In this inquiry, to give an instance of the diversity of opinion, the greater number of authorities have affirmed the existence of the gods; it is the most likely conclusion, and one to which we are all led by the guidance of nature; but Protagoras said that he was doubtful, and Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene thought that there were no such beings at all. Those, further, who have asserted their existence present so much diversity and disagreement that it would be tedious to enumerate their ideas separately. For a great deal is said about the forms of the gods, and about their locality, dwelling-places, and mode of life, and these points are disputed with the utmost difference of opinion among philosophers.
While upon the question in which our subject of discussion is mainly comprised, the question whether the gods do nothing, project nothing, and are free from all charge and administration of affairs, or whether, on the other hand, all things were from the beginning formed and established by them, and are throughout infinity ruled and directed by them, on this question, especially, there are great differences of opinion, and it is inevitable, unless these are decided, that mankind should be involved in the greatest uncertainty, and in ignorance of things which are of supreme importance.
https://gbsadler.blogspot.com/2013/02/classic-arguments-about-gods-existence.html#:~:text=In%20this%20inquiry%2C%20to%20give,which%20are%20of%20supreme%20importance.
Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time.
— creativesoul
This is a side-issue, but who are the three defenders you are thinking of? — Ludwig V
Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not.
— creativesoul
I may have misinterpreted "prior". I was treating it as meaning "presupposed" and thinking of the variety of preconditions that have to be satisfied to make thought and belief meaningful. — Ludwig V
Even new introductions have to be based on existing ideas if they are to be explained at all. — Ludwig V
This takes me back to:-
All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things.
— creativesoul
Here, you seem to be suggesting a single pattern of thought that explains all thought. But is that consistent with the variety of thoughts you specify? If some thought and beliefs are existentially dependent on being talked about, I don't see how the model of correlations drawn between different things applies. — Ludwig V
It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding.
— creativesoul
I agree with that. That's why I've taken such an interest in this topic. There's very little discussion anywhere, and yet, in my view, it's not only important for understanding animals, but also for understanding humans. — Ludwig V
Thinking about X requires X. <------I'm okay with that.
— creativesoul
How does a god exist? — Athena
Do any animals other than human beings worship a god? — Athena
I am thinking about the existence of the things we talk about and also the difference between humans and animals.
How about love. What is it? What does it consist of? Will the lion ever learn to "love" its neighbor? — Athena
I read more of what Creativesoul had to say about existential thinking and thought of deleting my post, but maybe there is some benefit to simplifying a debate about what exists because it has substance and what does not. Does anyone remember the Greek argument of what exists and what does not?
...which animal other than a human thinks about a god or mates with someone because of ideas of love? — Athena
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.
But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.
I look forward to your reply. — Ludwig V
I did and I didn't. That is, I was expecting references to some of the critiques of Gettier's article, rather than Gettier's selection from existing formulations.I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink: — creativesoul
No hurry. I've never been happy in large, noisy, crowded (and drunken) parties and it's only got worse with age. People behave differently in crowds. There's a lot of research about that - largely with a public order agenda. The Greeks regarded it as a madness and explained it by reference to Bacchus and/or Pan.It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me. — creativesoul
Yes. I see that.For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological. — creativesoul
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. (It's not necessarily a question of one or the other. Both may well play their part.) Pavlov presupposes a passive organism - one that learns in response to a stimulus. Skinner posits what he calls "operant conditioning" which is a process that starts with the organism acting on or in the environment and noticing the results of those actions - here the organism stimulates the environment which responds in its turn. There's another interesting source of learning - mimicry. I've gathered that very new infants are able to smile back at a smiling face - there's even a section of the brain that produces this mirroring effect. It is still observable in adults. Just food for thought.I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex. — creativesoul
I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language.Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about. — creativesoul
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
— creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". — Ludwig V
I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex.
— creativesoul
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. — Ludwig V
I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language. — Ludwig V
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response?Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones. — creativesoul
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either.They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked. — creativesoul
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour.A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. — creativesoul
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about?that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion. — creativesoul
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour.My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head. — creativesoul
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? — creativesoul
A majority of the survey respondents ascribed emotions to "most" or "all or nearly all" non-human primates (98%), other mammals (89%), birds (78%), octopus, squids and cuttlefish (72%) and fish (53%). And most of the respondents ascribed emotions to at least some members of each taxonomic group of animals considered, including insects (67%) and other invertebrates (71%).
The survey also included questions about the risks in animal behavioral research of anthromorphism (inaccurately projecting human experience onto animals) and anthropodenial (willful blindness to any human characteristics of animals).
"It's surprising that 89% of the respondents thought that anthropodenial was problematic in animal behavioral research, compared to only 49% who thought anthromorphism poses a risk," Benítez says. "That seems like a big shift."
Thought etc. in creatures lacking human language is expressed and available to us in their behaviour. The same is true in human beings, but, of course, philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why.If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of? — Patterner
I don't know what anyone has in mind. The first thing that zones to mind for new is that it's a different type of behavior. For example, day someone punched me. I might:philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. — Ludwig V
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours.All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior). — Patterner
Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
— creativesoul
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response? — Ludwig V
They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
— creativesoul
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either. — Ludwig V
A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use.
— creativesoul
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour. — Ludwig V
...that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
— creativesoul
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about? — Ludwig V
My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
— creativesoul
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour. — Ludwig V
Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express?All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
— Patterner
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours. — Ludwig V
You may remember that earlier in this thread there was some discussion of Timothy Pennings' claim that his corgi could do calculus. See Excerpts from "Do dogs know calculus"When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted. — creativesoul
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at.Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought. — creativesoul
I'm inclined to answer yes. But I would much prefer to work from examples, so that I understand what the distinction amounts to.Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express? — Patterner
Of course one cannot philosophize without language. One of the big puzzles in Berekeley's writing is that he is very clear that his immatierialism does not imply any change whatever to his everyday behaviour, and there's a good case for saying that the heliocentric view of the solar system does not result in any change to ordinary behaviour.I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them? — Patterner
I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand.However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer. — Ludwig V
I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. All I'm suggesting is that linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, in our world, are connected. Yet I don't rule out the possibility that there are some beliefs that cannot be expressed without language. These are not separate domains, but intertwined. This is why Pennings' Corgi is such a puzzle.Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior. — Patterner
Yes, of course, But context is always essential to understand behaviour in creatures capable of rational thought.And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them. — Patterner
For what it's worth, I'm not clear about this stuff either. It would be tidy if we could draw a clear line between what can be done with and without language. But I just don't see it.I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand. — Patterner
I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. — Ludwig V
Maybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language.And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. — Ludwig V
Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why. — Ludwig V
Yes. You seem to have it about right. The only issue now is what concepts we can attribute when explaining what animals that do not have human languages.Maybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language. — Patterner
Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner
There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of?
— creativesoul
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? — Patterner
If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?
Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
— creativesoul
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at. — Ludwig V
However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
— creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.
But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. — Ludwig V
Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena.
The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.
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