Yeah see, this is, on it's face, a totally contradictory set of claims. It represents nothing, unless there is a real thing to which you are referring. In which case, it represents that. It can't really cut both ways. This is one of my personal gripes with the CRP that makes it come apart in some of its most important aspects. This reply would go to a couple of your further paras too.

I am not following the critique here: a thing-in-itself represents something real—it represent “that”. It doesn’t represent nothing.

I am saying that seeing a true disconnect

Ok, I was misunderstanding what you mean by “disconnect”. It would be, then, under my view that there is “connect” between the object which excited the senses and the phenomena of it insofar as the former is required for the latter but is not knowable, in terms of its properties, from the latter.

there is simply no reason whatsoever to assume the object which causes perceptions would be significantly different to the perception

You would have to experience the world as it were independently of your experience of it to verify how accurate your perceptions are; which is impossible. All you can know, is that when you strip out the way your brain is pre-structured to experience, then there’s nothing intelligible left. Take the coffee, e.g., and remove space, time, the twelve categories of the understanding, logic, math, etc. … what do you have left? Nothing but an indeterminate object.

Sorry for the delay Bob, my work and life have recently picked up quite a bit, and I have not had enough time recently to sit down and address your post in full. The conversation seems to be continuing on with others at least, so keep examining apriori and aposteriori with them. I'll see you in another post when my time becomes more available again.

No worries at all, Philosophim!

I am not following the critique here: a thing-in-itself represents something real—it represent “that”. It doesn’t represent nothing. — Bob Ross

If there is 'nothing out there' corresponding to your perception (which you have very expressly positied) then, no. It isn't anything. It represents nothing but a gap in the knowledge of hte perceiver. Maybe that was hte intention, but it butters no bread as far as I can see.

Ok, I was misunderstanding what you mean by “disconnect”. — Bob Ross

Fair enough - I'll try to be clearer (generally, not going to restate).

It would be, then, under my view that there is “connect” between the object which excited the senses and the phenomena of it insofar as the former is required for the latter but is not knowable, in terms of its properties, from the latter. — Bob Ross

I agree. Which, to the degree I can make heads or tails of it, is precluded by the above issue of correspondence.

You would have to experience the world as it were independently of your experience of it to verify how accurate your perceptions are — Bob Ross

Apodictically, yes.

All you can know, is that when you strip out the way your brain is pre-structured to experience, then there’s nothing intelligible left. — Bob Ross

This is yours, and Kant's view. I'm unsure it's mine, but it also does not defeat what I'm putting forward here.

what do you have left? — Bob Ross

The coffee. Quite blatantly.

If there is 'nothing out there' corresponding to your perception

So, something cannot correspond, from reality, to, one-to-one, your perception: that wouldn’t make sense. Your perception(s) are the aftermath of the intuition and cognition of whatever was in reality that excite your senses—that will never one-to-one map because (1) there are a priori preconditions by which your brain cognizes and (2) your brain is cognizing multiple objects, from those sensations, into one coherent stream of consciousness.

If by this you just meant that there must be something exciting your senses in order for your brain to have the material required to represent (i.e., the sensations), then you are absolutely right.

The coffee. Quite blatantly.

How? The idea of a coffee is inherently spatiotemporal, logical, mathematical, conceptual, etc. All of that is a priori.

So, something cannot correspond, from reality, to, one-to-one, your perception: that wouldn’t make sense. — Bob Ross

I understand, and I'm not quite suggesting this (though, it seems far more reasonable than pretending there isn't one at all). To reiterate something from an earlier take, there is no good reason to think that which excites our perceptions is significantly different from them. The fidelity between people's perceptions tends toward this, as does "objective measurement" to the degree that that is actually going on LOL.

(1) there are a priori preconditions by which your brain cognizes and (2) your brain is cognizing multiple objects, from those sensations, into one coherent stream of consciousness. — Bob Ross

So say's Kant's system. Am well aware of this position. But I don't think that's necessarily the case. The idea of a priori concepts is a baffling one, if you're not going to invoke like genetic memory or whatever. This isn't decisive for me, but I think this, coupled with the above, are points, again, at which for me Kant is left seriously wanting.

If by this you just meant that there must be something exciting your senses in order for your brain to have the material required to represent (i.e., the sensations), then you are absolutely right. — Bob Ross

To make this a speculative proposition: That "something" must be (in the sense of, it would be required) sufficiently similar in form, function and aesthetic to your perceptions to cause them absent any notable aberration in perception (this leans on the above two objections, I suppose, and I take that they are all speculative, and work together).

How? The idea of a coffee is inherently spatiotemporal, logical, mathematical, conceptual, etc. All of that is a priori. — Bob Ross

I don't think so, no. And even if it were, you need to explain to me how the thing which causes coffee is not coffee (albeit, having never been named as such - but that's clearly not what's at issue here). If it's not coffee... well. I'm sure it's quite clear why this a rocky road to go down. And perhaps why philosophies like Kant's don't make it further than universities... No one relates to this nonsense.

there is no good reason to think that which excites our perceptions is significantly different from them

The fact that space, time, logic, math, and various core conceptions is not evidence enough that there’s no reason to believe that our perceptions are closely mirrored of things-in-themselves?!?

The idea of a priori concepts is a baffling one, if you're not going to invoke like genetic memory or whatever.

It’s an innate capacity; not memory.

And perhaps why philosophies like Kant's don't make it further than universities... No one relates to this nonsense.

That’s true of all major philosophical movements to a large extent, because people don’t critically think.

It’s an innate capacity; not memory. — Bob Ross

I don't think you've grasped what I've said. It is an objection to that formulation of Kant's. It does not seem to me that this is the case. Babies cannot intuit time and space. They develop those concepts as best i can tell, through experience (and if true, in a rough-and-ready way, defeating Kant's position entirely - but apoditicality would be required, and im not suggesting this.)

The fact that.... — Bob Ross

I can't quite understand the question - it seems as if you're asking the question I should be asking? I'm rejecting a significant gulf between the thing-in-itself and our perception of it in terms of form and aesthetics. I would also add, that we have no reason to think time and space aren't inherent in matter, rather htan our perception of it, for hte same reasons. Perhaps you're seeing what I'm seeing, but grasping at the gap as significant in theory? Can't quite tell, i'm sorry.

hat’s true of all major philosophical movements to a large extent, — Bob Ross

I don't think so. Kant is pariticularly esoteric and counter to intuition. Several large philosophical movements have had their day - even Kant's - but it falls away when people come to the similar thoughts I've laid out here, it seems (this, also in universities, in my experience).

Babies cannot intuit time and space.

When Kant speaks of intuition, he is talking about the innate capacity our sensibility and reason has for attributing spatio-temporal properties to phenomena—not ‘intuition’ in the sense of what our higher-order thinking abilities does.

(and if true, in a rough-and-ready way, defeating Kant's position entirely - but apoditicality would be required, and im not suggesting this.)

With all due respect, this doesn’t even address what Kant is talking about; so, no, I am going to have to say that it would not refute Kant’s position. Babies experience in space and time, which entails that their cognition is representing things with the concepts of space and time which it already has readily at its disposal; and of which the baby is not capable of formulating a concept of with thought.

I would also add, that we have no reason to think time and space aren't inherent in matter

The space and time which are the forms of your sensibility are not in reality—they are the forms that your brain uses to represent phenomena. Whether or not objects themselves have spatiotemporal properties, whether space and time also exist in reality, is a wholly separate question.

Perhaps you're seeing what I'm seeing, but grasping at the gap as significant in theory? Can't quite tell, i'm sorry.

No worries at all. I think you are just misunderstanding Kant’s view, dare I say (;

Perhaps you're seeing what I'm seeing, but grasping at the gap as significant in theory? Can't quite tell, i'm sorry.

That’s true; but there’s still a lot of his view that hasn’t been negated.

When Kant speaks of intuition, he is talking about the innate capacity our sensibility and reason has for attributing spatio-temporal properties to phenomena—not ‘intuition’ in the sense of what our higher-order thinking abilities does. — Bob Ross

I, also, am referring to these. Babies cannot determine depth and do not see themselves as separate to things around them. They, obviously, have no concept of time or duration. They can't note 'difference'. I am using the philosophical term 'intuition' here (though, admittedly, used the other sense at the end of that post so sorry for the confusion).

this doesn’t even address what Kant is talking about — Bob Ross

It does. Your response says to me you aren't engaging with it sufficiently to understand what's being said. Babies do not have concepts of space and time at birth . These are developed from experience. IF TRUE (which I contend, it is) then Kant's system fails on that fact. It is not an inherent ability. It is not something built-in to human reason. It is something discovered, by virtue of, I contend likely, the inherence of those concepts in the world around us. I think Kant's dumbest claim is that without perception time and space are either useless, or do not exist. That is such an insane speculation, as with the gulf between perception and ding-en-sich, that I've had to re-read the CRP specifically to see if there's anything whatsoever that makes it less insane. There doesn't seem to be..

TO be clear: We experience babies in space and time. You are, it seems, rather confused as between this and the baby's experience. I have raised two. I can be fairly sure of this confusion.

The space and time which are the forms of your sensibility are not in reality — Bob Ross

Yes, that is the claim. I reject it on several grounds already canvassed. Though, I suggest, most likely, we have evolved to mirror them in sensibility. Again, assuming the kind of gap between things and our perception as would support the position you take from Kant is simply speculative nonsense to me. Absence is not evidence.

is a wholly separate question. — Bob Ross

Per above, I do not think this is a tenable position to take. We may simply have to disagree here.

I think you are just misunderstanding Kant’s view — Bob Ross

If this is the case, his view is not in line with yours :D