• Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Truth is not subjective, although there are truths about subjective things. Objective truth: "The universe exists".Relativist

    Agree it's a difficult point to make. I'm saying that there is an implicit subject in every statement about what exists, including what exists in the absence of any observers. It is true that we can model the universe as if there were no observers in it on the practical or methodological level but it's not ultimately the case, because that model is mind-dependent. The universe exists for the subject - as you say, that doesn't preclude the discovery of objective facts about it, but their objectivity is not absolute or stand-alone.
  • Relativist
    2.6k
    What is the subject of "The universe exists"?

    You acknowldge that we can discover objective facts about the universe. Isn't "the universe exists" an objective fact?

    I can buy into the notion that all of our knowledge is grounded in ourselves. We individually develop language because we interact with the world, perceiving that world in our uniquely human way. But my point is: there is an actual world that we are perceiving.

    My argument for denying solipsism is related to this, so I'll describe it.

    We innately believe there exists a world external to ourselves. This is a basic, non-verbal belief- it's not derived logically from other beliefs. Importantly, it is a properly basic belief because it is a consequence of the way the world actually is and of the necessity of interacting with that world for our survival. (If you've read Alvan Plantinga, this will sound familiar. He argues that belief in God is rational - if there exists a God who instilled within us a sensus divinitatus).

    Even a properly basic belief could be false. It's possible solipsism is true, but that mere possibility doesn't defeat the inherent belief that we have. I also acknowledge that IF solipsism is true, our belief in the external world is irrational. But that possibility doesn't worry me in the least, because my belief in the external world is so strong - I literally have zero doubt.

    This is not an argument that proves solipsism is false. Rather, it shows that belief in an external world is rational, if it is true that there is an external world that produced this innate belief of ours. It is rational to maintain a belief that has not been defeated.

    So, irrespective of what anyone else may believe, I am justified in believing there to exist a world external to myself, which I am a part of. If this belief is true (as I am convinced), it is an objective fact, not a subjective fact that is only true for me. It is an objective fact even if everyone else holds a false belief in solipsism.

    It seems to me, this basic objective fact, that there exists a world outside the mind, is a reasonable starting point to derive additional objective facts about the world.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    So, irrespective of what anyone else may believe, I am justified in believing there to exist a world external to myself, which I am a part of. If this belief is true (as I am convinced), it is an objective fact, not a subjective fact that is only true for me. It is an objective fact even if everyone else holds a false belief in solipsism.Relativist

    I have taken pains to word the essay we're discussing in such a way as to avoid solipsism and subjectivism.

    I am not arguing that it (idealism) means that ‘the world is all in the mind’. It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.Wayfarer

    To quote from Schopenhauer:

    the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared—this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all.

    Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link. These two contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with the same necessity, we might again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge… The necessary contradiction which at last presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use Kant’s phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form; which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely different side—the side of its inmost nature—its kernel—the thing-in-itself… But the world as idea… only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time.

    Where I take issue with physicalism is that it accords the objective world with an inherent or supposedly mind-independent reality, so that it would remain just so, regardless of whether any being perceives it or not. Within that framework, the mind is considered a consequent fact, a faculty which owes its existence to the vast prior period of material and biological evolution that preceeded it. But this is dependent on viewing the mind as an object among other objects, so it is a judgement that is implicitly made from a perspective outside of the mind. Which is, of course, an impossibility - the inherent contradiction of materialist theories of mind.

    For heuristic purposes, we can behave as if the external world is mind-independent and exists just it would without us. But that is a methodolical axiom, not an existential fact. The error arises from regarding the contingent facts of scientific inquiry as possessing a form of absolute veracity which they don't have. In Husserl's terms:

    In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge.... — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
  • Janus
    16.3k
    I am not arguing that it (idealism) means that ‘the world is all in the mind’. It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.Wayfarer

    I don't follow this argument. I can see that the judgement that "all such supposedly unseen realities" exist relies on an implicit perspective. What I don't see is that the existence of whatever relies on any perspective. There is an unexplained and seemingly unwarranted leap there from judgement of existence to actual existence.

    When you say "What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle" you are treating only what that existence is ( or is not) for us. Of course something outside of any perspective is indeterminable for us. It doesn't follow that there is no existence outside of our perspectives or any perspective at all. You seem to be conflating experience and judgement with existence. We cannot say anything at all about anything that might exist beyond our possible experience and judgement including that it could not exist. All the evidence points to the fact that something did exist prior to our existence or the existence of any percipients.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I don't follow this argument.Janus

    Any comment or criticism of the above snippet about Husserl?
  • Janus
    16.3k
    I'd say consciousness has evolved from very rudimentary sensory awareness. So what is ontologically fundamental would be the pre-existent conditions that enabled the genesis of and continues to make possible the most rudimentary sensory awareness.

    I don't see that as inconsistent with the fact that from the perspective of phenomenological inquiry what is fundamental for us is what we are and can be aware of. I don't agree with the kind of thinking that counts what is fundamental for us as being fundamental tout court. Such thinking is too human-centric for my taste. I view it as a conceit.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    So Husserl is conceited?
  • Janus
    16.3k
    Are you worried about what I said being an attack on authority? I explained what I think is wrong with ontologically absolutizing human consciousness. What more do you want? Do you have a counter argument or critique?
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I asked if you had any comment on the passage about Husserl. Apparently not, but never mind.
  • Janus
    16.3k
    What I said was a comment on that passage. I can't help it if you didn't understand that. Also I should point out that passage is not a quote from Husserl but is someone else's interpretation of what they think he believed.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    It’s from Dermot Morgan’s Introduction to Phenomenology. I quoted it in support of my overall argument, which is also similar to The Blind Spot of Science, another of your favorites :wink:
  • Janus
    16.3k
    Right so no counter argument or critique of what I've said just more references to your favourite authorities. Seems pointless.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I don't see that as inconsistent with the fact that from the perspective of phenomenological inquiry what is fundamental for us is what we are and can be aware of. I don't agree with the kind of thinking that counts what is fundamental for us as being fundamental tout court. Such thinking is too human-centric for my taste. I view it as a conceit.Janus

    It is naturalism (or physicalism) that is human-centric. Why? Because of having excluded the subject from consideration of what is real and declaring the measurable attributes of objects the sole criterion for what exists, as if that has philosophical significance, independently of any perspective whatever (something that the ‘measurement problem’ has made explicit.) Phenomenology, following Kant, is intellectually humble, in that it acknowledges the role of the subject in science, thereby overturning the conceit implicit in the presumption of a ‘view from nowhere’. And I continue to refer to The Blind Spot of Science, by Thompson, Frank and Gleiser, because I think it’s an important book that makes a case very similar to that I have given in the OP. It’s not an ‘appeal to authority’, it is an acknowledgement of a similar line of argument from recognised scholars.
  • Relativist
    2.6k
    Where I take issue with physicalism is that it accords the objective world with an inherent or supposedly mind-independent reality, so that it would remain just so, regardless of whether any being perceives it or not. Within that framework, the mind is considered a consequent fact, a faculty which owes its existence to the vast prior period of material and biological evolution that preceeded it. But this is dependent on viewing the mind as an object among other objects, so it is a judgement that is implicitly made from a perspective outside of the mind. Which is, of course, an impossibility - the inherent contradiction of materialist theories of mind...Wayfarer
    "Supposedly" a mind-independent reality?! Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality? I read the following statement as indicating you agree there is a mind-independent reality:

    though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eyeWayfarer

    Which implies you agree with the "judgement" that this is the case, even if you don't make that judgement on the same basis. The question of whether or not there exists a mind-independent reality does not depend on physicalism being true.

    I have taken pains to word the essay we're discussing in such a way as to avoid solipsism and subjectivism.Wayfarer
    I know that, but I was explaining why I believe there is an external world: it is necessarily the case that our perceptions provide some access to this world that is at least functionally accurate.. So, even though your are rejecting solipsism, you seem overly skeptical that we can know something about the external world. I fully accept that our image of the world is rooted in our human perspective, but that fact doesn't imply our understanding is false or even suspect. I think it just means we need to take ourselves, and our perspective, into account when seeking objective facts about the world.

    Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, — Schopenhaurer
    Taken literally, I think this is absurd - it contradicts my view that there is an external world, that we have a functionally accurate image of it through our senses, and that this provides a foundation for learning objective facts about the world.

    But maybe he's using "the whole world" to refer to our human concept of the world. That's a bit more palatable, but it still seems to imply we're too detached from it to discern object truths about it. If I'm correct about this, why would anyone believe this? This seems like unjustified skepticism.

    For heuristic purposes, we can behave as if the external world is mind-independent and exists just it would without us. But that is a methodolical axiom, not an existential fact. The error arises from regarding the contingent facts of scientific inquiry as possessing a form of absolute veracity which they don't have.Wayfarer
    Why think this is not an existential fact? Why think our inherent belief in a world external to ourselves is false or completely inscrutable?

    Why are you calling the facts of scientific inquiry "contingent"? Is it because they can't be rigorously proven and theories are necessarily falsifiable? That doesn't preclude getting some things right, nor of getting many or most things at least partly right. I just don't understand why one would have such a pessimistic view.

    the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
    I completely agree with this statement, because "meaning" is a term that pertains specifically to conscious beings.

    Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
    Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism.

    Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
    I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. Does this quoted statement have broader implications?
  • Janus
    16.3k
    It is naturalism (or physicalism) that is human-centric. Why? Because of having excluded the subject from consideration of what is real and declaring the measurable attributes of objects the sole criterion for what exists, as if that has philosophical significance, independently of any perspective whatever (something that the ‘measurement problem’ has made explicit.)Wayfarer

    Naturalism consists in the idea that the natural world is not dependent on humans for its existence. Your view, counterpointing naturalism, is that the natural world does depend on humans for its existence. It is obvious which view is human-centric.

    The central idea of The Blind Spot of Science is trivially true. Of course science only exists on account of humans. I've challenged you before to explain how the human subject is to be incorporated as an integral part of the theory of astronomy, geology, chemistry, natural science or any of the non-humanistic sciences.

    Of course you can never answer the challenge because its a ridiculous notion. We are already there in those subjects as the investigator, but we don't appear in the subject itself just as the eye does not appear in the visual field. Those disciplines study their respective subjects as they appear to us. How could it be otherwise?
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    But you agree there is an mind-independent reality:

    though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye
    — Wayfarer
    Relativist

    I do, but this is qualified by declaring that the world is not ultimately or really mind-independent, insofar as any judgement about its nature presupposes, but then 'brackets out', the observer.

    The error I'm calling out is the 'absolutisation' of objective judgement. There's an Aeon essay (now a book) I frequently refer to, The Blind Spot of Science. It says, in part:

    Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is). Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary. The scientific task becomes about figuring out how to reduce them to something physical, such as the behaviour of neural networks, the architecture of computational systems, or some measure of information.

    This framework faces two intractable problems. The first concerns scientific objectivism. We never encounter physical reality outside of our observations of it. Elementary particles, time, genes and the brain are manifest to us only through our measurements, models and manipulations. Their presence is always based on scientific investigations, which occur only in the field of our experience.

    This doesn’t mean that scientific knowledge is arbitrary, or a mere projection of our own minds. On the contrary, some models and methods of investigation work much better than others, and we can test this. But these tests never give us nature as it is in itself, outside our ways of seeing and acting on things. Experience is just as fundamental to scientific knowledge as the physical reality it reveals.

    The second problem concerns physicalism. According to the most reductive version of physicalism, science tells us that everything, including life, the mind and consciousness, can be reduced to the behaviour of the smallest material constituents. You’re nothing but your neurons, and your neurons are nothing but little bits of matter. Here, life and the mind are gone, and only lifeless matter exists.

    To put it bluntly, the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness. This is not to say that consciousness is something unnatural or supernatural. The point is that physical science doesn’t include an account of experience; but we know that experience exists, so the claim that the only things that exist are what physical science tells us is false. On the other hand, if ‘physical reality’ means reality according to some future and complete physics, then the claim that there is nothing else but physical reality is empty, because we have no idea what such a future physics will look like, especially in relation to consciousness.
    The Blind Spot

    Why think our inherent belief in a world external to ourselves is false or completely inscrutable?Relativist

    In line with the above, it's true in one way, but not in another. The very first thing any organism has to do is establish and maintain a boundary between itself and the environment. It is a basic condition of existence. And from a common-sense (or naive realist) point of view, we're indeed all separate people and separate from the world. But this is illusory in the sense that reality itself is not something we're apart from or outside of. One of Einstein's sayings, often put on posters, captures it:

    A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe", a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. The striving to free oneself from this delusion is the one issue of true religion. Not to nourish the delusion but to try to overcome it is the way to reach the attainable measure of peace of mind. — Albert Einstein, Letter of condolence sent to Robert J. Marcus on the death of a son

    I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure.Relativist

    It matters for materialist theories of mind, such as D M Armstrong's and others, surely. They all proclaim the identity of brain and mind.

    Again, the thrust of 'mind-created world' (and it might have been better called 'mind-constructed') is in line with cognitivism, the insight into the way the mind synthesises sensory data with inherent faculties of judgement so as to generate, construct, or create the sense of the world within which science and all else is conducted. It's not as radical as it might seem, but it is definitely a challenge for physicalism, which is the context in which we're discussing it.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism.Relativist

    My issue with dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is that it tends to reify consciousness, treat it as a spiritual 'substance', which is an oxymoronic term in my view. I think some form of revised hylomorphic dualism (matter-form dualism) is quite feasble, one of the reasons I'm impressed with Feser's 'A-T' philosophy. I'm impressed by many of his arguments about the nature and primacy of reason, such as Think, McFly, Think. But he is critical of Cartesian dualism, at least as it has come down to us, and I think the 'Cartesian divide' is the source of many of the intellectual ailments of modernity.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    We are already there in those subjects as the investigator, but we don't appear in the subject itself just as the eye does not appear in the visual field.Janus

    True - but not trivial. That is an insight I claim you will never find called out in mainstream Anglo philosophy. It challenges the point of physicalist philosophy of mind, which is to explain the nature of the subject in objective physical terms.
  • Janus
    16.3k
    For me the idea of explaining the nature of the subject in physicalist terms is simply, under a certain conception of the nature of the subject, a misunderstanding of what could be possible in attempting to combine incommensurable paradigms of thought.

    Even a "hard" science like geology is not understandable (even if it were possible it would be an immensely cumbersome task) in terms of quantum physics.
  • Relativist
    2.6k
    I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. — Relativist


    It matters for materialist theories of mind, such as D M Armstrong's and others, surely. They all proclaim the identity of brain and mind.
    Wayfarer
    No, it doesn't. Hurricane behavior is not best understood in terms of particle physics, but there's no reason to doubt that it is fundamentally due to the behavior of particles.


    Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism. — Relativist


    My issue with dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is that it tends to reify consciousness, treat it as a spiritual 'substance', which is an oxymoronic term in my view. I think some form of revised hylomorphic dualism (matter-form dualism) is quite feasble, one of the reasons I'm impressed with Feser's 'A-T' philosophy. I'm impressed by many of his arguments about the nature and primacy of reason, such as Think, McFly, Think. But he is critical of Cartesian dualism, at least as it has come down to us, and I think the 'Cartesian divide' is the source of many of the intellectual ailments of modernity.
    Wayfarer
    I'm not defending physicalism here, I'm defending the existence of the external world and that we are able to determine some truths about it.

    Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is). Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary. The scientific task becomes about figuring out how to reduce them to something physical, such as the behaviour of neural networks, the architecture of computational systems, or some measure of information.The Blind Spot
    Do you deny that science can tell us much about the real, mind-independent world? Are elementary particles and genes pure fiction?

    Is the mind your sole focus? I'm happy to discuss that further, but I need to understand your perspective of everything in the world BESIDES minds.

    To put it bluntly, the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness.The Blind Spot
    Why does this matter? No metaphysical account of the mind is without flaws, and none can be proven as true. A person could practice psychology without a metaphysical account of the mind. On the other hand, neurology depends mostly on the physical - but often relating it to the "magic" of behavior (both physical and mental). But even here, a metaphysical account doesn't contribute to the practice of the discipline.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Do you deny that science can tell us much about the real, mind-independent world? Are elementary particles and genes pure fiction?Relativist

    No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered.

    I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent. Which is another way of saying objectivity cannot be absolute.

    Why does this matter?Relativist

    As for whether you're defending physicalism, the link to this discussion was made from this post in another thread in which you claimed to be 'representing David Armstrong's metaphysics'. I see the above arguments as a challenge to Armstrong's metaphysics. As I'm opposing Armstrong's metaphysics, this is why I think it matters.

    For me the idea of explaining the nature of the subject in physicalist terms is simply, under a certain conception of the nature of the subject, a misunderstanding of what could be possible in attempting to combine incommensurable paradigms of thought.Janus

    You put a lot of effort into disagreeing with something you actually don't disagree with.
  • Janus
    16.3k
    I do, but this is qualified by declaring that the world is not ultimately or really mind-independent, insofar as any judgement about its nature presupposes, but then 'brackets out', the observer.Wayfarer

    This clearly shows a confusion between judgement and what is being judged. Of course judgement is mind-dependent, but there seems to be little reason to think that the Universe could be human mind-dependent given that all the evidence points to its having being around for about seven thousand times as long as humans have been. I don't think this is a hard fact to grasp, but surprisingly you seem to have much difficulty understanding (or is it perhaps accepting?) it.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I don't think this is a hard fact to grasp, but surprisingly you seem to have much difficulty understanding (or is it perhaps accepting?) it.Janus

    If you address the actual argument, I will respond.
  • Janus
    16.3k
    For me the idea of explaining the nature of the subject in physicalist terms is simply, under a certain conception of the nature of the subject, a misunderstanding of what could be possible in attempting to combine incommensurable paradigms of thought.
    — Janus

    You put a lot of effort into disagreeing with something you actually don't disagree with.
    Wayfarer

    I think you missed "under a certain conception". Under the intuitive conception people commonly have of the mind and consciousness and the subject a physical explanation is obviously impossible. Under a physicalist notion of the subject (that is that the subject is the living body) a physical explanation may indeed be possible.

    You assume that the subject cannot be physical and then criticize physicalism for not being able to explain it. Can't you see that is tendentious thinking?
  • Janus
    16.3k
    How am I not addressing the argument? What point have I neglected to address?
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I asked you to say explicitly what you thought was wrong with Husserl's criticism of naturalism, which you didn't do. How about this excerpt from Bryan Magee's 'Schopenhauer's Philosophy'? You will notice that it opens with the very challenge you have just given:

    Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'

    Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was [that] the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.

    The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

    This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.

    Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.
    — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

    If you think this is wrong, say why.
  • Janus
    16.3k
    I don't agree that it is self-evident (or even plausible) that time is merely "one of the forms of our sensibility". If, as according to Kant, the in itself is unknowable how can it be justified to claim that time does not exist in itself?
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Deep questions, I agree.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality?Relativist

    I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent.
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