OK, sure, I'll come back to your response to my posts about scholastic realism. You said:

For me, ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of what exists’; and ‘existence’ is the primitive concept of ‘being’. ...given the modern perspective, we understand that reality in-itself lacks any forms. Perhaps you can give some insight into this. — Bob Ross

To me, to take a ‘realist’ account, in the medieval sense, is to necessarily posit that the a priori ways by which we experience is a 1:1 mirror of the forms of the universe itself; and I have absolutely no clue why I should believe that. — Bob Ross

From a high level, your instinctive intuition of the world is that you are separate from it. Ideas, including universals, are in the mind but are not attributes of reality as such, which 'lack any forms'. I presume you would also say that you believe the world to exist independently of yours' or anyone's mind, that it is something we discover and explore through empirical means. The customary modern notion of the world is that its 'mind-independent' nature is a hallmark of the kind of reality it has - 'reality is what continues to exist when you stop believing in it' as Philip K. Dick said.

But, and again from a high level, what I'm calling attention to the sense in which the mind constructs reality on an active basis moment by moment. The world is not simply a given, and we ourselves are not passive recipients of information about it. Every sensory signal we receive is absorbed through the process of apperception and then incorporated into the background of our existing understanding. That is the thrust of Kant's 'Copernican revolution in philosophy': contrary to what the empiricists say, the mind is not tabula rasa, a blank slate on which things are merely impressed. Things conform to thoughts, rather than vice versa. (That's why I included the video 'Is Reality Real?' Cognitive scientists are also very much aware of the constructive activities of mind. That's why Kant has been called 'the godfather of modern cognitive science'.)

The second point I want to make is about 'the Cartesian division' (or 'anxiety'). This refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his divisions of "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other". (Richard J. Bernstein Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 1983)

That is very much bound up with the ground of modern culture, although as we're embedded in it, it can be very hard to notice (i.e. 'fish unaware of water'.) But the upshot is, just as you say - ideas and forms are in the mind, the vast Universe inchoate, driven only by the processes described by physics, devoid of intentionality. That is the political and philosophical background of modern liberal individualism.

I have more to add on why I hark back to scholastic realism, but that's enough for one post.

My apologies Mww, I forgot to respond.

Because of the definition in play for the conception of reality, which is a category, having all the real as schemata subsumed under it, re: “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time).…”

Ahhh, I understand now. For me, what is real for my understanding, in the Kantian sense, is not the same as I would define “reality”. My understanding is limited, and deploys a limited concept of ‘real’ in order to construct my conscious experience. Through reason, pure reason, which is purely self-reflective, I can know that reality must be far more than what the understanding determines it to be.

The parenthetical is wrong: a thing can exist and not be given to the senses. Without the parenthetical the statement is a contradiction, re: there could be a thing in reality but is not.

Perhaps I used your terms incorrectly: then it would be “you are saying that there could be a thing which is in reality but is not (i.e., is not real because it cannot be given to the senses).”

I think I get where you are coming from now: you are using the concept of ‘reality’ which is a transcendental category of the understanding; and deny, for some reason, the concept as understood by self-reflective reason—by meta-cognition.

Like I said before, my first point would be a semantic note: when something is not real, it does not exist because it is not—under your view, this does not hold because some things which exist are not real.

My other point, now, would be that our self-reflective reason has the ability to understand, just like it can about other transcendental things, that the true concept of reality cannot be identical to that category of the understanding which you refer; because something can be which is not sensed.

If you deny this, then the very concept of ‘reality’, as a category of the understanding, is not real; nor anything which is not currently being sensed; nor anything else transcendentally determined. I think you are just going to bite the bullet on this; so let me just point out that if there really aren’t these a priori modes of cognition (which they cannot be real according to your view) then that undermines the grounds that anything object which is cognized is real—for how can something which isn’t real cognize something which is?????

YEA!!!
(Does the happy dance, feet just a’flyin’, enough to make Snoopy jealous, I tell ya)

(:

I appreciate your elaboration!

But, and again from a high level, what I'm calling attention to the sense in which the mind constructs reality on an active basis moment by moment.

I don’t disagree with anything you said in your response; but what I am wondering is if you believe that there are forms to reality as it is in-itself or not (which is what ‘realism’ and ‘nominalism’, which you brought up, are debating). If you agree with me that the forms of reality are really attributed by our cognition; then they are not ‘real’ (in the realist’s sense) but rather transcendentally ideal; and this would be a position which is neither nominalist nor realist (in the sense of those terms as you defined them). What are your thoughts?

If you agree with me that the forms of reality are really attributed by our cognition; then they are not ‘real’ (in the realist’s sense) but rather transcendentally ideal; and this would be a position which is neither nominalist nor realist (in the sense of those terms as you defined them). — Bob Ross

Very perceptive question. That was the reason I called out scholastic realism, and C S Peirce's recapitulation of it:

For Peirce, universals are real because they represent tendencies or patterns in nature that guide how things behave. His realism is grounded in his belief that the regularities of the world, such as the laws of logic or nature, are not arbitrary constructs of the human mind but are real features of the universe.

and that:

while something real may be said to exist, reality encompasses a broader domain of truths, including abstract concepts like laws of nature or mathematical objects, which don’t exist in a material sense but are still real because they hold independently of personal opinion.

I think that's a clear and intelligible statement of Peirce's distinction between existence and reality. His point is that universals such as logical laws are constitutive of nature itself but not on the same level as phenomena. Bertrand Russell also recognises this:

The relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. — Russell, the World of Universals

Russell is intuiting here the distinct ontological status of universals, which he calls out:

We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless.

Compare with Consider the Aristotelian conception of 'nous' (nowadays translated as intellect). It is 'the basic understanding or awareness that grounds rationality. For Aristotle, this was distinct from sensory perception, including imagination and memory, which other animals possess. Discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions (i.e. grasps meaning) in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate faculty to understand the same universal categories in the same ways' (wiki). (Peirce, of course, came before Russell and Moore's repudiation of idealism, so it was still the dominant influence in the philosophy of his day; Peirce is often categorised as an 'objective idealist' which is nearest to my own inclinations, far as I can tell.)

At the heart of that sense of knowing is something again that we can't easily see, but it's the absence of that sense of division from the world. And that sense of 'otherness' is an existential plight, a way-of-being in the world. But for the pre-moderns, the world was the expression of a will, and was related to on an 'I-thou' basis, rather than the 'us-it' basis which seems natural to moderns. The cosmos was, as it were, animated by the Logos, and this world but one station on the scala naturae, the 'stairway to heaven'. (This doesn't mean for one moment that it was all peace and light in the pre-modern world, history bears witness to that, but stay with me.) We were participants in a cosmic drama, not bystanders in an indifferent world. Before Descartes, 'ideas' were not understood as the possessions of individual minds but as ideas in the Divine Intellect (a foundational principle of Christian Platonism).

In that pre-modern context the knower has a different kind of relationship with the known. We are in some sense united with the known through the ability to grasp its essence, to know what it is. Indeed, metaphysical insight could be construed as 'knowing is-ness', seeing the essence of things.* (You can see how that even underlies early modern science, with the caveat that it is predicated on just this division of subject and object which is the source of the above-mentioned Cartesian anxiety.)

Now to your question as to whether these are 'transcendentally ideal'. I agree, but this can't be taken to mean that they're subjective. Perhaps you could say that they are characteristic of how any mind must work, not simply my mind or yours. That is closer to Peirce's sense.

In all this, I'm trying to maintain the awareness of levels of being, an heirarchical ontology. Of course we can't 'go back' to the pre-modern ontology, but we need to understand and re-interpret it.

-----

* Compare:

If you see "what is" then you see the universe, and denying "what is" is the origin of conflict. The beauty of the universe is in the "what is"; and to live with "what is" without effort is virtue. — J. Krishnamurti

I think this vision of 'what is', is at the heart of both philosophy and mysticism, and that we generally don't see 'what is' (tathata in Buddhist philosophy) because of that sense of otherness.

See also Sensible Form and Intelligible Form.

My understanding is limited, and deploys a limited concept of ‘real’ in order to construct my conscious experience. — Bob Ross

As it should be, and does…..

“…..the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, (…) is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere….”

……but on the other hand….

Through reason, pure reason, which is purely self-reflective, I can know that reality must be far more than what the understanding determines it to be. — Bob Ross

…..troubles abound from such insistence, insofar as….

“….the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism….”

…. correction and guidance seemingly required…..

“….because it aims (…) to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge à priori….”

….and in this case, where you’ve given understanding the power of cognizing the content of experience and calling it knowledge, you then your invite pure reason to question, arbitrate and possibly overthrow that very power.

Pure reason, in its “dogmatical” use, cannot inform you there MUST be more to reality than understanding determines, insofar as immediately upon deducing there must be, it may also deduce with equal justice there cannot be, you end up knowing neither, and you, in order to maintain rational integrity, revert back to what understanding has already told you, re: reality is that which is susceptible to sensation in general, from which, a priori, properly critiqued pure reason can only inform for that which does not appear, the reality of it remains undetermined.
—————-

you are using the concept of ‘reality’ which is a transcendental category of the understanding; and deny, for some reason, the concept as understood by self-reflective reason—by meta-cognition. — Bob Ross

Meta-cognition. Ehhhh….thinking about thinking. What a waste. Thinking about thinking just IS thinking. I don’t know how what seems to be me thinking, comes about, I haven’t a freakin’ clue. All I’m doing here, is iterating my comprehension of some theory by which the ways and means of what appears to be my thinking makes sense to me, without any possibility of it actually being the case. I’m not thinking about thinking; I’m thinking about the content of a speculative metaphysic, my actually thinking, if there be such a thing, be what it may.

So it is that within the predicates of this particular theory, there is no such thing as meta-cognition, the description of a system in operation in the talking about it, which I know because it is me describing it, is very far from the system in operation, in itself, which I don’t know at all, and for which I can say nothing**. It is only in the description can stuff like “concept as understood by self-reflective reason” be said, insofar as in the operation of the system itself, reason doesn’t understand and understanding doesn’t reason.

In my comprehension of the theory, then, it arises that, yes, I use reality as a pure conception of the understanding, a category, because that’s what the theory stipulates, and likewise deny to reason the use of that category, and all other categories, in its transcendental activities, for transcendental reason is that by which the deduction of them, the restrictive applicability of them, hence their objective validity, is given.
—————

And now it comes to pass, that this cannot be true…..

My other point, now, would be that our self-reflective reason has the ability to understand, just like it can about other transcendental things, that the true concept of reality cannot be identical to that category of the understanding which you refer; because something can be which is not sensed. — Bob Ross

…..because pure reason is the origin of the concept of reality transcendnetally in the first place, which instantiates it as the “true” concept understanding uses in its synthetical apperceptions a priori, regarding things that appear to the senses. While the category “reality” belongs to understanding for its use, and while it is not the same as the conception named reality thought to arise spontaneously in the synthesis of conceptions to phenomena for the act of judging objects, these are two very different functions of understanding itself and are deserving of their differences.
—————-

Because something can be which is not sensed, is a logical inference, which must be separated from existence. There can be conceptions, there can be intuitions, there can be judgements, the actual experiences of which are impossible, just as there can be inhabitants of some other celestial body, the experience of which may be possible. Reality can be but not be sensed, but reality is not an existent. We experience real things, or, if you like, and loosely speaking, we experience things that are in reality; either way, we do not experience reality. As it is with all the pure conceptions of the understanding deduced by pure reason transcendentally: necessity can be that required for experience but necessity is not itself sensed; causality can be that required for experience but causality is not itself sensed, and so on.

Same with pure intuitions deduced transcendentally a priori. We manufacture the conception of time to understand Nature, but we have no understanding of the reality of time itself, insofar as it can never be an appearance to sensibility, but only reason to it for its necessity as a primary condition for everything else.
—————-

If you deny this, then the very concept of ‘reality’, as a category of the understanding, is not real; nor anything which is not currently being sensed; nor anything else transcendentally determined. — Bob Ross

I do deny “reality” as a category, reality as a condition. Or, I affirm that “reality” as a category, is not real, as well as all else transcendentally originated. As far as the real juxtapositioned to the not currently being sensed, still leaves the possibility of sensation in the future, by which the reality of the thing would then be given. Reality, being defined as the reception of sensation in general, makes no allowance for time, or, which is the same thing, allows for sensation in any time.

Is this legitimate? Yes, not only legitimate, but necessary, within the predicates of this particular speculative metaphysics, for which logic is the only arbiter. The more pertinent question then becomes….is this particular metaphysics itself, or the tripartite syllogistic logic which grounds it, legitimate, and for that, only a subjective motivation or inclination suffices for the determination of an answer.

(** and Wittgenstein thought he had itself an epiphany. (Sigh) Sorry, dude; long before you it had already been covered)
—————-

….how can something which isn’t real cognize something which is? — Bob Ross

First you have to prove why it must be that only the real can cognize the real. Or, prove from a pure, empirically grounded, science, that the non-real cannot cognize the real. In no other way can you prove it is impossible the merely valid can be sufficient to cognize the real. Failing that, it comes about that we already know how something which isn’t real can cognize the real. Whether or not that knowledge is worth a damn, is another question altogether.

My apologies on the long delay on my reply! I had intended to reply to this another time as I had some other conversations in play, and only remembered this recently.

Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. — Bob Ross

If we say 'experience' here is 'empirical data', then I'm fine with this. Our thoughts, memories, etc are all 'experience', but I suppose not define here. What we should be careful with is defining thoughts that are based on experience, vs thoughts that have no basis on experience. For example, if I remember a tree, my memory is now based on the experience and identify of a tree. True 'non-empirical' based experiences are what we would call 'instincts'. When a newborn is born for example it cries, and it can breath even though it hasn't breathed yet. The moment after it breathes, any thought on breathing is based on empirical experience.

“Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. — Bob Ross

A JTB theory of knowledge has long been countered by "The Gettier Problem". But lets go with the idea that knowledge is something obtained through reason that is the best stab available at understanding reality. What is apriori knowledge if apriori is simply instinct? The moment a baby kicks, it knows what its like to kick through its empirical sensations. The moment a child learns about ''the number 1' its now empirical knowledge. 'Apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. It doesn't make any sense.

The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. — Bob Ross

Notice that even in this sentence you justified a claim of apriori by saying 'we experience'. All bodies are extended is something we empirically learn by experience, not anything we are born with.

This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’

Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (; — Bob Ross

Yes, I did, and it has been a while. :) You may want to re-read it again now that you're much more versed in philosophy and discussions, or at least the summary that was posted right after it on the revision I posted a while back. So we don't get into that too deeply right now and can remain focused on the point here, I'll simply answer, "Yes, its consistent at its base between the two types".

Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

Its similar, but not exactly the same. The most like apriori is distinctive knowledge. Thus if I kick, I have an experience of that kick, and identify it distinctively in some way from the rest of my experience. I know that experience distinctively. It doesn't mean that if I kick, a burst of air will erupt and shatter a wall in front of me. For that, I need to apply my kick to the air to see if that result happens.

The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”. — Bob Ross

My disagreement purely rests on the fact that 'apriori knowledge' does not make sense as I noted above. The thing that is aprior is instinct or innate capability, not knowledge.

The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions. — Bob Ross

There is no instinct to do math in any base. It takes time for this to develop in humans.

"Quantity recognition: around 6 months
Quantity recognition is often the first mathematical skill children learn. Well before counting, babies as young as 6 months can demonstrate a basic understanding of quantities just by observing objects. Research suggests that babies can distinguish between different quantities, especially when the difference is significant—for example, six apples versus 12 apples.

By 10 to 12 months, babies may apply this skill when making choices."
https://blog.lovevery.com/skills-stages/numbers-counting/#:~:text=Quantity%20recognition%3A%20around%206%20months&text=Research%20suggests%20that%20babies%20can,this%20skill%20when%20making%20choices.

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.

Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross

I cannot applicably claim to know there is 'a thing in itself'. Its a logical induction. Its plausible that a thing in itself exists, and implausible that it does not. Therefore its the smart money bet. But it is not applicably known, and because it is such a broad and unspecified definition, nothing else besides that fact that we say, "There must be something that exists in itself apart for what we observe" can ever be said about it.

"The thing in itself" is a space alien

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. — Bob Ross

You misunderstood, I was creating a hypothetical in the example. My point was to give a concrete to the abstract. To demonstrate a possible 'thing in itself' and demonstrate that no amount of observation could discover it, as everything we observe from it leads us to view it as something completely different then what it really is as itself.

I appreciate your thoughtful response. I think I understand now what you are going for, and I agree despite our semantic differences :up: .

Like I said before, I just think it is best to reserve the term 'real', 'actual', etc. for 'it exists'; and 'existence' as 'being'. Otherwise, you end up having to posit that something can not be real but exists or what exists may not be real (depending on how the semantics are hashed out).

Good discussion, Wayfarer!

:pray:

My apologies on the long delay on my reply! I had intended to reply to this another time as I had some other conversations in play, and only remembered this recently.

No worries at all, my friend!

If we say 'experience' here is 'empirical data', then I'm fine with this. Our thoughts, memories, etc are all 'experience', but I suppose not define here

I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well.

True 'non-empirical' based experiences are what we would call 'instincts'.

Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one.

A JTB theory of knowledge has long been countered by "The Gettier Problem".

I no longer see the gettier problems as problematic at all (tbh); but you are correct.

What is apriori knowledge if apriori is simply instinct? The moment a baby kicks, it knows what its like to kick through its empirical sensations. The moment a child learns about ''the number 1' its now empirical knowledge. 'Apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. It doesn't make any sense.

You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience.

This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. “1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience.

All bodies are extended is something we empirically learn by experience, not anything we are born with.

Again, all knowledge begins with experience—not all knowledge arises out of it. The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data.

The problem you are having is that ‘experience’ encompasses both an a priori and a posteriori aspect; and so there are equivocations being made here by both of us in our discussion. I will try to be more clear from now on. What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential.

Its similar, but not exactly the same. The most like apriori is distinctive knowledge

No, my point is that your theory sidesteps the question: it doesn’t address it and doesn’t eliminate its possibility. Nothing about distinctive vs. applicable knowledge negates the possibility of a priori knowledge: the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction is a different one than you are addressing in your theory; and I am merely noting that a priori knowledge is not incompatible with your view.

There is no instinct to do math in any base. It takes time for this to develop in humans.

Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves

I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well. — Bob Ross

I don't think we're in disagreement with the idea of apriori, just apriori knowledge. You're using math, but as I'll note, I still don't see that as knowledge independent of experience. Can you give some other examples of apriori knowledge?

Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; — Bob Ross

I believe instinct includes this, but also the impetus to act at all. Apriori essentially includes the package of being prior to experience. The apriori of a fish would be very different from a human. One could also posit its the being and potential prior to experience.

whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one. — Bob Ross

I'm with you all the way until the last sentence. It may be due to the way you're defining instincts. I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience. So its not a false dichotomy, its a true one.

You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience. — Bob Ross

In the way we experience... So let me note again the point about 'distinctive experience'. In the paper I comment that "I don't know why I distinctively experience, but I do." That isn't knowledge. Actions and instincts prior to experience are not themselves experience. The first time I discretely experience, I now have that experience. But there was no experience before that allowed me to discretely experience. Its an innate capability. Innate capabilities are not knowledge. Knowledge can only be gleaned from experience. So while apriori can work on its own, apriori knowledge is a contradiction.

This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. — Bob Ross

I noted that math is the logic of discrete experience. But it still needs to be learned through experience. One cannot begin to understand the logic of discrete experience without first discretely experiencing. And that IS an experience. Every thought, feelilng, and 'mental' existence, is an experience. We forget sometimes that even when I touch something, that experience is 'mental'. The carpet doesn't feel soft outside of our touch. Its our touch interpreting the carpet into some type of sensation in our brains. Whether I have a though by touching carpet, or a thought while sitting on a couch imagining a blue sky, those are still experiences.

“1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). — Bob Ross

He almost had it. Since we innately discretely experience, we all share that same aspect of viewing the world. And because we can be logical beings, we can figure out that there is a logic to discretely experiencing. Thus if you reason through it, you can conclude some type of expression of 'math'. But these are things we must learn though experiencing. Just like the fact that physics exists in our world, we don't know about it unless we experience it. Apriori means 'independent of experience'. Knowledge is "What can be logically concluded by experience that best fits reality". Apriori knowledge is therefore a contradiction. You cannot have knowledge, which is dependent on experience, that is also independent of experience.

This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross

A fun and poetic saying, but it does not make logical sense. Knowledge by experience is an either or situation. If you must have experience for knowledge, you cannot have apriori knowledge, or "Knowledge by experience that is independent of experience". Something isn't being reasoned through correctly.

The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data. — Bob Ross

All empirical data is from your brain Bob. All experience is in your brain. We are fortunately able to interpret that there is a world outside of our brain that we try to master. The only difference is, 'Thoughts through nerves that hit the brain" vs "thoughts in the brain without nerves".

What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential. — Bob Ross

This needs to be more clearly defined then. How can one have experience and also not have experience? I think its a confusion as to believing that the senses are a different kind of experience then thoughts without the senses. This is a fine distinction, but they are both experiences. That's the difference between my point of 'discrete experiences' vs 'applicable experiences'. Both are experiences, and both can gain knowledge. Apriori knowledge is "Knowledge without experience, but it still starts with experience", which breaks down the more you think on it.

Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves — Bob Ross

Again, numbers are signs, which are learned through experience. The sign '1' never had to arise in human society. The sign for one could have just as easily ben 'ua'. What we can learn by discretely experiencing is that we can focus on a 'discrete', or one that is separate from everything around it. We then have the capability to hold a '1' and a '1' discrete experience, and group that into a new discrete experience that we label as '2'. While I believe most people have the innate capacity to do this process, it does not result in 'math' or 'numbers'. If one is able to function with a basic logic of discrete experience, then one can do this. But to know one can do this, one has to experience it first.

The point is that there is no knowledge apart from experience. All knowledge is gained from experience. Our innate capacities determine what types of experiences we can have, and if we can reason through them in a particular way. But knowledge of that only comes after doing so. "Discrete experience" and "distinctive knowledge" solve the problem, "apriori knowledge" doesn't quite work.

You're using math, but as I'll note, I still don't see that as knowledge independent of experience.

It is grounded in—i.e., make true in virtue of—something which is not empirical. The space which objects take up on your conscious experience is not empirical—it is not a posteriori. Any knowledge which one has which is true in virtue of the way, e.g., objects work in space is a priori.

I think you are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge which one has independently of ever having experienced anything; and I am partially to blame to for that: I was misusing the term a while back.

Taking space as another example, the axiom in geometry that “the shortest path between two points is a straight line connecting them” is a proposition that is true in virtue of the way we experience as opposed to what we experience—it doesn’t matter the empirical data which our brains represent, the a priori mode of representing them in space remains the same.

What I think you are thinking, is that because we can only knowledge this after beginning to experience that we do not have a priori knowledge; but the “a priori” in “a priori knowledge” is conveying how it is grounded—specifically that it is not grounded in empirical data.

a posteriori knowledge is knowledge which is grounded in empirical data, and is, thusly, about reality; whereas a priori knowledge is about how we perceive reality.

The apriori of a fish would be very different from a human.

This isn’t a coherent sentence: the a priori...what?

I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.

Then the root of our disagreement there is merely semantical: that’s not usually what an “instinct” means. For example, Webster’s is “a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason”.

Instincts are behavior patterns not attributable to being learned through reason; and most the a priori pre-structure of cognition, intuition, judgment, etc. do not fit that bill.

The point that I was making with “applicable” vs. “distinctive” knowledge, is that it doesn’t preclude a priori knowledge; and it would be applicable knowledge in your theory (assuming I grant our theory in its entirety).

Here’s the definitions you have in your summary:

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience...Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.
...
What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge.

I discretely experience, and I extract from it the necessary forms of that experience (as opposed to the empirical data of that experience); and I apply my hypothesis without contradiction to reality, thusly making it applicable knowledge that is a priori knowledge. I don’t see anything incorrect going here, even in terms of your position.

Ok, @Mww, I see your point now: “reality” cannot include the a priori modes of cognizing it; so our a priori faculties are not technically “real” in that sense, but must be grounded ontologically in something which allows for those faculties to exist—we just can’t know definitively what that is (viz., I do not know myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself).

I noted that math is the logic of discrete experience. But it still needs to be learned through experience.

I can’t tell if you are saying we just self-reflectively use math to navigate experience, or that math is a form of how we experience—the difference between saying, e.g., the ball has mathematically features itself (phenomenally), or that we just use math to nominally understand the ball (phenomenally).

This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross

A fun and poetic saying, but it does not make logical sense

You aren’t understanding it (with all due respect); and I can see now this is the root of our disagreement. You are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge one comes born with in the sense that they don’t have to glean it from the forms of experience—that’s not what it means.

All empirical data is from your brain Bob. All experience is in your brain.

Space data is not empirical—you are using the terms to loosely. There are aspects of your experience which your brain produces as a matter of how it is pre-structured to represent vs. the actual empirical data it is representing.

How can one have experience and also not have experience?

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; and I can’t tell if you agree with that or not (yet).

I was wondering how to tackle this post as the entirety of apriori, posteriori, analytic, and synthetic distinctions can get messy. Further, apriori knowledge is often the means of justifying said knowledge, and Kant's justification model is still based off of JTB if I recall correctly. Since we're discussing specifically what Kant is saying, I think its important that we accurately assess what Kant is saying, and not our interpretation of it.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/#ExamIlluDiffBetwPrioPostEmpiJust

Honestly, the above is a greater and more accurate source of the definition of apriori, and some of the issues. Specifically, I' m going to refer to section 4 " What is the nature of a priori justification?" Take a read and see what you think. Feel free to ask me to revisit any of the above notes when you're done. But as it is now, I think the terms need better clarification to continue.

Sorry I didn't see this: I wasn't linked to it. Philosophim, I am not going to make your argument for you (:

If there is something in that article that you think is relevant, then you will need to bring it to our attention as it relates to what I have said.

Ok, Mww, I see your point now: “reality” cannot include the a priori modes of cognizing it; so our a priori faculties are not technically “real” in that sense, but must be grounded ontologically in something which allows for those faculties to exist—we just can’t know definitively what that is (viz., I do not know myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself). — Bob Ross

Another footnote - scholars have commented on the influence Kant and Schopenhauer had on Freud’s theories. See this The point being many aspects of our own psyche are not available to casual introspection but are in some important sense sub- and unconscious. Meaning the ancient dictum ‘Know thyself’ is not nearly so straightforward as it may seem.

Sorry I didn't see this: I wasn't linked to it. Philosophim, I am not going to make your argument for you (: — Bob Ross

Yes I just wanted you to read section 4, but there's no direct link. You can ctrl+F and type the phrase in to find it directly. I'm also not trying to have you make my argument, I just know when there are other better references then myself. I read Kant's work on knowledge many moons ago, and I would not deign to be an expert on the specifics. We are not really at a point of debating if Kant's ideology works, but we seem to be debating the meaning of what Kant was saying. That type of discussion requires good references.

I think you are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge which one has independently of ever having experienced anything; and I am partially to blame to for that: I was misusing the term a while back. — Bob Ross

Yes, and so now I need a new clarification of what you mean by apriori. That was the crux of what I was against. Kant is easy to read at a surface level, but when you get into the specifics of it, problems start to crop up.

a posteriori knowledge is knowledge which is grounded in empirical data, and is, thusly, about reality; whereas a priori knowledge is about how we perceive reality. — Bob Ross

Are you sure this makes sense? Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori? Let me link the first section of the article I linked.

"A standard answer to the question about the difference between a priori and empirical justification is that a priori justification is independent of experience and empirical justification is not, and this seems to explain the contrasts present in the fifteen examples above. But various things have been meant by “experience”. On a narrow account, “experience” refers to sense experience, that is, to experiences that come from the use of our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste. However, this narrow account implies that justification based on introspection, proprioception (our kinesthetic sense of the position and movements of our body), memory, and testimony are kinds of a priori justification. And if we had different senses, like those of bats (echolocation) and duck-billed platypuses (electrolocation), experiences based on those senses would provide a priori, not empirical, justification on this account which takes a priori justification to be independent of experiences based on the senses we have.

Given these considerations, perhaps “experience” should be taken to mean “sense experience of any sort, introspection, proprioception, memory, and testimony”. This sounds like a hodgepodge of various sources of justification but perhaps what unites them is that, leaving aside memory and testimony, these sources provide us with information either about the physical world or our inner world, either the outer world through perception or the inner world of what we are feeling or thinking, or information about our bodies, through introspection and proprioception. Memory and testimony are not primary sources of justification; their primary epistemic function is to transmit either a priori or empirical justification. So the proposal should be seen as a way of distinguishing the primary sources of justification into two categories of justification: a priori and empirical.

As noted above (see, sec. 3) and below (secs. 4.4 and 4.5), “independent of experience” should not be taken to mean independent of all experience, but, as a first approximation, to mean “independent of all experience beyond what is needed to grasp the relevant concepts involved in the proposition”. It is sometimes said that a priori justification can depend on experience insofar as it enables the person to acquire the concepts needed to grasp the meaning of the proposition which is the object of justification, but experience cannot play an evidential role in that justification (Williamson 2013: 293). Later we will see that the notion of enabling experience might better be expanded to include experience needed to acquire certain intellectual skills such as those needed to construct certain proofs or create counterexamples (see, secs. 4.4 and 4.5, below).

Suppose there is a significant difference between a priori and empirical justification. This still does not tell us what the basis of a priori justification is. One view is that rational intuitions or insights are the bases of a priori justification; experiences, as construed above, the bases of empirical justification. Before discussing the nature of rational intuitions or insights, we should first distinguish between intuitions and intuitive judgments and consider what the content of intuitive judgments evoked in thought experiments is."

The point of the above is trying to make the definitions of apriori and aposteriori work, because Kant is unclear and seems to contradict himself at times (or perhaps through the language translation of his works) when he says "experience". What truly separates the two? As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences.

Taking space as another example, the axiom in geometry that “the shortest path between two points is a straight line connecting them” is a proposition that is true in virtue of the way we experience as opposed to what we experience — Bob Ross

So if I am blind and have no sense of touch, it is true in virtue of the way I experience? That doesn't make any sense. It is known 'to be true' (known by application) based on empirical experience. We can also know it 'by definition'. But knowing a definition of something doesn't make it true in application. I can know the definition of a pink elephant, but it doesn't mean I'll ever know one empirically.

I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.

Then the root of our disagreement there is merely semantical: that’s not usually what an “instinct” means. For example, Webster’s is “a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason”. — Bob Ross

Yes, that's fine. I'm trying to note the parts of apriori that work. What works is when you note apriori as 'innate being'. This includes instincts and physical potential. These are the only things which are independent of empirical experience. You could think independent of ever having any sense, but what would you think about? You wouldn't even know what space is let alone have a memory of anything but some dark and wordless nothingness. You wouldn't even know what 'dark' is, it would just be a senseless existence. Everything else that we reason about in our head has its root in empirical experience. We create identities, memories, and then have the innate ability to part and parcel those memories into ideas, imagination, dreams, and other thoughts. But to say they are 'true'? What exactly about them is true Bob?

The point that I was making with “applicable” vs. “distinctive” knowledge, is that it doesn’t preclude a priori knowledge; and it would be applicable knowledge in your theory (assuming I grant our theory in its entirety). — Bob Ross

Distinctive knowledge is the closest to the loose concept of 'apriori knowledge'. Its an evolution of the concept without the problematic definitive issues of what apriori is. Never do I say distinctive knowledge is 'true'. Never do I separate the empirical from the mental with distinctive knowledge. The separation is when you try to take those memories and experiences, and apply it to a world that is independent of your wishes, desires, and interpretations. The idea of apriori does not do this.

Space data is not empirical—you are using the terms to loosely. There are aspects of your experience which your brain produces as a matter of how it is pre-structured to represent vs. the actual empirical data it is representing. — Bob Ross

How does a person who has no senses understand space? And if it was inborn, how come it takes several months to learn?

(Development of spatial development in babies)
4 to 6 months:
Begins to grasp objects and explores them with hands and mouth.
Starts to show depth perception (judging distances between objects).
https://www.visionlearncenter.com/post/milestones-for-visual-spatial-development

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; and I can’t tell if you agree with that or not — Bob Ross

I agree with this. What I'm noting is that apriori meaning "thoughts(?) that are independent of empirical experience" needs special care. If you are to claim an understanding of space is apriori, how can that understanding of space be completely independent of empirical experience with the assertion that is it true?

That type of discussion requires good references.

I skimmed through it, and none of it seemed to reference Kant: it was about, more broadly, how many philosophers have contended we should use the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction (and how it relates to the nature of ‘experience’). There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. If there is something in there you want discuss, then please bring it up specifically so I can address it adequately.

Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?

“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. The term ‘empirical’ (usually) refers to the content of experience which is of reality,

On a narrow account, “experience” refers to sense experience, that is, to experiences that come from the use of our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste. However, this narrow account implies that justification based on introspection, proprioception (our kinesthetic sense of the position and movements of our body), memory, and testimony are kinds of a priori justification. And if we had different senses, like those of bats (echolocation) and duck-billed platypuses (electrolocation), experiences based on those senses would provide a priori, not empirical, justification on this account which takes a priori justification to be independent of experiences based on the senses we have.

We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; I am not sure what they mean by “testimony”; memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data.

Suppose there is a significant difference between a priori and empirical justification. This still does not tell us what the basis of a priori justification is

a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience).

What truly separates the two?

I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction?

As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical

How can they not be different? One is about what is in reality and one is about something other than how reality is itself: they are mutually exclusive categories.

So if I am blind and have no sense of touch, it is true in virtue of the way I experience?

In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. What you are positing, is fundamentally a person who not only is blind and doesn’t have a sense of touch, but cannot sense at all. All senses that we have which are outer senses fundamentally are cognized in space (e.g., I close my eyes, touch nothing, feel no outer objects, but can still sense where my left finger is located without touching it—that’s in space).

The point about these sort of a priori propositions being true for human experience; is that they are true for the human understanding: the way we experience; and, yes, it is entirely possible for a human to lack the proper ability to understand reality.

Everything else that we reason about in our head has its root in empirical experience. We create identities, memories, and then have the innate ability to part and parcel those memories into ideas, imagination, dreams, and other thoughts. But to say they are 'true'? What exactly about them is true Bob?

Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form).

On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. Everything we think about implies separation between, at least, concepts.

Moreover, it is plainly seen that the lack of the concept of space is not due to a lack of the empirical aspect of experience (if I were to grant your hypothetical as possible), because if they were to be given a hardcore drug that causes them to hallucinate utter nonsense, which would not be based off of any empirical data because they have never had any, they would immediately become acquainted with space—thusly, it is a priori.

How does a person who has no senses understand space?

Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person.

(Development of spatial development in babies)

Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing.

Hopefully that helps clear some things up. Good discussion, Philosophim!

Bob

There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. — Bob Ross

It was more to note the point between apriori as 'without experience' vs aposteriori as 'with experience' and your note that there is a difference between empirical and non-empirical experience. My point is that finding that dividing line between what is gained with empirical experience, vs none at all, doesn't leave us with anything we could commonly call knowledge.

Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?

“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. — Bob Ross

Then I need a little clarification as to what you mean by this below:

How can one have experience and also not have experience?

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; — Bob Ross

I interpreted this to mean we can have empirical experience, and non-empirical experience. What is the difference between apriori and aposteriori experience in your view then?

We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; — Bob Ross

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? There's no reading of the outside world in this case. So if I'm thinking about the outside world, its not a sense, but if I'm thinking about myself, its a sense?

memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data. — Bob Ross

And where is this distinct separation in memory? If an illusion, which is a misinterpretation of empirical sense data is aposteriori, is any misinterpretation of anything aposteriori? The point here is its difficult to see the dividing line.

What truly separates the two?

I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction? — Bob Ross

If it was clear, I would not be asking again. :) I'm noting that in practice, giving an example of how one can have knowledge apart from experience doesn't make any sense. Apriori knowledge is often understood as understanding something independently from experience. You noted earlier that apriori does involve experience, but you seemed to divide this experience between the empirical and non-empirical. This is where I'm confused.

a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience). — Bob Ross

See this is generally not seen as knowledge. If I have the capability to see red, that's just an innate part of my being. Its not something I 'know'. If I've never seen red before, I can have the capacity to know what it is when I see it, but I don't know what red is apart from experience.

In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. — Bob Ross

Right, they don't know what space is in that sense, because they've never encountered it before. They have the capacity to understand what space is, but no experience to know what space is in that way. What you seem to be claiming, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that someone knows what space is before they've experienced it. Even under the JTB, knowledge is a 'justified true belief'. Where is the justification, or the belief in something one has never experienced?

As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences. — Philosophim

Then I'm not sure you're actually using apriori correctly. I agree with this notion, but I'm not sure that's what Kant actually believes. We seem to have a notion of 'without experience, but experience'. There's a lack of a terminology that doesn't devolve into contradictions here.

Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form). — Bob Ross

Breaking this down, you're pointing out what I am. You can't reflect on space if you've never experienced space. Meaning that any knowledge gained from this would come from experience. How is knowledge gained? How is knowledge gained apriori? How is this 'apriori knowledge' a JTB?

On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. If you've never experienced space or its concepts, you don't know it. Moving your fingers and coming up with an idea or notion of space is learned by experience, not apart from it.

How does a person who has no senses understand space?

Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person. — Bob Ross

I'm just talking about lacking the five senses. "Inner senses" is a misnomer. Senses refer to the five ways we are able to gain information from the outside world.

Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing. — Bob Ross

But it is justified by the experience of space. Again, I agree that babies have an innate capacity to come to certain conclusions about space, but that knowledge is learned by experience. Where is the knowledge of space without experience, which is the idea of 'apriori knowledge'? The ability to see red, does not mean one knows what red is before one has experienced it. Do we have apriori knowledge of red? No. Because apriori knowledge doesn't make sense as Kant defined it.

I appreciate the response, and I see that we need to address more the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction more in depth before we move on to that distinction as it relates to knowledge. So, for now, let’s forget about a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge, and focus on the generic distinction itself.

but you seemed to divide this experience between the empirical and non-empirical. This is where I'm confused.

Yes, this is the root of the confusion (I think). When I was saying, before, that a priori knowledge is knowledge gained independently of “experience”, I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical.

By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them.

The Kantian way of thinking about it, philosophically, is essentially:

1. An object “impacts” your senses.
2. Your sensations produce sensations.
3. You brain intuits objects from those sensations in space and time.
4. Your brain cognizes objects, according to logical rules and conceptions, in space and time.
5. You experience an object, or objects, in space and time.

If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. Hence, the extension and succession which you experience things in and of, are not from the sensations and hence are not empirical (even if the brain learns how to represent the causal relations of things better with space and time as it develops).

So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). This means that space and time are like the containers in which the content of experience is placed; and this is just a simplified way of saying that they are a priori and used to represent a posteriori content.

What you seem to be claiming, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that someone knows what space is before they've experienced it

No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori.

This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience, but not all knowledge arises out of experience. It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality.

How is knowledge gained apriori?

Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways.

I agree with this notion, but I'm not sure that's what Kant actually believes

I can’t speak for what Kant actually believes without being in his own mind; but I can say that the CPR seems pretty clear to me that what he means is that experience contains both an a priori and a posteriori aspect because there are necessary preconditions the possibility of that experience which are about how we are pre-structured to experience as opposed to the representation of the empirical, sensational content of that experience.

If you've never experienced space or its concepts, you don't know it.

I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. E.g., if I am thinking about “bawwws” vs “glipglips”, even if they are utter nonsense, I am making separations and distinctions between them, which is inherent to reason, and this is conceptually spatial. You can’t have thoughts which don’t imply any conceptual separation between other concepts and ideas which you have—viz., you cannot think without space. You may not call it “space”; you may not know it is “space”; but when you are thinking you are thinking in terms of space. If you don’t believe, then just try to come up with a counter-example, and I will demonstrate that it is still using, implicitly, conceptual separation between thoughts, ideas, and concepts in play.

"Inner senses" is a misnomer.

Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. Which leads me to:

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection?

I was assuming by introspection we are talking about self-consciousness, and this requires an inner sense; for one cannot know they are experiencing by merely experiencing: they must also have the capacity to acquire knowledge about their own experience. It is entirely possible to have a brain that is damaged in such a way as to still experience but lack self-experience.

You only have knowledge of yourself insofar as you affect your own senses. Which entails that there is not “I think, therefore I am” kind of direct window into one’s own self.

Really good point worth distilling here - you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. Very good.

Re a priori knowledge - there's a current philosopher, Lawrence BonJour, who writes about role of a priori knowledge and philosophical rationalism. As it happens, I've found a rather good and quite brief video on BonJour's ideas, by a professor of philosophy, which you can review here.

I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical. — Bob Ross

If reality is 'what is', then isn't anything we experience reality? Again, what it seems you want to say is there is a distinction between the classic empirical and non-empirical modes of experience.

By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them. — Bob Ross

Again, this seems to be an empirical and non-empirical distinction. Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. — Bob Ross

But this is just wrong. Modern day neuroscience and understanding of brain development shows this is a learned process. I get what Kant was saying hundreds of years ago, but we've learned much more about the brain since then. Again, I will note what is possible is that we have the capacity to understand space and time through our being. But that is not knowledge that we already know without experience. Space and time are identities we create to label experiences. But we don't know these identities before we encounter them.

So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). — Bob Ross

But this is everything, and not exclusive to space and time. Any identity attributed as a representation is not the property of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is the logical layer of the unknown upon which all representations rest. And that's it. There's nothing that can ever be concluded from it besides that.

in which the content of experience is placed; and this is just a simplified way of saying that they are a priori and used to represent a posteriori content.[/quote]

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

— Bob Ross

No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori. — Bob Ross

you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. — AmadeusD

Bob, are you talking about the ability to discretely experience? This requires no innate understanding of space, just the ability to separate what one experiences into identities. "Space" is a very particular identity that assumes depth and location. We can learn this, but its not innate knowledge. Having experience, then being able to focus and divide that experience into 'experiences' is innate. We can also know the division of these experiences once we have make them. This division of experiences at its base, does not necessitate space or any form of empiricism. That is developed later.

It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality. — Bob Ross

The problem is this assumes that experiences apart from the empirical are not reality. Every experience you have is part of reality. The question of whether your interpretation of that experience represents aspects of reality beyond the experience itself (I see water, therefore water is a X location in space and not a mirage) is correct when applied beyond the inductive.

How is knowledge gained apriori?

Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways. — Bob Ross

Again, there are problems here because you note that empirical data is reality, while non-empirical data is not.

I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. — Bob Ross

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience. It thinks in terms of inductions and deductions based off of this discrete experience. I see water over there, when I normally see water, in my past experience this means there is water over there. I go over there, and the water vanishes. It was a mirage. Distinctive knowledge, beliefs, and the application of those beliefs. Empirical experiences are merely one subset of discrete experiences. "Space" is one such concept that is formed and reasoned on. It is not known innately.

Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. — Bob Ross

Senses refer to the empirical. There are only five of them. Using the term, 'inner sense' as if it means 'one of the five senses' is a misnomer. Self-reflection is a type of thought, not a sense. If you start blending sense into internal thoughts, then the this easily makes every experience a sense. Its good to have tight separations of terms at times or else you run into making it too generic. Self-reflection after all is simply conscious awareness. Which means non-self-reflective awareness can also be a sense...and now the term 'sense' doesn't really mean much anymore beyond 'experience'.

there's a current philosopher, Lawrence BonJour, who writes about role of a priori knowledge and philosophical rationalism. As it happens, I've found a rather good and quite brief video on BonJour's ideas, by a professor of philosophy, which you can review here. — Wayfarer

That's nice of Wayfarer, thank you.

:up:

If reality is 'what is', then isn't anything we experience reality?
…
The problem is this assumes that experiences apart from the empirical are not reality. Every experience you have is part of reality.

Alright @Mww and @Wayfarer, your mysterious forces are beginning to sway me. In having to explain this to Philosophim, I am starting to appreciate your distinction between what is real and what exists: it seems I have to posit that distinction now to resolve the ambiguity.

Philosophim, the ambiguity is that you are using ‘reality’, like I usually do, too vaguely and loosely. The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality).

Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations).

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

I did that with space: what did you disagree with there?

But this is just wrong. Modern day neuroscience and understanding of brain development shows this is a learned process.

You are equivocating. The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. These are three completely separate claims, and the first one is what scientifically you were noting.

Neuroscience is useless for transcendental investigations; and to not understand that is to misunderstand, fundamentally, the Kantian problem of experience.

Space and time are identities we create to label experiences

Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense.

But this is everything, and not exclusive to space and time. Any identity attributed as a representation is not the property of the thing in itself.

The difference is that properties of things are a mixture of empirical and non-empirical content. We cognize them based off of sensational data, which is empirical. Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all.

When our brains cognize a ‘ball’, you are right that it represents sensations of a thing in correspondence with certain pure and impure a priori conceptions; but there is an empirical aspect to it; whereas that it has extension and is placed in a sequential sequence is pure a priori.

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. If you mean a concept which is ingrained in how we represent reality for our conscious experience, then it is quite obviously drastically different. The former is an idea we have of our conscious experience, the latter is an idea which our representative faculties has for constructing our conscious experience.

This requires no innate understanding of space, just the ability to separate what one experiences into identities.
…

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.

That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. That was my original point that you denied.

There are only five of them.

We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false.

Self-reflection is a type of thought, not a sense.

Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not respresented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. My brain has already sensed and properly sorted my thoughts, under the preconditioned a priori modes to represent them, for me to consciously experience my own thoughts. Time, without space, is the pure intuition for the inner sense; simply meaning, that for reflective consciousness, it is represented by the brain in time alone and never in space.

If I take your argument here seriously, then my thoughts, which are presented to me in organized succession, are somehow non-representational and my brain somehow could organize it in succession without any sensational data of its own thinking processes. How is that possible, Philosophim?!?!?

Having experience, then being able to focus and divide that experience into 'experiences' is innate. — Philosophim

This is what I was trying to get at, but there's no real explanation for why this is the case other than 'it's required for what we take to be experience'. However, some mental experiences (usually drug-induced) can counter this potential. The mind, either without, or unaware of, the body, may not need these a prioris to 'experience' something like timeless space for instance.

Though, you addressed your response to Bob, so i'm unsure exactly the intent.

I get what Kant was saying hundreds of years ago, but we've learned much more about the brain since then. — Philosophim

I don't think you can deflate Kant's claims so easily. Despite the 'marvellous progress of modern science' there are philosophical issues which will not yield so easily to those clever folks in their white lab coats.

A scholar named Andrew Brook has published books and papers on the intersection of Kantian philosophy and modern cognitive science, exploring how Kant’s insights align with and contribute to contemporary understanding of the mind. Brook’s work emphasizes that Kant anticipated several concepts central to cognitive science, particularly the notion that cognition involves active processes of structuring and organizing experience rather than passively receiving sensory input. Brook sees Kant as a precursor to theories in cognitive science that propose the mind as a system that imposes order on incoming data, emphasizing the mind’s role in synthesizing raw sensory data into coherent experiences.

For Kant, as Brook underscores, this means that the mind doesn’t simply react to raw sensory data; rather, it actively organizes and interprets it in line with certain fundamental principles that are implicit in the nature of experience itself. These principles—such as causality, unity, and temporality—are not derived from experience but are necessary for experience to have any coherent form. Brook views Kant’s insight here as crucial: it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. This structuring role of the mind underpins cognitive processes, creating a foundation on which experience unfolds.

That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within.

One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures.

Kant’s influence persists in social sciences and philosophy precisely because his insights about the mind's role in shaping experience laid the groundwork for modern theories that emphasize the constructive nature of perception and knowledge. Constructivism, for instance, echoes Kant by asserting that knowledge is actively constructed, not merely passively received. Enactivism, with its focus on the dynamic interaction between organism and environment, builds on Kant’s notion that perception depends on structures and activities within the perceiver, rather than solely on external stimuli. Phenomenology also draws deeply from Kant by emphasizing the role of consciousness in constituting the meaningful world around us, exploring how subjective experience shapes our understanding of reality.

In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. This ongoing influence shows that Kant’s work continues to offer essential insights into how we understand ourselves and our place in a world that we, in part, construct through our own cognitive and perceptual frameworks.

Ref: Kant’s View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Andrew Brook.

*ChatGPT was utilised in drafting the above text*.

Alright Mww and @Wayfarer, your mysterious forces are beginning to sway me. — Bob Ross

HA!!! Mysterious forces.

There’s some great stuff in your post here, Bob. I particularly note your “introspectively analyze my own thinking” and its relation to time. One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.

I might mention your #2 from a few days ago, but that wasn’t addressed to me.

Anyway…..carry on.

The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality). — Bob Ross

How is it not real? Its a real experience. Its our interpretation by noting whether our real experience can be accurately applied beyond the current experience we are having. So, I can discretely experience what I call a 'tree', and that discrete experience is real. But is my belief that it is a tree something that I know, or something that I believe? That's when we apply. If we have to have two definitions of 'real', perhaps we should re-examine how we're putting our model together.

Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations). — Bob Ross

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real. You experience space. Then, when you apply that belief about space by reaching out to grab something, you apply that belief accurately and are able to retrieve that cup. But we have all misjudged space before in application. I've reached out to grab something and missed. Thought I would catch a ball when I opened my hand and didn't. But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience. Knowledge cannot be gained without experience.

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

I did that with space: what did you disagree with there? — Bob Ross

You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?

The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. — Bob Ross

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space. Philosophy should always side with what is currently known, and the solid science of spatial awareness development in kids is something we should not dismiss. Otherwise we're debating fiction.

Space and time are identities we create to label experiences

Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense. — Bob Ross

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences. Two of those are 'space' and 'time'. We then apply these identities to the reality we experience to make it to work on time by driving a car to another location. Just because we use the concepts of space and time without thinking, does not mean that these concepts and their application was done apart from the experience we built from our first moments out of the womb (Possibly within too).

Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all. — Bob Ross

No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. — Bob Ross

Correct. Then everything is apriori. Because we experience everything by discrete experiences. But that isn't knowledge. That's just the ability to sort our experience into 'pieces' or 'identities'. Creating an identity is distinctive knowledge. It is not applicable knowledge. But no distinctive knowledge is gained apart from experience. There is no innate knowledge. Just the innate capability to discretely experience.

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.

That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. — Bob Ross

Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after. Discrete experience happens whether we come up with the concept of space or not. Lets take your point in another way. "I breath, therefore I must already know what breathing is before I've ever breathed." No, you don't know what its like to breath before you breath. You have the potential and capability to. But it is not 'innate knowledge'. Existing and living in space, and learning that and adapting to it, does not mean you have innate knowledge of time and space.

There are only five of them.

We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false. — Bob Ross

No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.

Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not represented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. — Bob Ross

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them. There is really one thing in itself that we know of. Your experience. The act of 'experiencing' is the subjective reality that is, and there is nothing more that it represents. We can think about it. We can wonder how its put together. Adding an extra layer of 'represents' doesn't mean anything. We have thoughts, and we have thoughts on thoughts. But those thoughts on thoughts are still thoughts. They are experiences. We can know them as we have them. But we do not know them before we have them.

I can know I discretely experience. But I don't have to know what I discretely experience to discretely experience. The act itself is not knowledge. Knowledge comes after/during the act. We can exist in time and space without knowing about time and space. It doesn't mean we innately know about time and space. This false conclusion you are drawing is that because we exist in time and space, that we must have innate knowledge about time and space. No. Knowledge is learned by experience. Knowledge by definition, cannot be innate.

it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. — Wayfarer

Understood. But this is a different claim then, "Innate knowledge apart from experience". Its not knowledge. Its instinct and being. We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd. It is a being in time and space. That doesn't mean it has innate knowledge of it apart from experience.

That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is my point. There is experience, and there are innate ways of experiencing dependent on your being. But this is not 'knowledge'. Knowledge is a process that concludes an interpretation of experience is not contradictory to reality. So the reality of the experience itself is known as one experiences. If I see a pink elephant, it is a real experience that I know I'm having. If I take an extra step and state, "My experience is an accurate representation that there is an actual pink elephant apart from my experience," then we run into beliefs, and must find a way to ascertain whether we can know that it is so. My point has been that 'apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. The definition of knowledge itself does not allow it to exist apart from experience.

One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures. — Wayfarer

I have no disagreement with this. But that does not mean 'apriori knowledge' is a term that holds up under scrutiny. Kant is not describing knowledge, he is describing being.

In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. — Wayfarer

I agree that Kant's influence on philosophy and its evolution are phenomenal. My disagreement is not with Kant, or to imply he is a bad philosopher in any way. My point is that the apriori and aposteriori distinction has serious problems with it that can be resolved with a much better model of 'being' and 'knowledge'.

HA!!! Mysterious forces.

:smile:

One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.

Could you elaborate on this? I didn’t follow this part.

I might mention your #2 from a few days ago, but that wasn’t addressed to me.

Mww, always feel free to chime in on these conversations if you have something to add (:

I don’t recall what this #2 was from a few days ago, but feel free to address it if you would like.