That’s what I mean by saying that “I think therefore I am” is not the culmination of cogito qua cogito but of the transcendence of itself viz. the externalization of being through the process of “doubting.” Thinking that thinks itself. — NotAristotle

I think, supposing we were to take up Descartes' side in this back-and-forth, Descartes could reply that Sartre has no right to claim externalization on the basis of his methodological doubt. Whether the process of doubting requires time is beside the point from the metaphysical set-up of the method of doubt.

Which is why I keep coming back to thinking that difference between them is the how they interpret being and "...exists". As well as their overall philosophical goals being very different, since they're in very different times.

"Descartes could reply that Sartre has no right to claim externalization on the basis of his methodological doubt."

We might ask: Why not? What's wrong with externalization, Descartes? But then we might add that externalization appears to be implicit in methodological "doubting."

"how they interpret being and "...exists"." Could you say more about that?

So I see Descartes as claiming not faith but knowledge of God's existence -- and this need not even counter faith. Especially at the time scientists and theologians weren't far apart. In a way I'm trying to bring out "the spirit of the times" by focusing on the prima facie meaning to put Descartes in the context of the Enlightenment. — Moliere

If you're distinguishing between faith and knowledge, you'll have to define those terms. If we accept that knowledge requires a justified true belief, it would seem that the distinction between faith and knowledge would somehow hinge on the justification element. Those who believe in God based upon faith do not admit to having no justification for their faith, but they might use personal conviction, religious text, mystical feeling, or even pragmatic reasons to justify that faith. Some might even suggest an empirical basis (as in their experience of reality leads them to believe there must be a God), so that question is somewhat complicated.

That's not to say there are not differences between the justificaitons used by the faithful and those who are not of faith, but it's difficult to say one "knows" something and the other doesn't. What I think those who question those of faith really are attacking is the "truth" element, meaning they simply think there is no God and there is no way you can "know" something that isn't true. So, if you say Descartes knows there is God, then you are saying there is a God because to know something means it must be true.

My main point here isn't to suggest that Descartes made an intentional argument proving God by arguing that failure to accept God led to an incoherent solipsitic position. I just think that by working backwards and seeing what Descartes required to avoid solipsism you can come to the conclusion that God is necessary for Descartes to avoid that.

I do see the similarities with Kant's approach, but I also see the differences. With Kant, as it pertains to time, he argued that you could not begin to understand something without placing it in time. That is, an object outside of time is meaningless.

With Descartes, there is an private language argument problem that can suggest a complete incoherence to solipsism. https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#:~:text=The%20Incoherence%20of%20Solipsism,-With%20the%20belief&text=As%20a%20theory%2C%20it%20is,his%20solipsistic%20thoughts%20at%20all . What this would mean is that if God is necessary to avoid solipsism and solipsism is incoherent, then you need God to avoid incoherence.

Whether you want to go down that road, I don't know. I'm not necessarily arguing that a godless universe would result in a complete inability to understand anything, but, even if I did, I still see a distinction between that sort of incoherence and the one Kant references when he says time is imposed on objects and therefore a necessary element of the understanding.

This whole argument here has expanded as I've thought about it, so maybe there is a good argument that human understanding is impossible without God if one follows Descartes' reasoning. This wouldn't mean there is God. It would just mean you can't know anything without God.

Descartes believed God is a necessary thing, which he demonstrates by analyzing the idea of perfection. Descartes' Ontological Argument

I know that argument, but that's the stupid argument from logical necessity, like God can be created by syllogism.

My novel contribution to the field of Cartesian analysis that appeared for the first time here argues that God is required in order to avoid to solipsism, an inherently incoherent position. That is, feel free to be an atheist, but your position is incoherent.

Descartes saved us from the unsalvagable pits of eternal and infinite skeptism by reminding us that God would not allow for such. There being no other way out, God becomes the only way for such salvation.

That's my contribution to the field.

I know that argument, but that's the stupid argument from logical necessity, like God can be created by syllogism. — Hanover

I knew a guy who claimed that if we don't go over to the Mayan calendar, the world will end. He wrote letters to the UN trying to explain to them that the word "week" sounds a lot like "weak", and based on that, we need to change the way the days are named. "Like for instance, today is Blue Galactic Monkey day." he said.

"My main point here isn't to suggest that Descartes made an intentional argument proving God by arguing that failure to accept God led to an incoherent solipsitic position. I just think that by working backwards and seeing what Descartes required to avoid solipsism you can come to the conclusion that God is necessary for Descartes to avoid that."

"It would just mean you can't know anything without God."

I think this is a good reading of Descartes.

"So, given his arguments -- at face value -- he knows God exists, rather than it being faith-based"

Maybe Descartes can be interpreted to be making this argument:

If not for faith in God, I, Descartes, wouldn't know anything after methodological doubt. (Knowledge requires faith in God).
If I, Descartes, have knowledge, then God is real.
I, Descartes, have knowledge.
Therefore, God is real.

See how the argument guarantees knowledge of God, and yet that knowledge depends on faith in the first place?

I knew a guy who claimed that if we don't go over to the Mayan calendar, the world will end. — frank

One day the world will end, and we won't know why it will end until it does end. Until then, the jury is out as to whether the guy you knew is correct.

I'd be interested in hearing more from you on this comment. (I've read some of Husserl's anti-psychologist arguments and found them amenable, but not Frege's) — Moliere

Husserl and Frege seem quite similar to me, re psychologism. They both reject the idea that thoughts can only be said to be “caused,” rather than explained or justified. One of the things I see Husserl doing is to separate the fact that thought-terms describe mental/psychological phenomena from the further fact (as he saw it) that phenomena like judgments and syllogisms are also normative. Similarly, a number is not to be understood as a “presentation,” a thought that occurs to me or you. Husserl says, “The number Five is not my own or anyone else’s counting of five, it is also not my presentation or anyone else’s presentation of five.” Frege’s emphasis, as far as I know (I don’t know his work deeply), was more on what we’d call the analytic quality of logical truths. But the point is similar: The psychological origin of subjective (synthetic) and objective (analytic) truths may be the same – they’re all thoughts – but it’s the way we demonstrate them that shows the difference. So, “the psychological is to be distinguished sharply from the logical, as the subjective is from the objective.” (Foundations of Arithmetic)

One day the world will end, and we won't know why it will end until it does end. Until then, the jury is out as to whether the guy you knew is correct. — Hanover

That's good. I want it to be a surprise.

What is the source of Descartes certainty according to the Meditations?