Yeah see, this is, on it's face, a totally contradictory set of claims. It represents nothing, unless there is a real thing to which you are referring. In which case, it represents that. It can't really cut both ways. This is one of my personal gripes with the CRP that makes it come apart in some of its most important aspects. This reply would go to a couple of your further paras too.

I am not following the critique here: a thing-in-itself represents something real—it represent “that”. It doesn’t represent nothing.

I am saying that seeing a true disconnect

Ok, I was misunderstanding what you mean by “disconnect”. It would be, then, under my view that there is “connect” between the object which excited the senses and the phenomena of it insofar as the former is required for the latter but is not knowable, in terms of its properties, from the latter.

there is simply no reason whatsoever to assume the object which causes perceptions would be significantly different to the perception

You would have to experience the world as it were independently of your experience of it to verify how accurate your perceptions are; which is impossible. All you can know, is that when you strip out the way your brain is pre-structured to experience, then there’s nothing intelligible left. Take the coffee, e.g., and remove space, time, the twelve categories of the understanding, logic, math, etc. … what do you have left? Nothing but an indeterminate object.

Sorry for the delay Bob, my work and life have recently picked up quite a bit, and I have not had enough time recently to sit down and address your post in full. The conversation seems to be continuing on with others at least, so keep examining apriori and aposteriori with them. I'll see you in another post when my time becomes more available again.

No worries at all, Philosophim!

I am not following the critique here: a thing-in-itself represents something real—it represent “that”. It doesn’t represent nothing. — Bob Ross

If there is 'nothing out there' corresponding to your perception (which you have very expressly positied) then, no. It isn't anything. It represents nothing but a gap in the knowledge of hte perceiver. Maybe that was hte intention, but it butters no bread as far as I can see.

Ok, I was misunderstanding what you mean by “disconnect”. — Bob Ross

Fair enough - I'll try to be clearer (generally, not going to restate).

It would be, then, under my view that there is “connect” between the object which excited the senses and the phenomena of it insofar as the former is required for the latter but is not knowable, in terms of its properties, from the latter. — Bob Ross

I agree. Which, to the degree I can make heads or tails of it, is precluded by the above issue of correspondence.

You would have to experience the world as it were independently of your experience of it to verify how accurate your perceptions are — Bob Ross

Apodictically, yes.

All you can know, is that when you strip out the way your brain is pre-structured to experience, then there’s nothing intelligible left. — Bob Ross

This is yours, and Kant's view. I'm unsure it's mine, but it also does not defeat what I'm putting forward here.

what do you have left? — Bob Ross

The coffee. Quite blatantly.

If there is 'nothing out there' corresponding to your perception

So, something cannot correspond, from reality, to, one-to-one, your perception: that wouldn’t make sense. Your perception(s) are the aftermath of the intuition and cognition of whatever was in reality that excite your senses—that will never one-to-one map because (1) there are a priori preconditions by which your brain cognizes and (2) your brain is cognizing multiple objects, from those sensations, into one coherent stream of consciousness.

If by this you just meant that there must be something exciting your senses in order for your brain to have the material required to represent (i.e., the sensations), then you are absolutely right.

The coffee. Quite blatantly.

How? The idea of a coffee is inherently spatiotemporal, logical, mathematical, conceptual, etc. All of that is a priori.

So, something cannot correspond, from reality, to, one-to-one, your perception: that wouldn’t make sense. — Bob Ross

I understand, and I'm not quite suggesting this (though, it seems far more reasonable than pretending there isn't one at all). To reiterate something from an earlier take, there is no good reason to think that which excites our perceptions is significantly different from them. The fidelity between people's perceptions tends toward this, as does "objective measurement" to the degree that that is actually going on LOL.

(1) there are a priori preconditions by which your brain cognizes and (2) your brain is cognizing multiple objects, from those sensations, into one coherent stream of consciousness. — Bob Ross

So say's Kant's system. Am well aware of this position. But I don't think that's necessarily the case. The idea of a priori concepts is a baffling one, if you're not going to invoke like genetic memory or whatever. This isn't decisive for me, but I think this, coupled with the above, are points, again, at which for me Kant is left seriously wanting.

If by this you just meant that there must be something exciting your senses in order for your brain to have the material required to represent (i.e., the sensations), then you are absolutely right. — Bob Ross

To make this a speculative proposition: That "something" must be (in the sense of, it would be required) sufficiently similar in form, function and aesthetic to your perceptions to cause them absent any notable aberration in perception (this leans on the above two objections, I suppose, and I take that they are all speculative, and work together).

How? The idea of a coffee is inherently spatiotemporal, logical, mathematical, conceptual, etc. All of that is a priori. — Bob Ross

I don't think so, no. And even if it were, you need to explain to me how the thing which causes coffee is not coffee (albeit, having never been named as such - but that's clearly not what's at issue here). If it's not coffee... well. I'm sure it's quite clear why this a rocky road to go down. And perhaps why philosophies like Kant's don't make it further than universities... No one relates to this nonsense.

there is no good reason to think that which excites our perceptions is significantly different from them

The fact that space, time, logic, math, and various core conceptions is not evidence enough that there’s no reason to believe that our perceptions are closely mirrored of things-in-themselves?!?

The idea of a priori concepts is a baffling one, if you're not going to invoke like genetic memory or whatever.

It’s an innate capacity; not memory.

And perhaps why philosophies like Kant's don't make it further than universities... No one relates to this nonsense.

That’s true of all major philosophical movements to a large extent, because people don’t critically think.

It’s an innate capacity; not memory. — Bob Ross

I don't think you've grasped what I've said. It is an objection to that formulation of Kant's. It does not seem to me that this is the case. Babies cannot intuit time and space. They develop those concepts as best i can tell, through experience (and if true, in a rough-and-ready way, defeating Kant's position entirely - but apoditicality would be required, and im not suggesting this.)

The fact that.... — Bob Ross

I can't quite understand the question - it seems as if you're asking the question I should be asking? I'm rejecting a significant gulf between the thing-in-itself and our perception of it in terms of form and aesthetics. I would also add, that we have no reason to think time and space aren't inherent in matter, rather htan our perception of it, for hte same reasons. Perhaps you're seeing what I'm seeing, but grasping at the gap as significant in theory? Can't quite tell, i'm sorry.

hat’s true of all major philosophical movements to a large extent, — Bob Ross

I don't think so. Kant is pariticularly esoteric and counter to intuition. Several large philosophical movements have had their day - even Kant's - but it falls away when people come to the similar thoughts I've laid out here, it seems (this, also in universities, in my experience).

Babies cannot intuit time and space.

When Kant speaks of intuition, he is talking about the innate capacity our sensibility and reason has for attributing spatio-temporal properties to phenomena—not ‘intuition’ in the sense of what our higher-order thinking abilities does.

(and if true, in a rough-and-ready way, defeating Kant's position entirely - but apoditicality would be required, and im not suggesting this.)

With all due respect, this doesn’t even address what Kant is talking about; so, no, I am going to have to say that it would not refute Kant’s position. Babies experience in space and time, which entails that their cognition is representing things with the concepts of space and time which it already has readily at its disposal; and of which the baby is not capable of formulating a concept of with thought.

I would also add, that we have no reason to think time and space aren't inherent in matter

The space and time which are the forms of your sensibility are not in reality—they are the forms that your brain uses to represent phenomena. Whether or not objects themselves have spatiotemporal properties, whether space and time also exist in reality, is a wholly separate question.

Perhaps you're seeing what I'm seeing, but grasping at the gap as significant in theory? Can't quite tell, i'm sorry.

No worries at all. I think you are just misunderstanding Kant’s view, dare I say (;

Perhaps you're seeing what I'm seeing, but grasping at the gap as significant in theory? Can't quite tell, i'm sorry.

That’s true; but there’s still a lot of his view that hasn’t been negated.

When Kant speaks of intuition, he is talking about the innate capacity our sensibility and reason has for attributing spatio-temporal properties to phenomena—not ‘intuition’ in the sense of what our higher-order thinking abilities does. — Bob Ross

I, also, am referring to these. Babies cannot determine depth and do not see themselves as separate to things around them. They, obviously, have no concept of time or duration. They can't note 'difference'. I am using the philosophical term 'intuition' here (though, admittedly, used the other sense at the end of that post so sorry for the confusion).

this doesn’t even address what Kant is talking about — Bob Ross

It does. Your response says to me you aren't engaging with it sufficiently to understand what's being said. Babies do not have concepts of space and time at birth . These are developed from experience. IF TRUE (which I contend, it is) then Kant's system fails on that fact. It is not an inherent ability. It is not something built-in to human reason. It is something discovered, by virtue of, I contend likely, the inherence of those concepts in the world around us. I think Kant's dumbest claim is that without perception time and space are either useless, or do not exist. That is such an insane speculation, as with the gulf between perception and ding-en-sich, that I've had to re-read the CRP specifically to see if there's anything whatsoever that makes it less insane. There doesn't seem to be..

TO be clear: We experience babies in space and time. You are, it seems, rather confused as between this and the baby's experience. I have raised two. I can be fairly sure of this confusion.

The space and time which are the forms of your sensibility are not in reality — Bob Ross

Yes, that is the claim. I reject it on several grounds already canvassed. Though, I suggest, most likely, we have evolved to mirror them in sensibility. Again, assuming the kind of gap between things and our perception as would support the position you take from Kant is simply speculative nonsense to me. Absence is not evidence.

is a wholly separate question. — Bob Ross

Per above, I do not think this is a tenable position to take. We may simply have to disagree here.

I think you are just misunderstanding Kant’s view — Bob Ross

If this is the case, his view is not in line with yours :D

Ok, I may have misunderstood what you were claiming. Let me ask for clarification: are you saying that a baby does not experience in space and time despite lacking the thinking power know that they are experiencing in space and time?

Just because a baby does not understand well enough, e.g., the difference between themselves and other things and space and time does not entail in the slightest that they do not experience in space and time.

….does not entail in the slightest that they do not experience in space and time. — Bob Ross

I think this is correct, or at least feasible, insofar as if otherwise, it must be the case infants have, not so much an underdeveloped human intellect, but an entirely different intellect altogether. And even if that were the case, it then becomes necessary to speculate on a time condition in which a transformation would occur. Even if experience is the ground for development, it has nothing to do with pure a priori intuitions by which they are possible in the first place.

:up:


If @AmadeusD believes that a baby does not experience in space and time, then they are positing that there is a part of human development which is not human experience in any meaningful sense: it would be toto genere different then how we experience and yet with pre-mature versions of the same organs we have.

All that, and the overarching premise grounding CPR, is the determination of rational governances, not the exceptions to them. This necessarily presupposes imbued in the subject the condition by which pure reason is not so much merely possible, but manifests its activity. Infants are not subjects in which pure reason is active, insofar as it is impossible that humans with such insufficient empirical knowledge have the required inkling to question possible experiences, which is the major raison d’etre for pure reason’s activity…..construct principles by which possible experience doesn’t contradict Nature.

I mean…babies do in fact try to put a round object in a square hole. At least once, and it is impossible for a cognizant observer to determine whether trial and error or mere frustration is the reason he doesn’t just keep trying the impossible. If he immediately recognized the impossible, he wouldn’t have tried in the first place, right?

Yes, but the thing is @AmadeusD is arguing that the baby that tries to put a square object in a round hold is not experiencing that square object and round hole spatiotemporally; viz., the square object doesn't have extension nor is it placed in succession within that baby's consciousness. Arguably, what, then, would a square, which is a spatial concept, be in a consciousness that doesn't represent it in space?!??

what, then, would a square, which is a spatial concept, be in a consciousness that doesn't represent it in space?!?? — Bob Ross

A baby does not have the experience required to name things as square. No parent says to a baby….this is round, that is square, keep ‘em separate, because he knows the baby desn’t know the difference.

What the baby’s doing….who knows.

Just because a baby does not understand well enough, e.g., the difference between themselves and other things and space and time does not entail in the slightest that they do not experience in space and time. — Bob Ross

It really does. They have no experience of difference - which is what is entailed by space and time. They denote difference. Babies do not have a concept of difference. This is particularly obvious when you note that a baby's 'intellect' begins in utero - where they couldn't have those concepts. They are clearly (in my view) learned, and not innate. That 'space and time' are innate is somewhat implausible to me. These seem to be arguments that would need to come down to some supernatural conclusion. Which, you'll note, Kant does.

Let me ask for clarification: are you saying that a baby does not experience in space and time despite lacking the thinking power know that they are experiencing in space and time? — Bob Ross

This is a really quite confused way of approaching a clarification imo, and that is not to be rude. I can't quite figure what to 'straighten out' as to why you'd ask this - but let me try: What's at issue here is that you experience a baby in space and time. I think your question words on that level. But that's not to do with the baby, and their ability (as it were). They simply don't access those concepts (to a point, obvs, from our perspective). And so, "experience in space and time" is a third party observation. It comes from you, not the baby. The baby doesn't have a concept of either. (again, my view.. not some scientific claim). The baby probably doesn't have a concept of experience. Automata. The baby lack's the thinking power to apprehend those concepts at all to begin with. I understand the reliance on the claim to 'possibility' but that possibility, even on a reading of Kant's claims, does not preclude having an experience without those frame works available. But this, then, asks the question about whether time and space inhere in objects and so a baby simply learns to access concepts which make certain thoughts possible. This certainly seems to happen to adults in a more esoteric way.

You'll note from the above, that, with respect, this is nonsense.
Your terms don't align with mine, for one thing. Secondly, your claim about

hat there is a part of human development which is not human experience in any meaningful sense — Bob Ross

This is an utter non sequitur that borders on idolizing Kant and his vision. It could simply not be true that he had a handle on much, beyond the logical form of human reason. Babies don't have reason. SO, unless that, to you, removes humanity, then i simply reject, wholesale your entire conjecture here.

toto genere — Bob Ross

Yes. THis seems inarguable, on an empirical reading before we even get to 'our' disagreement on Kant.

doesn't have extension nor is it placed in succession within that baby's consciousness — Bob Ross

In the baby's perception, this also seems inarguable. Not quite sure what the pushback on this is. If you have an intellect that doesn't correctly order your spatiotemporal categories, you do not cease to be human or cease to experience.

what, then — Bob Ross

bare experience, unorganised and automatically responded to. This, also, doesn't seem a problem. Adults have this experience also. Take mushrooms my guy. Space and time are not as hard-and-fast as you seem to think, in human experience.

But that is besides the point: the babies conscious experience is still in space and time. They just don't understand that yet in thought. Thinking and cognizing are not the same thing.

But that is besides the point: the babies conscious experience is still in space and time. — Bob Ross

What point is it beside, when I’m agreeing with it? All experience is IN space and time, whether or not the subject is cognizant of relations as such, in general. And it is a given that thinking and cognizing are not the same thing, at least in accordance with this particular metaphysic.

That 'space and time' are innate is somewhat implausible to me. These seem to be arguments that would need to come down to some supernatural conclusion. Which, you'll note, Kant does.

Kant does not argue for space and time being a prior as a matter of being supernatural—quite the contrary.

. They have no experience of difference

The fact that they move at all towards or away from things annihilates this hypothesis in concreto; but, in abstracta, it makes no sense to posit that the brain doesn’t develop accurate to a certain prestructure which represents in a specific way. When, then, does the human brain develop enough to construct an experience in space and time? The brain doesn’t fully develop until adulthood.

Let me ask for clarification: are you saying that a baby does not experience in space and time despite lacking the thinking power know that they are experiencing in space and time? — Bob Ross

This is a really quite confused way of approaching a clarification imo

This is exactly why I asked it, because Kant is not talking about what you are talking about: thinking and cognizing are not the same thing. Viz., self-reflective reason is different than transcendental reason—you are conflating them as one ‘faculty of reason’.

Here’s the pinnacle of your confusion (with no disrespect meant):

The baby probably doesn't have a concept of experience

This solidifies to me that you are, in fact, thinking of self-reflective concepts as opposed to transcendental concepts. The baby still experiences, and this you do not contend against (I would imagine), but yet it doesn’t have the self-reflective thinking capacities to understand that—that’s no problem for Kant. Kant is noting that we have concepts built into our brain for cognizing objects—not for thinking about our experience of them.

The baby lack's the thinking power to apprehend those concepts at all to begin with

Correct. But this has nothing to do with the Critique: Kant is noting that, irregardless of that, the baby’s brain is pre-structured to represent objects within space and time which constitute the baby’s experience of the world; and the baby, to your point, of course, does not have the thinking power to understand that its conscious experience is in space and time—this takes time to learn.

Babies don't have reason. SO, unless that, to you, removes humanity, then i simply reject, wholesale your entire conjecture here.

You are, by-at-large, correct that they don’t have “reason” because by “reason” you mean self-reflective reason—viz., the ability to think about one’s conscious experience. Kant means “reason” in the sense of our brain’s cognition for cognizing reality into a coherent experience. This was one complaint that Schopenhauer had of Kant’s semantics, as it led to confusion for people, and S actually advocated to call Kant’s idea of “reason” as “the understanding” and to use “reason” in your sense of the term.

In the baby's perception, this also seems inarguable. Not quite sure what the pushback on this is. If you have an intellect that doesn't correctly order your spatiotemporal categories, you do not cease to be human or cease to experience.

You are not arguing that the brain doesn’t order the objects properly in space and time: you are arguing that the baby’s brain has a super-human power to cognize in different forms of sensibility—viz., to experience objects ordered in some other forms than space and time.

You are saying that the baby that is trying to eat that toy block, that doesn’t really know what it is, isn’t experiencing that toy block with any extension nor in any temporal succession—so it is an experience akin to some higher dimensional being. Imagine being able to experience things outside of time….that’s what you are saying a baby can do.

bare experience, unorganised and automatically responded to.

What does that mean? What would objects look like unorganized outside of space and time?

Take mushrooms my guy. Space and time are not as hard-and-fast as you seem to think, in human experience.

What you experience on psychedelics is still in space and time—if you have experienced hallucinations that did not take those forms, then I would be interested to hear you elaborate on it specifically.

Oh, haha. I thought you were disagreeing. Nevermind.

Kant does not argue for space and time being a prior as a matter of being supernatural—quite the contrary. — Bob Ross

I didn't claim that was the case. But God is the fundamental parameter for his entire system. Nothing works without it, on his account, and unfortunately, he only reveals this in the Method. Which leads most readers to assume its not important. I understand that.

The fact that they move at all towards or away from things annihilates this hypothesis in concreto — Bob Ross

No. No it doesn't. I need say no more.

When, then, does the human brain develop enough to construct an experience in space and time? The brain doesn’t fully develop until adulthood. — Bob Ross

This is a ridiculous question in light of what we're taking about. Crawl before you sprint, my guy. As a catch-all response to the underlying objection: It doesn't matter, because we could never answer this question even if you agreed with me. At some point from the development of sense organs to the abstract, non-language-based thought of "Over there" let's say. That's all we can give. In your system, there's some pre-determined access to concepts that exist in the empirical, physical world. This has no support. Kant's system simply doesn't tell us why this is needed. He just says its the grounds of possible experience. No. It's the grounds of experience in time and space. If he's going to give us the ding-en-sich, then he's got to accept that this in an inacessible 'fact' of our lives. We cannot know whether those concepts are a prior, and it seems, based on experience with actual, real-life humans, that its not correct. Feel free to just disagree with those empirical considerations - but they defeat Kant, if true.

you are conflating them as one ‘faculty of reason’. — Bob Ross

I am not. BUt this explains why you're so resistant.

This solidifies to me that you are, in fact, thinking of self-reflective concepts as opposed to transcendental concepts. — Bob Ross

You are wrong. Not sure where to take that...

Kant is noting that we have concepts built into our brain for cognizing objects — Bob Ross

And, for me, he's entirely wrong and bares on no explanation for how that could possibly be the case. Just that he can't think of anything else (ironically). Same as god of the gaps. Also, ironically (in the modern, inaccurate sense of that word albeit).

you mean — Bob Ross

I don't. And you need to stop pretending you can read my mind, if you want a discussion.

Kant means “reason” in the sense of our brain’s cognition for cognizing reality into a coherent experience. — Bob Ross

My position, and this is based on a lot of experience, is that babies do not have a 'coherent' experience at birth. They are, at best, mildly overwhelmed by that fact, and usually, VERY overwhelmed. As they learn concepts of space and time, they become more comfortable and less schizophrenic in their reactions to the world. This is not self-reflective reason at all. Schizophrenic people have a similar problem - but I assume you'd say schizophrenics who cannot perceive time 'accurately' have unlearned an a priori structural concept. Which is .. to put it mildly, absurd, to me. If the concepts are a priori, built in concepts, this is not an available option to explain it.

That's exactly what I'm explaining to you is my view - which is why all your above contentions are explicitly incorrect, as to my position. Babies do not have a coherent experience. They may not even have an experience, at birth. WE experience them existing and make assumptions from our projections. That's about all we can say (though, like two of the important points about, this is because we are precluded from knowing - not because its certainly false). Again, if you disagree with this (on grounds other than wholesale accepting Kant's position, anyway) that's fine and you'll have good points im sure, and they can be discussed. BUt you have my position wrong and that needs to be corrected.

to represent objects within space and time which constitute the baby’s experience of the world; — Bob Ross

This

takes time to learn. — Bob Ross

The rest of it too (i.e aspects of reflective reason). But without the ability to make those representations, whcih I contend a bare newborn does not, it takes time to learn from your, developed perspective. From theirs, there is no time at birth and for some short period after. I'm unsure there's any kind of sound argument against this, other than what you're doing: simply asserting that there's something else to it. I don't think there is. With respect, this is the prime "agree to disagree" situation for the reason set out above - we could not know whether this is true. I think it is. You don't. That's fine. But I am not misunderstanding anything here, as you posit (or, conversely, you're open tot he same criticism from my perspective, and that's fine too). There is no disrespect here. You have had my position wrong for this whole exchange, it seems.

You are not arguing that the brain doesn’t order the objects properly in space and time: you are arguing that the baby’s brain has a super-human power to cognize in different forms of sensibility—viz., to experience objects ordered in some other forms than space and time. — Bob Ross

I am not, and I would really appreciate you not trying to read minds, or putting words in my mouth Bob. Ask questions instead. You'd probably get more satisfactory answers.

Nothing in this passage is needed. I am not positing that. I am positing that newborn babies (for, let's be clear: a very short period) do not have concepts of time and space. This seems obvious to me. What kind of experience babies do have is not relevant to this disagreement, if I were to be 'right'. I do not need to clothe the emperor at this stage. I have some ideas there, but they are off-topic for this discussion of Kant's failures (in my view). At this stage, all I need do is present hte plausible (i htink it is) notion that babies dont experience space and time. They experience a jumble of sensation and instinct. Nothing coherent about it (again, if you disagree - that's fine! That's what we're trying to get to).

You are saying that the baby that is trying to eat that toy block, that doesn’t really know what it is, isn’t experiencing that toy block with any extension nor in any temporal succession—so it is an experience akin to some higher dimensional being. Imagine being able to experience things outside of time….that’s what you are saying a baby can do. — Bob Ross

Sort of. But, please, stop putting words in my mouth or articulating my arguments for me. Just ask me to clarify. AM i saying that? Well...
The baby does not experience. It acts. YOU experience the baby chewing a block. It (plausibly) doesn't. This is not complicated or difficult to understand. It gains experience once it can perceive difference. I have gone over this, and if it has missed you I am sorry for either being inadequately clear, or perhaps not addressing it in the right place of my replies. The one caveat I'd add here, is that it's entirely possible your example its beyond the point at which my position would apply. New born babies cannot do what you've just said, at birth. Perhaps babies even five days old can. I don't know - I've not tried to tie that down. That's a secondary exercise, though.

so it is an experience akin to some higher dimensional being — Bob Ross

Or, get this Bob - lower. Hehe. Flatlander.

What does that mean? What would objects look like unorganized outside of space and time? — Bob Ross

They may not 'look' like anything. Think of philosophical zombies. Newborns may be just that, in terms of behaviour.
But you've already restricted the possibilities to your existing mode of perception which is not unreasonable, but I think misleading. I am saying, multiple times at length, we couldn't know. We are not babies, and people who are no longer babies are unable to recall, in 100% of cases. Which gives some extremely bare and minimal credence to what i'm getting at, conceptually. You might be right in that restriction, and you might be right about the idea of a priori concepts of space and time, but I see no good reason for it at this point other than simplicity - but then I'd need to take on Kant's system, which is quite complicated and imo very much wanting.. So, not only do i see no good reason, that conclusion also goes against my intuitions and experience.

What you experience on psychedelics is still in space and time—if you have experienced hallucinations that did not take those forms, then I would be interested to hear you elaborate on it specifically. — Bob Ross

Other than adhering to Kant, what authority are you relying on when making the bolded statement? It seems you're describing your perception of someone on psychedelics. I think you're doing the same with the babies. I assume you'd feel the same about meditators. Nevertheless...

Millions of people have. I'll give a couple of examples of discussions in the lit on this: https://digscholarship.unco.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=dissertations
https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/11/1061 this one has a great phrase "valueless category of human experience". I would say that describes my experiences quite well. They are ineffable because to describe them requires concepts that don't exist in the experience itself. So, take it or leave it - the point is that those experiences transcend elaboration because that would occur in space and time (to be deathly clear: I take these experiences as almost certainly of the mind. Not of some mystical or divine reality).

You can use words/phrases like "I fell into the light" but this does not to describe the experience. It gives you, the listener, a watered-down, pale imitation within your limits of perception, to understand the direction and nothing more. There is no light. There is no falling. They are just best-estimates at values to represent non-values. These experiences are ineffable for good reason: You cannot describe them. They are outside that mode of perception ;)

And, for me, he's entirely wrong and bares on no explanation for how that could possibly be the case.

If by “how”, you mean ontologically how it would work; then that is an irrelevant question. If by “how”, you mean why it is a necessary precondition for possibility of human experience; then that is elaborated in depth in the Critique.

is that babies do not have a 'coherent' experience at birth

I agree, and never disagree with this: my point is that the (sufficiently) incoherent experience is still in space and time. One can have a spatiotemporal experience which the aftermath of the one’s brain butchering how to represent objects properly.

As they learn concepts of space and time
…
And, for me, he's entirely wrong and bares on no explanation for how that could possibly be the case.

Ok, then, by your own critique, how does a baby’s brain learn to represent objects in space and time?

Schizophrenic people have a similar problem

Schizophrenic people experience in space and time: the disorder is that they experience things which are not there in space and time.

They may not even have an experience, at birth

They have to, though—that’s my point. Babies cry afterbirth when they are hungry: that entails, to some degree, that they have an experience.

so it is an experience akin to some higher dimensional being — Bob Ross

Or, get this Bob – lower.

True, but it wouldn’t be human experience anything like all experience human’s have ever had that they had introspective access to—can we agree on that?

Think of philosophical zombies

PZs are impossible; but if I were to grant their possible existence for a second, then I would note that:

Newborns may be just that, in terms of behaviour.

Then, a newborn does experience—just not in terms of qualia. That non-qualia experience would still be in the forms of space and time.

Millions of people have. I'll give a couple of examples of discussions in the lit on this:

Neither of those links you sent described an experience a human had that didn’t take the forms of space and time: those articles are about the life-altering nature of psychedelics. I want to hear a specific example from you to gauge better what you are saying.

Look Amadeus, I am not denying that psychedelics can make one experience things weirdly: I’ve had them before. I had a trip so bad that I literally perceived layers to my consciousness, periodically lost the concept of time, and lost most motor function. I think you are confusing, with all due respect, concepts qua self-reflective reason with transcendental reason. When, e.g., I was presented pure blankness that seemed, at the time, outside of time; it was still temporal: I just lacked the ability to properly analyze the situation and, quite frankly, lacked the words to properly describe it. People can perceive time differently, and this can be affected by drugs; but the brain is still hallucinating, if it presents anything to the conscious experience, in the forms of space and time.

I remember what it is like to perceive being beyond time; and I was not beyond time, or else I would not have any memory of it—for my memory assumes at least the form of time when recalling.

If by “how”, you mean ontologically how it would work; then that is an irrelevant question. If by “how”, you mean why it is a necessary precondition for possibility of human experience; then that is elaborated in depth in the Critique. — Bob Ross

I have addressed this point. I shall not labour it, but he does not provide any reason for necessity at birth. Merely necessity for the more developed mind to have certain concepts in place. May just be that there is nothing which requires them in the mind of a newborn baby.

my point is that the (sufficiently) incoherent experience is still in space and time. — Bob Ross

I understand. But again, I am fairly sure you must be confusing your experience with theirs. There is no reason to think they have experiences of anything, really. I've used the term incoherent to meet you half way in that sentence.

One can have a spatiotemporal experience which the aftermath of the one’s brain butchering how to represent objects properly. — Bob Ross

One can also have the opposite (as tends to happen with some psychedelic experiences). We simply couldn't know if one or other was 'necessary' or 'not needed'. I think that's a fair place to land on this.

how does a baby’s brain learn to represent objects in space and time? — Bob Ross

Again, separate exercise. I don't have a good answer, because I've not really thought about it. And as i say, you might, in the event, be right. But i can't in good conscience take a 'hmmm' as a 'it must be X' as I think Kant is doing. That's not to discount it, entirely. That's for another discussion. But this particular position, imo, is not particularly strong. A similar question could be put to Kant (or you): How could these a priori concepts occur, and in what form could they possibly be 'built in'? Without an adequate account of that, its mystical, really.

Schizophrenic people experience in space and time: the disorder is that they experience things which are not there in space and time. — Bob Ross

This is a claim which i reject, wholesale. as arrogance.

True, but it wouldn’t be human experience anything like all experience human’s have ever had that they had introspective access to—can we agree on that? — Bob Ross

Perhaps - but if that's what newborns have, then that's what newborns have. No harm, no foul (until the question above, of how the transition occurs). It doesn't lead to any other position to accept this. So, we agree, i suppose.

PZs are impossible — Bob Ross

You think. I don't. Many don't. You make many claims about htings that aren't known, rather than claiming positions. I get that's your position. Fine. Not mine. I respect your position.

Then, a newborn does experience—just not in terms of qualia. That non-qualia experience would still be in the forms of space and time. — Bob Ross

Without qualia, that's nonsensical to me. There is no experience. Plain and simple. If you disagree that's the case, that's fine. But your claim here is counter engaging with the position. Thought, I take your point that on your view this would be some form of rebuttal. It does nothing for me, unfortunately. I would want you to describe an experience without qualia, please.

Neither of those links you sent described an experience a human had that didn’t take the forms of space and time — Bob Ross

They do. And i gave you a phrase from the second one which aptly describes how that can be conceptualised. I understand if you're not seeing it that way, though. But, I think that may come from two places:
Biased towards your own conceptual schema, and lack of familiarity with psychedelic lit. That's fine too. I point you to this, to be brief:

"The more the subject experiences such characteristics of mystical experience as unity (with all of existence), noetic quality (knowingness and a sense of reality), sacredness,transcendence of time and space, ineffability, sense of awe, etc., the richer may be the rewards. In summary, not only do psychedelic substances sometimes bring therapeutic benefit, but there is definite evidence that such benefit depends upon the discernible richness of the experience’s ‘mystical’ qualities."

It is a literal parameter of measuring these experiences.

I want to hear a specific example from you to gauge better what you are saying. — Bob Ross

I've been over why you are asking for something impossible. If i am right (that I have had an experience which transcends time or space) it would not be possible to elaborate. Ineffability is a key concept in this discussion. Unless you wholesale reject that notion, please respect this since you have asked.

I think you are confusing — Bob Ross

Simply: No. I am not.

I remember what it is like to perceive being beyond time; and I was not beyond time — Bob Ross

To use your technique: This is conclusive proof you are importing your own, current, perceptual schema, into ones which are ncessarily outside your ambit. So be it :)

Well, I am just not following what exactly about an under-developed, human brain would allow it to cognize with different forms of sensibility: I get how it could represent things as a jumble and highly inaccurately.

By my lights, if one is affirming that a baby has experience but not immediately with the forms of space and time, then that entails necessarily that it takes different forms—otherwise, then, the baby is not experiencing, which was affirmed to begin with. This is a point that I am not sure you agree with, but there would have to be something about how an under-developed brain, in the sense of a baby’s, that makes it represent in different forms: for there has to be forms to the sensibility of the any being that has representative faculties.

This is where it gets interesting because, and of which I cannot tell if you have realized that, the baby’s brain having different forms of sensibility, which it would have to if it experiences (to any degree—even if it be incoherent) and not in space and time, does not itself entail any sort of inaccuracy nor incoherency in its representation; but that was the original point you were trying to make. Then, the claim that a baby experiences but not in space and time because their experience is too incoherent becomes a mute point; because it is not the fact that it is too incoherent that makes the baby uncapable of having those two pure forms. Thusly, you would have to explain NOT why the baby’s incoherent experience renders outside of time and space but, rather, why we should believe that a baby’s brain is too underdeveloped to render objects in space and time but it does have the capacity to render it in different pure forms of sensibility.

In short, you would seem to need to argue that the baby just doesn’t have pure forms of sensibility—no? At that point, though, the baby has no experience. Which, again, we can be certain that is false: babies react to some degree to their environment.

Schizophrenic people experience in space and time: the disorder is that they experience things which are not there in space and time. — Bob Ross

This is a claim which i reject, wholesale. as arrogance

Nothing about Schizophrenia entails that the brain is defective in such a way as to intuit objects in other pure forms than space and time. There is no shred of evidence to support that. We give them medication to get rid of their temporal and spatial hallucinations.

PZs are impossible — Bob Ross

You think. I don't. Many don't. You make many claims about htings that aren't known, rather than claiming positions. I get that's your position. Fine. Not mine. I respect your position.

That’s why I granted to the position, but left in the footnote that I don’t think it is possible. Of course, when someone brings up a highly controversial example, then I have to note my position on it; but of course I will entertain the hypothetical despite that.

Without qualia, that's nonsensical to me. There is no experience. Plain and simple.

So this is getting into philosophy of mind, and I am not sure how deep we want to go down that rabbit whole. Traditionally, those who accept qualia note a “hard problem of consciousness” which revolves, by necessity, around the idea that awareness and experience are not equivalent to each other (although, perhaps, they will use different terms sometimes to express it). Awareness is the bare ability to gather information about your environment; whereas, experience is a qualitative, subjective ‘having’ of that gathered and interpreted information. E.g., the brain is aware that this block is the color green because it interpreted the light that reflected off of it as green, but the (qualitative) experience, of which there is something to be you experiencing it, is over-and-beyond that bare awareness that it is green. This is, traditionally, the hard problem in a nutshell: why is there something it is like to be the subject having the awareness, of which is qualitative and subjective, instead of just the bare awareness of it? It doesn’t seem like, prima facie, e.g., there needs to be an actual qualitative experience of the green block of which there is something it is like to be me experiencing it for my brain to be aware that it is green (as interpreted by the wavelengths). It seems like my brain is more than aware of its environment without having a ‘me’ which subjectively experiences it.

So, there would be no experience in the case that a baby were a PZ, but that baby would still be, to some degree, aware; and this distinction has not surfaced in your view yet (as we have discussed it).

This is why I put my disagreement with the possibility of PZs as a footnote (;

I've been over why you are asking for something impossible. If i am right (that I have had an experience which transcends time or space) it would not be possible to elaborate. Ineffability is a key concept in this discussion. Unless you wholesale reject that notion, please respect this since you have asked.

I understand that to a certain degree; but it’s the ultimate cop-out. I can’t contend with your view that they are experiencing somehow with different pure forms of sensibility if you just blanketly assert it.

"The more the subject experiences such characteristics of mystical experience as unity (with all of existence), noetic quality (knowingness and a sense of reality), sacredness,transcendence of time and space, ineffability, sense of awe, etc., the richer may be the rewards. In summary, not only do psychedelic substances sometimes bring therapeutic benefit, but there is definite evidence that such benefit depends upon the discernible richness of the experience’s ‘mystical’ qualities."

Ok, good: this helps. Let’s break it down.

1. Unity is the concept of everything in question as one: this is inherently spatial. A person that experiences no ego, which is sometimes called “ego death”, e.g., thereby experiencing a complete unity with their experience IS NOT thereby experiencing in some form which is non-spatial. Unity of experience is just everything which is presented in space, or in time, or both, as being identical to everything else presented. So this doesn’t demonstrate your point.

2. Noetic quality does not demonstrate your point for obvious reasons.

3. Sacredness: same.

4. Transcendence of time and space: I am assuming this is the heavy-hitter, huh? (: I would need to hear what evidence you have for this, and how it works. I have a feeling you are just going to say you can’t describe it; but what forms are the experience in when not in space and time (on drugs)?

5. Ineffability. This is related to your point insofar as our words can never, in meaning, be reduced down to what they reference (about reality); but you have to be able to explain what those forms are, which are not space and time, that these people are experiencing things in for us to have any serious conversation; and it should be possible, with inadequate diction, if they really aren’t just confused.

I get how it could represent things as a jumble and highly inaccurately. — Bob Ross

Then you understand how the concepts of space and time being absent would cause this?

By my lights, if one is affirming that a baby has experience — Bob Ross

I....didn't....affirm this? I actively gave the potential that a baby has no experience. You simply rejected that, on grounds that you don't like PZs are possible. This is a confusing approach...

husly, you would have to explain NOT why the baby’s incoherent experience renders outside of time and space but, rather, why we should believe that a baby’s brain is too underdeveloped to render objects in space and time but it does have the capacity to render it in different pure forms of sensibility. — Bob Ross

This seems to be a new position you've plucked out of nowhere. The preceding section of your reply doesn't help me get there...

In short, you would seem to need to argue that the baby just doesn’t have pure forms of sensibility—no? At that point, though, the baby has no experience. Which, again, we can be certain that is false: babies react to some degree to their environment. — Bob Ross

I did allow for that, and no, that doesn't preclude it. The fact they react has nothing to do with experience. But this goes back to the PZ thing. Amoebas react and I think that's significant here (though, I take hte point if you assert they also have qualia - seems unresolvable)

So, there would be no experience in the case that a baby were a PZ, but that baby would still be, to some degree, aware; and this distinction has not surfaced in your view yet (as we have discussed it). — Bob Ross

Hmm, don't think so. I have said quite clearly that it's open to us to posit babies don't experience. That was required by my position too, so figured it was inferred naturally. If not, that is, in fact, the (possible) position I would take on this. That was probably a subconscious utility in bringing up PZs.

but of course I will entertain the hypothetical despite that. — Bob Ross

Fair - seemed a much stronger response on its face, than this gives me. Thanks for that!

Awareness is the bare ability to gather information about your environment; whereas, experience is a qualitative, subjective ‘having’ of that gathered and interpreted information. E.g., the brain is aware that this block is the color green because it interpreted the light that reflected off of it as green, but the (qualitative) experience, of which there is something to be you experiencing it, is over-and-beyond that bare awareness that it is green. — Bob Ross

This fairly well explains what I'm talking about with a Baby, but yeah, goes deeper than we probably wanted to. But to be extremely clear: It would be utterly insane to assert babies could 'behave' without any access to data on which they could base behaviour. I just assert they don't 'know' about it, because no experience to speak of (this raises a similar issue as with some other concepts as to when or how that experience, eventually, arises and as noted earlier, I have no good answer to that).

I understand that to a certain degree; but it’s the ultimate cop-out. I can’t contend with your view that they are experiencing somehow with different pure forms of sensibility if you just blanketly assert it. — Bob Ross

That isn't my view. Please, please, PLEASE stop putting views in my words that simply aren't there. Either ask me, or just don't. It's extremely frustrating, confuses the exchanges and wastes a lot of time.

It isn't a cop out. IT is the fact of hte matter. If there is a possible 'experience' outside time and space, there are no ways within time and space to convey it. If you don't accept that, we have nothing to go on. This has been all for naught. You not being satisfied is, sorry to say, irrelevant.

this is inherently spatia — Bob Ross

No. No it isn't. You have quite inadequately described what that experience is like. It is akin to the 'view from nowhere'. Its literally not accessible through normal consciousness. Again, if you simply cannot accept ineffability as an indicator, so be it. But the fact that it cannot be adequately conveyed should give you pause.

2, 3 and 5 have nothing to do with my claim, per se (so, I agree). They are interesting, but have nothing to do with the concepts of time and space. No idea why you responded to them. I, in fact, highlighted the bit that mattered in that passage (I would add though, I have always found the 'sacredness' aspect of these scales a bit boring and unhelpful. It seems to do more for assigning gravity to one's existing cosmologic views that anything to do witht eh experiences in the trials).

5 can help support the claim by way of giving you a fact of hte matter which precludes the view that they are experiences of 'the normal kind' (i,e of time and space). Doesn't mean they are that, but the fact that this is an extremely anomalous fact which has had to be inculcated into the way scientists assess the reports is telling. Not particularly strong, but figured this was worth noting.

but you have to be able to explain what those forms are, which are not space and time — Bob Ross

I don't think so, no. That's just something you want, and understandable. These experiences, if outside the scope of your a prioris, are not available for the same conveyance techniques we use for those within the scope of them. If there is no temporal or spatial aspects to those experiences then there are no words available, because words are dimensional. The experiences can't be conveyed if I'm right. They simply couldn't be. You are literally expecting a square peg to fit in a round hole. It wont. You either accept that ineffability is a quality of hte experiences in question, or you reject that the experiences are possible. You can't cross-reference those things. If I'm right, there is nothing I can do to explain it you, in the aesthetic sense you want a description for. If I'm wrong, then its moot. To bring this back to the first thing I said, no, one does not 'need to' other than to described them as ineffable, if that's the case. And it is, on my view, and the view of those who've had the experiences. Its almost distressing trying to put them into words because of how far away from words the experiences seem (i say seem, because I don't know whether what i'm saying is true - i just think its risible to write them off in the way you are, so doing my best to advocate).

I would need to hear what evidence you have for this, and how it works. I have a feeling you are just going to say you can’t describe it; but what forms are the experience in when not in space and time (on drugs)? — Bob Ross

Yeah, good, This is a decent approach imo. I understand you want evidence, but by it's very nature having the experience is the only thing that amounts to 'evidence' and clearly that wouldn't come under the descriptor we all know as 'evidence'. So, I take the point in your next line... But, that's the case. There are no words. The 'forms' are whatever they are. We don't have a science, or anything remotely close to being able to investigate these states adequately. Which is a real shame, and it may be that sometime soon, everything I've said will become obviously false based on some new development in neuroscience or imaging studies or what have you. I accept that, entirely. But as it stands, the evidence you want isn't available IFF i am right. If i'm not, you'll get the 'evidence' and be able to pick it apart and reduce to a misapprehension. Which I suspect is partially true, given the only psychedelic experience that could lead to what I'm saying is the Unitive one, rather than the others. I would also add the point that it seems to me no combination of words would move you on this. But that's speculation..

I realise this is a really disappointing place to leave that, and it is for me too - but believe me, for those who have had those experiences, its not just disappointing, its distressing. Imaging having the solution to some global problem. and being unable to convey it? That's how it feels (while that wording is dramatic as heck LOL).

Really appreciate your time and effort on this exchange, Bob. Thank you!

That isn't my view. Please, please, PLEASE stop putting views in my words that simply aren't there.

I am not meaning to imply that you agree with what I am saying: I am giving the logical consequences of your position, which you seem to be failing to see (which is fine). If there are moments where I am presenting it as if it is something you are affirming (as opposed to should be affirming to make your view internally coherent and logically consistent), then please call me out: that is unacceptable.

The problem I am having is that I don’t think you are conceding that either a (1) being experiences in some forms (which are a prior) or (2) they are not experiencing at all, when this seems plainly true to me.

For example:

I get how it could represent things as a jumble and highly inaccurately. — Bob Ross

Then you understand how the concepts of space and time being absent would cause this?

And:

By my lights, if one is affirming that a baby has experience — Bob Ross

I....didn't....affirm this? I actively gave the potential that a baby has no experience.

If the baby has a jumbled experience that is highly inaccurate, then the baby is experiencing in some pure forms, as noted above, AND IF you are affirming that the baby is not experiencing in space and time, THEN IT LOGICALLY FOLLOWS that the baby is experiencing in other pure forms than space and time.

E.g., saying that the baby may not have any experience does not address this issue that I am noting IF you affirm that it is having a jumbled experience (which you certainly have claimed that before in our conversation). Saying that you presented the option that the baby has no experience at all is completely irrelevant to my addressal of your presented option that they experience in an incoherent manner.

Likewise, if you are accepting, as you mentioned in the first quote above, that the baby does indeed experience but that it is the absence of space and time which makes it so jumbled, then you must concede that the baby is experiencing it so jumbled in SOME OTHER pure forms than space and time; OR DENY IN THE FIRST PLACE that the baby has any experience at all. You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; .

I have said quite clearly that it's open to us to posit babies don't experience.

It is completely unclear that you mean by “experience” in light of the PZ thought experiment. I already went in depth into the difference between awareness and experience; so I feel no need to delve into it deeper without your elaboration first.

But to be extremely clear: It would be utterly insane to assert babies could 'behave' without any access to data on which they could base behaviour. I just assert they don't 'know' about it, because no experience to speak of (this raises a similar issue as with some other concepts as to when or how that experience, eventually, arises and as noted earlier, I have no good answer to that).

I need to ask for clarification on what you mean by “experience”: are you talking about qualia? Are you talking about awareness? Does experience require self-knowledge or sufficent self-reflective faculties under your view? It doesn’t for mine. E.g., the fact a squirrel doesn’t know that it is eating an acorn doesn’t mean it isn’t experiencing it….so why would a baby not experience, as noted in the bolded part of your quote, because it has no knowledge of it?

The underlined portion in your quote seems to imply that you do believe that babies have “experience” in the sense of awareness, to some degree.

It isn't a cop out. IT is the fact of hte matter. If there is a possible 'experience' outside time and space, there are no ways within time and space to convey it.

It’s not that it is impossible to properly convey with language that makes it a cop out: it is that you are just blanketly asserting that, on the basis of ineffibility, that people have experienced in pure forms other than space and time, which is seems plausibly impossible since the drugs only interfere with the already prestructured ways that the brain experiences (and so a drug doesn’t plausibly have the ability to introduce new pure forms of sensibility to the mix), without giving a shred of real evidence. Surely you can appreciate why I cannot contend with your claim here, given its lack of transparency. There’s got to be some inaccurate but adequate way of proving that the brain is capable of experiencing in other pure forms...or we shouldn’t take it seriously unless we ourselves have had such an experience.

The 'forms' are whatever they are.

The problem I have is that you can’t explain it even to yourself, so how do you know you weren’t experiencing in space and time but in an incoherent way? How did you rule out, e.g., that the incoherence was with the objects as related in space and time to you, and as cut out incoherently in sections, rather than you experiencing without space and time?

This is the danger of ineffibility, although it is a valid concept, because people just use it as a god of the gaps. Look, I can tell you that my experience of something, of anything, cannot be put accurately into words; and this is because the words erode some of the emotional and phenomenal baggage of the experience itself. Sure, to a being that were to somehow have a language which 1:1 mapped what they experienced in perfect detail, that lost no meaning whatsoever in such a conversion, it may be really hard to convey the point to them; but I can give examples which at least make sense to me. E.g., the wonder and awe I got from seeing the Grand Canyon is clearly not contained perfectly in my description of “I was struck with wonder and awe amidst the Grand Canyon” because it doesn’t describe the feeling perfectly and only a person who experienced something similarly to that degree of awe and wonderment will be able to map that properly to the experience I had.

I am not seeing any analogous kind of example on your part, and no real responses to why you find the alternative possibilities implausible (like the incoherence being in how the brain is presenting the objects within space and time, or like how the higher-order brain functions [such as separating the self from the other] may be inhibited by the drugs without inhibiting the pure forms of sensibility). Without responses, there’s nothing more I can say.

Really appreciate your time and effort on this exchange, Bob. Thank you!

Of course, and you too AmadeusD!

It is also worth mentioning that it is entirely possible for a normal human to experience only in time given a drug, as it is apodictically true that our inner sense is in time along.

The real refutation, I think, of your whole position, notwithstanding my earlier critiques, is that a drug merely inhibits the way that the brain is prestructured to cognize; but it would need, quite plausibly, the ability to actually modify the physical pre-structure to cause a human to hallucinate in a manner that is with other pure forms. Just food for thought.