The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology defines belief this way:

"Belief has often been represented as a state available to introspection with a certain relation to a present image or complex of images. “I believe that P” means that I have an attitude of acceptance toward P."

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as:
the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

Which seems equivalent (setting aside the fact that the 2nd definition lacks a definition of "true"). You're more detailed definition is subtly different because you conclude:

As such, beliefs need not be complete or absolute but can well be partial. — javra

I think your point is that you can believe X, but not be fully committed to it or completely certain of it. This is the way the word "belief" tends to be used in common conversation. We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty.

But why force this vague concept into a philosophical analysis? It seems to me you can analyze your belief (colloquial sense of the word) and rephrase it to use the more precise definition of belief and still correctly convey the attitude you have toward the proposition. That's what I did when I recast a person's (less than certain) belief in the future outcome of a game.

Am I wrong? Do you think there's something about belief (colloquial sense) that isn't translatable in this way?

There a bunch of other reasons, but as one significant gripe I have with it (here placing its inconsistencies aside), if physicalism is true, then this will easily lead to - if it does not directly entail - moral nihilism. And it certainly does away with any possibility of an objective good. — javra

By "inconsistencies" I take it you mean that physicalism is not consistent with our "normal' intuitions about the nature of mind and consciousness and the subject?

Anyway you've left those aside so are you saying that because (many or most?) people need to believe that moral laws are given by a higher (necessarily non-physical) power, physicalism in denying the existence of such a law-giver will lead to moral nihilism?

I don't think the idea of an objective moral good depends on a law-giver. I believe there are objective facts about human flourishing and suffering and social needs and social harmony which support the most basic and significant moral injunctions (usually proscriptions).

Ergo, enduring the suffering of life with as much grace as possible when things get rough is stupid - and there is no ultimate good to aspire toward, well, other than one's personal death when life gets a bit too much. — javra

What about the idea of living a good life. improving the lives of others. Do you believe that it's all pointless if there is no afterlife? It may be for you but I'm sure there are many people who don't think this way. Thinking this way is after all only a particular attitude or disposition not a reflection of objective truth.

I think your point is that you can believe X, but not be fully committed to it or completely certain of it. This is the way the word "belief" tends to be used in common conversation, but why force this vague concept into a philosophical analysis? — Relativist

There a rather long enough post in which I explained, to which you did not directly reply. What does philosophical analysis address? The real world or manufactured bubbles?

We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty. — Relativist

Um, no, not "absolute - hence infallible - certainty". But it does mean that the belief can be justified without inconsistencies, thereby evidencing both its truth and that the knower can thereby confirm the truth of the belief.

Hell, we disagree galore on epistemology then. As I've previously stated, I'm a fallibilist. And since it's now evident that you are not, I now take it that you will uphold the possibility if not actuality of infallibility.

We differ significantly in this regard. I'll leave it at that.

By "inconsistencies" I take it you mean that physicalism is not consistent with our "normal' intuitions about the nature of mind and consciousness and the subject? — Janus

No. I mean that phisicalism has internal inconsistencies of logical reasoning - mostly having to do with awareness.

The last unaddressed example I made in this thread was:

The question again was "are hallucinations physical?". So if a person hallucinates a stray cat running along their path, is the hallucinated cat physical?

As to perceptions being this and that in the brain, this will include all veridical perceptions just as much as it will include all non-veridical perceptions. So claiming that the hallucinated cat was caused by the brain does not resolve whether or not the hallucinated cat was physical as a hallucination per se. — javra

Anyway you've left those aside so are you saying that because (many or most?) people need to believe that moral laws are given by a higher (necessarily non-physical) power, physicalism in denying the existence of such a law-giver will lead to moral nihilism? — Janus

No. Reread what I've stated more attentively before replying and you might see how this assumption is unwarranted. All the same, thank you for putting it in the form of a question.

I don't think the idea of an objective moral good depends on a law-giver. — Janus

Yea, ditto.

What about the idea of living a good life. improving the lives of others. Do you believe that it's all pointless if there is no afterlife? It may be for you but I'm sure there are many people who don't think this way. Thinking this way is after all only a particular attitude or disposition not an objective truth. — Janus

And on what is this notion of what a "good life" is itself grounded, philosophically speaking within systems of physicalism? I'm not here addressing dispositions. I'm addressing logical reasoning.

The question again was "are hallucinations physical?". So if a person hallucinates a stray cat running along their path, is the hallucinated cat physical? — javra

The hallucination is a neural process and hence physical. Of course it is not a physical (real) cat. I see no inconsistency there but rather a conflation between the hallucination and what is hallucinated.

No. Reread what I've stated more attentively before replying and you might see how this assumption is unwarranted. — javra

I read it attentively the first time and I can't see what in a non-physicalist model the objective support for morality could be other than a lawgiver or else some kind of karmic threat of having to pay for transgressions. And again, I don't see how any of that could work absent the assumption of an afterlife.

And on what is this notion of what a "good life" is itself grounded, philosophically speaking within systems of physicalism? I'm not here addressing dispositions. I'm addressing logical reasoning. — javra

It would be grounded on human flourishing and social harmony. Of course there will be inconsistency if you presume that those things are not grounded in our physical embodiedness. Absent that assumption I see no inconsistency. In other words on the physicalists assumptions there are no inconsistencies even though there may be on yours.

There a rather long enough post in which I explained, to which you did not directly reply. What does philosophical analysis address? The real world or manufactured bubbles? — javra

The philosophical analysis I was referring to was epistemology, so not directly related to "the real world or manufactured bubbles" - which is metaphysics.

We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty. — Relativist


Um, no, not "absolute - hence infallible - certainty". But it does mean that the belief can be justified without inconsistencies, thereby evidencing both its truth and that the knower can thereby confirm the — javra

You're demonstrating that the colloquial use of the term "belief" leads to quibbling about what each individual means. All the more reason to use the formalisms.

Hell, we disagree galore on epistemology then. — javra

Do we? It sounded like you were just defending the use of a definition of belief that differs from that of standard epistemology.. I am a fallibilist: empirical beliefs can't be proven with certainty. That is a separate issue from the definition of belief that is standard in epistemology.

You sound pissed off, like when you (falsely) accused me of making a confrontational statement. I've simply tried to address things you've brought up, as honestly as I can. If my views piss you off, there's no point continuing.

The hallucination is a neural process and hence physical. Of course it is not a physical (real) cat. I see no inconsistency there but rather a conflation between the hallucination and what is hallucinated. — Janus

How is a distinction between the perceived physical cat and the perceived non-physical cat to be made when both are equally "neural process and hence physical" as perceptions?

I read it attentively the first time and I can't see what in a non-physicalist model the objective support for morality could be other than a lawgiver or else some kind of karmic threat of having to pay for transgressions. And again, I don't see how any of that could work absent the assumption of an afterlife. — Janus

There is here a warrantless conflation between lawgiver and afterlife. See, for example, Buddhism. I said "no" to your assumption of there being a deity (a law-giver) which ordains an objective good.

It would be grounded on human flourishing and social harmony. — Janus

And, within physicalism, why are these to be deemed "good"?

How is a distinction between the perceived physical cat and the perceived non-physical cat to be made when both are equally "neural process and hence physical" as perceptions? — javra

The hallucinated cat is not a cat at all. The perceived cat is a cat.

There is here a warrantless conflation between lawgiver and afterlife. See, for example, Buddhism. I said "no" to your assumption of there being a deity (a law-giver) which ordains an objective good. — javra

I'm not conflating lawgiver and afterlife. I'm asking how physicalism could undermine the idea of there being consequences for immoral actions. I'm wondering how non-physicalism could support morality in any way that physicalism cannot, since that seemed to be your contention. You haven't attempted to address that question.

And, within physicalism, why are these to be deemed "good"? — javra

Because they are generally important to people, and because a society with moral principles that promoted general disharmony and suffering could not last long. It would necessarily be despotic.

The philosophical analysis I was referring to was epistemology, so not directly related to "the real world or manufactured bubbles" - which is metaphysics. — Relativist

Epistemology is not directly related to the real world? I disagree.

Do we? It sounded like you were just defending the use of a definition of belief . — Relativist

I really dislike the idea of "absolute/infallible certainty" being something that anyone can hold. You affirmed that:

implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty. — Relativist

Which to me is not a position that a fallibililist can hold.

You sound pissed off, like when you (falsely) accused me of making a confrontational statement. I've simply tried to address things you've brought up, as honestly as I can. If my views piss you off, there's no point continuing. — Relativist

No, not pissed off, just in a rush. I appreciate your replies, but I've learned that there are certain impasses do discussions/debates. The discussion of what fallibilism is and entails can present itself as one such. To put it differently, unequivocal fallibilism devoid of exceptions is modernized terminology for Ancient Skepticism - which is contrary to Cartesian Skepticism. A long story that doesn't seen to belong on this thread. But, in this vein, I can well affirm that, "I fallibly know that in infallibly know nothing." If that makes sense to you, great.

The hallucinated cat is not a cat at all. The perceived cat is a cat. — Janus

On what grounds if both percepts are physical in the same way via the functioning of the brain. (To better drive the point home, I'll specify that the observer of the cat is not surrounded by others - and that he observes a cat which he has no reason to presume is a hallucination even though it is.)

I'm wondering how non-physicalism could support morality in any way that physicalism cannot, since that seemed to be your contention. You haven't attempted to address that question. — Janus

Via examples, the Platonic / Neoplatonic notion of the Good can only be a non-physical ideal - one that is nevertheless the ultimate reality. But please note: no law-giver created or else decreed the Good in either system of understanding. And such objective good requires an non-physicalist metaphysics. Wtih the occurrence of such an objective good then also is entailed an objective morality.

Because they are generally important to people, and because a society with moral principles that promoted general disharmony and suffering could not last long. It would necessarily be despotic. — Janus

I acknowledge the sentiment, but none of this is a rational grounding for what is good. Slavery was once generally important to people, for example. Would that make slavery morally good? And on what grounds would an Orwellian 1984 not last long? Besides, why is lasting long a good to be aspired toward within physicalism?

Epistemology is not directly related to the real world? — javra

Of course it is, but the definition of "belief" and the practices used in the discipline of epistemology doesn't depend on any particular theory of that connection.

I really dislike the idea of "absolute/infallible certainty" being something that anyone can hold. You affirmed that:

implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty.
— Relativist

Which to me is not a position that a fallibililist can hold. — javra

Irrelevant to the point I was making about the terminology, and the problems of using any colloquial definition of belief.

The discussion of what fallibilism is and entails can present itself as one such. — javra

I expect we could agree on a definition of fallibilism, if we could agree on the terms (like belief) that it is based on.

I really don't like to debate semantics, where people argue what a word really means. The objective ought to be to communicate. My reference to a "standard" definition was aimed at trying to avoid potential communication problems. If we use the word "belief" differently, we won't be able to have a meaningful discussion.

Irrelevant to the point I was making about the terminology, and the problems of using any colloquial definition of belief. — Relativist

Maybe I jumped the gun a bit. Do you take a categorical belief to be absolute? Granting no such thing as infallible beliefs, what would an absolute belief then entail? So far, it seems to me that if a belief is not infallible, then one is aware that the belief might be wrong - and this irrespective of how well justified it might be so far. Which in turn seems to me to necessitate that all fallible beliefs are graded beliefs upon analysis, even when staunchly addressed in terms of yes/no.

On what grounds if both percepts are physical in the same way via the functioning of the brain. (To better drive the point home, I'll specify that the observer of the cat is not surrounded by others - and that he observes a cat which he has no reason to presume is a hallucination even though it is.) — javra

In the case of the real cat there would be light reflected from it which enters the eye, etc. You know the story. In any case I have never had such a realistic hallucination, even during my extensive use of hallucinogens. I don't know anyone else who has either. I'm not saying such a thing is impossible, but if it is possible the level of delusion would be extreme.

Via examples, the Platonic / Neoplatonic notion of the Good can only be a non-physical ideal - one that is nevertheless the ultimate reality. But please note: no law-giver created or else decreed the Good in either system of understanding. And such objective good requires an non-physicalist metaphysics. Wtih the occurrence of such an objective good then also is entailed an objective morality. — javra

How would the objective morality in such a belief system be enforced other than via people believing in it? If it is non-physical how could such a thing exist if not in some universal mind. Goodness is a value and as far as I can see values can exist only in, be held by, minds. You seem to be gesturing at something, but it lacks coherent detail.

I acknowledge the sentiment, but none of this is a rational grounding for what is good. Slavery was once generally important to people, for example. Would that make slavery morally good? And on what grounds would an Orwellian 1984 not last long? Besides, why is lasting long a good to be aspired toward within physicalism? — javra

Why is it not a practical rational grounding? If you want a well-functioning society that fosters human flourishing and harmony why would you not want the most significant moral principles to govern? Slavery is a moral failure to be sure. It is pre-rationally normal for humans to care predominately about their own welfare and the welfare of those close to them. I don't believe the abolition of slavery depended on any higher principle. It depended on people having compassion and coming to count those who were previously thought to be of no significance to be of significance after all. We see the same thing happening today (although not enough to be sure) with animal welfare. Physicalism does not seem to be an impediment to such sentiments.

Oppressive dictatorships cannot last. Oppressed people will eventually become fed up and revolt. Humans may not have achieved much in the way of harmoniously living together but that lack of achievement has chiefly occurred in societies where people have believed in a higher good or deity. From a purely rational perspective there is no reason to grant one person more rights or privileges than another. So slavery itself can only be supported by practical reasons, and those reasons are not good ones because they promote disharmony.

Consciousness IS part of the world at large. If consciousness is immaterial, then the world includes this immaterial sort of thing. — Relativist

The world contains no immaterial things, according to materialism. An 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoronic expression.

The difficulty of devising a naturalistic account of the nature of consciousness is precisely the subject of David Chalmers' 'hard problem of consciousness', the essence of which is that no objective description can truly depict the nature first person experience (ref). There are many active threads on that topic, but suffice to say here, the issue is again one of perspective. Consciousness is not an objective phenomenon, because it is that to which phenomena appear - it is not itself among phenomena. Mind, as such, is never an object in the sense that all of the objects sorrounding you are, including the screen you're reading this from. Husserl's point is precisely that the attempt to 'naturalise' consciousness as an object on the same ontological plane as other objects is erroneous as a matter of principle. (This is why it is essential for Daniel Dennett that it is eliminated, as there is no conceptual space for it in his materialist framework.)

I just don't understand why you think metaphysical physicalism overvalues the scientific method. — Relativist

It is very clear, although to provide a detailed account would occupy many hundreds of words. I will default to one of the passages I often cite from a critique of philosophical materialism, Thomas Nagel's 2012 book Mind and Cosmos:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.

This is a very succinct statement of a very broad issue which is the subject of many volumes of commentary. But suffice to say this provides the background assumed by physicalism, a background in which Descartes' 'res cogitans' is deprecated and naturalistic explanations sought solely in terms of 'res extensia' or extended matter, which is manipulable and measurable in a way that 'mind' could never be. This is why physics is paradigmatic for physicalism. It is this, which Husserl's critique of naturalism has in its sights.

If there is more to existence than what science can possibly discover or extrapolate, how then can it be discovered? — Relativist

It was at this point last night (in my time zone) that I thought I should chuck it in, on the basis that we're 'talking past' one another. But in the light of day, I will try and compose a response.

In his history of philosophy, Frederick Copleson observes that due to the outstanding achievements and presence of science and technology, that the temper of 20th century philosophy:

The immense growth of empirical science, and the great and tangible benefits brought to civilisation by applied science, have given to science that degree of prestige which it enjoys, a prestige, which far outweighs philosophy and still more theology; and that this prestige of science, by creating the impression that all that can be known, can be known by means of science, has created an atmosphere or metal climate which is reflected in logical positivism. Once, philosophy was regarded as the ‘handmaiden of theology’. Now it has tended to become the ‘handmaiden of science’. As all that can be known can be known by means of science, what is more reasonable than that the philosopher should devote herself to an analysis of the meaning of certain terms used by scientists and an inquiry into the presuppositions of scientific method. .... As science does not come across God in its investigations, and, indeed, as it cannot come across God, since God is, ex hypothesi, incapable of being an object of investigation by the methods of science, the philosopher will also not take God into account. — A History of Philosophy, Vol 11, F. Copleston

Although Armstrong would not describe himself as a logical positivist, I still think this description fairly depicts Armstrong's philosophical perspective.

So the point of all this is as follows: both Kantian idealism, and Husserl's phenomenology, are concerned, not with the objects of knowledge, as discovered by natural science, but with the nature of knowing, from a first-person perspective. So it's not as if they have access to some vast repository of information not known to science, but they are occupied with different kinds of issues than are the sciences. However it's true from the rather 'scientistic' perspective of materialist philosophy of mind, those issues may well be invisible to science, hence not considered suitable subjects of investigation (although they are very much on the agenda for philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi.)

I believe I've stayed faithful to this (structural realism) approach in all my replies to you. — Relativist

I wouldn't doubt that, but it also has the effect of interpreting the various materials and sources I'm presenting against that perspective, which is why I think we're 'talking past' one another. However, reviewing that SEP source on Structural Realism, I do notice a paragraph on Kantian ESR which might be congenial to my overall outlook (although I haven't absorbed it yet.)

In any case, the crucial point is the perspectival distinction between idealist and phenonenological stances, and the 'objectivist' stance of Armstrong et al. I hope the foregoing has brought that into a sharper focus.

I'm running out of steam and getting short on time. I still don't get why you defend physicalism against the possibility of non-physicalism when you so clearly expressed that:

There is no guarantee that physicalism is false. Nor is there a guarantee that it is true. The real issue as I see it is what does it matter? Why should we mind whether physicalism is true or false? — Janus

I've provided this explanation, if not in full then in part: there can be no objective good - and hence no objective morality - within any system of physicalism.

You can, of course, evidence me wrong by pointing out any physicalist system wherein there can be coherently maintained an objective good.

But I'd like to know: why does all of this matter to you?

I'm running out of steam and getting short on time. I still don't get why you defend physicalism against the possibility of non-physicalism when you so clearly expressed that:

There is no guarantee that physicalism is false. Nor is there a guarantee that it is true. The real issue as I see it is what does it matter? Why should we mind whether physicalism is true or false? — javra

Firstly I'm not defending physicalism but refuting the claims of its supposed inconsistency.

I've provided this explanation, if not in full then in part: there can be no objective good - and hence no objective morality - within any system of physicalism.

You can, of course, evidence me wrong by pointing out any physicalist system wherein there can be coherently maintained an objective good.

But I'd like to know: why does all of this matter to you? — javra

You haven't explained why there can be no objective good under physicalism. I gave you examples to show that there can. You also haven't explained how there could be objective good under idealist or antirealist systems without positing a lawgiver apart from appeals to human flourishing and harmony etc which don't depend on any particular metaphysics.

Only the ethical and the aesthetical matter to me and I don't see those as being dependent on any particular metaphysic, and that is why the debate between materialism and idealism doesn't matter to me.

I am merely interested to see if proponents of idealism can show that such values are only or at least better supported by idealism (absent a lawgiver). Apparently that cannot be shown, at least not by you or anyone else I've encountered.

Thanks for trying anyway.

Thanks for trying anyway. — Janus

You're welcome.

Maybe I jumped the gun a bit. Do you take a categorical belief to be absolute? Granting no such thing as infallible beliefs, what would an absolute belief then entail? So far, it seems to me that if a belief is not infallible, then one is aware that the belief might be wrong - and this irrespective of how well justified it might be so far. Which in turn seems to me to necessitate that all fallible beliefs are graded beliefs upon analysis, even when staunchly addressed in terms of yes/no. — javra

Do you not consider 2+2=4 a categorical belief? Is it a fallible beliefs? Are you "aware that it might be wrong?"

Regarding beliefs that are clearly not categorical, I agree we have degrees of belief. I'm also fine with a fallibilist saying "I believe X", even though he knows it's at least logically possible he's wrong.

What is our area of disagreement? I think we went down this road because you denied the principle of equivalence:

"I believe X" is equivalent to "I believe X is true"

I don't follow why fallibilism would make these statements unequivalent. It's just a semantic equivalence, a claim related to the meaning of truth.

I'm fallible, so I acknowledge that my belief X could be false, but that doesn't negate the semantic equivalence. My degree of belief in X is equivalent to my degree of belief that X is true.

Consciousness IS part of the world at large. If consciousness is immaterial, then the world includes this immaterial sort of thing.
— Relativist

The world contains no immaterial things, according to materialism. An 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoronic expression. — Wayfarer

My statement was not based on a premise of materialism. I was making a semantic claim about the meaning of "the world" in metaphysics: it is the totality of existence.

You responded to this:

If there is more to existence than what science can possibly discover or extrapolate, how then can it be discovered? — Relativist

...by elaborating on objections to this assertion:

all that can be known can be known by means of science

You demonstrated that there are truths that science cannot uncover, which is a point I agree with. But it doesn't answer my question: what truths can be discovered outside of science?

Is it solely negative truths, like "physicalism is false"? I don't have a problem with that, but that statement tells us nothing about the way reality actually IS. Can positive facts about the world be discovered outside the parameters of science? If so, then describe the methodology.

You noted that science cannot discover God. I agree 100%. My question is: is God discoverable through some alternative, objective means? What about other aspects of reality that are beyond the reach of science ?

You noted that science cannot discover God. I agree 100%. My question is: is God discoverable through some alternative, objective means? What about other aspects of reality that are beyond the reach of science ? — Relativist

There are domains other than that of objective fact. I will only say that Armstrong's style of philosophy is to assume that science provides the only valid perspective.

There are domains other than that of objective fact. I will only say that Armstrong's style of philosophy is to assume that science provides the only valid perspective. — Wayfarer

So then, do you agree that there are no alternatives to science for discovering objective truths about the world?

What I infer is that you are defending or promoting world-views which do not depend exclusively on objective facts. Am I right?

What I infer is that you are defending or promoting world-views which do not depend exclusively on objective facts. Am I right? — Relativist

I'll go back to your first response to this thread:

This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth - wayfarer.

I don't understand this. Truth is not subjective, although there are truths about subjective things. Objective truth: "The universe exists". Truth about something subjective: "The images of the 'Pillars of Creation' produced by the Webb telescope are beautiful". — Relativist

I will try again to re-state the idea. Another way to explain it is to observe that reality contains both the observer and the observed - the subject who observes, and the object of observation. Reality is the totality of that, the total situation of human existence. And philosophy seeks to find reason and meaning in that context.

The objective sciences by contrast begin with an act of exclusion. They narrow the focus to only and precisely those elements of experience which can be measured and quantified with exactitude. That is the point of the Thomas Nagel passage I quoted here, a 'mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them'. So this means that even if science considers everything on every scale, from the sub-atomic to the cosmological, already there's an implicit perspective, it considers all of those matters in those terms. So you're asking, what other 'terms' are there? To which the answer is, practically the whole of philosophy other than science. Ancient and pre-modern philosophy, Eastern philosophy, existentialism, phenomenology. There are many. But if they are looked at through the perspective of 'what is "objectively true" in what they say', then most of what they say will be missed.

Here's what I asked:

do you agree that there are no alternatives to science for discovering objective truths about the world? — Relativist

You seem to be tacitly agreeing, since you proposed no alternatives and instead said:

So you're asking, what other 'terms' are there? To which the answer is, practically the whole of philosophy other than science. Ancient and pre-modern philosophy, Eastern philosophy, existentialism, phenomenology. There are many. But if they are looked at through the perspective of 'what is "objectively true" in what they say', then most of what they say will be missed. — Wayfarer

I think you're saying that limiting our perspectives (our world views) to objective facts is too limiting; it leads to rejecting some philosophies that can be valuable.

I think you're saying that limiting our perspectives (our world views) to objective facts is too limiting; it leads to rejecting some philosophies that can be valuable. — Relativist

Sure, I'd go along with that. But it's the tip of a large iceberg!

So it sounds like I have a decent understanding of your position. So now I can comment.

I believe these philosophies and religion can definitely be valuable for the individuals that embrace them. I would not try to talk anyone out of them, even if that were possible. Nevertheless, I do not find them personally valuable. What I find valuable is to be grounded in objective facts. I don't just mean grounded in an epistemological sense, but also grounded in my outlook on life and my relations with others.This has worked well for me - it's a perspective that makes it easier for me to accept whatever happens and to make realistic decisions on how to react. It's not for everyone. Nothing is.

Thanks for an interesting discussion.

Well, glad we came to some understanding, although I wouldn't want to leave it with the tacit understanding that philosophies other the scientifically-mediated type are merely personal or subjective.