you have is part of reality.
Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
But this is just wrong. Modern day neuroscience and understanding of brain development shows this is a learned process.
Space and time are identities we create to label experiences
But this is everything, and not exclusive to space and time. Any identity attributed as a representation is not the property of the thing in itself.
How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)
This requires no innate understanding of space, just the ability to separate what one experiences into identities.
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No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.
There are only five of them.
Self-reflection is a type of thought, not a sense.
Having experience, then being able to focus and divide that experience into 'experiences' is innate. — Philosophim
I get what Kant was saying hundreds of years ago, but we've learned much more about the brain since then. — Philosophim
Alright Mww and @Wayfarer, your mysterious forces are beginning to sway me. — Bob Ross
The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality). — Bob Ross
Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations). — Bob Ross
Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
I did that with space: what did you disagree with there? — Bob Ross
The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. — Bob Ross
Space and time are identities we create to label experiences
Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense. — Bob Ross
Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all. — Bob Ross
How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)
It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. — Bob Ross
No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.
That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. — Bob Ross
There are only five of them.
We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false. — Bob Ross
Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not represented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. — Bob Ross
it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. — Wayfarer
That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within. — Wayfarer
One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures. — Wayfarer
In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. — Wayfarer
HA!!! Mysterious forces.
One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.
I might mention your #2 from a few days ago, but that wasn’t addressed to me.
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