Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

No. It seems as though there is something more to it than the solipsism Descartes allowed in his analysis on the cogito. I think that one can allow skepticism about things like God's intention or even the Will itself.

Interesting thread. :up:

So the question: Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

Yes, I think Sartre is right, at least with respect to doubt.

If so then it seems the skeptic must at least admit of knowledge of time. And so cannot be universally skeptical. — Moliere

Agreed.

If we know about time then just how could there be an Evil Demon behind the appearances? Is it outside of time? If so then the cogito has nothing to do with it, as per the argument. — Moliere

I don't follow this. Are you supposing that the Evil Demon cannot manipulate our experience of time?

Also of interest is how the argument does not touch on Pyrrhonian skepticism, which explicitly courts the suspension of judgment. This has more to do with the sort of skepticism inspired by Descartes which desires a certain foundation. — Moliere

Doesn't Descartes explicitly court the suspension of judgment? It seems to me that Descartes thinks he can descend even below the level of Pyrrhonism and nevertheless re-surface with certain knowledge.

This has more to do with the sort of skepticism inspired by Descartes which desires a certain foundation. — Moliere

The idea that doubt can, dialectically so to speak, lead to certainty, is dependent on a pre-established conceptual context, which is historically, culturally mediated, and is thus itself open to doubt. hence the importance of the past. And the possibility that the said conceptual paradigm might one day be completely supplanted brings the future into play.

If so then it seems the skeptic must at least admit of knowledge of time. — Moliere

We don't see the skeptic Sartre is responding to in the OP. I find it difficult to tell exactly what radical doubt he's responding to.

This is almost a troll reading, but I want to give it anyway - no further resources are needed to talk about the validity of "I think, therefore I am" than seeing if, in the circumstance of the utterance, predicating an entity entails it exists. In normal circumstances it does. Therefore the argument ought to be understood as valid by competent speakers of English.

What isn't a troll reading about it - Sartre's commentary is transcendental, a reading of the necessary preconditions of Descartes' ability to argue, judge, doubt ensuring the truth of the claim it seeks to demonstrate. That the doubter exists. The above account involves only norms of language, and specifically talks about predicability rather than any phenomenological, a-priori or transcendental structure.

If an account of the argument can be given without use of the specific transcendental concepts Sartre is using, how can we say his analysis of necessary preconditions follows? Since the argument can be conceived otherwise.

I mostly just wanted to throw this in the thread to see what happens.

Doesn't Descartes explicitly court the suspension of judgment? It seems to me that Descartes thinks he can descend even below the level of Pyrrhonism and nevertheless re-surface with certain knowledge. — Leontiskos

Yeah, but it's very different -- methodical doubt is a process for finding a certain foundation for knowledge in Descartes. He's using it as a tool to dig out the foundations from the confusion.

Also, since he finds his certainty, he's no longer a skeptic at all by the end of the meditations. Whereas the Pyrrhonian wants to sustain the attitude of suspension of belief to the point that supposing someone came up with a persuasive argument then it would be the Pyrrhonian skeptic's task to invent another way to dissolve that belief.

Yeah, but it's very different -- methodical doubt is a process for finding a certain foundation for knowledge in Descartes. He's using it as a tool to dig out the foundations from the confusion.

Also, since he finds his certainty, he's no longer a skeptic at all by the end of the meditations. Whereas the Pyrrhonian wants to sustain the attitude of suspension of belief to the point that supposing someone came up with a persuasive argument then it would be the Pyrrhonian skeptic's task to invent another way to dissolve that belief. — Moliere

Well, Descartes wants to occupy the same space as the Pyrrhonist. He has a different goal, but he does not want to provide himself with a guarantee that he will get there (just as the Pyrrhonist is not supposed to provide himself with a guarantee that he will reach his goal of ataraxia). See:

Accordingly, when Gassendi, in keeping with his unwillingness to allow Sextus to doubt ordinary truth-claims as well as theoretical ones, was unwilling to accept that the sceptical doubt of the first Meditation was seriously meant to have absolutely general scope, Descartes replied:

"My statement that the entire testimony of the senses must be considered to be uncertain, nay, even false, is quite serious and so necessary for the comprehension of my meditations, that he who will not or cannot admit that, is unfit to urge any objection to them that merits a reply." (V Rep., HR ii, 206) — Myles Burnyeat, The Sceptic in his place and time, 340-1

We don't see the skeptic Sartre is responding to in the OP. I find it difficult to tell exactly what radical doubt he's responding to. — fdrake

He's not responding to a skeptic here really, but using Descartes as a foil and it seems to me to fit a certain conception of the self as popularized in The Matrix, and so serves as a certain disentangling of concepts -- the topic he's writing about here is the structure of temporality after a bunch of other stuff. Mostly I've been looking for quotes that could be decontextualized and this is one of the first that struck me as a good entry into an old topic.

If an account of the argument can be given without use of the specific transcendental concepts Sartre is using, how can we say his analysis of necessary preconditions follows? Since the argument can be conceived otherwise. — fdrake

The way Sartre is talking isn't quite like having necessary preconditions, though the critique of Descartes relies upon that notion. But since it's Descartes that sets up the problem by using doubt it's not Sartre's necessary preconditions but Descartes' starting point (which is why it kind of reads like a deconstruction to me).

I don't think he intends this against a skeptic as much as I could see how his reflection on the cogito mirrors pop-understandings of the self as an instantaneous moment. At the moment he is describing the structure of temporality -- what I have in mind with the cogito here has more to do with The Subject, in elevator word terms, but I thought Sartre's text provided a nice entry way into that thought topic. As well as being something new to throw into the mix of thoughts here.

This is almost a troll reading, but I want to give it anyway - no further resources are needed to talk about the validity of "I think, therefore I am" than seeing if, in the circumstance of the utterance, predicating an entity entails it exists. In normal circumstances it does. Therefore the argument ought to be understood as valid by competent speakers of English. — fdrake

I'm fine with this approach. The quote is an entry-point, not a barrier.

I see a problem though. Descartes wrote "I think, therefore I am", and Descartes does not exist. He's dead.

What isn't a troll reading about it - Sartre's commentary is transcendental, a reading of the necessary preconditions of Descartes' ability to argue, judge, doubt ensuring the truth of the claim it seeks to demonstrate. That the doubter exists. The above account involves only norms of language, and specifically talks about predicability rather than any phenomenological, a-priori or transcendental structure.

Right. My interpretation so far would emphasize the phenomenological method more than the other bits. In a lot of ways there's a certain dissolution going on of transcendental structures through the phenomenological description that doesn't just waffle around in a circle like Heidegger.

At least so far.

I mostly just wanted to throw this in the thread to see what happens. — fdrake

Keep at it, I say! :D -- I brought in the skeptic because it's another topic that I think on, and the description here reminded me of The Matrix, and how that can easily lend itself into -- if you do not accept Descartes' solution -- thinking the only thing certain is the repetition of the cogito at the moment.

So the question: Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

The Cogito is: I think, I am. Maybe we could show that change is integral to thought. Is that Sartre's point?

I think the appeal to the Augustinian exploration of self was done as a safe place as leverage against the
Scholastic schools who dominated the discussion of nature at the time. So, not about skepticism at all.

,,

Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

To doubt is to doubt. It is somewhat contrary to suggest we 'rely on' doubt. What cannot be questioned cannot be appreciated. That is all there is too it.

It takes time to think and to be.

It takes time to think and to be. — Janus

The Evil Demon could make you believe that. The quote in the OP is pointing to something intrinsic to thought. Something the Evil Demon couldn't fool you about.

The OP does not mention the Evil Demon. In any case once such a ridiculous idea as an Evil Demon is allowed it could bring about a state of being fooled in regard to anything at all

Are you supposing that the Evil Demon cannot manipulate our experience of time? — Leontiskos

I don't think so.

My line of thinking here is if we know something, then at least in that respect we are not deceived. I think the change in outcomes with respect to the thought experiment has to do with emphasizing doubt over certainty -- rather than looking for a certainty that I cannot doubt, and so cannot be decieved by even the evil demon the process of looking for certitude requires I already know things that are uncertain.

To kind of do an inversion here on that line: In some sense we could say that if we accept the certitude of the cogito then we must also accept the certitude of the before-after, and so the self is not this indivisible point-particle that thinks.

The Cogito is: I think, I am. Maybe we could show that change is integral to thought. Is that Sartre's point? — frank

I think his point is to argue for a tripartite division of time which the cogito seems not to require. But mostly I'm riffing from the text here while thinking about skepticism and the philosophical self.

To doubt is to doubt. It is somewhat contrary to suggest we 'rely on' doubt. What cannot be questioned cannot be appreciated. That is all there is too it. — I like sushi

I don't think we rely upon the cogito, exactly. This isn't really a pragmatic question. When we doubt some statement or other there's a huge web that the judgment is embedded within. Here, though, the philosophical concepts are cut new to demonstrate some point or other, and so the doubt isn't that kind of doubt, but the radical kind of doubt often associated with Descartes.

I think the appeal to the Augustinian exploration of self was done as a safe place as leverage against the
Scholastic schools who dominated the discussion of nature at the time. So, not about skepticism at all. — Paine

Yeah -- though I can see how the ideas taken out of context can easily lead one to a skeptical conclusion.

One of those ideas I think the argument is targeting is the notion that the self is an indivisible point-like unity.

For purposes of this thread I think I'd like to simply stipulate the difference rather than get down into the exegesis of whether or not Descartes was really a skeptic or not.

Taking Descartes at face value in the Meditations we end with knowledge of self, God, and world. So the doubt is surely methodical rather than radical.

For the Pyrrhonist I'd stipulate that the purpose of their philosophy is to remain in a state of suspended judgment. With respect to Sartre's argument that's permissible because he's relying upon a more full-throated notion of doubt that Descartes uses which the Pyrrhonist escapes by noting they're the ones not interested in belief so have no need to defend it, but are forced to do so by those who insist on having them. For them belief is a disease to be cured.

I think stipulating what the evil demon can and cannot do is a part of the game, in a way. By stating what the evil demon is or isn't limited by you begin to pick out a foundation, be it certitude or something else.

Even the instantaneous cogito?

I think stipulating what the evil demon can and cannot do is a part of the game, in a way. By stating what the evil demon is or isn't limited by you begin to pick out a foundation, be it certitude or something else. — Moliere

Descartes' foundation is a benevolent God, right? The Evil Demon is used to show that logical truths aren't indubitable. For a piece of knowledge to survive the Evil Demon, it would have to be intrinsic to the Cogito itself. Is change intrinsic to the Cogito?

I think of the Cogito as experiential. At this moment, I experience the world around me. I find that I can't doubt that this experience is happening. That I think of cognition as something that's happening does suggest that I think in story arcs.

(I'm not sure if I'm right to equate pre-reflexion with being-as-such).

An instantaneous cogito implies the structure of doubt, that is, suspension of judgment. But the cogito is committed to more than mere suspension of judgement; it is by necessity interwoven within a time "architecture."

The architecture of doubt is directly mirroring the architecture of the cogito itself, in time, but as a negation.

This architecture is pre-ontological in the sense of not yet truly ontological. That is, it is prior to the formulation of an ontology. The movement from pre-ontological knowing, the cogito, to a pre-reflexive ontology of being-as-such (that is to actually study being), requires transcendence of the cogito, where "doubt" is understood as just the negation of the cogito, ego.

It may be strange for pre-reflective awareness to be after the cogito's pre-ontological mode, but this is just the path of consciousness. Whereas pre-reflection is wholly prior to the cogito, in consciousness it comes after, as it is from the perspective of the negation of the ego that pre-reflection is attainable in a self-conscious way. This is why the saying "I think, therefore I am" is concluded after Descartes' "doubt" meditation. The saying is not the culmination of cogito but its transcendence.

To say that in a briefer manner: I think -> I doubt -> I am.

Bad faith. Hidden fullness. Sense-certainty. Ego. The other. Contradiction. Doubt. Clarity. Certainty. Thinghood is thought, thought is thinghood; being-in-itself; "I am." Being-for-another. Implication. Enlightenment. Reason. Authenticity. Absolute knowledge. The unfolding of the Absolute. Return to the beginning. Faith.

Descartes' foundation is a benevolent God, right? The Evil Demon is used to show that logical truths aren't indubitable. For a piece of knowledge to survive the Evil Demon, it would have to be intrinsic to the Cogito itself. Is change intrinsic to the Cogito? — frank

I'd say certainty -- clear and distinct ideas -- is how he gets there. Looking at Meditation 3 right now:

....For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited.... — Descartes Meditation III

I read up to about there to refresh my memory. The theme I see is certainty, which is understood as something which is clear and distinct that cannot be doubted.

I'm noticing upon looking at this that Descartes allows a past for his own argument, and seems to include objects even as he builds up there so it seems, at least by the Meditations, he's closer to Sartre than I was getting on about, and that this is really mostly a pop-notion that I'm describing.

I think of the Cogito as experiential. At this moment, I experience the world around me. I find that I can't doubt that this experience is happening. That I think of cognition as something that's happening does suggest that I think in story arcs. — frank

Does "I think" refer to the experiential whole?

Good thoughts here. Two things:

it's an excellent example of philosophical engagement without agreement, and without simply negating. — Moliere

I think so too, and this kind of engagement seems crucial to doing any deep work in philosophy. Disagreement should, in my view, produce puzzlement, and then curiosity -- what might we learn here? I wouldn't necessarily pick Sartre as my favorite interlocutor, but I like it that he has no interest in "refuting" Descartes.

Second thing: I rooted around in B&N for the context of these quotes and found this interesting passage (my emphases):

If I cannot re-enter into the past, it is not because some magical power puts it beyond my reach but simply because it is in-itself and because I am for-myself. The past is what I am without being able to live it. The past is substance. In this sense the Cartesian cogito ought to be formulated rather: 'I think; therefore I was.' — B&N, p. 173 (Washington Square Press ed.)

To de-jargonize, "in-itself" means, more or less, without self-consciousness or awareness; "for-itself" characterizes the being of conscious creatures like us. So my past might as well be a rock, for all that I can re-enter it or use it as a postulate about my current being. But Sartre does appear to believe that my previous existence can be a conclusion derived from "I think," which may pertain to your OP.

I read up to about there to refresh my memory. The theme I see is certainty, which is understood as something which is clear and distinct that cannot be doubted. — Moliere

I think the project he sets is to find an indubitable proposition. Once he's there, there doesn't appear to be anyway out of the brain vat except to just have faith that God wouldn't let the Evil Demon torture us with lies. Kind of dubious, but maybe it made sense at the time? I think Descartes uses an old scholastic(?) idea about the necessity of God. God is existence itself or something like that.

Does "I think" refer to the experiential whole? — Moliere

Some commentators insist that it does, but I'd have to go on an expedition to find those sources. :smile:

I don't think we rely upon the cogito, exactly. This isn't really a pragmatic question. — Moliere

Well, given that Sartre is talking about radical doubt as being given to us only through time reference (something like Kant's intuitions I feel) there is nothing other to hang experience off of is there?

'Rely' is probably the sticky word here. Sartre likes to make words less like words.

So the question: Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense?

If so then it seems the skeptic must at least admit of knowledge of time. And so cannot be universally skeptical. If we know about time then just how could there be an Evil Demon behind the appearances? Is it outside of time? If so then the cogito has nothing to do with it, as per the argument. — Moliere

I think it's correct to assume that we cannot understand the world without reference to time, and so the Cogito must be understood within the context of time.

However, that does not mean that the Cogito proves that time exists, nor does it suggest that Descartes failed in his attempt to be infinitely skeptical by assuming the existence of time. It only means that an understanding of the world is impossible without placing events within time.

This approach I'm arguing is consistent with Kant's view that time does not necessarily exist outside humans because it is a form of intuition necessary for our perception of reality, but not an inherent property of the world itself.

Well, given that Sartre is talking about radical doubt as being given to us only through time reference (something like Kant's intuitions I feel) there is nothing other to hang experience off of is there?

'Rely' is probably the sticky word here. Sartre likes to make words less like words. — I like sushi

I understood Sartre here to mean (and I don't think he was terribly clear) that doubt must occur in the past, present, and future for it to be real doubt. So, if I doubt a pen is in front of me, I have to doubt all that I previously knew of pens, the current pen I see, and the future pen that I have grown accustomed to seeing over time. I can't just say I question the pen's existence in the here and now and that be the radical and complete doubt Descartes is looking for.

On the Kant intuition issue, I don't think Sartre was suggesting that we must doubt time if we want to be radical skeptics. I think he was saying we must doubt an object in all phases of time: past, present, and future. The pen never was, is not, and never will be. I don't think he's suggesting we doubt our Kantian intuitions. In fact, all the Kant is committed to saying about time is that we think there is time, which doesn't give any external reality to it. That is, a radical skeptic would not be required to say there is time, but would only say he thinks there is time, which is consistent with solipsism.

So, if I doubt a pen is in front of me, I have to doubt all that I previously knew of pens, the current pen I see, and the future pen that I have grown accustomed to seeing over time. I can't just say I question the pen's existence in the here and now and that be the radical and complete doubt Descartes is looking for. — Hanover

Yeah, probably. Tedious though. If we pull the rug out from under our feet things get weird; or we ignore the effects!

On the Kant intuition issue, I don't think Sartre was suggesting that we must doubt time if we want to be radical skeptics. I think he was saying we must doubt an object in all phases of time: past, present, and future. The pen never was, is not, and never will be. I don't think he's suggesting we doubt our Kantian intuitions. — Hanover

I believe my remark is more or less a reflection of Descartes. We can "doubt" therefore. If we cannot, there-not.

I believe Sartre's 'radical scepticism' is more or less constructed alongside 'radical freedom'. I would assume so? I have his book under a pile of other books and although I am tempted to move them I am resisting :) Anyway, my guess would be because we are self creating all that we are comes into question - hence 'radical scpeticism'. I have no idea if this is either a good or correct interpretation of his view, just an educated guess.

@Moliere care to chime in? Save me reading ;)

Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

The cogito is I think. Does the validity of the notion that I think, require time?

The notion of past, future and therefore time itself, would be necessary regarding that which I think about, iff it is the case thoughts are always and only singular and successive. Even in the occurence of a single thought, i.e., “not-x”, or the instantaneous act of doubting, there is the antecedent time of its non-occurence, but that is in relation to the thought alone.

On the other hand, I at one time didn’t think to doubt x, and iff I subsequently think to doubt x, there must be a time of my not thinking the one then a different time of me thinking the one.

I vote for time being a necessary condition for the cogito to make sense of anything thought about, which is the same as any thought in general, which is the same as thought itself. I am, after all, nothing but my thoughts.

Descartes’ mistake: the subject isn’t as much a different substance than the object, as it is differently conditioned than an object.

...the reflective achievement of Descartes, the cogito, must not be limited to the infinitesimal instant. — Being and Nothingness, p 156

In the Third Meditation Descartes says :

For a life-span can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the others, so that from my existing at one time it doesn’t follow that I exist at later times, unless some cause keeps me in existence – one might say that it creates me afresh at each moment.

I take it that it is in response to this that Sartre says:

Moreover this conclusion could be drawn from the fact that thought is an act which engages the past and shapes it outline by the future. — Being and Nothingness, p 156

If I am a thinking thing, and if thinking is not something that exists anew from moment to moment but rather extends from the past to the future, then as a thinking thing I do not exist anew from moment to moment and thus do not require some cause to keep me in existence.

Caveat: dubito, dubitans accidit. :smirk:

Descartes’ mistake: the subject isn’t as much a different substance than the object, as it is differently conditioned than an object.

Yes, "the subject" is what an object does and, as Spinoza suggests, a complementary way of attributing-describing an object's predicates. In other words, "for itself" is only a kind – phase transition – of "in itself" (pace Sartre).

(2020)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/539399

In the Third Meditation Descartes says :

For a life-span can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the others, so that from my existing at one time it doesn’t follow that I exist at later times, unless some cause keeps me in existence – one might say that it creates me afresh at each moment.

I take it that it is in response to this that Sartre says:

Moreover this conclusion could be drawn from the fact that thought is an act which engages the past and shapes it outline by the future.
— Being and Nothingness, p 156 — Fooloso4

I don't think these two are in conflict. If change is inherent to thought, it doesn't matter much if that change produces discrete moments or comes as a stream, does it?

I don't think these two are in conflict. If change is inherent to thought, it doesn't matter much if that change produces discreet moments or comes as a stream, does it? — frank

According to Descartes existence occurs in discreet moments. It requires a cause, namely God, to create it moment to moment.

According to Descartes existence occurs in discreet moments. It requires a cause, namely God, to create it moment to moment. — Fooloso4

Yes. I like that view, it's a spin on one of Aristotle's proofs of God. We aren't doing a textual analysis of Descartes though. In other words, we aren't using any writings of Descartes as the limit to the discussion.