agree that philosophy begins with a problem or with questions that need to be asked. I suppose amongst the problematics of Platonism was the nature of knowledge, the good, the true, the beautiful, the just, and such large and difficult-to-define questions. But also notice the significance of aporia in those dialogues - questions which can't be answered and for which no easy solution presents itself — Wayfarer

Notice further that framing the essential questions of philosophy in terms of the nature of knowledge, the good, the true, the beautiful and the just already poses the questions by way of a pre-understanding of what these concepts mean and constrains the direction of their answer, such as whether and in what sense they lead to aporia, and how to interpret the meaning of the aporia.

philosophers have no business offering opinions within a scientific discourse — J

Dope.

Their super-power, if any, lies in their ability to defend themselves from challenges that would redirect their discourse into other disciplines. — J

I'm with you ― I believe ― in thinking this doesn't sound all that impressive.

(1) Who bothers to challenge philosophy?

(2) Are you sure that no other discipline has this "super-power"? I suspect every discipline does, even in good faith. (If all you've got is a hammer, ...)

(3) Are you sure this is anything more than a dirty rhetorical trick? Another "heads I win, tails you lose" sort of thing? ― Distinguished from (2) because you don't even need a discipline, just the willingness to treat discussion as competition.

*

I'm not bringing up science just as boosterism, but because I was thinking that the tradition of the "top-level" idea casts philosophy as specifically "the queen of the sciences" ― not as something set over against science, as it is so often seen these days. Even (on shaky ground here) something like Aristotle's "first philosophy" would embrace physics, biology, psychology, ethics, and politics as the rest, right?

Anyway ― I would distinguish between a view of philosophy as (either) the highest (or the most fundamental) science, and a view that philosophy holds some particular and special place precisely by not being science.

He is talking about wise men with a "rare faculty" whose teachings are based on authority, not personal understanding. — goremand

Or in insight. That was, for instance, the basis of the Buddha's authority - one which was never imposed on others, unlike the tendency in Roman Christianity. Max Weber's distinction between charismatic leadership and traditional authority is relevant here.

philosophers have no business offering opinions within a scientific discourse
—

Dope. — Srap Tasmaner

How about opinions that directly challenge the presuppositions of a science? Heidegger’s ideas about emotion, and Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s models of perception were decades ahead of the psychological sciences. Have you ever read Phenomenology of Perception?

Or in insight. That was, for instance, the basis of the Buddha's authority - one which was never imposed on others — Wayfarer

I'm having a really hard time telling if this is your interpretation of Conzes text or just you laying out your own opinions. I think Conze makes it very clear: insight can not be transmitted or taught to people who lack it. Instead the best we get is submission to a charismatic sage, who we trust to guide us despite our inability to understand the underlying principles of their teachings.

If you think Conze is saying something else, I'd like to hear your reasons.

I was thinking that the tradition of the "top-level" idea casts philosophy as specifically "the queen of the sciences" — Srap Tasmaner

Refuting Gauss, who termed mathematics as that. Also in medieval terms, theology.

What philosophical notions illuminating the mysteries of QM have been proposed by non-scientist philosophers? Just curious.

Gauss, who termed mathematics as that — jgill

Oh you're right! Well, never mind then. I'll go with Gauss.

go with Gauss — Srap Tasmaner

Hmmm. Is this how Catholic mathematicians say "See you later"?

I think Conze makes it very clear: insight can not be transmitted or taught to people who lack it — goremand

That was an excerpt. The entire essay is Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels, Philosophy East and West, 1963. Aside from Conze, the principle of monastic lineage in Buddhism and other spiritual traditions assumes the transmission of insight. Which is not to say that every student will be capable of it, or even interested in it. I think you're very much viewing it through the lens of the rejection of dogmatic Christianity and its 'blind faith' - if it sounds like an appeal to religious insight, then what else could it be, right?

Incidentally, another excerpt from that source:

That (i.e. 'sciential philosophy' a.k.a. 'scientism') has the following features: [1] Natural science, particularly that dealing with inorganic matter, has a cognitive value, tells us about the actual structure of the universe, and provides the other branches of knowledge with an ideal standard in that they are the more "scientific" the more they are capable of mathematical formulation and the more they rely on repeatable and publicly verified observations. [2] Man is the highest of beings known to science, and his power and convenience should be promoted at all costs. [3] Spiritual and magical forces cannot influence events, and life after death may be disregarded, because it is unproven by scientific methods. [4] In consequence, "life" means "man's" life in this world, and the task is to ameliorate this life by a social "technique" in harmony with the "welfare" or "will" of "the people." Buddhists must view all these tenets with the utmost distaste.

Have you ever read Phenomenology of Perception? — Joshs

Tried, and failed. Too long and too hard. But I've picked up quite a bit from Thompson et al, and from some of his briefer essays.

(3) Are you sure this is anything more than a dirty rhetorical trick? Another "heads I win, tails you lose" sort of thing? — Srap Tasmaner

No, I'm not sure. If you've been following this thread, you'll see that at several points I voiced the desire to find something better, more interesting, than what I called "an argumentative gotcha!" Maybe it can't be found, but that's not yet clear. I repeat that, if that's all there is, it's not much of a result.

I would distinguish between a view of philosophy as (either) the highest (or the most fundamental) science, and a view that philosophy holds some particular and special place precisely by not being science. — Srap Tasmaner

Good, and that too is part of what I raised in the OP, in referring to the Top-Level Thesis as requiring that the move from some particular discipline to philosophy be more than a lateral move. It's supposed to be a rung up, according to the TLT. How can we justify that?

Are you sure that no other discipline has this "super-power"? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, pretty sure. Can you think of an example? How would chemistry, for instance, defend itself strictly within the discourse of chemistry from the challenge that it is really a form of physics?

Yes, you've picked a discipline in which the distinction is very hard to draw. To this day we find philosophers challenging a position as "mere psychology," with no great clarity as to what that might mean. I think this is in part because so much of the psychology of perception and emotion is "done" using language that overlaps with philosophical discourse.

(I read the M-P a long time ago; good time for a reread)

go with Gauss
— Srap Tasmaner

Hmmm. Is this how Catholic mathematicians say "See you later"? — Srap Tasmaner

Oh for Gödel's sake.

That was an excerpt. The entire essay is Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels, Philosophy East and West, 1963. — Wayfarer

Thank you, but does the additional context modify the meaning of the quote in any relevant way?

Aside from Conze, the principle of monastic lineage in Buddhism and other spiritual traditions assumes the transmission of insight. — Wayfarer

Well I'd like to discuss his text, so let's not put him "aside". But either way, if there really is such an unbroken lineage this could be explained by sages being replaced by other sages without any muggles ever being elevated to sage-hood.

I think you're very much viewing it through the lens of the rejection of dogmatic Christianity and its 'blind faith' — Wayfarer

That's quite presumptuous, I think my reading is pretty straightforward. You clearly have your own preconceptions about Buddhism and the like, maybe you're viewing the text through that lens?

Oh for Gödel's sake. — J

I cannot adequately express my appreciation for this response.

That's quite presumptuous, I think my reading is pretty straightforward. — goremand

I think today's culture is generally antagonistic to the idea of spiritual authority. Let's consider it from the perspective of philosophy rather than any kind of religious apologetics. I think the underlying idea is something often found in ancient and pre-modern philosophy in the respect shown to the philosophical greats, as Hadot describes under the heading of sages. In fact, sagacity is a rare quality, comprising a kind of holistic vision. The sages are those who have realised that kind of insight, and who are able to convey it to others. I mean, the Western metaphysical tradition, beginning with Parmenides, has various such figures.

there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by... studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes; for only by it is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine. For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning. — Plato, The Republic

the desire to find something better, more interesting, than what I called "an argumentative gotcha!" Maybe it can't be found, but that's not yet clear. I repeat that, if that's all there is, it's not much of a result. — J

Right. I didn't think I was introducing the idea, but endorsing your uncertainty.

How would chemistry, for instance, defend itself strictly within the discourse of chemistry from the challenge that it is really a form of physics? — J

But this seems like a whole different thing.

Were you ever suggesting that there might be a reduction of natural science to philosophy? If you were, I missed it.

My understanding of the thread was that philosophy does something different from science. What it does different might turn out to be not so interesting ― and we have some idea in what sense it might not be interesting, if it's just a cheap "gotcha" ― or it might be interesting, only it's hard to characterize what it might be doing that's interesting.

My suggestion was that any discipline could just keep doing its thing, even when confronted with philosophical questions. I think you were underestimating the determination of non-philosophers. Your psycho-analyst folds pretty quickly. I can absolutely imagine an historian, or a sociologist, or a neuroscientist just continually folding back into his own domain, with its own frameworks of explanation, whatever question philosophy wants to pose. Or an economist. Or a Marxist economist.

I guess we could debate that, but even if most disciplines choose to stay within their lane ― and so only use the handy hammer on the prescribed nails ― when challenged to justify themselves and their procedures, isn't it the most natural thing in the world to reach for that hammer and treat the philosophical challenge as de facto within their purview? Like, philosophy is begging to be a nail.

I'm not sure what kind of debate we would have without evidence to hand, except making up stories, but for me it barely needs defense.

To you, on the other, it's perfectly intuitive that philosophy is uniquely universal in this way. I find that puzzling. I mean, I know it's part of philosophy's self-image, but if you've been around a bit you must know that you have no hope of out-flanking Marxism by questioning it, or economics, or psychology, or neuroscience, or biology, or ...

But now you're talking about reduction, which I didn't think was on the table, and which surely we don't want to get into here.

Here is another spanner.

Assume that if philosophy is the strictly the most expansive discipline, every claim should have philosophical importance, but not every philosophical claim would have domain specific import.

1 ) Take a philosophical claim X which does not have relevance to a claim in any discipline.
2 ) Take the collection of statements of which X has relevance to and call it Q.
3 ) Relevance is transitive, if X is relevant to Y, and Y is relevant to Z, then X is relevant to Z.
4 ) Relevance is symmetric, that is if X is relevant to Y, then Y is relevant to X.
5 ) Relevance is reflexive, X is relevant to X.
6 ) Relevance is an equivalence relation.
7 ) Then anything relevant to X cannot be relevant to any philosophical claim.
8 ) Then all of Q is not relevant to philosophy.

That gives you two choices about how disciplines are organised based on relevance. Either philosophy is related to all domains, and thus co-extensive with each of them it is related to. Or philosophy is not relevant to some domains - that is, philosophy is of no relevance to any claim in them.

But we don't get to decide which is which, based purely on the notion of relevance. If you can show that some claim is related to some claim which is relevant to philosophy, you would show that it is thereby relevant to philosophy assuming relevance is an equivalence relation.

Asking why X is justified gives you a good candidate for finding a claim relevant to the questioned claim which is relevant to philosophy, and thus showing X is relevant to philosophy.

However despite philosophy perhaps containing every discipline, it cannot uniquely constrain their content. Assume that a system of philosophy entails that some claim in some domain is true, then the falsehood of the latter claim entails the falsehood of some statement, or invalidity of argument, in the philosophical system through modus tollens impact.

If ever you end up strengthening philosophy's import to a discipline, that discipline can take a refutational revenge. It seems, then, that if one makes inferences within any domain which are not philosophical, and some philosophical inferences constrain those inferences, then the domain inferences also place constraints on philosophy. IE, one can impact what is true or false in philosophy without reasoning philosophically at all.

If we take the assumption that every discipline is a subdiscipline of philosophy, and grant that inquiry within discipline need not be done using philosophical reasoning... then every part of philosophy is saturated by nonphilosophy's refutational impact on philosophy.

The situation may even worsen for philosophy. If we assume that every philosophical claim is relevant to every other philosophical claim, then every claim in the subdisciplines is relevant to any claim in philosophy.

Just at the moment philosophy becomes the core of human inquiry, it balances on that inquiry's fine edge. Philosophy's nature turns on a dime without any philosopher lifting a finger.

Suppose some surly neo-Freudian interrupts me at the point where I assert that “there’s nowhere else to go.” Nonsense, he says. “I’ll give you a psychological-slash-reductive explanation of why philosophers do what they do, and this explanation will have nothing to do with ‛ideas’ or ‛reasoning,’ and everything to do with culturally determined modes of expression mixed with individual depth psychology.” Ah, but I can reply, “Indeed? And what is your justification for asserting that such an explanation is true?” We see where this has to go: We’re back to doing philosophy. My surly interlocutor has been trumped. — J

This isn't remotely convincing.

He hasn't been trumped. He'll stroke his inevitable beard and say, "Interesting. Do you often demand that people provide justification for what they say to you?"

Your guy wasn't even trying. Mine is holding his own even as a ridiculous stereotype.

Does this have to be an argument, if I can put it this way, that philosophical maximalism is equivalent to philosophical minimalism?

Does it also function as an argument that no boundary between philosophy and the sciences (and possibly other empirical disciplines, and possibly the arts, ...) is definable much less enforceable?

I can put it differently. It's common around here to say that every time you open your mouth, you're doing philosophy. Every field of study is built on philosophical assumptions, blah blah blah. ― What if we said instead (or 'also', but I'd rather not) every time you try to do philosophy you end up talking about history and psychology and biology and ... That there is no point pretending you are insulated from the rest of human thinking just by calling what you're doing philosophy.

(My go-to example for this sort of thing used to be phenomenalism, which kinda presents itself as a supremely abstract from-first-principles take on perception, but is 100% dependent on knowing that the surface of the eye is 2-dimensional.)

Does this have to be an argument, if I can put it this way, that philosophical maximalism is equivalent to philosophical minimalism?

Does it also function as an argument that no boundary between philosophy and the sciences (and possibly other empirical disciplines, and possibly the arts, ...) is definable much less enforceable? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. Yes.

And also that the top paragraph and bottom paragraph are equivalent.

7 ) Then anything relevant to X cannot be relevant to any philosophical claim. — fdrake

Why would this follow?

That's what I thought you might be doing.

So - 'no privileged perspective' - is that it?

Well here is a critical difference in what Conze is saying and what Plato is saying:

there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge — Plato, The Republic

Whatever happened to the "rare and unordinary faculty" of perennial philosophy?

I hope you understand, that what it is that I find "bleak" in Conzes text is not the idea that philosophy requires effort or that some people are better at it than others, but the idea that it is a hopeless endevour unless you belong to a privileged class of people.

I don’t think Conze says or implies that.

there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge — Plato, The Republic

In Mahāyāna texts you can find a comparable expression:

All sentient beings without exception have the nature of the Tathāgata. — Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra

Such later Buddhist texts express the concept that all being have the capacity for enlightenment, however, it is a capacity that still needs to be actualised. There are still teachers, teachings, and those needing to be taught.

The purpose of my quoting the Edward Conze text was simply an illustration of the idea of there being a higher truth - something for which I am generally criticized for suggesting. But to get down to basics, this is because I don't think our culture possesses a vertical axis along which the description of 'higher' makes any sense. 'Compared to what?' will be the question. So in posting that, I was suggesting a rather more traditionalist sense of the 'philosophical ascent', that there really is such a domain, that one has to 'ascend' to. (I even think a Hegel might endorse that.)

I suppose another relatively recent piece of popular philosophy I could refer to is Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, where Pirsig says our culture has no 'metaphysics of quality'. Pirsig explores a way of understanding the nature of existence that transcends typical dualistic distinctions, such as subject-object, science-religion, or fact-value. For Pirsig, a fundamental "Quality" underpins and precedes these conceptual splits. Quality isn't merely an attribute or characteristic of something or other, but is the root from which all experiences and understandings emerge. It is dynamic and intrinsic to life itself, a force that gives meaning and value to existence. (Long time since I read it, but I revisited some video interviews with Pirsig, now youtube exists.)

Equivalence relations work like equality. If you knew that x = 2, and that 2 = y, then you know x = y. Imagine that X is relevant to Y and that Y is relevant to some philosophical claim P, then X is relevant to Y, Y is relevant to P, then X is relevant to P. Y was arbitrary, so anything which is relevant to X cannot be relevant to philosophy.

Aye. It's an argument that if you make philosophy the most expansive and the most foundational discipline, you end up making philosophy able to be done without philosophical reasoning and also have its foundations refuted by non-philosophical reasoning.

Sure, I see what you're saying. IRL, that's quite likely what would happen, and as you point out, a Marxist or an evolutionary biologist could make the same sort of response.

What I was imagining, and trying to describe, was a refereed situation, so to speak, where each of the interlocutors agrees to the rules of rational philosophical discourse. Playing by these rules, the philosopher always trumps, and always wins. If the bearded Viennese tries his "Interesting. Do you always . . . " response, the referee steps in and says, "Out of bounds. Please answer the question."

By comparing these two scenarios, we may learn something about the issue at hand. The claim of the TLT seems to be, "There is no rational path down which philosophy may be drawn (and dissolved) by some other discipline, and we know what the rules are for rationality." Does the Freudian get to claim that his path is rational, that we are wrong about knowing the rules? I still say that he can't. What would the claim sound like? How would it avoid being further philosophy? Now perhaps he can say something like, "No, I can't explain or justify my claim, but I can show you how it's true." And he can then point, and describe, much in the way that a painter might show us images that move us and convince us, without ever making rational claims about anything. In short, the Freudian may be right, but what he can't do is justify a claim to being right, without engaging in more philosophy.

What should we say about this response? I find it unobjectionable, because it doesn't touch the TLT. There are many other important and useful discourses besides the rational/philosophical. They may even lead to vital truths. (I believe religious discourse is an example of this.) Anyone who engages in those discourses is free to forswear the discourses referred to by the TLT. But that doesn't challenge the TLT itself. The puzzle remains: Is this trick or knack of philosophical discourse something worth valuing, and pondering over? Or is it just a fact about recursion, of little further interest?

My understanding of the thread was that philosophy does something different from science. What it does different might turn out to be not so interesting ― and we have some idea in what sense it might not be interesting, if it's just a cheap "gotcha" ― or it might be interesting, only it's hard to characterize what it might be doing that's interesting. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's a good summary.

But now you're talking about reduction, which I didn't think was on the table, and which surely we don't want to get into here. — Srap Tasmaner

Reduction is a whole other mess, agreed. But let me try to say why I don't think my question about the discourse of chemistry was a question about reduction. I gave that example in response to your suggestion that many other disciplines have the same "super-power" that philosophy has:

Their super-power, if any, lies in their ability to defend themselves from challenges that would redirect their discourse into other disciplines. — J

So, if chemistry had this ability, it would be able to respond to a physicist's attempt at reduction using only the arguments available to it qua chemistry. That's what I was questioning, and I don't think it matters whether reductionism is right or not. The point concerns methods of argumentative defense, not the truth of a particular thesis.

Aye. It's an argument that if you make philosophy the most expansive and the most foundational discipline, you end up making philosophy able to be done without philosophical reasoning and also have its foundations refuted by non-philosophical reasoning. — fdrake

It's the end of the world! :wink:

Well, not quite that bad, but I think we have good reason to want to draw back from this conclusion. Before I talk about that, could you say whether your premises concerning relevance relations (3 - 7) are accepted logical truths? I don't know alternative logics well enough myself.