Here is what Cicero had to say about the existence of the gods....

In this inquiry, to give an instance of the diversity of opinion, the greater number of authorities have affirmed the existence of the gods; it is the most likely conclusion, and one to which we are all led by the guidance of nature; but Protagoras said that he was doubtful, and Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene thought that there were no such beings at all. Those, further, who have asserted their existence present so much diversity and disagreement that it would be tedious to enumerate their ideas separately. For a great deal is said about the forms of the gods, and about their locality, dwelling-places, and mode of life, and these points are disputed with the utmost difference of opinion among philosophers.

While upon the question in which our subject of discussion is mainly comprised, the question whether the gods do nothing, project nothing, and are free from all charge and administration of affairs, or whether, on the other hand, all things were from the beginning formed and established by them, and are throughout infinity ruled and directed by them, on this question, especially, there are great differences of opinion, and it is inevitable, unless these are decided, that mankind should be involved in the greatest uncertainty, and in ignorance of things which are of supreme importance.
https://gbsadler.blogspot.com/2013/02/classic-arguments-about-gods-existence.html#:~:text=In%20this%20inquiry%2C%20to%20give,which%20are%20of%20supreme%20importance.

Not so different from today's debates about the existence of a god. I think we have to puzzle what was the original awareness of a god. We can experience a tree or a lion, the gods are not experienced in that way, so where does the idea of god come from? And I want to mention animals, which animal other than a human thinks about a god or mates with someone because of ideas of love?

Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time.
— creativesoul
This is a side-issue, but who are the three defenders you are thinking of? — Ludwig V

I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink:

Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not.
— creativesoul
I may have misinterpreted "prior". I was treating it as meaning "presupposed" and thinking of the variety of preconditions that have to be satisfied to make thought and belief meaningful. — Ludwig V

That's okay. Sometimes it takes a little work to understand each other. They're very close in meaning, and often used interchangeably. I don't.

For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological.

Even new introductions have to be based on existing ideas if they are to be explained at all. — Ludwig V

Is this referring to the position I'm working out/from? I mean, sure, as language users anything we come up with will be based - loosely at least - on something we've already been exposed to. All explanation is language use. As it pertains to philosophy, there will be all sorts of prior influences. Yet, I'm confident that thought, belief, and meaningful experience is prior to the complex sort of language we employ. I'm also confident that there are precursors to our language that do some of the same thing(s) that our language does, despite those animals not having the ability to take account/record with meaningful marks, and naming and descriptive practices. We can look at what language less animals are doing with language too. <---- Here, of course, by "language-less" I mean complex spoken and written language such as our own, capable of metacognition. I really need to start being better about that qualification though, because I'm confident we're not the only language users.

This takes me back to:-
All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things.
— creativesoul
Here, you seem to be suggesting a single pattern of thought that explains all thought. But is that consistent with the variety of thoughts you specify? If some thought and beliefs are existentially dependent on being talked about, I don't see how the model of correlations drawn between different things applies. — Ludwig V

I'm not suggesting a pattern of thought. I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex. If there's inconsistency, self-contradiction, and/or incoherence I'm unaware. The differences in thoughts are the content of the correlations. That's key to all the different 'kinds' of thought, in a nutshell.

Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about. I mean, one cannot acquire knowledge of which train counts as the five o'clock train without drawing correlations between those standards and some train or another. That is chock full of correlations, some of which are between the language use itself, which amounts to talking about the time standards and trains.

That is the sort of thought/belief that is existentially dependent on a creature capable of metacognition.

It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding.
— creativesoul
I agree with that. That's why I've taken such an interest in this topic. There's very little discussion anywhere, and yet, in my view, it's not only important for understanding animals, but also for understanding humans. — Ludwig V

I see it much the same way. The current political environment shows how correlations work. It's how some get convinced to be mad at all the wrong people for all the wrong reasons.

Thinking about X requires X. <------I'm okay with that.
— creativesoul

How does a god exist? — Athena

As an explanation.

Do any animals other than human beings worship a god? — Athena

Well, as best I can tell, they're probably incapable of wondering why this or that happens. So, I suspect the answer is "no". I'm okay not knowing.

I am thinking about the existence of the things we talk about and also the difference between humans and animals.

How about love. What is it? What does it consist of? Will the lion ever learn to "love" its neighbor? — Athena

Good questions. Apt. Germane. Yet, seemingly so distant to the current conversation. They're not though! Not at all. It's extremely nuanced. I'm still working things out, but I'll say this much because it seems you're asking about the ontological basis I'm working from.

That which exists has an effect/affect.

I read more of what Creativesoul had to say about existential thinking and thought of deleting my post, but maybe there is some benefit to simplifying a debate about what exists because it has substance and what does not. Does anyone remember the Greek argument of what exists and what does not?

I'm thinking there's more than one. I'm unfamiliar with all.

Nice. I take it you read through some of my meanderings here?

...which animal other than a human thinks about a god or mates with someone because of ideas of love? — Athena

None that I can tell. Pondering one's own existence requires having already situated oneself in what isn't. Commit solipsism to the flames...

I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.

But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.

I look forward to your reply. — Ludwig V

It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me.

:wink:

I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink: — creativesoul

I did and I didn't. That is, I was expecting references to some of the critiques of Gettier's article, rather than Gettier's selection from existing formulations.

It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me. — creativesoul

No hurry. I've never been happy in large, noisy, crowded (and drunken) parties and it's only got worse with age. People behave differently in crowds. There's a lot of research about that - largely with a public order agenda. The Greeks regarded it as a madness and explained it by reference to Bacchus and/or Pan.

For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological. — creativesoul

Yes. I see that.

I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex. — creativesoul

There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. (It's not necessarily a question of one or the other. Both may well play their part.) Pavlov presupposes a passive organism - one that learns in response to a stimulus. Skinner posits what he calls "operant conditioning" which is a process that starts with the organism acting on or in the environment and noticing the results of those actions - here the organism stimulates the environment which responds in its turn. There's another interesting source of learning - mimicry. I've gathered that very new infants are able to smile back at a smiling face - there's even a section of the brain that produces this mirroring effect. It is still observable in adults. Just food for thought.

Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about. — creativesoul

I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language.
Suppose we stipulate that knowing that it is 5 o'clock requires an understanding of a conceptual scheme that is not available without language. My dogs have always tended to get restless and congregate near the kitchen at around the time that they are fed. I think they know that it is time for dinner. If they were people, we would have no hesitation in saying that they know it is 7 o'clock (say). How do I know that people understand the background scheme? I know if they can tell the time at any time, for example - which does not necessarily require human language, but normally that is how it works. If a small child (who has not yet learnt to tell the time) appears in the kitchen at 7 o'clock, we will look for other clues to explain why they show up.

Okay. Sorry for the delay...

A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
— creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". — Ludwig V

Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.

I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex.
— creativesoul
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. — Ludwig V

They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.

A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. Pavlov and Skinner differ in their respective explanations. What they're taking account of(attempting to explain) existed in its entirety prior to their account. <----------that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.

I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language. — Ludwig V

I'm happy to clarify. I'm unsure what you're after though. The fact that some philosophers cannot or do not have any idea how distinctions can be drawn without language doesn't bear on my argument as far as I can tell. Seems to me like a problem with their conceptual/linguistic framework(s). My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.

Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones. — creativesoul

Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response?

They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked. — creativesoul

Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either.

A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. — creativesoul

You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour.

that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion. — creativesoul

OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about?

My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head. — creativesoul

Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour.

There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? — creativesoul

If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?

Some relevant recent science news:

Scientific thought on emotions in animals

A majority of the survey respondents ascribed emotions to "most" or "all or nearly all" non-human primates (98%), other mammals (89%), birds (78%), octopus, squids and cuttlefish (72%) and fish (53%). And most of the respondents ascribed emotions to at least some members of each taxonomic group of animals considered, including insects (67%) and other invertebrates (71%).

The survey also included questions about the risks in animal behavioral research of anthromorphism (inaccurately projecting human experience onto animals) and anthropodenial (willful blindness to any human characteristics of animals).

"It's surprising that 89% of the respondents thought that anthropodenial was problematic in animal behavioral research, compared to only 49% who thought anthromorphism poses a risk," Benítez says. "That seems like a big shift."

If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of? — Patterner

Thought etc. in creatures lacking human language is expressed and available to us in their behaviour. The same is true in human beings, but, of course, philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why.


That's interesting. Are we talking about the responses of scientists who study animal behaviour? If so, it confirms my expectation that the closer people look at animal behaviour, the more they find in it.

Yes.

The first paragraph of the linked article:

The journal Royal Society Open Science published a survey of 100 researchers of animal behavior, providing a unique view of current scientific thought on animal emotions and consciousness.

philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. — Ludwig V

I don't know what anyone has in mind. The first thing that zones to mind for new is that it's a different type of behavior. For example, day someone punched me. I might:
1. Punch them in return.
2. Cry.
3. Ask them why they punched me; why they think punching is a good solution to any problem; or whatever.

All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).

It's quite a change from the old (Cartesian) scientific opinion. Perhaps there's some hope for the world.

All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior). — Patterner

Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours.

Okay. Again, sorry for the delay.

Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
— creativesoul
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response? — Ludwig V

When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted.

Pertaining whether or not I regard fear as a stimulus or a response...

I do not find it helpful to use that framework. It could be either, depending upon the framework/conceptual scheme being employed and point of view. Fear is the result of autonomous biological machinery doing its job. It is part of fearful experience. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Fearful experiences are meaningful to the creature full of fear, whether that includes an alpha male's growl accompanied by submissive members' behaviour, or the fear from/of falling(which I understand to be innate). Fear is always an internal element within a more complex experience involving both internal and external elements.

They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
— creativesoul
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either. — Ludwig V

Sure. Mimicry, for the sake of mimicking, involves the mimic drawing correlations between an other's behaviour and their own. Again, biological machinery plays an autonomous role here. However, I do think that neuroscience has established, as you've alluded to perhaps with the infant's smile, that there is not always a mimic who's mimicking for the sake of mimicking. Mirror neurons also play a role in empathy as well as recognizing/attributing other minds. At least, that's what I believe to be the case... very generally/roughly speaking. Smiles are contagious after-all. And then there's also the fact that young children learn how to act in this or that situation by virtue of mimicking others' behaviours, in a "children learn what they live" sort of thing.

I'm not sure what you're saying or referring to with "pattern of correlation".

A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use.
— creativesoul
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour. — Ludwig V

That is exactly what I'm arguing for. The basic elemental constituency of all thought... rational thought notwithstanding. The success or failure of identifying those is completely determined by the methodological approach. Current convention fails.

...that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
— creativesoul
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about? — Ludwig V

Well, we can use what we do know about our own thought and belief as a means for beginning to set out what must be the case if language less thought exists(if it is possible for language less creatures to think), or if language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought or belief, or if language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experiences. I've touched on all this earlier in the thread. I'd be pleased to dig in. It's time.

Such metacognitive endeavors shift the focus away from behaviour and onto our own thought, belief, and meaningful experiences. That is the only place to start. It is not the only place to finish.

My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
— creativesoul
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour. — Ludwig V

I'm confused.

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.

All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
— Patterner
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours. — Ludwig V

Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express?

When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted. — creativesoul

You may remember that earlier in this thread there was some discussion of Timothy Pennings' claim that his corgi could do calculus. See Excerpts from "Do dogs know calculus"
The path followed by light refracted through two different mediums is calculated in this way, but no-one worries about what meaningful experiences are involved. So if Pennings' Corgi follows the same path, I don't see that the experience of the corgi is relevant. The calculation applies. So Pennings' title forces us to face the issue whether what matters is the dog's experiences or the mathematics. Or, preferably, what the relationship is between the two points of view.
Or consider the theory of kin selection as an explanation of altruism in social creatures. The idea that preserving one's kin is as good a way (perhaps better than preserving oneself) to preserve one's DNA and that is what, in the end, matters. Empirically, that could well explain the phenomena. But no-one thinks that bees can identify the DNA of another bee. So we need to explain how the bees select who to sacrifice themselves for and clarify what the relationship is between the two points of view. For example, it may be that bees with the same DNA as our subject bee produce similar pheromones, which we know bees can identify and respond to. So that would be a candidate.
Catching a thrown ball is a quite complex mathematical problem. We have to learn how to do it and we improve with experience. But I'm quite sure that I am incapable of solving that mathematical problem. How do I do it? Well, I can also accurately identify where a sound is coming from. We know that we do that by calculation from the difference between the time the sound arrives at one ear and the time it arrives at the other, which is why stereo headphones work in the weird way that they do. Even if I could do the calculation, I could not do it in the time it takes me to identify where the sound comes from. (We can also accurately assess how far away the things we see are, at least at close range, by the extend we have to focus the two eyes in order to see one image - just like a range-finder. We don't normally experience that.)

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought. — creativesoul

Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at.

Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express? — Patterner

I'm inclined to answer yes. But I would much prefer to work from examples, so that I understand what the distinction amounts to.

I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them?

I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them? — Patterner

Of course one cannot philosophize without language. One of the big puzzles in Berekeley's writing is that he is very clear that his immatierialism does not imply any change whatever to his everyday behaviour, and there's a good case for saying that the heliocentric view of the solar system does not result in any change to ordinary behaviour.
But one can express philosophical views in actions rather than words. There's a story that some of Descartes' followers in Amsterdam expressed their belief in Cartesian dualism by nailing a dog to a wooden plank. Devout Christians may express their beliefs in many ways other than asserting them - refraining from certain behaviours and pursuing others. One of the arguments against radical scepticism is precisely that the sceptic does not behave as if scepticism were true.
However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer.

However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer. — Ludwig V

I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand.

Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior.

And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them.

Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior. — Patterner

I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. All I'm suggesting is that linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, in our world, are connected. Yet I don't rule out the possibility that there are some beliefs that cannot be expressed without language. These are not separate domains, but intertwined. This is why Pennings' Corgi is such a puzzle.

And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them. — Patterner

Yes, of course, But context is always essential to understand behaviour in creatures capable of rational thought.

I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand. — Patterner

For what it's worth, I'm not clear about this stuff either. It would be tidy if we could draw a clear line between what can be done with and without language. But I just don't see it.

Maybe these two things are not incompatible.

I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. — Ludwig V

And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. — Ludwig V

Maybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language.

However, I think the fact that we can't develop all beliefs without language addresses this:

philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why. — Ludwig V

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.

Maybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language. — Patterner

Yes. You seem to have it about right. The only issue now is what concepts we can attribute when explaining what animals that do not have human languages.

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner

Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.

Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all. — Ludwig V

How would that be judged?

:smile:

There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of?
— creativesoul
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? — Patterner

First, we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.

It's 'the things' that matter most here. Those are the differences between language less thought, belief, and meaningful experiences, and those of language users. Our knowledge acquisition of those things, if the right sort of approach is used and maintained, very clearly set out the difference(s) between the thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences of language less creatures and language users.

I'm not sure why that difference seems so puzzling to some. Language less creatures do not - cannot - draw correlations between language use and other things. It's as simple as that. Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use. They do not draw correlations between language use and other things.

The difficult and interesting aspects of this endeavor come with explaining the gradual increase in complexity that happens once language use has begun in earnest.



Second, we know language less creatures are capable of meaningful experience, because we can watch them do all sorts of stuff that it makes no sense to deny it. In addition to our ever increasing knowledge base regarding the biological machinery involved in our own experiences, our own working notions/terminological use of "thought", "belief", and "meaning" come to the fore here.

If language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experience(s), and all experience is meaningful to the creature having it, then it is clear that meaning exists prior to language creation on the evolutionary timeline. All meaningful experience consists - in very large part - of thought and belief about the universe. If a language less creature can form, have and/or hold belief about the world, and some of their belief about the world can be true, then either true belief exists without truth, or truth is prior to language.

If it is the case that meaningful experience predate language users, then one's notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaning" better be able to dovetail with those facts. Current convention fails to draw and maintain the actual distinctions between thinking and thinking about one's own thinking(thought/belief). That's been the bane of philosophy from Aristotle through Kant, Descartes, etc. I know of not a single philosopher who has drawn and maintained that distinction. Of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one, but, I've been asking many people for over 20 years, and I've yet to have been given an affirmative answer/author/philosopher so...

 This scope of this subject matter is as broad as it can be. If we've gotten our own thought and belief wrong, and I'm convinced we have, then we've also gotten something wrong about anything and everything ever thought, believed, spoken, stated, uttered, and/or otherwise expressed.

If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?

Indeed, it does.

I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
— creativesoul
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at. — Ludwig V

Are you claiming that language less thought, belief, and/or experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone?

I meant to directly address this, but didn't. Didn't pay close enough attention, I suppose. So, again, sorry for the delay...

However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-

A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
— creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.

But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. — Ludwig V

Yes. I would agree that the dog salivates upon hearing the bell, after the bell has become meaningful to the dog. The bell becomes meaningful to the dog when the dog draws correlations between it and eating. Hence, both are autonomous. The correlations drawn between the bell and food as well as the involuntary salivation.

 

Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena.

What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them.

I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak.

The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.

There's a sleight of hand here. Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness. That sort of 'higher order' thinking requires thinking about awareness as a separate subject matter in its own right(metacognition). Metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do.

I'm not sure I'm okay with calling it a warning, to be frank. That presupposes knowledge of the growling dog's worldview(intention) that I am not privy to.