No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say that. Please elaborate.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent.

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.

Which is another way of saying objectivity cannot be absolute.

It seems obvious to me that there are objective facts about the world that we know or can come to know. It is objective fact that we live on the third planet from the sun, which we orbit. How is this anything other than an absolute fact?

Why does this matter?
— Relativist

As for whether you're defending physicalism, the link to this discussion was made from this post in another thread in which you claimed to be 'representing David Armstrong's metaphysics'. I see the above arguments as a challenge to Armstrong's metaphysics. As I'm opposing Armstrong's metaphysics, this is why I think it matters. — Wayfarer

That's fine, and we can discuss it, but do you agree it has no practical significance? That's what I meant.

I'm willing to defend Armstrong's metaphysical theory against alternatives, so I need to understand what alternative you propose. I don't claim it's necessarily true; I simply think it's the best explanation for what we know about the world -broadly. It's conceivable that everything in the world is physical, except for minds.

Is his theory of mind the only thing you object to, or do you think there are flaws that are unrelated to his account of mind?

FYI, when we get to specifics of Armstrong's theory of mind, I won't be limiting myself to Armstrong's specifics, but I will stick with physicalism in general.

In the meantime, I need to better understand your position. If you don't believe we can know truths about the world, that seems more significant than whether or not the mind can be adequately accounted for through physicalism. I don't see how you could propose a superior alternative with such a background assumption.

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think the idea of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, then you can't believe there exists a mind-independent reality. I believe there is. Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? Understand that I acknowledge that physicalism could be wrong, but the belief in a mind-independent reality isn't dependent on physicalism being true.

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

If what is addressed by the term “reality” (I presume physical reality which, in a nutshell, is that actuality (or set of actualities) which affects all minds in equal manners irrespective of what individual minds might believe or else interpret, etc.) will itself be contingent on the occurrence of all minds which simultaneously exist—and, maybe needless to add, if the position of solipsism is … utterly false—then the following will necessarily hold: reality can only be independent of any one individual mind. As it is will be independent of any particular cohort of minds—just as long as this cohort is not taken to be that of “all minds that occur in the cosmos”.

Which is to say that reality will be independent of individual minds in a so-called “mind-created cosmos” (just as long as it’s not solipsistic).

That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature).

"I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent." - Wayfarer

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds. — Relativist

Just say this quibble between you and @Wayfarer. As I've just tried to illustrate, the quibble can be resolved by differentiating "mind" as generality (which occurs wherever individual minds occur) and "mind" as one concrete instantiation of the former (such that in concrete form minds are always plural and divided from each other) ... this in the term "mind-independent". Physical reality is not mind-independent in the first sense but is mind-independent in the second sense, this in any system of (non-solipsistic) idealism wherein the world is contingent upon the occurrence of minds.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent." - Wayfarer

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.
— Relativist

Just say this quibble between you and Wayfarer. As I've just tried to illustrate, the quibble can be resolved by differentiating "mind" as generality (which occurs wherever individual minds occur) and "mind" as one concrete instantiation of the former (such that in concrete form minds are always plural and divided from each other) ... this in the term "mind-independent". Physical reality is not mind-independent in the first sense but is mind-independent in the second sense, this in any system of (non-solipsistic) idealism wherein the world is contingent upon the occurrence of minds. — javra

That doesn't address the issue I raised.

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief.

That doesn't address the issue I raised.

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. — Relativist

If you re-read what was my initial reply to MU, you'll see that I also believe there exists a world independent of individual minds, and so I too agree with you on this count - even if, as the case is, I simultaneously believe this same world is contingent on the occurrence of mind as a generality.

So I'm not sure how to further reply.

Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? — Relativist

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible.

If what is addressed by the term “reality” (I presume physical reality which, in a nutshell, is that actuality (or set of actualities) which affects all minds in equal manners irrespective of what individual minds might believe or else interpret, etc.) will itself be contingent on the occurrence of all minds which simultaneously exist—and, maybe needless to add, if the position of solipsism is … utterly false—then the following will necessarily hold: reality can only be independent of any one individual mind. As it is will be independent of any particular cohort of minds—just as long as this cohort is not taken to be that of “all minds that occur in the cosmos”. — javra

I really can't understand what you are saying here javra. Perhaps you could rephrase it?

No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered.
— Wayfarer
I don't understand why you say that. Please elaborate. — Relativist

The question was about elementary particles and genes. These are part of scientific models.

It is well known that the nature of the existence of former, in particular, is rather ambiguous, to say the least. Although I don't want to divert this thread too far in this direction, this is where the Copenhagen interpretation of physics is relevant. This says that physics does not reveal what nature is in itself (or herself, some would say) but as how she appears to our methods of questioning. So these 'elementary particles' are not mind-independent in that sense - which is the implication of the observer problem. They only appear to be particles when subjected to a specific kind of experimental setup. This is part of why there is a tendency towards philosophical idealism in modern physics (e.g. Henry Stapp, John Wheeler, Werner Heisenberg, Bernard D'Espagnat, Shimon Malin, can all be said to advocate for one or another form of philosophical idealism. The latter's book is called Nature Loves to Hide.)

As for genes, and whether these comprise a fundamental explanatory unit, again, the emergence of epigenetics has given rise to an understanding that genes themselves are context-dependent. That is not downplaying the significance of the discovery of genes (or quantum theory, for that matter) but the role they are both assigned by physicalism as being ontologically primary or fundamental.

If you don't believe we can know truths about the world, that seems more significant than whether or not the mind can be adequately accounted for through physicalism. I don't see how you could propose a superior alternative with such a background assumption. — Relativist

I don't know how you could come to that conclusion. We know all manner of things about the world. I'm not denying that scientific knowledge is efficacious. What I'm questioning is the metaphysics of materialism, which posits that 'Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary' (The Blind Spot). Armstrong's physicalist philosophy would maintain that exact view, would it not? That the mind is 'the product of the brain'? What else could 'materialist theory of mind mean? And I think it can be questioned, without saying that nobody knows anything about the world.

I think I can see the point you're having difficulty with (and please don't take this to be condescending.) Philosophical idealism is nearly always understood as the view that 'the world only exists in the mind'. I think that is how you're reading what I am saying, which is why you believe that for me to acknowledge the reality of objective facts will undermine idealism. But what I'm arguing is that this is a misreprentation of what is true about idealism.

To get a bit technical, it's the difference between Berkeley's idealism, and Kant's. Kant acknowledges the empirical veracity of scientific hypotheses (empirical realism). After all, he was a polymath who devised a theory of nebular formation, which, adapted by LaPlace, is still considered current. But transcendental idealism still maintains that in a fundamental sense, the mind provides the intuitions of time and space, within which all such empirical judgements are made. I know it's a really hard distinction to get. Bryan Magee says 'We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counter-intuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices.'

If what is addressed by the term “reality” (I presume physical reality which, in a nutshell, is that actuality (or set of actualities) which affects all minds in equal manners irrespective of what individual minds might believe or else interpret, etc.) will itself be contingent on the occurrence of all minds which simultaneously exist—and, maybe needless to add, if the position of solipsism is … utterly false—then the following will necessarily hold: reality can only be independent of any one individual mind. As it is will be independent of any particular cohort of minds—just as long as this cohort is not taken to be that of “all minds that occur in the cosmos”. — javra

I have read about Bernardo Kastrup's idea of 'mind at large'. At first I was sceptical of it but I've come around to it, if it is understood simply as 'some mind'. Not yours or mine, or anyone's in particular but as a genre.

I really can't understand what you are saying here javra. Perhaps you could rephrase it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough. I'll try. First, we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is false. Therefore, ours is not the only mind that currently occurs in the world. Given this fact, we then entertain the metaphysical reality/actuality that there can be no world in the absence of minds (in the plural).

Via one convenient though imperfect analogy: We all know that an ocean is not one single drop of water. Given this fact, we then hold the conviction that there can be no ocean in the absence of individual drops of water from which the ocean is constituted.

So the physical world is itself here taken to be determined from the constituency of a plurality of individual minds - without which there can be no physical world. In rough parallel, an ocean is taken to be determined by the constituency of a plurality of individual drops of water - without which there can be no ocean.

Then, just as the given ocean will continue to occur independently of any one individual drop of water from which it is constituted, so too will the physical world continue to occur independently of any one mind from which it is constituted.

Take all individual drops of water away and no ocean remains. Take all individual minds way and no world remains. But adding or removing one drop of water from the ocean does not alter the ocean in any meaningful way. In like enough manner, adding or removing one mind from the physical world does not alter the physical world in any meaningful way.

The ocean is then drop-of-water-independent when it comes to any one individual drop of water from which it is constituted (or even from a relatively large quantity of individual drops of water - say as can be added by a hurricane or else removed by evaporation, etc.) - this even though the same ocean is drop-of-water-dependent in the sense that no ocean can exist in the complete absence of such.

In a roundabout way, the same can then be upheld for any non-solipsistic idealism: the physical world is mind-independent when it comes to any one individual mind (or any relatively large quantity of minds) - this even thought it is mind-dependent in the sense that no physical world can exist in the complete absence of minds.

This explanation via analogy is less then ideal by my appraisal, but it does I think adequately enough illustrate the necessity that in a non-solipsistic idealism (wherein the physical is thereby dependent on the psychical) the physical world will be independent of, say, my mind or your mind ... or any other individual mind or non-global-cohort of such for that matter.

As one possible summation of this, within any non-solipsistic idealism, there will necessarily be an external world that occurs independently of me and my own mind.

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The very notion of a perspective entails having a mind. We are sufficiently aware that we can recognize the fact we even have a perspective.

We obviously perceive space and time, so why doubt that this is an aspect of the actual world? The mere fact that we have a perspective does not entail that this perspective is an illusion.

Fair enough. I'll try. First, we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is false. Therefore, ours is not the only mind that currently occurs in the world. Given this fact, we then entertain the metaphysical reality/actuality that there can be no world in the absence of minds (in the plural). — javra

What we can conclude from the assumption that solipsism is false, is that there must be something which separates one mind from another, some sort of medium. But we cannot exclude the possibility that the medium is an illusion, or mind-created, as a sort of deficiency in minds' ability for direct communication with one another.

Via one convenient though imperfect analogy: We all know that an ocean is not one single drop of water. Given this fact, we then hold the conviction that there can be no ocean in the absence of individual drops of water from which the ocean is constituted. — javra

This one doesn't make sense to me. What is a "drop of water"? Why can't we say that the ocean is a single drop of water? And to me, "a drop" is an isolated quantity of water, so it makes no sense to talk about a body of water as if it is made of drops. If a number of drops put together makes an amount of water which is more than a drop, so that it cannot be called a drop, the entire amount exists without any drops within it, as a drop of water is an isolated thing. If a number of creeks coming together creates a river, it doesn't make sense to conclude that a river consists of a bunch of creeks.

In a roundabout way, the same can then be upheld for any non-solipsistic idealism: the physical world is mind-independent when it comes to any one individual mind (or any relatively large quantity of minds) - this even thought it is mind-dependent in the sense that no physical world can exist in the complete absence of minds. — javra

Sorry javra, I just cannot understand what you are saying here. This is what I get from it. If there is a complete absence of minds, then there is also the complete absence of a physical world. In that sense there is no mind-independent word. However, if there is so much as one mind (or a multitude of minds), then there must also be a mind-independent.

So how does the existence of a mind (or multitude of minds) necessitate the existence of a mind-independent world? If it is the existence of a mind, (or minds), which necessitates that world, how can it be a mind-independent world?

As one possible summation of this, within any non-solipsistic idealism, there will necessarily be an external world that occurs independently of me and my own mind. — javra

I don't deny that there would be something outside my own mind, what I called the "medium" above. But why conceive of this as "a world", or "a universe", or even "reality", as all these refer to mind dependent things, if you want to think of the medium as mind-independent? But, since I believe in the reality of numerous minds, there is nothing to persuade me that the "medium" is not something inside another mind, therefore not mind-independent at all.

We obviously perceive space and time... — Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

We obviously perceive space and time, so why doubt that this is an aspect of the actual world? The mere fact that we have a perspective does not entail that this perspective is an illusion. — Relativist

Not to dispel the question you've posed, but only to observe that the way in which it is posed the issues are lot more complex than not.

Our perception of time sometimes drastically differs from that time we commonly deem to be objective, with the latter being measured via use of objective/physical tools, by which I mean anything from sundials to clocks. As one example of this, when we are forced into an event we are bored with time will slow down (relative to objective time) and when we find ourselves engaged in an event we are enthralled by time will speed up or fly by (relative to objective time).

So our time perception is not necessarily an adequate representation of the time that occurs in the actual world.

This can then go in any number of different ways - but please note that I am not by this denying the reality of an objective time as previously addressed (which for me is another can of beans altogether (especially since I take objective time to be relativistic)). Nor am I by this then claiming that that aspect of reality we can term objective time is not of itself ultimately dependent on the co-occurrence of a plurality of minds.

What we can conclude from the assumption that solipsism is false, is that there must be something which separates one mind from another, some sort of medium. But we cannot exclude the possibility that the medium is an illusion, or mind-created, as a sort of deficiency in minds' ability for direct communication with one another. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, at minimum, part of the medium you address has to be physicality, aka physical reality - that same physicality of which our brains are made up of and which when damaged disrupts the functioning of our minds. In an Eastern train of thought wherein all but either the atman or the anatman (depending on philosophical perspective) is maya and hence illusion (i.e., "a magic trick"), yes, all aspects of this medium with partitions awareness into discrete parts (e.g., me and you, etc.) can be deemed mind-created illusion - including all of physical reality. But so entertaining goes far deeper, I believe, than claiming physical reality to be on par to something one hallucinates or else can imagine at will or so forth. As individual first-person points of view we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds, and our very lives are dependent on there being a sufficient degree of conformity to it. This even if it is to be considered pure maya (i.e., pure illusion in the sense of a magic trick).

This one doesn't make sense to me. What is a "drop of water"? Why can't we say that the ocean is a single drop of water? And to me, "a drop" is an isolated quantity of water, so it makes no sense to talk about a body of water as if it is made of drops. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I've already acknowledge the analogy was imperfect and less then ideal. Still, a drop is typically understood as that amount of liquid which might remain intact and maybe fall as such from a stick which had been placed into the liquid. Place a stick into the ocean, lift it up, and one will remove drops of water from the ocean. But yes, it was and remains, again, a very rough analogy. Sorry to hear it didn't make any sense to you.

Sorry javra, I just cannot understand what you are saying here. This is what I get from it. If there is a complete absence of minds, then there is also the complete absence of a physical world. In that sense there is no mind-independent word. However, if there is so much as one mind (or a multitude of minds), then there must also be a mind-independent.

So how does the existence of a mind (or multitude of minds) necessitate the existence of a mind-independent world? If it is the existence of a mind, (or minds), which necessitates that world, how can it be a mind-independent world? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yea, the "how does a plurality of minds necessitate an objective world which is constitutionally determined by them" part is not that easy to tersely express. But importantly, if no solipsism then, necessarily, the world can only be brought about by a multitude of minds - and not by a sole mind. If there are a plurality of minds which constitute the world, then the disappearance/death of any one mind from the world will not entail the disappearance/obliteration of the world itself - for there are yet other minds from which the world remains constituted. So the world occurs in manners not dependent on any one particular mind.

I don't deny that there would be something outside my own mind, what I called the "medium" above. But why conceive of this as "a world", or "a universe", or even "reality", as all these refer to mind dependent things, if you want to think of the medium as mind-independent? But, since I believe in the reality of numerous minds, there is nothing to persuade me that the "medium" is not something inside another mind, therefore not mind-independent at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear, are you then saying that if the so-called "medium" of physicality in total - to include my physical body and its brain - is not something that is an aspect of my own mind it would then need to be something the occurs as an aspect of some other individual mind?

As to the initial question, (I take it that) there is an actuality, or set of actualities, which affects all observers equally irrespective of what the observes believe, perceive, imagine, want, interpret, etc. This I then term the objective world (objectivity can well mean impartial, and this set of actualities in being as just described would then be literally impartial in complete manners to all observers which are thereby subjected to experiences, i.e. to all sentient beings as subjects, aka as subjective beings).

Do you deny there being actualities which occur irrespective of what any one individual sentient being intends, believes, and so forth?

I'm guessing at the end of the day we'll end up disagreeing. but I'm still honestly curious to hear your replies so as to better understand your point of view.

It is well known that the nature of the existence of former, in particular, is rather ambiguous, to say the least. Although I don't want to divert this thread too far in this direction, this is where the Copenhagen interpretation of physics is relevant. This says that physics does not reveal what nature is in itself (or herself, some would say) but as how she appears to our methods of questioning. So these 'elementary particles' are not mind-independent in that sense - which is the implication of the observer problem. — Wayfarer

The fact that models makes successful predictions demonstrates that we know something about the nature of physical reality, and that's really the basic thing I'm defending.

Quantum mechanics indeed shows that reality is not identical to that which we directly perceive, but this fact is itself a relevant truth about reality. Re: the "observer problem", don't jump to a conclusion consistent with your confirmation bias. No interpretation of QM is verifiably true, but it's a near certainty that reality actually exhibits the predictible law-like behavior that we observe.

As for genes, and whether these comprise a fundamental explanatory unit, again, the emergence of epigenetics has given rise to an understanding that genes themselves are context-dependent. That is not downplaying the significance of the discovery of genes (or quantum theory, for that matter) but the role they are both assigned by physicalism as being ontologically primary or fundamental. — Wayfarer

So you aren't denying that genes exist. You're pointing to the fact that there are other factors that influence growth and development. So once again, genetics does tell us something about life: more objective facts.

I don't know how you could come to that conclusion. We know all manner of things about the world. I'm not denying that scientific knowledge is efficacious. What I'm questioning is the metaphysics of materialism, which posits that 'Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. — Wayfarer

Sorry I didn't understand, but that's how it sounded to me. Glad we could clarify that you agree scientific knowledge is efficacious- so I assume you agree that we indeed have some knowledge about the world external to minds.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.

transcendental idealism still maintains that in a fundamental sense, the mind provides the intuitions of time and space, within which all such empirical judgements are made — Wayfarer

I completely agree with this; it makes perfect sense. My issue has been that these intuitions don't preclude discerning aspects of reality.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality. — Relativist

So, what does it depend on, then?

So our time perception is not necessarily an adequate representation of the time that occurs in the actual world. — javra

Absolutely! The fact that we (i.e..Einstein) developed a theory that transcends the "human perspective" of time is a testimony to our ability to transcend our own perspective, and endeavor to be objective.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.
— Relativist

So, what does it depend on, then? — Wayfarer

Physicalism = the thesis that everything that exists is physical. It is false only if there exists something non-physical. It depends only on this being true.

It is false only if there exists something non-physical. — Relativist

But you say:

No interpretation of QM is verifiably true, but it's a near certainty that reality actually exhibits the predictible law-like behavior that we observe. — Relativist

Sure it does. But what about this requires that the fundamental constituents are actually physical? What does 'physical' mean, when the nature of the so-called fundamental particles is ambiguous, as has been discussed? It's entirely plausible that 'physical' is a concept only applicable to composite objects, but not to their fundamental constituents. After all Neils Bohr said 'Everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded as real'. You could substitute 'physical' for 'real' in that sentence and it would still parse correctly.

And as for something non-physical, the wavefunction Ψ is an ideal candidate:

There is a crucial difference between the wave effect in the double-slit experiment and physical waves. In classical wave systems, such as ripples on water, the frequency — the number of wave peaks passing a point per second — determines the pattern and behavior of the wave. We might expect to equate the rate of emission (how often electrons are fired) with the frequency of a classical wave. But in quantum mechanics, this analogy breaks down, as particles can be emitted one at a time — and yet the interference pattern still forms. There is no equivalent in classical physics for a “one particle at a time” emission in a medium like water.

So the interference pattern arises not because the particles are behaving as classical waves, but because the probability wavefunction ψ describes where at any given point in time, any individual particle is likely to register. So it is wave-like, but not actually a wave, in that the pattern is not due to the proximity of particles to each other or their interaction, as is the case with physical waves. Consequently, the interference pattern emerges over time, irrespective of the rate at which particles are emitted, because it is tied to the wave-like form of the probability distribution, not to a physical wave passing through space. This is the key difference that separates the quantum interference pattern from physical wave phenomenon. This is what I describe as ‘the timeless wave of quantum physics’. — The Timeless Wave

We obviously perceive space and time...
— Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions).

Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.

But so entertaining goes far deeper, I believe, than claiming physical reality to be on par to something one hallucinates or else can imagine at will or so forth. As individual first-person points of view we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds, and our very lives are dependent on there being a sufficient degree of conformity to it. — javra

What one hallucinates, and what one imagines at will, are very different concepts, and ought not be classed together in this context. This is because we need to maintain some kind of division between things created by the mind which are not created consciously by will, and things willfully created. This is necessary to allow for the reality of the mind's subconscious activity in creating things like sense perceptions, images etc.. And when we allow that sense perceptions are creations of the mind, this enables us to properly understand things like dreams and hallucinations. But it also exposes the fact that what we know as "physical reality" is just a creation of the mind.

The fact that our lives are jeopardized by this force (I'll call the medium "a force" in this context) which we know as physical reality does not imply that our lives are dependent on it. Those are two different concepts. Our lives are dependent on that which gives us life, whatever it is which throws us into this situation of jeopardy, but the force which jeopardizes us is not necessarily the same as that which we are dependent on.

Because of this, it is incorrect to say "we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds". The reality of free-will indicates that this boundness is not real. It is an illusion which we have created. The illusion has been created (part of it subconsciously through evolution and instinct, and part of it consciously through education and science), because it assists us in understanding and dealing with "the force" in our actions. The important point to understand here is that this force is power, and as much as power is a force which can appear as if it restricts and binds us, it can also be harnessed and used to enhance one's freedom. But in order to use the force in this way, we need to understand it, and to understand it we represent it in the determinist model which produces the illusion that we are bound by it.

Still, a drop is typically understood as that amount of liquid which might remain intact and maybe fall as such from a stick which had been placed into the liquid. — javra

This is incorrect. You are simply defining "drop" as a quantity, for the purpose of your analogy, when "drop" is really not commonly understood as a quantity. My OED has as the first definition "a small round or pear-shaped portion of liquid that hangs or falls or adheres to a surface". Notice that the shape and activity of the thing, as an individual object called "a drop", are the principal features. The quantity is secondary, and is simply stated in the relative term of "small". "Small" does not indicate any specific quantity.

But importantly, if no solipsism then, necessarily, the world can only be brought about by a multitude of minds - and not by a sole mind. — javra

You are not getting the important point. The judgement of "no solipsism" may be only the creation of a mind. So we cannot produce the necessity required for your conclusion. "The world" might still just be the creation of a lonely mind, which likes to have other minds to keep it company. Once we accept that the subconscious part of the mind is engaged in creating (as evidenced in dreams and hallucinations), we cannot claim that just because the other minds are not willfully created by my conscious mind, they are not created by the mind in an absolute sense. The other minds might still be created by the subconscious part. The conclusion of "no solipsism" might be just a tactic (evolutionarily produced or something) which is allowing the mind to better deal with the force.

To be clear, are you then saying that if the so-called "medium" of physicality in total - to include my physical body and its brain - is not something that is an aspect of my own mind it would then need to be something the occurs as an aspect of some other individual mind? — javra

I mentioned that as a possibility. The issue here is that we do not know, and we cannot exclude anything as impossible until we do know, because that could mislead us.

As to the initial question, (I take it that) there is an actuality, or set of actualities, which affects all observers equally irrespective of what the observes believe, perceive, imagine, want, interpret, etc. — javra

This cannot be true, we can almost exclude it as impossible. We know each person to have a distinct perspective, and this necessitates the conclusion that the so-called "set of actualities") does not effect observers equally. The "distinct perspective" necessitates the conclusion of unequal effects. The equality you refer to is a creation of the mind. We create equality to understand each other.

Do you deny there being actualities which occur irrespective of what any one individual sentient being intends, believes, and so forth? — javra

What you call "actualities" is I believe, what I called "force". The problem with your question is that the force is understood as relative to the agent, so it does not make sense to ask about its existence independent of the agent. It is only a force relative to the thing which wants to move. We can only understand it in its relation to us, because that's the only existence which it has to us. It appears to us as "a force" because of our living tendency to act, but without that tendency to act, it may be nothing at all. So what appears as "the force", the independent reality, may actually be nothing, in the purest sense of the word. That's why I say questions about an independent reality are really incoherent.

Sure it does. But what about this requires that the fundamental constituents are actually physical? What does 'physical' mean, when the nature of the so-called fundamental particles is ambiguous, as has been discussed? — Wayfarer

It seems uncontroversial to stipulate that the objects of our ordinary experiences are physical. It seems most reasonable to treat the component parts of physical things as also physical, all the way down to whatever is fundamental.

And as for something non-physical, the wavefunction Ψ is an ideal candidate: — Wayfarer

A "wave function" is a mathematical abstraction. I see no good reason to think abstractions are ontological. So I infer that a wave function is descriptive of something that exists.

My definition of the physical: the ordinary objects of experience, and everything that is causally connected, through law-like behavior, to these ordinary objects of our experience.

Quantum systems fit this.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

If you re-read what was my initial reply to MU, you'll see that I also believe there exists a world independent of individual minds, and so I too agree with you on this count - even if, as the case is, I simultaneously believe this same world is contingent on the occurrence of mind as a generality. — javra

How can an external world exist independently of human minds AND be contingent upon human minds?

Being contingent upon entails a dependence, does it not?

OK, thanks for your reply. We disagree in multiple ways. But, since I don't much feel like argument at the moment, I prefer to leave it at that.

How can an external world exist independently of human minds AND be contingent upon human minds?

Being contingent upon entails a dependence, does it not? — Relativist

Yes "contingent upon" entails "a dependence" but your fist question equivocates what I have been proposing. With the equivocation taking place between the notion of "all elements from a multiplicity of elements of type X" and "one (or some) element(s) from a multiplicity of elements of type X - but not all". As an added example of this:

The presence of a heap of sand will be contingent upon, and hence will depend on, the presence of a multiplicity of sand particles in general - which are structured in a particular way. But it will not of itself be contingent upon the presence of any one particular sand particle, such that the heap of sand will remain present even if individual sand particles are taken away or added to it. No one sand particle on its own produces, or else equates to, the heap of sand. And so the heap of sand will occur independently of (i.e., will occur without being contingent on) any one individual, particular sand particle that partakes of the heap of sand. Take that one sand particle away and the heap of sand remains. The heap of sand can then be said to exist independently of any one individual sand particle from which it might be composed but, simultaneously, will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of sand particles in general. One could then incrementally replace each and every particular sand particle in the given heap of sand with the heap of sand persisting to occur unaltered throughout - even though it becomes constituted by utterly different sand particles. And the larger the heap of sand is, the less any alteration in its particular sand particles will make any meaningful difference to the identity, or else properties, of the heap of sand itself.

Replace "heap of sand" with "the physical world" and "individual sand particles" with "individual minds". The same relations will hold. This can thereby lead to the logically valid affirmation that, in a non-solipsistic mind-created world, the physical world occurs independently of me and my own mind, even though it will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of minds in general.

Replace "heap of sand" with "the physical world" and "individual sand particles" with "individual minds". The same relations will hold. This can thereby lead to the logically valid affirmation that, in a non-solipsistic mind-created world, the physical world occurs independently of me and my own mind, even though it will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of minds in general. — javra

OK, I think I understand. But as I said before:

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief. — Relativist

When I say "independent of minds", I mean that the world at large exists irrespective of the presence of any minds at all. I believe the universe is about 14B years old, and there were almost certainly no minds within it for quite a long time. Can you give me a reason to reject or doubt this belief of mine?

When I say "independent of minds", I mean that the world at large exists irrespective of the presence of any minds at all. I believe the universe is about 14B years old, and there were almost certainly no minds within it for quite a long time. Can you give me a reason to reject or doubt this belief of mine? — Relativist

Reasons such as these?:

That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature). — javra

Yes, I can provide them, but I don't think reasons will here much help. We are all typically attached to the notions we are habituated to hold, in this case that there was physicality long before there was any type of awareness, ergo physicalism.

My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. And I do not claim to have any great insight into how panpsychism works - nor into any metaphysically cogent explanation for how life evolved from non-life (the physicalist explanation that "it must have" doesn't much console me either as far as metaphysical explanations go - I find it just as comforting as the explanation of "God did it").

Reasons such as these?:

That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature). — javra

No. You expressing your judgement is not a reason for me, even with a vague allusion to some questionable assumption that it seems based on.

Yes, I can provide them, but I don't think reasons will here much help. We are all typically attached to the notions we are habituated to hold, in this case that there was physicality long before there was any type of awareness, ergo physicalism. — javra

I may agree that we're "habituated" to hold the view that there exists a mind-independent reality.

If we're a consequence of evolutionary tendencies, then we would necessarily have the implicit belief that there exists a world external to ourselves. How we then think about this (e.g. that this external world exists independently of ourselves) could be a cultural habituation. I'm willing to entertain an alternative, if there's a good enough reason.

My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. — javra

You're indicating panpaychism is a logical step beyond the "premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world." I'm just asking why should entertain that premise.

And I do not claim to have any great insight into how panpsychism works - nor into any metaphysically cogent explanation for how life evolved from non-life (the physicalist explanation that "it must have" doesn't much console me either as far as metaphysical explanations go - I find it just as comforting as the explanation of "God did it"). — javra

If your answer is that this feels right, and/or provides you comfort, I have no objection. I'm not trying to convince you that you're wrong. I'm just seeking my own comfort- I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world.

It seems uncontroversial to stipulate that the objects of our ordinary experiences are physical. It seems most reasonable to treat the component parts of physical things as also physical, all the way down to whatever is fundamental. — Relativist

There's a strong component of common sense realism in it, buttressed by the polemical and rhetorical skills developed by centuries of philosophical argument.

what we regard as the physical world is “physical” to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be “physical”. On the other hand, since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p6).

That’s physicalism in a nutshell.

A "wave function" is a mathematical abstraction. I see no good reason to think abstractions are ontological. So I infer that a wave function is descriptive of something that exists. — Relativist

It isn't so easily dismissed. The ontology of the wave function in quantum physics is one of the outstanding problems of philosophy of science. Realists argue that the wave function represents something real in the world, while instrumentalists may view it as merely a predictive tool without deeper ontological significance. Treating it as only an abstraction is one option but it is far from universally accepted. The point is, claiming that everything that exists is physical becomes problematic if we can’t definitively say what kind of existence the wave function has, as in quantum mechanics, the wave function is central to predicting physical phenomena. If we take its predictive power seriously, it’s hard to ignore the question of its ontological status without leaving an unresolved gap in the theory.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality. — Relativist

As I said before, as a materialist, D M Armstrong believes that science is paradigmatic for philosophy proper. So you can't have your cake and eat it too - if physics indeed suggests that the nature of the physical eludes precise definition, then so much for appealing to science as a model for philosophy!

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that. — Relativist

Perspective is not the same as bias.

I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world. — Relativist

I wouldn't put it in personal or pejorative terms, but I do believe that philosophical and/or scientific materialism is an erroneous philosophical view.

The point is, claiming that everything that exists is physical becomes problematic if we can’t definitively say what kind of existence the wave function has, as in quantum mechanics, the wave function is central to predicting physical phenomena. If we take its predictive power seriously, it’s hard to ignore the question of its ontological status without leaving an unresolved gap in the theory. — Wayfarer

But there IS this unresolved gap in our physics. We really don't know. Therefore one can't claim it's inconsistent with physicalism.

Besides this, nothing you said is a refutation of my position as to what I consider physical.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist

As I said before, as a materialist, D M Armstrong believes that science is paradigmatic for philosophy proper. So you can't have your cake and eat it too - if physics indeed suggests that the nature of the physical eludes precise definition, then so much for appealing to science as a model for philosophy! — Wayfarer

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

Armstrong's model is consistent with what we do know, so it's not falsified. A stipulation that the wave function is non-physical would technically falsify physicalism, but if the wave function behaves in a law-like manner, why make that stipulation? It would still be a coherent metaphysical model, save for using "physical" as a qualifier. That's why your objection seems forced: "let's label the wave function as non-physical (or just say it may not be physical) so we can dismiss every physicalist metaphysical theory".

I wouldn't put it in personal or pejorative terms, but I do believe that philosophical and/or scientific materialism is an erroneous philosophical view. — Wayfarer

My position is that Armstrong's theory is not necessarily true, but it's superior to other theories in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness.

The fact that it's consistent with what we know about physics is a point in its favor, while the fact that there are gaps in our understanding of physics is irrelevant. It's irrelevant because a theory can only be expected to account for what we know: that's the nature of abductive reasoning. Abduction entails comparing explanatory hypotheses - and what needs to be explained are the agreed facts. Unknowns do not constitute facts that need explaining.

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality. — Relativist

That physicalism should be rejected, if the thesis is that 'everything is ultimately physical' while what is physical can't be defined.

Armstrong's model is consistent with what we do know, so it's not falsified. — Relativist

If it hasn't been falsified by quantum physics, it's not falsifiable. So again, it appeals to science as a model of philosophical authority, but only when it suits.

I posted this comment some days ago, do you think it has any bearing on the argument?

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

Do you see the point of this criticism of philosophical naturalism? Because, if you don't, then I think I'll call it a day.

No. You expressing your judgement is not a reason for me, even with a vague allusion to some questionable assumption that it seems based on. — Relativist

Hmm. Physicalism can be defined as entailing that everything which does or can occur can only be physical in its nature. (In keeping with part of @Wayfarer's latest post:) There's a question which Darwin's Bulldog, the Agnostic who first coined the term "agnostic", Thomas Huxley, once placed which is to date yet unanswered: what is "the physical" (or else that "matter" from which one obtains materialism) defined as, exactly **. Yet, in overlooking this very awkward lack of coherent reasoning in affirming the stance of physicalism:

Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? One can of course state that the thoughts of a corporeal sentient being would not be in the absence of the respective corporeal body. But this does not entail that the given thoughts - say of a unicorn or of Harry Potter - are of themselves physical. I can get that that objective rock over there is physical, but how is my concept of a unicorn (which I can mold, make appear, and make disappear at will, and which might not be significantly similar to your concept of a unicorn) of itself physical?

Or, by extension, we perceive physical realities, but then - given the entailment of physicalism - how is a bona fide hallucination of itself physical? Say, for example, someone hallucinates seeing a burning bush; is the burning bush which this person sees physical?

But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false.

Then there's the definition of physicalism where everything supervenes on the physical. Which carries its own multiple philosophical problems. But I'll leave it at that for now. All this just intending food for thought. I have little interest in convincing you to reject or doubt your beliefs - and currently far more interest in properly justifying my own.

My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. — javra

You're indicating panpaychism is a logical step beyond the "premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world." I'm just asking why should entertain that premise. — Relativist

a) If non-solipsistic idealism is true, this then entails that everything is ultimately dependent on psyche in one way or another. My own stance is that of an objective idealism wherein there occurs an objective world of physicality as effete mind that itself evolves - which, ultimately, would not be but for the occurrence of disparate psyches.

b) If we are to trust the information which the empirical sciences present us with regarding the objective world - which, in short, is an extension of our trusting our own empirical senses - then there indeed was a time when the cosmos existed in the absence of all corporeal, biological life.

If both a) non-solipsistic idealism and b) the occurrence of a world in the absence of all life are taken to be true premises, then it becomes entailed that the occurrence of psyche is not dependent on the occurrence of biological life. This while the occurrence of multiple psyches - else of psyche in general - is yet requisite for any physical world to occur (this as per (a)).

This entailment then can be labeled panpsychism (all-psyche-ism) - which, I'll argue, is a modernized rebranding of animism ("anima" being Latin and "psyche" being Greek for the same thing: in a word, "soul" - with the Latin "animus" and the Greek "nous" being used to address "mind"), from which one can obtain concepts such as that of the anima mundi, among others (hence, an anima mundi that occurred long before biological life came into being)

If your answer is that this feels right, and/or provides you comfort, I have no objection. I'm not trying to convince you that you're wrong. I'm just seeking my own comfort- I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world. — Relativist

:grin: I wasn't being fully literal, but, all the same, at the end of the day yes: we all seek some sort of comfort in that which we search for and end up holding onto. A different topic for a different thread, but all reasoning can be said to serve this underlying purpose. If we search for truths for example, we are discomforted by not finding them, or else by finding reason to belief that what we stringently endorse as true is in fact not true (at which time we might welcome the pain of the catharsis which grants us greater awareness via better understanding). To harshly paraphrase David Hume: reason-derived conclusions are always enslaved to the intentioning volition's drive of obtaining emotive satisfaction. In this sense, reason is then always a slave to passion. Which, in a way, can work its way back to the motif of this thread: all that occurs is ultimately dependent upon psyche. The very reasoning which psyches utilize as tools for the purpose of obtaining what is wanted included, or so I will uphold.

---------

** In fairness, T. Huxley, the staunch agnostic that he was, held the same complain against materialism that he held regarding an adequate definition of "spirit" from which one obtains the notion of "spirituality". Here's a quote from him to this effect:

My fundamental axiom of speculative philosophy is that materialism and spiritualism are opposite poles of the same absurdity-the absurdity of imagining that we know anything about either spirit or matter. — Thomas Henry Huxley

Thanks, Javra. Very much in keeping with the OP.

I was going to suggest to @Relativist whether he'd ever encountered 'constructive empiricism', associated with Bas Van Fraasen.

Constructive empiricism is a philosophical view that science aims to produce theories that are empirically adequate, rather than true. It was developed by the 20th-century Canadian philosopher Bas van Fraassen and is presented most systematically in his 1980 work The Scientific Image.

Constructive empiricism differs from scientific realism, which holds that science aims to provide a literally true story of the world. Constructive empiricists believe that science aims for truth about observable aspects of the world, but not unobservable aspects. They also believe that accepting a scientific theory involves only the belief that it is empirically adequate. — AI Overview

I think this is a framework which is not antagonistic to science while leaving the question of the ultimate nature of reality an open one.