Why though? — fdrake

Why does the study of being qua motion (physics) implicate the study of being qua being (metaphysics)? Because motion is a kind of being.

I am putting philosophy and metaphysics together. Really there is an analogy. We are talking about philosophy in terms of justification or inquiry, and in that sense it is the justificatory "context of contexts" that parallels metaphysics' foundational character.

So if we put it in @J's terms, where philosophy is fundamentally bound up with thinking, we would say that the art of thinking qua thinking is implicated in every contextual form of justification, given that justification is a form of thinking. I would call this "thinking qua thinking" logic, which is the art of discursive reasoning. Thus whenever we operate in some justificatory context, we are presumably implicating ourselves in logic; and logic pervades all justificatory contexts as water pervades the ocean, not as a foundation underlies a house. There are strong commonalities between philosophy, metaphysics, and logic.

Why does the study of being qua motion (physics) implicate the study of being qua being (metaphysics)? Because motion is a kind of being. — Leontiskos

Yeah that's the inference I want you to flesh out. You have:

1 ) X is a subset of Y
2 ) Study of X is a subset of study of Y.

Why does 1 entail 2?

- It's not a subset, it's a ratio (Latin).

We could study a deer according to its totality, and we could study a deer according to its aspect of movability, and we could study a deer according to its aspect of longevity. The two latter studies are co-implicative with the former. When we study the movability of Deer we are being informed about the totality of Deer, even though our object is not the totality of Deer.

The analogy of course limps given the sui generis character of being.

Similarly if "philosophy" in @J's sense has to do with logic, or thinking qua thinking, or justification qua justification, or explanation qua explanation, then any contextualized instance of logic/thinking/justification/explanation will implicate philosophy. When a biologist makes an argument about the digestive system of deer, the philosopher is not barred from the argument in the way that an astronomer is. The philosopher's input cannot be a priori excluded, and this is because he deals with the "context of contexts."

The two latter studies are co-implicative with the former. — Leontiskos

The analogy of course limps given the sui generis character of being. — Leontiskos

Alright. Several claims at work. All of them inequivalent.

The first is that the study of the totality of some domain X entails substudies of subdomains of X. The study of deer in toto is at least the study of deer movement plus the study of deer longevity. I think that's fine. That's ultimately a combinatorial thing. Notably the deer is fixed. That's of one of the following forms:

A ) If X is a subdomain of Y, then studying Y is studying X.

B ) If X is a subdomain of Y, then the subject matter of Y is a superset of the subject matter of X.

C ) If X is a subdomain of Y, then the rules which Y are studied with are a superset of the rules which X is studied with.

Every one of these asks if a different predicate distributes over the subset relation - or if you wanted, ratio. That is, does X subset Y imply D( X ) subset D( Y ).

The argument from analogy you gave smacks of ( B ), whereas the rules that constitute how something is grasped involve both B and C, and moreover the broader rules of study are only encapsulated in A. In that regard the argument from analogy doesn't get at the crux of it, since it leaves unexamined how context would need to distribute over the nesting of contexts. Which is, I reckon, the principle manner in which @J's iterative questioning results in all inquiry "converging to philosophy".

A ) If X is a subdomain of Y, then studying Y is studying X. — fdrake

I'm not opposed to that, but what I said was the opposite.

it leaves unexamined how context would need to distribute over the nesting of contexts — fdrake

I don't think I've left that nearly as unexamined as you have. You seem to be committed to your same implicit claim that there is no contextless 'context', or no "context of contexts." Why think such a thing?

And I would say that these cases like the neo-Freudian rely on philosophical thinking to debunk philosophical discourse, and therefore result in a kind of performative contradiction. — Leontiskos

Yes, though many an honest scientist is probably unaware of doing this until it's pointed out.

I'm not opposed to that, but what I said was the opposite. — Leontiskos

You mean that you claim that if X is a subdomain of Y, then studying X is also studying Y?

And I would say that these cases like the neo-Freudian rely on philosophical thinking to debunk philosophical discourse, and therefore result in a kind of performative contradiction.
— Leontiskos

Yes, though many an honest scientist is probably unaware of doing this until it's pointed out. — J

Scientific theories can and do in fact put into question presuppositions passed down through the history of philosophy. I suggest that it is mostly these specific philosophical presuppositions that psychologists , biologists or scientists in other fields are attacking when they critique philosophy. There are exceptions, such as Stephen Hawking’s blanket dismissal of philosophy in general, as if the past limitations in philosophical speculation precluded any new kind of philosophizing. That new brand of philosophy would only be ‘higher’ than the disprove of theoretical physics in the sense that it is able to enrich it , and even surpass it, by making explicit what is only implicit in the scientific theory. But then who’s to say that explicit thinking is ‘higher’ than implicit thinking? Does literature offer higher truths than music?

the "right" answer to Q . . . — fdrake

I'm not completely sure there is a single right answer -- that is, one and only one way the recursion can occur.

I have bolded "would" there since it seems modal. But in my view it's the wrong modality for the question - I think the dialogue must go differently than I suggested in order for it not to count as an counter example. So we'd be left requiring an account of why the flippant repetition cannot count as an answer. It strikes me that it could count as one, even if it is a bad one. — fdrake

Interesting. What must not happen, or at any rate what we don't want to happen on pain of triviality, is the "flippant repetition" version. I think we need to be more precise. Did you mean your repeated "Why?" to be shorthand for "Why is what you just said a justification for what you said before that (eventually recurring back to X)"? Or does the "Why?" question change its character and possibly its reference depending on where we are in the chain of reason-giving? I'm trying to figure out if we're absolutely stuck with what we might call the "2-year-old's version" of "Why?" I think this makes a difference, but say more about how you were using the repeated why's.

(...) true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents.
— Wayfarer

I have to ask, is this what you yourself believe? — goremand

I wouldn't 'die on a hill' defending it, and I recognise that it is something often exploited by the unscrupulous to exploit the gullible, but I do. As the snippet from Pierre Hadot notes, it is also associated with ancient philosophy where the figure of the Sage personified philosophical wisdom.

Scientific theories can and do in fact put into question presuppositions passed down through the history of philosophy. — Joshs

They do, and the issue here is the nature of how they "put into question" those presuppositions. Is it possible to do this without invoking further philosophy -- as opposed to some allegedly pure scientific approach? That's what I'm doubting (and I bet you'd agree), though as I say, I don't think most scientists are engaged in some nefarious conspiracy to demolish philosophy with bad arguments. They're just doing their thing, and rarely get the chance to reflect on their presuppositions.

Isn't there a relationship between not entertaining presuppositions, and the epochē of ancient skepticism, revived by Husserl? Recall that ancient and Pyrrhonian skepticism differed from modern skepticism by simply 'withholding assent from that which is not evident' and strictly attending to the quality of phenomena as they appear.

Scientific theories can and do in fact put into question presuppositions passed down through the history of philosophy.
— Joshs

They do, and the issue here is the nature of how they "put into question" those presuppositions. Is it possible to do this without invoking further philosophy -- as opposed to some allegedly pure scientific approach? That's what I'm doubting (and I bet you'd agree), though as I say, I don't think most scientists are engaged in some nefarious conspiracy to demolish philosophy with bad arguments. They're just doing their thing, and rarely get the chance to reflect on their presuppositions. — J

I think what we’re talking about here isn’t a dichotomy between something called science and something called philosophy , but a spectrum of explication. Philosophy isn’t a content of meaning to be invoked or not. It’s a dimension of discursive style which pertains to the degree of conventionality, richness, synthetic unity in a description . Any mode of explication can be more or less philosophical depending on where it locates itself on this spectrum.

Isn't there a relationship between not entertaining presuppositions, and the epochē of ancient skepticism, revived by Husserl? Recall that ancient and Pyrrhonian skepticism differed from modern skepticism by simply 'withholding assent from that which is not evident' and strictly attending to the quality of phenomena as they appear. — Wayfarer

Yes, and Heidegger critiqued Husserlian phenomenology for harboring its own presuppositions at the very moment that it was invoking a return to the ‘things themselves’.

Probably not obscurantist enough for him to blather about.

↪Joshs Probably not obscurantist enough for him to blather about — Wayfarer

He only seems obscurantist because you don’t understand him. That’s the curse of great philosophy. It takes hard work to gain the rewards.

He only seems obscurantist because you don’t understand him — Joshs

I understand what I've read about him, and of him.

In any case, I stand by the initial point - that the absence of presuppositions is what was intended by epochē, both in Husserl and in the original skeptics.

In any case, I stand by the initial point - that the absence of presuppositions is what was intended by epochē, both in Husserl and in the original skeptics. — Wayfarer

I’m not denying that. I would say that there is no such thing as a presuppositionless philosophy. If philosophy begins with questioning, it is also the case that to question is to already have in mind the matter about which one is inquiring. What opens up the space within which the matter appears as intelligible is prior to philosophy, and in relation to which philosophy has no more claim than do literature, poetry, music or science.

Just to pull us back on track a little . . . It was @Leontiskos, earlier in this thread, who first voiced the question of presuppositions, in this way:

Philosophy could be called highest because it is without presuppositions. But could it be called highest for a more substantive reason? — Leontiskos

I myself, in my OP, wasn't thinking about presuppositions when I ruminated about what might make philosophy the "highest" discourse in some sense. Not to say that L's idea is a bad one, but I was focused more on what he calls "a more substantive reason."

Maybe we could refocus this aspect of the question by asking: What might be the relation between 1) an argument for philosophical discourse as presuppositionless, and 2) the observation that this discourse appears to allow endless recursion?

I recognise that it is something often exploited by the unscrupulous to exploit the gullible — Wayfarer

Yes there is clearly a problem with putting so much faith in a "charismatic" authority, but aside from that it's possibly the bleakest thing I've ever read as far as philosophy is concerned. I've always thought of philosophy as a personal pursuit of knowledge so to speak, the idea that it's a hopeless effort unless you belong to a chosen elite is quite depressing. It's yet another field where we the plebs must defer to the experts, like we already do with scientists, doctors, lawyers etc.

It's yet another field where we the plebs must defer to the experts, like we already do with scientists, doctors, lawyers etc. — goremand

Except that these days we’re beginning to discover that such supposed ‘experts’ get their expertise by dipping into cultural practices that we all participate in, so the knowledge they would like you to think to exclusive to their special elite is in fact a specialized version of knowledge already circulating widely through the larger society.

I think what we’re talking about here isn’t a dichotomy between something called science and something called philosophy , but a spectrum of explication. — Joshs

I sort of agree, and also sort of don't. I agree that in practice it's difficult to imagine a serious explication of anything in the physical world that doesn't partake of both discourses, scientific and philosophical. Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between what can be said within these discourses, and this has to do with their stated subject matters. As a philosopher I can say nothing about whether a particular proposal for quantum computing is a good one. My physicist friend, who works in this area, can say a lot, but insofar as he also talks about existence or reality or any of those "elevator words" (love that term!) he'll find no support within physics for anything he wants to say. (He agrees with this, by the way, being a firm proponent of the "shut up and calculate" school.)

So, granted the fuzziness of many boundaries, there is a clear difference between these discourses. And for the purposes of this thread, the question is, Why is it the case that philosophical discourse can question, and reflect upon, the discourse of physics, but the reverse is not the case? Does this make philosophy special in some interesting way?

It's yet another field where we the plebs must defer to the experts, like we already do with scientists, doctors, lawyers etc. — goremand

It would be bleak if you take such a bleak view. If you were a piano student, presumably you would select a teacher who was an expert in teaching piano, and you would admire and hope to emulate excellent pianists. Of course there are natural virtuosos but even they usually have teachers to bring forth their innate ability

I would say that there is no such thing as a presuppositionless philosophy. If philosophy begins with questioning, it is also the case that to question is to already have in mind the matter about which one is inquiring. — Joshs

I agree that philosophy begins with a problem or with questions that need to be asked. I suppose amongst the problematics of Platonism was the nature of knowledge, the good, the true, the beautiful, the just, and such large and difficult-to-define questions. But also notice the significance of aporia in those dialogues - questions which can't be answered and for which no easy solution presents itself. One could argue that aporetic questions themselves invite a kind of epochē, a sense of not knowing (and knowing one doesn't know, as opposed to further speculations and conceptual proliferation.)

Returning to epochē, scholars have noted the relationship between Pyrrho and India. Compare this brief snippet from Indian philosophy which is germane to the point:

Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.

This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in.

I think that opens up a mode of being which is focussed on paying close attention to what is actually so. As distinct from the construction of elaborate theories based largely on abstractions. Which leads to

the observation that this discourse appears to allow endless recursion? — J

Today's philosophy inheres in a tangled web of concepts and symbolic values, requiring considerable training in intellectual history. Of course stories, world-views, 'the metaphors we live by' serve a purpose, they're an inextricable part of our constitution as social creatures. But lived truth, the immediate awareness of what is so, is of a different order. I think the basis of philosophy as 'love~wisdom' has to be oriented around a kind of direct and vivid awareness.

Why is it the case that philosophical discourse can question, and reflect upon, the discourse of physics, but the reverse is not the case? — J

Because philosophical discourse is more presumptuous?

Scientific journals are peer-reviewed. That's not a guarantee that they publish only truth, of course. It's just a first nibble by the rest of the scientific community, because it is ultimately this community which will take up, build upon, pass by, propose alternative theories, replicate or fail to replicate experimental results, and so on. A paper is never the end, just a contribution.

But are philosophers supposed to be some sort of super-peers? Should journals hold off publication until they've "checked with a philosopher"?

But also notice the significance of aporia in those dialogues — Wayfarer

I'm glad you mentioned aporia. This is another fruitful way to think about what happens when philosophy -- apparently following its natural bent -- is able to "have the last word" in such a potentially mechanical, trivial way.

It would be bleak if you take such a bleak view. If you were a piano student, presumably you would select a teacher who was an expert in teaching piano, and you would admire and hope to emulate excellent pianists. — Wayfarer

This is not at all what I took Conze to be saying in your quoted text, the so-called sages here are not "teachers", they can't teach you the truth any more than a person with vision can teach a blind man how to see. They have insight that they can't communicate to lesser minds, all we can do is submit to their authority as presented through charisma.

Well, it depends. If the paper is heavy on philosophical discourse (not usually the case, thank goodness), then yes, running it by a peer-philosopher sounds good. Otherwise, as I said, philosophers have no business offering opinions within a scientific discourse. Their super-power, if any, lies in their ability to defend themselves from challenges that would redirect their discourse into other disciplines.

I have expressed before the idea that the role of philosophy is to 'take you to the border' - the border of what can be said, explained, expressed in words. Of course the influence of Zen Buddhism is perceptible in that, but the same intuition is expressed in other philosophers.

Those insights are communicated to the student by the teacher. As well as what is learned by their deportment and presence. Of course it's radically un-PC for liberal democracy, I do understand that. That's why I said I'm not going to die on a hill for it.

A further quote from the Hadot entry:

For Hadot, famously, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (PWL 84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done (Nussbaum 1996, 353-4; Cooper 2010).

Anxieties, indeed.

I have expressed before the idea that the role of philosophy is to 'take you to the border' - the border of what can be said, explained, expressed in words. Of course the influence of Zen Buddhism is perceptible in that, but the same intuition is expressed in other philosophers. — Wayfarer

Very good. I agree completely.

Those insights are communicated to the student by the teacher. As well as what is learned by their deportment and presence. — Wayfarer

Ok, well, I understand now that is what you believe, but it really is not what I think Edward Conze is saying in the text you quoted. He is talking about wise men with a "rare faculty" whose teachings are based on authority, not personal understanding.

Of course it's radically un-PC for liberal democracy — Wayfarer

Teachers teaching their students is not particularly "un-PC". Neither is the idea of trusting authorities for that matter, but I grant you that it might raise eyebrows in a philosophy forum.