Thanks, I agree it would be better if we had a good neutral term that wasn't steeped in philosophical history, but I don't know of one either. As long as we both understand each other . . .

As for Quine: "Two Dogmas" only questions analytic statements that are supposed to be true by virtue of meaning-synonymy. If you go back and look at the start of the paper, you'll see that he exempts logical truths.

Now that I think of it, @Srap Tasmaner and I discussed this earlier in the thread:

Quine himself had very mixed feelings about whether the laws of logic were subject to revision. I think his final answer was yes, but it's a last resort, and they are very insulated, resistant to revision.
— Srap Tasmaner

Just as an aside, I think Quine believed the laws of logic were true because we could supply clear definitions for all the operators and connectives. This is in Word and Object. In a subsequent work which I haven’t read, The Philosophy of Logic, he extends this to non-classical logics, according to [Susan] Haack. She says that he accepts “a meaning-variance argument to the effect that the theorems of deviant and classical logics are, alike, true in virtue of the meaning of the (deviant or classical) connectives; which, in turn, seems to lead him to compromise his earlier insistence that fallibilism extends even to logic.” — J

I think the key difference here is "true in virtue of meaning" (of the connectives) as opposed to some kind of truth that is dependent upon empirical facts. If this is right, then math and logical truths wouldn't depend on anything of the latter kind. But anyone who knows where Quine ended up on this should weigh in.

I'd rather say the relationship between some red object and someone seeing that object as red is essentially of the same sort that exists between two meteors colliding in interstellar space — Count Timothy von Icarus

I perceive as a phenomenal experience a red object, and believe that there is some unknown thing the other side of my senses that has caused this phenomenal experience. For convenience, I call this unknown thing a red object.

As two meteors collide, something the other side of my phenomenal experiences has caused my phenomenal experiences.
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Yet causation, information, energy, etc. seem to flow across the boundaries of animal bodies as if there was no boundary at all, so I see no reason to presuppose such a dividing line. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree that information flows across these boundaries, but would add that the carrier of the information changes across such boundaries, meaning that there is a dividing line.

For example, on the other side of the eye, the carrier of the information is a wavelength of 700nm travelling through space, and on this side of the eye the carrier of the information is an electric signal travelling up the optic nerve.
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Well, presumably the number 700 doesn't exist outside minds either, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly.
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How do we reconcile this seeming multiplicity (the Many) with the equally apparent unity of being (the One)? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We perceive complex patterns, whether inorganic, such as the rhombic dodecahedral crystal of a garnet, or organic, such as the stripes on a tiger.

But within such patterns we perceive a unity. Kant calls this "transcendental apperception". But how "transcendental apperception" is possible is beyond my understanding. How can the mind be conscious of a unity outside of time and space (the One) when the parts are separated in time and space (the Many)?
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But thought is obviously something with being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, we cannot think about "being" without thoughts, but we can also think about "being" existing outside the mind. Otherwise we come to the conclusion that the Universe didn't begin 13 billion years ago, but only began 200,000 years ago when humans developed language.
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I don't think solipsism is good philosophy.....................My take would be that we experience the things we do for reasons, due to causes, etc. and such reasons do not bottom out in the inaccessible and unintelligible as soon as we leave the confines of our own discrete phenomenological horizon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, because of my belief beyond doubt that some of my phenomenal experiences have been caused by something the other side of such phenomenal experiences.

My belief is that my belief beyond doubt in causation is a consequence of life having evolved for 3 billion years in dynamic interaction with its environment, ie Enactivism, resulting in my belief in causation having become part of the physical structure of my brain, ie Innatism.

That appearances are the necessary antecedent occasions for their employment, it does not follow they are derived from them, and in accordance with the theory, they are indeed, not, nor can they be. — Mww

Kant writes in CPR B276 on the Refutation of Idealism: "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time............................Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself."

"I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" is an a priori pure intuition.

"The existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" is a posteriori empirical experience.

Therefore "Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" can be read to mean that my a priori pure intuition is possible only by means of a posteriori empirical experience.

This is a transcendental argument.

I perceive as a phenomenal experience a red object, and believe that there is some unknown thing the other side of my senses that has caused this phenomenal experience. For convenience, I call this unknown thing a red object.

How unknown is it if you know what it causes and that it is red? What things do we not know through their effects/acts? How could we know anything immanent if not through its effects/acts? It seems a strange thing to me to say that knowing a thing's effects alone renders it unknowable.

I don't see how the assumption that our experiences are what we know, instead of how we know is anything but axiomatic here. But why assume such a thing? Certainly a good empirical case cannot be mustered for such a view, since it undercuts the very ability of experience to inform us on the topic in question.

I agree that information flows across these boundaries, but would add that the carrier of the information changes across such boundaries, meaning that there is a dividing line.

This just seems like question begging. The dividing line is at the eye because the mind/brain is assumed to be the dividing line between the world and the observer. Yet one could make the same sort of case for any dividing line one wants to defend. For example, when the mechanical energy of water turning a turbine is transformed into electrical current, or when the digital signal coming over some cable is transformed into light in a monitor. All physical action is mediated.

Nor do eyes see on their own or brains experience sight removed from bodies.

Yes, we cannot think about "being" without thoughts, but we can also think about "being" existing outside the mind. Otherwise we come to the conclusion that the Universe didn't begin 13 billion years ago, but only began 200,000 years ago when humans developed language.

This seems to be equivocating between different sorts of mind-independence. The early universe is not mind independent. There is an entire scientific field dedicated to studying it. People write books about it, watch movies about it, etc.

But you are shifting over to something like: "is dependent upon currently being experienced for its existence." These are not the same thing. To say being is in an importance sense one, and that thought is not separate from being is not to say "things only exist while being thought about."

Modern science paints a strange picture of the world. Our world is one of tremendous diversity. It includes many types of star and galaxy, a vast number of species, each with their own complex biology, a “zoo” of fundamental particles, etc. At the same time, it paints a picture of a word that is unified. There are no truly isolated systems. Causation, energy, and information flow across the boundaries of all seemingly discrete “things,” such that the universe appears to be not so much a “collection of things,” but rather a single continuous process. How do we reconcile this seeming multiplicity (the Many) with the equally apparent unity of being (the One)? How can we make true statements about the world given this problem? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is the problematic of classical philosophy in a nutshell, is it not? Which has nowadays made a comeback, through such sciences as systems theory and complexity science, where it had been deprecated by early modern science in favour of atomistic materialism. I like that you bring this perspective to bear in many of your comments, as not many contributors are as aware of it as you are. (Incidentally, and I might have mentioned this previously, there is a current book by a philosophical physicist that explores this territory, The One, Heinrich Pas. Video interview can be found here. )

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Yes, we cannot think about "being" without thoughts, but we can also think about "being" existing outside the mind. Otherwise we come to the conclusion that the Universe didn't begin 13 billion years ago, but only began 200,000 years ago when humans developed language. — RussellA

Almost anyone on this forum would take this assumption for granted, but it can be questioned, obvious though it may seem. Many of the conundrums you're wrestling with arise from this assumption.

You're assuming that 'the universe' (or 'world') would exist, just as it is, without any observers in it. But that assumption always requires an implicit perspective. Certainly we can imagine the early universe, devoid of organic life, but that imagined universe still contains a perspective and a sense of scale provided by the observing mind. For absent scale and perspective, what can we say exists?

For what exactly is meant by saying that the world existed prior to human consciousnesses? It might be meant that the earth emerged from a primitive nebula where the conditions for life had not [yet] been brought together. But each one of these words, just like each equation in physics, presupposes our pre-scientific experience of the world, and this reference to the lived world contributes to constituting the valid signification of the statement. Nothing will ever lead me to understand what a nebula, which could not be seen by anyone, might be. Laplace’s nebula is not behind us, at our origin, but rather out in front of us in the cultural world ~ Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty is not denying that there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which we can say that the world existed before human consciousness. Indeed, he refers to the “valid signification” of this statement. He is making a point at a different level, the level of meaning. The meanings of terms in scientific statements, including mathematical equations, depend on the life-world [the web of connected meanings within which subjects interpret existence ~wayfarer]. Furthermore, the universe does not come ready-made and presorted into kinds of entities, such as nebulae, independent of investigating scientists who find it useful to conceptualize and categorize things that way given their perceptual capacities, observational tools, and explanatory purposes in the life-world and the scientific workshop [a point also central to Mind and the Cosmic Order, Pinter ~ wf]. The very idea of a nebula, a distinct body of interstellar clouds, reflects our human and scientific way of perceptually and conceptually sorting astronomical phenomena. This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that he cannot understand what a nebula that could not be seen by anyone might be. Nothing intrinsically bears the identity “nebula” within it. That identity depends on a conceptual system that informs (and is informed by) observation. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s last sentence is exaggerated. Given the conceptual system of astrophysics and general relativity theory, Laplace’s nebula is behind us in cosmic time. But it is not just behind us. It is also out in front of us in the cultural world, because the very idea of a nebula is a human category. The universe contains the life-world, but the life-world contains the universe. ...

We can now appreciate that the life-world has the same kind of primacy as the primacy of consciousness and the primacy of embodiment. Better yet, the primacy of the life-world subsumes the primacy of consciousness and the primacy of embodiment. We cannot step outside the life-world, because we carry it with us wherever we go. — The Blind Spot - Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson

Whereas, I think you're taking what you understand as the scientific picture of the world as being real independently of any observer, attributing with a kind of absolute or taken-for-granted reality. But then you can't see where 'mind' fits in, because that picture is purportedly 'mind-independent'!

> Also see How Time Began with the First Eye Opening

“I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" is an a priori pure intuition. — RussellA

The quoted section is only a synthetic judgement based on a pure a priori intuition.

There are but two pure intuitions, space and time, operating a priori to make phenomena possible, and no discursive judgement relative to existences, is given from mere phenomena.

My existence as a body begins as an empirical intuition. Neither the consciousness of my body’s existence, nor the experience of it, can be found in faculties the only function of which is to represent appearances.

I am conscious of my body’s existence as determined in time, only insofar as no other determination with respect to the existence of my body, or any other body whatsoever, is at all possible.
—————-

“The existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" is a posteriori empirical experience. — RussellA

The quoted part is a pretty good definition of sensation. The assertion as a whole is false, insofar as experience is not of things perceived, but representations of them.
—————-

….my a priori pure intuition is possible only by means of a posteriori empirical experience. — RussellA

Why would the refutation of material idealism have this as a conclusion? Space and time, those being the only two pure a priori intuitions, are only possible because there occur experiences?

Maybe YOUR a priori pure intuitions according to your transcendental argument, but if Kant with his means for humanity in general the only two are space and time, and they are the necessary conditions for possible experience, it is the other way around from yours.

What things do we not know through their effects/acts? How could we know anything immanent if not through its effects/acts? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, so let's take this as a starting position.
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The dividing line is at the eye because the mind/brain is assumed to be the dividing line between the world and the observer. Yet one could make the same sort of case for any dividing line one wants to defend. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, in that there have been many different carriers of the information we have in our consciousness about the Andromeda Galaxy. Each change in carrier may be called a dividing line.

One question is, does the change in the carrier of information of necessity require a change in the information carried?

For example, the information about a red star is carried as an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm through space and an electric current up the optic nerve.

Is it logically possible to maintain exactly the same information when changing from a carrier of oscillating electric and magnetic fields to a carrier of charged particles moving along an electrical conductor?

If it is, the Direct Realists have a persuasive argument that the world we see around us is the real world itself, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

If not, then the Indirect Realists have a persuasive argument that things in the world are perceived indirectly.
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How unknown is it if you know what it causes and that it is red? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree when you say: "What things do we not know through their effects/acts? How could we know anything immanent if not through its effects/acts?"

We perceive as a sensory experience the phenomenon that we understand as a red postbox.

We believe that something has caused our sensory experience, in that we don't believe our sensory experience has generated itself.

Regardless of whether we do or don't know the cause of our sensory experiences, we can name the cause "a red postbox".

The name "red postbox" is not the name of a thing-in-itself in a world outside our mind, but rather is the name of the cause of a known sensory experience

In the same way, i) we name the cause of an acrid smell something that is "acrid", as in "acrid smoke from a bonfire", ii) we name the cause of a bitter taste something that is bitter, as in "angostine bitters", iii) we name the cause of a sweet taste as something that is sweet, as in "a sweet apple", we name the cause of a silky feel as something that is silky, as in "silk" and finally v) we name the cause of crackling sound as something that crackles, as in "a cracking fire".

IE, we can name the cause of our sensory experiences after the known sensory experience, meaning that we can even talk about an unknown cause as "the cracking fire giving off acrid smoke".
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This seems to be equivocating between different sorts of mind-independence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In one sense, in philosophy-speak, "the early universe" is not mind-independent, in that "the early universe" are words which only exist in language, and language only exists in the mind. As "the early universe" only exists in the mind, by definition, it cannot be mind-independent.

In another sense, in ordinary language, "the early universe" was clearly mind-independent, and can be affirmed by every non-philosopher, by every person going to the supermarket or waiting at a bus stop,

For those philosophers that do believe that "the early universe" is not mind-independent, then logically no referent of any expression can be mind-independent, including expressions such as "tables and chairs". This which would be a problem for Direct Realists, as they do believe that things like tables and chairs do exist independently of the mind, that they are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

The quoted section is only a synthetic judgement based on a pure a priori intuition. — Mww

CPR B276
Theorem = The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.
Proof = I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.
All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception.
This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing.
Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.
Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existenceb of actual things that I perceive outside myself.
Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination:
Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination;
i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Being conscious of my existence must be prior to any perception of persistence
Kant wrote "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time"

For Kant, we have a priori pure intuitions of time and space. These intuitions are non-empirical, singular, immediate, objective and conscious representations.

The unity of consciousness is central to Kant's transcendental deduction of the Categories, which are a priori pure concepts.

Consciousness of my existence cannot be a consequence of perceiving something persistent, but must be prior to perceiving something persistent.

Therefore being conscious of my existence must be prior to any perception of persistence.
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The quoted part is a pretty good definition of sensation. The assertion as a whole is false, insofar as experience is not of things perceived, but representations of them. — Mww

Kant is trying to prove the validity of Realism
Kant wrote "Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself."

Kant wrote "actual things that I perceive outside me".

This is the purpose of Kant's Refutation of Idealism, an attempt to prove the existence of objects in space outside a representation of them.
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Maybe YOUR a priori pure intuitions according to your transcendental argument, but if Kant with his means for humanity in general the only two are space and time, and they are the necessary conditions for possible experience, it is the other way around from yours. — Mww

Kant seems to be using a Transcendental Argument
Kant writes
a) I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.
b) All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception.
c) Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.
d) Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.

In other words
1) My consciousness of existence must be prior to being able to perceive a persistence
2) My perception of a persistence is only possible because of things outside me
3) It is the things outside me that determine the consciousness of my existence

This seems to be a transcendental argument.

Certainly we can imagine the early universe, devoid of organic life, but that imagined universe still contains a perspective and a sense of scale provided by the observing mind. — Wayfarer

It depends on the viewpoint.

We can imagine a sense of scale in an early universe devoid of life from our viewpoint, but we can't imagine a sense of scale in an early universe devoid of life from the viewpoint of an early universe devoid of life.
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Nothing will ever lead me to understand what a nebula, which could not be seen by anyone, might be. Maurice Merleau-Ponty — Wayfarer

It's a question of logic.

Something can be only be named if an observer knows what that something is.

If there is no observer to know what a something is, then it cannot be named.

Therefore, for something to be named "nebula" when there is no one to know what that something is is a logical contradiction.
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We cannot step outside the life-world, because we carry it with us wherever we go. — The Blind Spot - Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson

The Direct Realist would disagree. I would estimate that 50% of those on the PF believe in Direct Realism.

For the Direct Realist, the world they see around them is the real world itself. Things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

If a Direct Realist sees an apple on a table, for the Direct Realist, the apple and table exist in the world exactly as they perceive it independently of being perceived.

The Direct Realist does believe that they can step outside the life-world.
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Whereas, I think you're taking what you understand as the scientific picture of the world as being real independently of any observer, attributing with a kind of absolute or taken-for-granted reality. But then you can't see where 'mind' fits in, because that picture is purportedly 'mind-independent'! — Wayfarer

As an Indirect Realist, I agree that I cannot know the early universe independently of my mind, as I can only know the early universe using my mind.

I cannot literally know the early universe, but I can metaphorically know it.

The book Metaphors We Live By 1980 by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggests that metaphor is a tool that enables people to use what they know about their direct physical and social experiences to understand more abstract things like work, time, mental activity and feelings.

It can be argued that language, including the language of science, is more metaphorical rather than literal.

Metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

For example, Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes the point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor, in that it is difficult to see how it could be argued that F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense.

As I understand gravity using the metaphor of a heavy ball on a sheet of rubber, I understand an early universe metaphorically rather than literally.
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Also see How Time Began with the First Eye Opening — Wayfarer

Those who like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos, the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment here referred to at which time appears, though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him, since he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease, and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene - Schopenhauer

Our understanding is more metaphorical than literal, whether figure of speech, myth as noted by Schopenhauer, analogy or symbolism. After all, language is a symbolic system.

The removal/deletion of a single word makes your latest remarkably improved over the preceding. Kant’s use of internal/external experience has to be judged from its context or exposition, and sometimes is better left alone. He does the same thing with phenomena and sense, etc., expecting the reader to know the difference in his meanings.
—————-

This is the purpose of Kant's Refutation of Idealism, an attempt to prove the existence of objects in space outside a representation of them. — RussellA

Kant has no need to prove the existence of objects external to us, those having been granted as necessary in the first sentence of the first paragraph of the first book, in the Doctrine of Elements.

He is demonstrating the fallacy in dogmatic idealism on the one hand, insofar as existent objects are denied by it, and the insufficient logic of problematic idealism on the other, insofar as the existent objects are merely doubted. The thesis, re: that the consciousness of my own existence as determined in time proves the existence of objects in space outside me, is just to show the premises in material idealism’s arguments are ill-grounded, which tends to make the conclusions from such premises, irrational.

In other words, insofar as it is apodeitically certain I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time, it is only so insofar as time-determinant conditions are given relative to existences in general. Time-determinant conditions are themselves possible only insofar as there is a permanence external to me by which time determinations in me are possible. It is already the case I am conscious of my own time-determined existence, which presupposes the time-determinant conditions as not merely possible but necessary and are that by which my time-determinations are given. The only permanence external to me, a necessity, is given from the reality of things which appear to my senses, and from which time-determinant conditions of which I am already conscious, are given.

Kant isn’t proving the existence of things as much as he’s proving the material idealist’s denial or doubt of things, is improperly justified. As an added bonus, he is also solidifying his contention, or admonishment if you like, that our representations are not entirely imaginary. As if getting, e.g., a broken arm from falling out of a tree wasn’t sufficient reason for granting external reality.

He has no issue with the validity of realism, being a self-admitted dualist having the real/reality/realism as half of such dualism. But, naturally enough, that “realism” from the perspective of 18th century understandings, which should prohibit the attachment of modern alterations.
—————-

“….From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external
things involves the existence of these things, for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of external objects…”

I think it better to understand that, that is to say for me the system of transcendental metaphysics is more comprehensible when, Kant isn’t proving the existence of external things, but suggesting, first, it is absurd to suppose, then, second, proving it is impossible, that there aren’t any.
————-

This seems to be a transcendental argument. — RussellA

Yeah, well….any argument, or even a dialectical thesis, having Kantian transcendental philosophy as its ground, which is to say any argument or dialectical thesis ultimately given by and for reason itself, is transcendental, in the proper sense. Other non-Kantian definitions or descriptions of the concept, of course, don’t count. (Grin)

I cannot literally know the early universe, but I can metaphorically know it. — RussellA

Right. But naturalism then presumes that the mind which knows it, is the product of that process it only knows metaphorically.

But naturalism then presumes that the mind which knows it, is the product of that process it only knows metaphorically. — Wayfarer

That's my question. Are scientific explanations literally true or metaphorically true? Is F = ma literal or metaphorical?

According to Britannica articles:
" naturalism, in philosophy, a theory that relates scientific method to philosophy by affirming that all beings and events in the universe (whatever their inherent character may be) are natural."

"scientific method, mathematical and experimental technique employed in the sciences. More specifically, it is the technique used in the construction and testing of a scientific hypothesis."

"scientific hypothesis, an idea that proposes a tentative explanation about a phenomenon or a narrow set of phenomena observed in the natural world."

Kant isn’t proving the existence of things as much as he’s proving the material idealist’s denial or doubt of things, is improperly justified. — Mww

In B276, Kant starts with the theorem: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

He then follows this by his proof: "Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me."

In B276, Kant seems to be proving that objects in space and time exist independently of our experience of them, regardless of any belief of the Transcendental Idealist.

In B276, Kant starts with the theorem: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." — RussellA

While that is the case, it is merely beside the point. It needs be shown why external objects as considered by the established idealisms of the day were conceived without proper regard for what came to be posited as transcendental conditions, the foremost being, of course, time.

“….The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is properly immediate, that only by virtue of it—(…) internal experience—is possible.…”

“…. as regards the third postulate, it applies to material necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions. (…) But the only existence cognized, under the condition of other given phenomena, as necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality. It is consequently not the necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity of the state of things that we cognize, and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of other states given in perception, according to empirical laws of causality….”

The first says immediate experience is entirely internal and is projected onto the world of external things, re: Berkeley’s ideas, in that these are the cause of our representations and the things in the world are accounted for by them. Kant reverses that notion of material idealism, making it so our representations are given from external things and not originating on their own internally. We do not project our ideas on the world; the world gives itself to us by being perceived, and we discern for ourselves what we are given.

The second says immediate experience, re: Descartes’ problematic idealism, of things, is not the case at all, insofar as all perceptions of things, which give us immediate existences, must then be mediated by the logical part of the system as a whole, in order for there to even be experience at all. The empirical laws of causality, of course, being the purview of understanding, and not in any way connected to sensibility.

Immediate experience, in Kant-speak, is consciousness, in that the subject is affected by himself, with or without affectation from empirical conditions. Experience proper, is cognition by means of conceptions, of which sensibility is incapable, and shows where Descartes misstepped: we indeed do have the capacity for formal judgements of strict certainty other than, or in addition to, the consciousness of the determinations of our own existence in time.

B276 is all well and good, but beaten to death at the expense of The Grand Scheme of Things. The Big Picture. Alas….The Critique of Pure Reason.

While that is the case, it is merely beside the point. It needs be shown why external objects as considered by the established idealisms of the day were conceived without proper regard for what came to be posited as transcendental conditions, the foremost being, of course, time. — Mww

In what way is Kant's proof in CPR B276 besides the point, ie "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me".

Berkeley's Dogmatic Idealism declares that space and all the things in it are impossible and things in space are imaginary (CPR B275)

Kant wanted to show that his idealism is a formal idealism rather than Berkeley's subjective realism, and therefore included in the second edition his Refutation of Idealism (Introduction to CPR).

In the Refutation of Idealism (CPR B276), Kant attempts to prove not only the existence of things outside me, but also that our inner experience of these things outside me is immediate, and we are only conscious of our own existence in time because of the existence of things outside me.

In Practice, it would be difficult fr Berkeleyan Idealism to prove the non-existence of things outside me.

One must not overlook the significance embedded in propositions such as, consciousness of determinations of existence in time.

We don’t care, at this point, that there are things external to me, only that it would be impossible for me to determine my own existence in time if there weren’t. Therefore, insofar as I most certainly can determine, and am certainly conscious of, my own existence in time, the doubt of external existences manifest in problematic idealism, and indeed the impossibility of them as manifest in dogmatic idealism, does not hold, and material idealism in general is properly refuted.

And what of the significance in NOT proposing the consciousness of determinations of existence in space? Insofar as they are all thought, all conscious determinations are in time, external existence, which can only be of real objects in space anyway, eliminating the mere presupposition of their possibility, being just another one of them.

One must not overlook the significance embedded in propositions such as, consciousness of determinations of existence in time. — Mww

Kant starts his proof in CPR B276 with "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time", and continues with his proof that "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

I agree with the significance of the passage of time as central to Kant's refutation of Problematic and Dogmatic Idealism.

Over the course of seven days, you’ve included B276 in every single one of seven consecutive responses to my posts to you, but never say any more than the text itself.

Can’t you do any better? Have you nothing more to offer?

Over the course of seven days, you’ve included B276 in every single one of seven consecutive responses to my posts to you, but never say any more than the text itself. — Mww

Apart from my ongoing justification, based on the text, that "Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency".

“Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency". — RussellA

Where it all began, yes, but I reject that as nonsense, justification for it not found in the over-used reference.

Kant’s synthetic a priori is the principle…..synthetic a priori isn’t a principle, it’s a relation of the content of certain kinds of conceptions to each other;

We can discover a priori necessity….necessity isn’t discovered, it’s given as a transcendental deduction a priori for the use of the understanding in its empirical judgements;

We can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency…..implies the possibility of apodeitic certainty from empirical conditions, which contradicts experience.

What sense does it make to say, that I am conscious of the determination of my own existence in time, is a discovery?

What sense does it make to say that the determination in time of which I am conscious, is only discoverable because of the existence of external things?

That I am conscious of a determination in time does not in itself necessarily extend to my own existence. To add my existence is to add a predicate to an a priori judgement, which then becomes a synthetic a priori judgement, a mere logical inference of understanding the proof of which is not yet given, and is still not thereby a proper principle, the origins of which, is reason.

“…. That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me….”

This is not proof of the existence of external things, but the proof for the necessity of them, insofar as if I am conscious of my determinations with respect to the former it is requisite that I be conscious of my determinations with respect to the latter. Or, more exactly, if I am conscious of the determination of my own existence in time it is requisite that I be conscious of the determinations of the existence of external things in time, which makes explicit the necessary existence of those things, and by which the conditional a posteriori contingency, is lost.

Immediate consciousness of the determination of the existence of external objects does not imply the intuitive representation belonging to them. The proof of the existence of an object, regardless of any of my conscious determinations in time related to it, is the effect it has on sensibility, which is very far indeed from the mere consciousness of time-determinations alone.

Where do we make our conscious determinations in time? In understanding.
Where do the pure conceptions of necessity and existence reside? In understanding.
Where does the synthesis of pure conceptions with representations of the external objects occur? In understanding.

Only through proper understanding then, is the doubting and/or impossibility of external objects destroyed, which just is the refutation of material idealism, all with which this section was ever concerned. As if the title didn’t say enough.

Don't you think the issue here is the difficulty of questioning the instinctive sense of the reality of the sense-able world? (a.k.a. naive and/or scientific realism). As Bryan Magee puts it in his book on Schopenhauer:

Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices.

Modern society, generally, is overall realist in its orientation, it takes the sense-able world as possessing an intrinsic reality, which transcendental idealism calls into question. That's why I sometimes say, in a whimsical kind of way, that to understand it is to 'go through the looking glass' - it requires a literal cognitive shift or flip (and yes, I think Lewis Carroll was on to this!) Something like the satori of Buddhism, albeit perhaps not in the ultimate sense that Buddhists understand it, but a step in that direction.

Don't you think the issue here is the difficulty of questioning the instinctive sense of the reality of the sense-able world? — Wayfarer

It might be part of the issue, but I think the greatest divide is differences in understanding the overall intent of Kant’s text. I think my present dialectical opponent is bound and determined to make a molehill out of a mountain.

Even if Kant does provide sufficient proof for external objects, the transcendental idealist already grants their necessary reality so couldn’t care less about a proof for them. He may have reason, on the one hand, to care about those that wish to doubt or deny altogether such existence, and on the other those that give such existence more attention than they deserve, and it is they that need to be directed to the sufficient method for getting their nose away from the tree far enough to provide the forest an opportunity to show itself.

Or……my understanding is wrong, and that is the issue. But even if it is, I’ve been given nothing but repetitive textual references without supporting argument, such that I might have some ground for changing my mind.

But to answer directly, I don’t have enough experience with Russell’s personal philosophy to grasp whether he questions the instinctive sense of the reality of the sense-able world. I may be inclined to think he grants such reality, but it remains a question by what means is that grant warranted.

Thanks for the Magee; he’s definitely worth a serious read.

my understanding is wrong, and that is the issue — Mww

Never!

Ehhhh…..not never. Let’s be honest. 1964, it was. Historical precedent for me being wrong. I told my buddies those mop-haired caterwallin’ British punks would never be bigger than the Beach Boys.

Fair. But then a label turned them down because they didn’t have trumpets so you weren’t alone. But, I meant with regards to the issues at hand.

synthetic a priori isn’t a principle, it’s a relation of the content of certain kinds of conceptions to each other; — Mww

Just taking your first point.

Kant writes in CPR B14 section V that a synthetic a priori judgement is a principle of reason.

"Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason."

The Merriam Webster Dictionary includes "a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption" as part of its definition of "principle".

It is true that "synthetic a priori judgements" relate the synthetic with the a priori, but it is also true that a synthetic a priori judgement is a principle that may be used, for example in mathematics (B14)

Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that relates the synthetic to the a priori.

Kant also refers to other principles, such as the principle of contradiction (B14), principle that all things as appearances are in time (B52), principle of the ideality of our sensible intuitions (B70), principle of the unity of manifold of representations (A117), principle of the unity of apperception (A112), etc.

I get it; sorry, I shoulda stayed away from ill-begotten attempts at humor.

On agreeing with the difficulty in questioning the instinctive sense of reality of the sense-able world, re: those that say stuff like….time passes. They instinctively understand it as time passing or changing, they have difficulty in questioning their instinctive notions, especially when they change their clocks and thereby insist their manipulations are altering the passage of time. Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, argues that time does not pass or change, but only things in time.

Even a word like “yesterday” implies a time that was, and the common understanding has no issue with attaching meaning to the word synonymous with the passage of time, but in truth, there ever was only a succession of discreet times.

https://aeon.co/essays/who-really-won-when-bergson-and-einstein-debated-time

You said synthetic a priori is a principle; Kant says synthetic a priori judgements are principles.

Hopefully, it is merely your language use that disguises the fact you actually do understand the difference.

I’ve said it before….you come up with the most interesting stuff to read. Hell, I read them when they aren’t even addressed to me.

I’m inclined to suggest Bergson was Kantian, but the article doesn’t support me, so I better not.

Einstein, though….that guy. While the guy on the train sees the thing differently that the guy on the tracks, it takes a guy that is neither to see them both, which ol’ Albert doesn’t see fit to mention. It must have been he that was that third guy in order to construct the simultaneity of relativity in the first place, but in fact, he was neither. Philosophically, he nonetheless denied the validity inherent in Kantian synthetic a priori cognitions….all the while being thoroughly engaged by them.

“…. In my opinion the answer to this question is, briefly, this: as far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality…”
(Einstein, “Geometry and Experience”, 1921, in Norton, U. of Pittsburgh, 2013)