I, for one, do not trust math — Moliere

Blasphemy!

We may be immortal for all that. — Moliere

Could be. Maybe we're uploadable.

Blasphemy! — frank

I mean I have a type of thinking I keep going back to and it's often labeled as Blasphemy :D

Could be. Maybe we're uploadable. — frank

Taking this one up in favor of the OP:

If we invented a Transporter in the way Star Trek seems to indicate I would not enter it.

It's science fiction so we can invent whatever: My understanding is that the Transporter converts your physical make-up into "information", and then translates that information into light which can quickly travel to the surface of a planet and re-create you.

But I think the "new you" would behave exactly like you, but the you which experiences things would disappear. It's basically a death machine for convenience, by my guess. (which is only a guess -- this is somewhat a pop-sci explanation of the problem of consciousness in a nutshell)

But your body is in a constant state of flux. Every seven years, all the cells (except neurons) have been replaced with new ones. So are you saying that you're constantly dying? How many people named Moliere have there been since .. not your birth, but that original birth?

I can say, with certainty, that the Moliere posting on the old TPF is not the same person as the new TPF, but at the same time is the same person as the Moliere of the old TPF.

And I can say that I have a body, and have had a body the entire time, and that when my body is gone I believe that I'll be gone too.

So -- going into the transporter may turn me into light and recreate me on the other side, but my folk belief about the metaphysics of consciousness is that the "I" I'm experiencing now would cease to exist.

In that sense then only one person named Moliere has been on TPF, and the old PF. The ship of Theseus still belongs to Theseus -- but not because of the bits we can name.

But this - "Things that affect the body affect the mind. For example, drinking alcohol changes what we feel. Construct a long list of such examples" - does not imply the mind is the body. Alcohol affects my mind, but that doesn't imply that my mind is alcohol. My brain affects my mind. That doesn't imply my mind is my brain.

"Inference to the best explanation suggests that therefore the body is the mind, or perhaps the functions of the body is the mind."

Why, without assuming that materialism is true, is that the best explanation?

Where's the evidence that the mind is the body? Without assuming that the mind is the body - which is question begging - what evidence is there that the mind is part of the body? — Clearbury

What's evidence to you?

That's probably where disagreement lies, by my guess.

The evidence I'd point to with respect to the mind being a part of the body -- and only a part (my foot is not a mind) -- is that what we normally think of as mind is influenced by physical things. The world feels different when drunk. If I've eaten a big meal that I ought not to have I get feeling tired and want to sleep. Even the smells and sounds of an environment seem to effect my mind. (you need not trust my word on it: fast for several days and you'll see what I'm talking about, if you desire not to utilize these various methods and want to rely upon your body and your body alone for feedback)

When I pay attention to why I'm doing what I do it's hard to rule out that the body does not relate to what we like to call the mind.

So -- going into the transporter may turn me into light and recreate me on the other side, but my folk belief about the metaphysics of consciousness is that the "I" I'm experiencing now would cease to exist.

In that sense then only one person named Moliere has been on TPF, and the old PF. The ship of Theseus still belongs to Theseus -- but not because of the bits we can name. — Moliere

Is it because your body changes slowly, that your consciousness is unified over time? But an abrupt lack of body would obliterate your identity?

"The evidence I'd point to with respect to the mind being a part of the body -- and only a part (my foot is not a mind) -- is that what we normally think of as mind is influenced by physical things."

So, the donut affects what goes on in my mind....therefore i am a donut?

I wish I could tell you the "because", so I'm sorry for piquing your curiosity here without having an answer.

I'm still interested in the problem of consciousness, and slowly reading Sartre's B&N as an effort to think through the metaphysics of consciousness (cuz Chalmer's kind of just leaves it in the air)

Naw. "Mind" and "Identity" are different.

For instance if I'm looking for some keys then my mind is occupied with keys, but I am not the keys.

I'm still interested in the problem of consciousness, and slowly reading Sartre's B&N as an effort to think through the metaphysics of consciousness (cuz Chalmer's kind of just leaves it in the air) — Moliere

Ok. Please report back your findings.

:heart: :nerd:

I hope to do so :).

Perhaps I misunderstood, but your evidence that the mind is the body is that doing things to the body affects what happens in the mind. Yet by that reasoning i am a donut as the donut is affecting what is happening in my mind.

:up: :up:

I believe you've misunderstood, or I've not explained myself clearly. Wherever the fault lies doesn't matter to me.

My thinking is that the mind is not the body. My foot is not my mind. I still have a mind for all that. And when I think about a donut that does not make me the donut. Thus far I believe we agree.

The part I'd point out is that my mind is influenced by whether my foot itches, hurts, etc -- and is even influenced by things like how much sugar or water I presently have in my body. It's much easier to be amiable when I'm feeling pleasure than it is when I'm feeling pain.{

so I conclude that my body and mind, while not being one, are connected.

After that it has to do with stupid theological shit that need not be brought up in this question.

EDIT: I ought say that "stupid theological shit" includes my own atheism and all that.

Yes, I agree that the mind is not the body (yet are causally connected). And yes, I too do not consider theological claims to have any probative force.

But OK, please let me know what you think of this baby step. Even if so called concrete things turn out to be other than as they appear, perhaps also evasive, etc. Are they not yet, all of them together, bodies, trees, oceans, and rocks, something physics explores differently than it does the ideas which appear to shape our experiences and are not constructed out of matter. I get that we have dreamed that they might be, but if we are being fair, a thought might require matter to generate it, but once projected and gone, it is gone. Because it never really was. — ENOAH

Physics does not explore oceans, trees, rocks, that belongs to oceanography, arborists and geologists respectively. If we are going to use physics in applied form, then we do an abstraction to apply it to things like rocks. Ocean movement and trees are way too complicated for physics.

We can't use physics to study ideas. That's in part because these are different domains: physicists study the simplest things and ask difficult questions about these. Ideas or at least, the consequence of some ideas might fall on the psychologist, even though they deal with behavior, strictly speaking.

The issue is: are our ideas different in kind to the nature of the stuff physics says there is?

Here I am probably and outlier. Physics tell us a bit about the structure of matter but leaves its intrinsic nature untouched.

I think we just don't know enough about the nature of matter in general to say conclusively if there is a difference in kind between our ideas and physics or not.

I think we just don't know enough about the nature of matter in general to say conclusively if there is a difference in kind between our ideas and physics or not. — Manuel

Interesting. An admirable open pov, but if I needed that hurdle resolved to proceed, I'd say matter is matter, mind is Mind, and never the twain shall meet.

Is it because your body changes slowly, that your consciousness is unified over time? But an abrupt lack of body would obliterate your identity? — frank

Why do amputees experience phantom limb? Why does a limb they don't have anymore seem to hurt, and get muscle cramps where there are no muscles to cramp?

Why do amputees experience phantom limb? Why does a limb they don't have anymore seem to hurt, and get muscle cramps where there are no muscles to cramp? — punos

I don't know. Why do you think it is?

Alcohol affects my mind, but that doesn't imply that my mind is alcohol. My brain affects my mind. That doesn't imply my mind is my brain. — Clearbury

But it is one explanation. If we want to answer the question "How is it that when I drink alcohol (a physical thing) a mental thing results (feeling drunk)?" One answer is to say that the mental just is the physical, so there is no mystery, no interaction problem. Its a simple and obvious explanation. I agree with you that it is wrong (or perhaps partly wrong) but you asked for arguments, and this is one.

Why, without assuming that materialism is true, is that the best explanation? — Clearbury

It's monistic. Consider that we know there are physical things. Also consider that two fundamentally different kinds of thing cannot interact. Our minds are affected by physical things, therefore our minds must be physical too. So let's look around for physical objects (or functions thereof) that could be minds. A rock? Presumably not, because when a rock is struck I feel nothing, so the rock isn't my mind. A body? Well, not all of it, fingernails and some internal processes are not felt. But whenever we feel something there is always some correlation with brain activity. The simplest way to explain a correlation is identity, as one thing always occurs with itself. So it's a monistic and simple theory which fits the data, which are traditional hallmarks of a good theory.

I don't agree with it, but that's perhaps one main prima facie case for it.

Why do amputees experience phantom limb? Why does a limb they don't have anymore seem to hurt, and get muscle cramps where there are no muscles to cramp? — punos


I don't know. Why do you think it is? — frank

Well, because there are regions in the brain that model your body, there exists a neural simulation of yourself within your brain. When someone loses a limb, those brain regions stop receiving signals from the body, but the neural simulation of that limb continues. That part of the brain was not amputated; only the actual limb was. When these regions try to communicate with the missing limb, they do not receive feedback from it (broken feedback). The brain attempts to send signals to move the limb but does not get confirmation signals in return. The muscles that it is trying to contract to move the limb fail to send back signals indicating that the limb has moved. As a result, that part of your brain intensifies its efforts (essentially "yelling") at the part it is still trying to model. This leads to phantom cramps generated in your brain as a component of your mind.

You don't experience "your" actual body; you only experience a simulated model of it. Your identity is formed in the context of your body, but once it is established, it can theoretically be separated from your physical form. If one were to place your living brain in a vat, you would still have a sense of your body, even though you wouldn't have a physical body (apart from the brain itself). You could call this a phantom identity.

Your identity is formed in the context of your body, but once it is established, it can theoretically be separated from your physical form. — punos

This may be true, but I don't think we know enough about how consciousness works to make any assertions one way or the other.

But it's entirely conceivable that property dualism exists. That means that those who claim such a separation is impossible have the burden of proof.

This may be true, but I don't think we know enough about how consciousness works to make any assertions one way or the other. — frank

Okay, but we can know some things, and we do. What do you think the implications are of the "phantom identity" i described? You seem to agree with the veracity of the description i gave. Do you believe that this "phantom identity" is identical with what you call your identity, or is there another identity behind the phantom identity?

But it's entirely conceivable that property dualism exists. — frank

So you believe that there is one substance, but two properties: physical and mental? If so, then we may be in agreement, but to be sure: what do you think the nature of the mental property is? Is it contingent upon the physical, or can it exist in isolation from the physical?

Do you believe that this "phantom identity" is identical with what you call your identity, or is there another identity behind the phantom identity? — punos

I really don't know. Somewhere along the line I started thinking of identity as analogous to music. The bass notes are physicality, the middle tones are emotions, and the high notes are the intellect. Themes play out and change over time. The intellect is the only part that deals with ontology. To the rest of the psyche, everything encountered is real, so "real" is meaningless.

If so, then we may be in agreement, but to be sure: what do you think the nature of the mental property is? Is it contingent upon the physical, or can it exist in isolation from the physical? — punos

I think the mental is the high notes on the piano, present in some other animals, but more sophisticated in humans, maybe because of the big brain. It's a worldview mashup. :grin:

Which is fine. But the task is to say what is unique to physical stuff alone, which cannot include mind.

The problem is in arguing why the physical cannot be mental without it turning into stipulation: the physical is not mental because physical stuff cannot be mental stuff.

You'd have to show how this could be possible. That's the problem. And it's far from trivial.

You'd have to show how this could be possible. That's the problem. And it's far from trivial — Manuel

You are absolutely right. Admittedly, I'm still at the stage of working out hypotheses.
A problem, I suspect, is that we have become so sophisticated in our accumulation and methods, that if the Hypothesis were simply--mind consists of signifiers operating autonomously by an evolved law and dynamic, it would involve many disciplines over many decades to prove/disprove, with the likely conclusion that it is inconclusive.

You're points have been guiding. Many of which; I need to revisit.

Somewhere along the line I started thinking of identity as analogous to music. The bass notes are physicality, the middle tones are emotions, and the high notes are the intellect. Themes play out and change over time. — frank

That's a beautiful way to look at it. So within the context of your analogy; what would you say is vibrating to produce the sound of music?

The intellect is the only part that deals with ontology. To the rest of the psyche, everything encountered is real, so "real" is meaningless. — frank

I agree, which is why i think people generally accept the reality they present themselves with in dreams, believing it all to be true and normal, even in cases of absolutely bizarre dreams. The critical-thinking areas (intellect) of the brain are dampened during sleep, and in that condition, all things appear as real as can be to the rest of the brain (without the aid of intellect), as you stated. But this is all happening because there is a kind of neural self-simulation still going on in the brain even when sleeping. If the intellect wakes up in the middle of the dream, that's when you get lucid dreams.

Edit:
Notice also that in the dream, you have a visible body, and a sense of you body in the dream. A copy of your real body in the dream.

It's a worldview mashup. :grin: — frank

Same here. :wink:

As a metaphorical recap of tge Hypothesis, think of cats and dogs, how we imagine them with personalities, dogs are loving and loyal, cats are aloof and selfish, and so on individually; but thats not what they are. Theyre dogs, dogging and cats catting, whatever it is tgeir bodies and species do. it's possible for us to see, though not easy, that the personalities are superimposed from our 'world' and that they're not real. But that's obviously what we are, our so called world, just a superimposition onto our bodies and our species. I think my point being we can't know what body is, but it's not that personality having imposed itself. Just like a dog is just dogging. A human is just is-ing. Our only access to the truth of what we are is not by proving it and knowing it--that's where the distraction lies; the one creating the illusion of duality--it is just being it, the human body.

Which brings us to MP and this OP.