Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. (…) Look again. "space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us — L'éléphant

Given minor differences in translations, yes, he is, and no, they are not. Mode of perception is not perception, and neither space nor time is ever an appearance, but only that which is in space and time, is.

“….It will first be necessary to explain as distinctly as possible our opin­ion in regard to the fundamental constitution of sensible cognition in general, in order to preclude all misinterpretation of it.
We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so con­stituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this recep­tivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are ac­quainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are con- cerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former ad­heres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different for different subjects. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which is alone given to us….”
(Guyer/Wood, 1988, emphasis mine)
(Kemp Smith, 1929 is clearer, but older, so….)

Cognition in general is the process writ large, for which perception is merely the initial occasion;
To take away the nature and relations of objects is not to take away the objects;
The mode of perception merely indicates particular affected sense(s);
“ and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves” only means the constitution and relations of objects of appearance;
To be real is to appear to a sense as given matter, to appear to a sense is to affect it, to affect it is to cause a sensation,
…..there is no sensation of space or time, neither affect a sense, neither appears to senses in general, neither are appearances, neither are real as given matter;
The mode of perception is not the same as the mode of intuition, the former determined by physiology, the latter determined by the type of sensation such physiology provides;
Space and time merely represent the irreducible commonality of every sensation, without regard to its physiological cause;
Absent this particular, albeit speculative, form of human intelligence, there is no need for irreducible commonalities, thus the absence of space and time is given from the absence of the human subjective condition.

Time is nothing more than change. — Janus

Not quite; time is the representation of change, change presupposes time as the means by which changes are determinable. Change requires things that change, usually in the form of movement, but nevertheless, something empirical, whereas time itself does not change. But time itself is not empirical, insofar as the form of time is infinite and without substance, and all times are but one time.

For us, then, this argument stipulates there can be time without change in things, but there cannot be change in things without time, therefore one must be something more than, or at least very different from, the other.

For the sake of argument this is the only thing that justifies this belief. — Michael

For the sake of the current argument, perhaps. From the perspective of a metaphysical antirealist, any belief is justified by its construction, and as far as JTB is concerned, there is nothing but a mere cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical mistake.

Belief just means something is missing; knowledge just means nothing is missing, between the thought of something and the relative certainty of it.

The metaphysical antirealist doesn’t think in propositions, therefore the proposition “the cat is in the box” as expressed to him is merely a possible state of affairs for him, under the assumption he already knows what cats and boxes are. If he doesn’t, the proposition as expressed doesn’t even represent a possible state of affairs to him.

When he expresses himself with the proposition, “the cat is in the box”, he does not necessarily know anything at all about particular cats or boxes, re: idle musings, and the recipient of that expression can do nothing with it, and he himself neither knows nor believes anything in particular except he hasn’t expressed a non-sensical absurdity.

When he is expressing a fact that the cat is in the box, his belief in and of itself relative to the fact, is utterly irrelevant, insofar as the judgement the expression represents has already been proven by experience, and thereby the cum hoc mistake never occurs.
————-

That there is some thing now is possible knowledge; that there is this thing now is empirical knowledge. That there was this thing then, is nothing but deductive inference now, insofar as the time of the one is not the time of the other, hence the empirical certainty of the one, re: experience, is not possible from the mere logical certainty of the other.

Correlation (logical consistency) is not causation (experience). Some famous guy said that, I just stole it. You know….argument from authority and all.

And while it is perfectly rational to suppose that which is now was the same at som time then, or, that which was then is the same now, it is irrational to claim that supposition as knowledge. And, of course, the negation of either is rational/irrational just as well, re: just because we don’t know of a thing then doesn’t permit us to deny there ever was that thing now.

Everybody here knows this shit already, not like I’m teaching any wonderous story. (tip of the pointy hat to Jon Anderson) The mockery of it, on the other hand…..

These are references to Aquinas' epistemology of assimilation, which I have no doubt you know considerably better than I do. But the salient point is, it undercuts the idea of 'mind-independence' in the sense posited by naturalism. Why? Because the pre-moderns did not have our modern sense of otherness or separateness from the Cosmos. (I know this is very sketchy, but I think I am discerning something of significance here.) — Wayfarer

Yes, that seems right to me. Good quotes.

But note that for the Thomist intellectual knowledge depends on an immaterial intellect. You could construe the moderns as estranged from the cosmos, or you could construe them as materialists. Probably both approaches end up in much the same place.

But in remedying modern epistemology, one could move in a Christian/theistic/transcendent direction, or a Hindu/pantheistic/immanent direction. In the former, Western tradition, the human is both within and beyond the cosmos, as a kind of mediator or steward for the transcendent God. Thus for Aquinas there is an important sense in which the intellect stands over and surveys the cosmos in much the same way that an eagle stands over and surveys the landscape. But the angels do this more completely, and man is the strange mixture or meeting point between angels and matter.

So, at the very least, we should be antirealists about cats in boxes. — Michael

...Because if you think the question of whether the cat is in the box is a verifiable question, then in Michael's terms you are an "antirealist." And if you are a "realist" (in Michael's terms) about cats in boxes, then you would have to say that "The cat is in the box" is both unverifiable and nevertheless true.

No one uses the terms "realism" and "antirealism" in this way. Such extremely idiosyncratic usage is unhelpful. In favor of his strange definition, Michael cites a single sentence buried in an SEP article on Fitch's Paradox of Unknowability. But if we look to SEP (or any other reputable source) for this question, we do not find Michael's definition:

There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table’s being square, the rock’s being made of granite, and the moon’s being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. — Realism | SEP

The OP's definitions were much more accurate, mapping the two general aspects of SEP:

1. There exist objects that are mind-independent.

2. We can grasp the features of objects external to our mind... — Sirius

If the existence of objects is mind-independent then the truth of “the object exists” is mind-independent such that it could be true even if it is not possible, in principle, to know that it’s true.

There’s a reason that Dummett, the man who coined the term “antirealism”, framed the dispute between realism and antirealism as a dispute about the logic of truth.

Read further in the article you posted, under “6. Views Opposing the Independence Dimension (I): Semantic Realism”.

"the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle."

Which means that the realist believes either that (5) does not entail (1) or that it if "the cat is in the box" is true then it is possibly not possible to look in the box and see the cat. Either entails that if "the cat is in the box" is true then it is unknowable1. — Michael

What?!?

That's silly.

Time comes into existence with minds. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't.

Although
that time is passing does.

Time passed before there were minds. That's kinda built in to the notion of there being a time when there were no minds. Basic stuff. You need some quite sophist-icated argument to avoid it. Like his piece of bullshit:
knowing

Laplace’s nebula is not behind us, at our origin, but rather out in front of us in the cultural world — Maurice Merleau-Ponty, quoted in The Blind Spot, Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson

...which confuses what is true (Laplace’s nebula) with what is cultural (our stories about Laplace’s nebula). It's just bad thinking.

If the existence of objects is mind-independent then the truth of “the object exists” is mind-independent such that it could be true even if it is not possible, in principle, to know that it’s true. — Michael

That's not a characteristically realist view. Realists have not historically claimed that because objects can exist apart from minds, therefore truth exists apart from minds. Nevermind the odd add-on about truths which are unknowable.

You have a particular way of construing metaphysical realism vis-a-vis an abstruse knowability debate. It doesn't follow from this that Realism = Believing in unknowable (or unjustifiable) truths. And you won't find sources on Realism that claim such a thing. My quote from the SEP article on Realism is but one example.

There’s a reason that Dummett, the man who coined the term “antirealism”, framed the dispute between realism and antirealism as a dispute about the logic of truth. — Michael

You give a curious definition of antirealism (that no one on this forum would recognize precritically), and then define realism over and against that definition. This is wrong in the first place because realism "wears the pants," not antirealism. It is wrong in the second place because "antirealism" is not identical with Dummett's view, much less a secondary branch of that view (see section 7). It is wrong in the third place because non-realism is not simply anti-realism:

Non-realism can take many forms, depending on whether or not it is the existence or independence dimension of realism that is questioned or rejected. The forms of non-realism can vary dramatically from subject-matter to subject-matter, but error-theories, non-cognitivism, instrumentalism, nominalism,relativism, certain styles of reductionism, and eliminativism typically reject realism by rejecting the existence dimension, while idealism, subjectivism, and anti-realism typically concede the existence dimension but reject the independence dimension. — Realism | SEP

Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist — Realism | SEP

Portentious, then, that Albert Einstein himself felt obliged to ask his friend Abraham Pais 'does the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?' It was a rhetorical question - the implication being of course it does. But that Einstein was obliged to ask it was portentious.

Which leads to another useful SEP entry, Challenges to Metaphysical Realism

Time passed before there were minds — Banno

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

Hence, once again, the fundamental role of 'the observer', which (or who) is ever excluded from the objective picture.

"...quantum!"

:rofl:

You know that what is to count as 'the observer' in "the fundamental role of 'the observer'" is a subject of debate. Yet you insist that the only thing that collapses a wave function is a mind. It suits your narrative to pretend there is a consensus where there is none.

Well he literally said, "If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara." This is clearly committing to the view that truth exists where no minds do.

But apparently you hold a different view, namely the view that we can make truth-apt statements about unperceived events? — Leontiskos

Not saying you've done it deliberately but I think you have phrased that in a way that is misleading. The way I would put it is: "It is true that even if all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else were undisturbed, that there would still be gold in Boorara."

@Banno will confirm whether or not this misrepresents his view, but in any case, it is my view. So, yes I do think we can make truth-apt statements about unperceived events. The alternative, that truth depends on knowledge, seems absurd to me.

Yet you insist that the only thing that collapses a wave function is a mind — Banno

You complimented my essay on it. You will no doubt recall the citation:

The very idea of science from the usual point of view is to take out everything to do with human subjectivity and see what remains. QBism says, if you take everything out of quantum theory to do with human subjectivity, then nothing remains.

What do you make of this criticism from the above-mentioned SEP article on metaphysical realism:

For Putnam, metaphysical realism boils down to the idea that the facts of the world (or the truth of propositions) are fixed by something mind-independent and language-independent. As a consequence of this idea, Putnam suggests that the Metaphysical Realist is committed to the existence of a unique correspondence between statements in a language or theory and a determinate collection of mind and language-independent objects in the world. Such talk of correspondence between facts and objects, Putnam argues, presupposes that we find ourselves in possession of a fixed metaphysically-privileged notion of ‘object’.

Does this accurately describe your view?

Yep. This is a pattern for Leon.

Putnam suggests that the Metaphysical Realist is committed to the existence of a unique correspondence between statements in a language or theory and a determinate collection of mind and language-independent objects in the world. Such talk of correspondence between facts and objects, Putnam argues, presupposes that we find ourselves in possession of a fixed metaphysically-privileged notion of ‘object’.

Putnam is wrong, though. A realist can employ Davidson and bypass any need for correspondence.

Not quite; time is the representation of change, change presupposes time as the means by which changes are determinable. Change requires things that change, usually in the form of movement, but nevertheless, something empirical, whereas time itself does not change. — Mww

The way I see it time is change not the "representation" of change. You say change presupposes time, but I say that equally time presupposes change. You say that change requires that things change, and I would say that is tautologically true, and that what is also true is that time requires that things change. You say that time itself does not change, and I agree but would add that change does not change either and that it is not time or change that changes but things.

What?!? — Banno

1. "the cat is in the box" is true and I have looked in the box and seen the cat
2. "the cat is in the box" is true and justified

If "the cat is in the box" is true then is it possible to look in the box and see the cat?
Does (1) entail (2)?

If "yes" to both then if "the cat is in the box" is true then it is knowable.

If "the cat is in the box" being true is not knowable then either (1) does not entail (2) or it is not possible to look in the box and see the cat.

Do you disagree with any of this?

A realist can employ Davidson — frank

Ah yes. With the magical supervenience, which fills all manner of explanatory gaps.

You seem to be falling into a common form of sophistry, as follows:

<absurdity> = "It is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle"

1. Realism → <absurdity>
2. ∴ ~Realism

There is nothing wrong with giving this reductio against realism. The sophistry comes here:

"Realism is_def <absurdity>"

When you try to define realism as <absurdity> you deprive the realist of the opportunity to dispute (1), and this is a form of sophistry. Note too that you haven't been able to find a single example of a self-proclaimed realist who accepts your definition of realism, or would at least sign on to <absurdity>. initially volunteered himself, but now has distanced himself from your definition (as I predicted he would).

You complimented my essay on it. — Wayfarer

Yep, it was a good essay. That doesn't make it right.

Does this accurately describe your view? — Wayfarer

Nope. I'm arguing that the realist/antirealist issue is a choice of language game, and that there are good reasons to prefer a realist logic to an antirealist logic when talking about medium-sized small goods. Cats in boxes. Or on mats. Or gold in the ground.

But this forum has a plague of antirealists, and I find myself again defending realism against bad arguments.

I am unhappy with Putnam's idea that "Metaphysical Realist is committed to the existence of a unique correspondence between statements in a language or theory and a determinate collection of mind and language-independent objects in the world.". Ugly. But even if it were so, it's not my approach.

Pretty much.

Ah yes. With the magical supervenience, which fills all manner of explanatory gaps. — Wayfarer

There's nothing magical about Davidson.

No.

You seem to think that a realist will say that nothing is knowable. Not following that at all.

Curious that thinks Davidson magical, but is happy with ghosts in machines.

You seem to think that a realist will say that nothing is knowable. — Banno

That follows from the claim, quoted from the SEP article, that "the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle".

If it is possible that a true sentence is unknowable then it is possibly not possible that a true sentence is known, and if it is possibly not possible that a true sentence is known then it is necessarily not possible that a true sentence is known.

◇¬◇p→□¬◇p

Banno has distanced himself from your definition — Leontiskos

I do not trust your ability to understand and present either what I am saying or what is saying.

is happy with ghosts in machines. — Banno

Instructive that you think that I think there are any.

But thanks for the explanation.

"the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle". — Michael

Humour me and provide a link. Which article?

Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability:

He also points out that TKP, rather than the unrestricted KP, serves as the more interesting point of contention between the semantic realist and anti-realist. The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle. Fitch’s reasoning, at best, shows us that there is structural unknowability, that is, unknowability that is a function of logical considerations alone. But is there a more substantial kind of unknowability, for instance, unknowability that is a function of the recognition-transcendence of the non-logical subject-matter? A realist decrying the ad hoc nature of TKP (or DKP) fails to engage the knowability theorist at the heart of the realism debate.

Your want a ghost to be the only thing that can collapse the wave function.

There is no collapse. That's why I differentiated myself from Penrose's account.

The key idea of QBism is that the wavefunction ψ does not describe something that exists objectively “out there” in the world. Instead, it represents the observer’s knowledge of the probabilities of the outcomes of observations. In other words, the wavefunction provides a rule that an agent/observer follows to update their beliefs about the likely outcomes of a quantum experiment. These probabilities, much like betting odds, are not intrinsic features of the world but rather reflect the agent’s expectations based on their unique perspective and prior information.

In QBism, measurement outcomes are seen in terms of experiences of the agent making the observation. (In contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation views the wavefunction being relational to objective facts about how a system is prepared, and downplays the subjective aspect.) Each agent may confer and agree upon the consequences of a measurement, but the outcome is fundamentally the experience that each of them individually has. Accordingly the wavefunction doesn’t describe the system itself but rather the agent’s belief about what might happen when they interact with it. So while quantum theory has extremely high predictive accuracy, no two observations are ever exactly the same, and each observation is unique to a particular observer at that moment. This is why the role of the subject is central to the QBist model, and where it diverges from the realist view, which holds to a mind-independent reality that must be the same for all observers. In this sense, QBism puts the scientist back into the science — where, really, she has always belonged!

No ghost, and no collapse.