Oh piss, I see. Sorry, definitely misapprehended.

Nb: is that a. R. Fripp reference or something else I'm not aware of?

Why should one do that which is good? No, I don't think that good is synonymous with, "something one ought to do". For example, most people would agree that selling all your worldly possessions and donating the money to charity is something that would be good. However, that doesn't mean that one is obligated to do so. Please input into this conversation with your own takes. — Hyper

A good conundrum for myself.

Why should one, in the general sense, do good is much harder for me to answer than why the good is attractive.

For one tempted by the good there is no "Why do what is good?" -- it's a light that brings moths in to burn them up.

No one is obligated by anything in the existential sense -- we are all free to choose.

But you do what is good because that's what you do (at least, as long as it helps others -- there's a darker side to this that hurts others, but that's not what I mean by the good)

I agree. The concept of the good and the concept of the right are clearly distinct, even though something's being good can sometimes - not always - be why an act is right.

Another example - should one be needed: Jack deserves to be tortured (as he freely tortured others). it is good when a person gets what they deserve. Yet it is not right to torture Jack.

Another demonstration that we are dealing with different concepts is that the property of goodness is a property that anything can have (in principle). States of affairs, character traits, intentions. But the property of rightness is a property that only actions can have. Actions can be good too, but they're not the same concept as acts and only acts can be right.

Biology can inform ethics without ethics being reducible to biology.

You're probably right. But the question seems simple. "Should we do good?" Of course, we should do good. I always feel good when I do the right thing. Then I can better respect mysel

In some sense, intentional action seems to always seek after some good. For example, when we eat, we seek some good, be it the enjoyment of the food, the satiety of our appetite, good health, not offending a cook, etc. Likewise, people generally play games because they enjoy them.

This holds true for bad acts as well. We generally steal because we want the good of getting to possess what is stolen, or else of the thrill of stealing, etc. As points out, the murderer normally seeks some good, the reestablishment of their honor, vengeance, etc.

In ethics, we are concerned with what we should want. It is clear that we can want things that are not good for us, like wanting to engage in adultery even though we know this would be both wrong and disastrous, or the alcoholics desire for a drink they do not wish to have the desire for.

The human good, human flourishing, living a good life, being a good person, etc. involves biology but cannot be wholly explained by it. We might allow that human beings are by nature social animals, and that status is important for self-actualization, but still see that the way status is gained and maintained depends heavily on culture and individual preferences.

Virtue, on the classical view, involves not only doing the right thing but also wanting the right things. Virtue can be trained. Research suggests that people can indeed habituate themselves to wanting good things. The virtues are what allow one to act justly in challenging situations, or just habitually. Doing what is good while not enjoying it is mere continence. Obviously, it's preferable to be happy while doing what is right.

I think another factor here is self-determination. Is our happiness dependent on good fortune. Health, wealth, lovers, status, time for hobbies, etc. can all be lost. They often are at some point in a life. A virtuous person is insulated from these losses. Many historical paragons, saints and sages, seem practically immune to bad fortune, penning sublime works and focusing on a concern for others as they undergo imprisonment or torture, or face immanent execution. In a sense, then, the pinnacle of virtue also becomes a sort of self-determining flourishing.

And of course, virtue helps with freedom even in less extreme cases. Being courageous, prudent, charitable, magnanimous, temperate, etc. help one avoid the traps that land people in situations they cannot easily escape, be it heavy debt, weight they cannot lose, bullied in a relationship, in family feuds, etc. Virtue cannot preclude these, but it both prevents them and makes them manageable.

Why should one, in the general sense, do good is much harder for me to answer than why the good is attractive

I do think this is a problem modern ethics creates for itself. It tends to be more rules based (an after effect of the Reformation and theologies that precluded any strong role for human virtue). Even as the theology has crumbled, the structure has often remained.

Another problem is making the "moral good" a sort of sui generis "goodness" cut off from all other goods (e.g. being a "good baseball player," "good cars," etc. ) I much prefer simply acknowledging that bad things have some good to them, or some apparent good. In this case, it's easier to explain immoral acts in terms of people falling for appearances. This is concupiscence, the love for mere apparent good.

Why engage in vices? Because they are fun, which is a good. Why do so many people, especially (young) men, come to idolize and mimic characters with glaring character flaws (we could consider the long standing appeal of Tyler Durden of "Fight Club" or Tony Montana of "Scarface")? Because these characters do embody some virtues in dramatic fashion. Tyler Durden is smart, courageous, iron willed, etc. They have some of the key ingredients for flourishing in spades. Such characters just also lack other virtues or have glaring vices.

You should want the virtues because they are most likely to make you flourish, and because they help others flourish (which is key to our flourishing and freedom at any rate). You're safest when everyone around you is freer and wants what best for you. If they only do what is good for you because of coercion, then your happiness is unstable because that coercion can break down (and you are not free to remove that coercion without consequences).

As Saint Augustine says: "Thus, a good man, though a slave, is free; but a wicked man, though a king, is a slave. For he serves, not one man alone, but what is worse, as many masters as he has vices." Epictetus, the philosopher-slave, makes a similar point.

Tyler Durden is smart, courageous, iron willed, etc. They have some of the key ingredients for flourishing in spades. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And there's the rub. If the individual conscience is the sole arbiter of virtue, then who's to say that's not good? Suffice to say that St Augustine holds convictions on that question which may not be shared by others, even if I myself can plainly see the sense in them. So again in the absence of a summum bonum it is hard to see what provides the pole to the moral compass, so to speak.

However, that doesn't mean that one is obligated to do so. Please input into this conversation with your own takes. — Hyper

Good brings happiness. Bad and evil brings unhappiness. Doing good feels good and makes one happy. If happiness is the purpose of life, doing good makes sense. Because doing good brings happiness.

Doing good out of obligation can be good, but it doesn't always bring happiness. Doing good because it is good thing to do brings happiness.

And again, is the goal to achieve "the highest level of being human", or just to do what is right? — Banno

IMO, the highest level of being human is to be your most true, authentic self. This means getting the most in touch with your natural instincts, with your "wild knowing." The question becomes, does this coincide with doing right or doing wrong?

Are we born compassionate, and learn aggression, or are we born aggressive, and learn compassion?

What is our genetic predisposition before the environment makes its mark on us?

Biology can inform ethics without ethics being reducible to biology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Much food for thought. The relationship between ethics and biology. From what you've said, I take it to mean that ethics is something bigger and beyond biology. Then, what else are we?

This reminds me of the story about the two sons of an alcoholic. One son grows up to be an alcoholic. When asked why, he answers, "I watched my father."

The other son grows up and stays completely away from alcohol. When asked why, he says, "I watched my father."

How do we explain the difference between the two sons?

Why should one do that which is good? — Hyper

Actually, it is our own actions that we must always present to other people as being good and right, we must talk about ourselves as "I'm only doing what is good and right" and "I'm only acting in ways one should act".

It doesn't say anything about what we ought do, so isn't intended to be "workable". It's a bit of frippery, like the OP. — Banno

Metaethics and virtue signaling go hand in hand.

That we have evolved to do something or to prefer something simply does not imply that we ought to do that thing. There remains the logical gap between what we do and what we ought do. Until you get your heads around that, you are not even addressing ethical issues. — Banno

I want to emphasize this point. It’s a big fork in the road for ethical theory. You can try to define ethical words like “ought” and “good” and “right” to mean, roughly, “referring to the stuff we’ve evolved to choose or prefer, all things being equal.” But you can’t just do it by fiat; this requires a powerful argument, because it cuts against the grain of how those words have always been used. You certainly can’t just stipulate it on the grounds of some sort of obviousness or scientific/evolutionary knowledge. Nor, it seems to me, can you use something like this as evidence for your argument:

We have new understanding of psychology and sociology that seems to offer near-empirical evidence as to what builds and sustains societies that last and what factors, behaviors, and deviations lead to their collapse. — Outlander

If this could be shown to be true, it still wouldn’t answer the (traditional) ethical question of what is the right thing to do. We’re supposed to combine this “new understanding” story with the idea that, obviously, any human being should want to build and sustain societies that last. But this isn’t true now, and it wasn’t true in classical Greece. It’s never been true. Why should you or I or anyone else value “sustaining society” more than our own comfort or advantage? That, to me, is a genuine ethical question that can’t even be posed until, as @Banno points out, we stop thinking that some naturalistic fact about human beings or evolution is going to contain the answer.

Why should you or I or anyone else value “sustaining society” more than our own comfort or advantage? — J

We need to take the long view of our evolution, going far back beyond civilization.

I’m going to return to my earlier point that notions of “good’ and “bad” only evolved through social interactions. The universe is neutral. To determine if something is good or bad requires human judgement, and what is being judged is one’s behavior towards another. Does it serve the interests of the group? This is what we are hard-wired for.

Consider the universal virtues of honesty, justice, loyalty or humanity – they can only come to light in relationships between people, or groups. Even creativity requires the artist and the receiver of the art.

There is no such thing as solitary goodness, or badness. Goodness is manifested in co-operation and strengthened relationships, and badness in harm to others.

Now, the question "Why should we?" might be answered by: Because we want to belong to the group. Because we want to live in peace. Because we want safety and security.

Now, the question "Why should we?" might be answered by: Because we want to belong to the group. Because we want to live in peace. Because we want safety and security. — Questioner

And "we" don't care if all these peace, safety, and security come at the expense of the other group.

Why should you or I or anyone else value “sustaining society” more than our own comfort or advantage?
— J

We need to take the long view of our evolution, going far back beyond civilization. — Questioner

We "need to"? Why? Why in the world should I care about what happened millions of years in the past, or what will happen thousands of years in the future? Why, in particular, should I care about "sustaining society" more than I care about looking out for Number 1?

(These are meant to be devil's-advocate questions, but they do demand answers.)

If the individual conscience is the sole arbiter of virtue, then who's to say that's not good?

Sure, but this seems in the same vein as: "if the individual is the sole arbiter of truth, then who's to say that anything is or isn't true?"

Yet surely we can be right or wrong about "what is good for us." And indeed, we often realize later that we were in error about what was truly good for us, and even that others understood what was truly better for us more than did we ourselves.

Supposing reason is like a stool, it seems to me that one cannot chop off the leg of practical reason (reasoning vis-á-vis good and bad) and expect the stool not to tip over. For you might maintain that the "true remains true," and yet it certainly cannot be "better" for all to affirm this, or "better" to hold to the truth over falsity, to prefer "good" reasoning to bad, or "good faith" argumentation to bad faith. People should only prefer truth when they find it preferable. And if the good is just what they prefer, they can never be wrong about it.

As Plato points out re Protagoras' version of this doctrine in the Theatetus, this makes philosophy pointless. Who needs teachers when one is always right.

Why should you or I or anyone else value “sustaining society” more than our own comfort or advantage?

Right, as Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyich discovers, it is one thing to know that "Socrates is mortal," or that "man is mortal," and another to confront one's own death. The same holds true for suffering and deprivation in the abstract, versus taking them on oneself in order to do what one thinks is truly better.

That is, even leaving aside the question of "what is truly best," people are often unable to bring themselves to do what they truly see as better. Yet this informs the virtues as well, since surely "being good" entails those excellences that make one free to act on their knowledge of what is good, to "actualize the good" as (relatively) self-determining entities.

To do good, one must know what is good, know how to accomplish this good, and be free to do so. Naturalist approaches often get lost in the second of these, spiraling down into the great multiplicity of efficient causes and causal mastery. This focus on particulars lets us know "how to do things," but not what to do. The main problem I see with deontological ethics (and utilitarian consequentialism is just the prioritization of a specific rule in this respect) is that it fails to see how, for a principle to be convincing, it must be found in the Many, in the multitude of concrete particulars. For example, if we can identify "harm" to organisms in analagous biological terms, what is the common principle?

You cannot jump to rules without principles. This sort of moral reasoning sprang from the context where it was assumed that God had clearly revealed the rules in the Bible, and "accessibility to all rational agents," is a poor substitute for divine revelation it seems.

I do have some hopes here. The sea change brought on by the ability of information theoretic approaches and complexity studies' ability to unify disparate fields (including across the "natural" and "social" sciences divide) does seem to be a potent counter to reductionism and the tendency to prioritize the many over any unifying one (e.g. Harris wants to identify the good in neuronal activity, which seems to me like trying to understand flight by looking at primarily at the cells in the wings of flying animals in isolation, rather than for the principle of lift.)

And "we" don't care if all these peace, safety, and security come at the expense of the other group. — baker

Very interesting observation. In the distant past, survival often depended on fearing "the other." But in a modern society, with all its diversity, that ancient instinct can lead to discrimination, bigotry and racism.

That's when we rely more on our intellect and empathy rather than ancient protective mechanisms.

You should want the virtues because they are most likely to make you flourish, and because they help others flourish (which is key to our flourishing and freedom at any rate). You're safest when everyone around you is freer and wants what best for you. If they only do what is good for you because of coercion, then your happiness is unstable because that coercion can break down (and you are not free to remove that coercion without consequences).

As Saint Augustine says: "Thus, a good man, though a slave, is free; but a wicked man, though a king, is a slave. For he serves, not one man alone, but what is worse, as many masters as he has vices." Epictetus, the philosopher-slave, makes a similar point. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I see a problem here.

What we have control over is only ourselves and so even if we pursue the virtues because we want them for flourishing it could be that flourishing in one environment differs from another environment -- so I could pursue a kind of harmony with my fellow men, but supposing I've been thrown into prison unjustly, or I'm drafted to war, then what helps me flourish changes dramatically.

Tyler Durden's flourishing fits within his revolutionary cult and is dramatically opposed to Jack's effete office flourishing; the attraction of Tyler Durden is to someone who feels like the modern male is a mutation which should be rebelled against, which in turn requires a plan to destroy the financial infastructure so that modern men can "reset" and go back to a primordial existene of explicit hierarchal domination -- the man of Tyler Durden isn't opposed to the corporate hierarchies due to domination, but rather because it's not the sort of world Tyler Durden can flourish within.

The interesting twist being that Jack embodies both of these masculinities, the modern effete with tastes in apartment furniture and clever jokes, and the masculine ghost within that wants a primate based society (or what I'd call "The bad anarchy")

So the good man is more free, but the ends of flourishing aren't set -- and the problem comes up again. Why ought one do what's good? (And which vision is good?)

Why in the world should I care about what happened millions of years in the past — J

Whether you care or not is irrelevant. The fact is that the process of evolution that occurred over those millions of years made us what we are today.

should I care about "sustaining society" more than I care about looking out for Number 1? — J

I have already provided some insight into that. The simple fact is that most humans do best in society, and to live in isolation or loneliness leads to its own mental stresses. Sure, this is not true for everyone, but for the majority. We are hard-wired to connect.

even leaving aside the question of "what is truly best," people are often unable to bring themselves to do what they truly see as better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is true, but the "why not be selfish?" question goes further. A version of rational egoism says, "I don't believe 'the good of society' or 'the good of future generations' are goods at all. It's not that I'm unable to act with those goals in mind because it's painful or difficult; I deny that they're worth sacrificing anything for. I want my own desires to be satisfied, period, and no, I'm not a selfish monster, because some of those desires include concern for those I love. But they are still mine. Societal progress has absolutely no claim on me."

Sure, this is not true for everyone, but for the majority. — Questioner

So if I'm one of the ones it's not true for, then it's OK for me to choose to act selfishly?

So if I'm one of the ones it's not true for, then it's OK for me to choose to act selfishly? — J

Good question. But I think selfishness is another one of those traits that requires a party of two or more to be manifested. if you live your life without any consideration of others, that is selfish, even if it only adds up to an act of omission.

To be honest, this objection seems to beg the question to me. It only makes sense if "flourishing" and "freedom" are relativized such that being the "alpha male" of some apocalyptic band allows for just as much freedom and flourish as say, living in Star Trek's post-scarcity society, where everyone has access to a top tier education, and ample room to pursue their interests. Now, I certainly haven't attempted the long justification for why the latter is superior, but at the same time, I think most people can work this out for themselves.


Ancient hierarchical societies place constraints on their leadership as much as the slaves and plebians. One cannot lift the boot lest one ends up with their throat cut, that another might climb up to the place of honor. Roman Emperors were frequently both ruled over by vice and violently deposed—for long periods most died screaming, cut down by their underlings as often as their explicit foes. This is St. Augustine's point in "The City of God," when he argues that Rome was never a commonwealth, in terms that foreshadow Hegel's lord-bondsman dialectic a millennia and a half later (and we might also consider de Beauvoir's extension of this, the ways in which man's flourishing is hindered by the degradation of woman.)

Also, we don't just have control over ourselves. We can have relatives degrees of control over others as well, hence freedom and virtue are in some respects social projects.

But the good is either arbitrary, and unjustifiable in terms of reason or it isn't.

Likewise, Tony Montana's contentment is dependent on good fortune, on the Columbians not sending a death squad against him or the Feds not closing in. Boethius' happiness survives imprisonment, torture, and a death sentence.

The second problem with the objection, which is perhaps more relevant, is that it paints a sort of static picture of the virtues where they are simply "whatever leads to success in one's current context." But Jack isn't flourishing. That's the whole point; the standards are defective, the society sick. Again, relativism is the underlying assumption here if we are going to say that what is virtuous for an SS officer is just those things that gain him status as a committed Hitlerite.

But the virtues are generally not framed in these narrow terms. The proper counterexample would be "rashness or indecisiveness being superior to prudence." Now, in the occasional situation, might the person who acts impulsively fare better than the prudent person, or the person who is paralyzed by decisions? Sure. The person who fails to escape a burning building early because they are paralyzed by doubt might just happen to be in the right place to somehow survive the building's collapse, while the prudent person dies. But will the vices work better on average? Over a lifetime?

We might suppose, "but sometimes it pays to act quickly." And indeed this is true, but prudence includes knowing when this is the case, whereas the brash person acts impulsively in all situations. Even if you're a serial killer rapist, your aims are better served by a certain form of prudence (we might call this cunning instead) then "acting like an idiot."

Courage likewise is the median between rashness and cowardice. Might the extremes sometimes accidentally lead to "better outcomes." It seems possible. Will they tend to? I doubt it. But more importantly, the virtues are what serve us better precisely if we have bad fortune.

You can think of self-determination in terms of human organizations as well. The society that follows through on the Durden plan to "return to monke," is just going to get steamrolled by the first competent, technology wielding military that wants their resources and is prepared to use force to get them.

Star Fleet, of course, doesn't do this. Why? I feel like to get at this the Timaeus and the reason that God is ultimately beneficent and not indifferent nor hostile is a good starting point. The entity that is hostile to other things is less than fully transcedent, it is defined by what it is not. Love is the identification of the self with the other. God is love because God has no limits, and because God also faces no threats. But Star Fleet might as well be God compared to most races, and surely their beneficence is helped along by knowledge, which gives them this strength.

Likewise, we might not be able to "prove" the superiority of growing up in the Star Trek universe. However, I would imagine that many carpenters might be unable to write a proof for the Pythagorean theorem they use on a regular basis as well. Certainly though, they shouldn't find this too troubling.

A version of rational egoism says, "I don't believe 'the good of society' or 'the good of future generations' are goods at all. It's not that I'm unable to act with those goals in mind because it's painful or difficult; I deny that they're worth sacrificing anything for. I want my own desires to be satisfied, period, and no, I'm not a selfish monster, because some of those desires include concern for those I love. But they are still mine. Societal progress has absolutely no claim on me."

Ok. Do you think this is a good position? Is it "as defendable as any other?"

Let me point out a similar problem. While not as popular as "nothing is good, it's all egoistic personal preference," "nothing is true it's all egoistic personal preference," is still a position people take up.

Now how does one argue against such a position? Suppose we give all sorts of reasons for why things might be true in a sense that is not reducible to our personal preferences. Then they reply: "is any of what you said true? I don't think it can be, truth doesn't really exist."

Yet the good is essentially filling the role in practical reason of the true vis-á-vis theoretical reason. To deny it is to deny practical reason tout court—what more can be said? Can one justify reason with reasons? Certainly not without circularity.

Well, if you allow an interlocutor a sacrosanct premise that you believe to be false, or likely to be false, it shouldn't be surprising that it's impossible to refute them.

Plato has it that reason is transcedent. Reasons takes us past the given of what we already are. It allows us to move beyond our current opinions, and current desires, in search of what is truly best. But reason is transcedent in another way. We can always ask of any proposition "but what if it isn't true? What if I am mistaken?' And as G.E. Moore points out, we can do this with practical reason as well. We can always ask with coherence, "but is it really good?" or "why is it good?" 'The Logos is without beginning or end,' indeed.

But then if epistemology is better off without foundationalism we might assume this holds for moral/practical epistemology. Because a good degree of moral relativism has currency in our culture (e.g. "bourgeoisie metaphysics," where anything can be true so long as it allows others to be true), "well not everyone agrees, and this varies by culture and historical epoch," is considered a "good argument" against statements of practical reason. But of course, opinions about the shape of the Earth also vary by person and by culture and historical epoch. This would be considered trivial grounds for doubting the shape of the Earth.

The question ought to be what is the good thing to do and then you could ask why that's the good thing to do, but you wouldn't agree upon what the good thing is to do and then ask why do it.

The "good" thing is the thing you want to do because that's what it means to be good.

The good thing to do is not necessarily what we want to do. Morality often entails putting our own needs aside for the sake of the group.

In any case, to the OP, this was the OP @Hyper I remember as an undergrad this question of moral motivation was so big that it just permanently turned me off to secular ethics as studying them for years. Yes, we might make the determination that X action is moral, but we also have other types of reasons for behavior outside of that. I couldn't even pin down what the "moral" motivation must be overriding.