What is that something? — Janus

In terms of a what that something is thinking. In terms of a who it is Descartes.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? Or is cogito strictly to "I" only? If it does, then could you say, "He thinks therefore he exists", or "It thinks, therefore it exists."?

If it is only for "I", then wouldn't it be just a solipsistic utterance?
— Corvus

Just realised that you have not answered to this question. What's your thought on this point? — Corvus

In response to your first question I said:

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

With regard to the second question, if he were to have stopped there then yes.

I don't exist is untrue (not from cogito, but from my sensory perception), therefore it implies cogito is untrue as well. Agree? — Corvus

No.I must exist in order to have sensory perception. He does not doubt that he senses. What he doubts is the judgment that what he senses corresponds to anything outside his mind.

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

Does it entail then,
God thinks (doubts), therefore God exists?

No.I must exist in order to have sensory perception. He does not doubt that he senses. What he doubts is the judgment that what he senses corresponds to anything outside his mind. — Fooloso4

But that is not the case from the scientific point of view. I must exist first before I am able to think, or sense the world.  These are the biological facts. Remember when you were born?  You didn't know anything, and you didn't think anything. You didn't know any language, so didn't speak anything intelligible.  Your mind was a blank sheet of paper (by metaphor). Then you grew up picking up the ability to speak, see, think .... etc etc?

You have existed without having to think that you think.

Thanks for doing all this detective work in the Meditations -- it's very helpful and illuminating. A few thoughts:

- We see how conflicted Descartes is about what to say concerning essence, nature, thinking thing, etc. He wants "thinking thing" to be primary -- "nothing else belongs to my nature or essence" -- but he's aware that the mind's connection to the body is not merely like a sailor and a ship. Rather, it's an "intermingling". (I'd be interested to know the Latin here.)

-- He also clearly has trouble with using "mind" and "soul" interchangeably. If his own nature is a "totality of things bestowed by God," surely this is the soul, rather than a thinking thing. As you show, this results in a number of contradictions, both philosophical and theological.

-- All these represent criticisms of Descartes on his own terms, pointing out contradictions or inconsistencies. But what is most striking to me (and I think to Ricoeur) is that, for Descartes, the problem is a mind/body/soul problem: How can we best describe the capacities, natures, and overlappings of these three aspects of humans? Which is ontologically primary, if any? What depends on what? Whereas, for us moderns, the essential element left out of this analysis is the unconscious. I think Descartes might partially understand this as an aspect of the soul, an aspect not encountered by the thinking thing. This is in keeping with many spiritual traditions which describe the vital connections between unconscious processes and spiritual insight and experience. But I doubt if Descartes would have liked the idea that there are aspects of the soul (read "the self") that are not only different from thoughts and desires and sensations, but are actually unknown to him. Or, if he did grasp what this meant, he would probably dismiss it as unimportant: What counts is what we experience via the ego, the "I" (as he conceived it).

Does it entail then,
God thinks (doubts), therefore God exists? — Corvus

It does not entail that God thinks, but if God does think then God exists.

But that is not the case from the scientific point of view. — Corvus

No doubt that if Descartes has the benefit of contemporary science some of his views would change.

It does not entail that God thinks, but if God does think then God exists. — Fooloso4

But all thoughts are private to the thinker. I am only conscious of my thought, and you would be, I reckon, too. If God thinks, is the same category of inference to If you think, If she think, or if they think, then they must exist. What makes "If you think, then you exist" more probable than "if God thinks, God exists"?

No doubt that if Descartes has the benefit of contemporary science some of his views would change. — Fooloso4

Would you not agree it is a commonsense knowledge rather than a contemporary Science? Even ancient Greeks would have known about it.

We see how conflicted Descartes is ... — J

I am not so sure. I ascribe to the idea that when a careful writer says things that seem contradictory that is is sign that we need to look closer and attempt to resolve the conflict.

He also clearly has trouble with using "mind" and "soul" interchangeably. — J

I think it is an intentional rhetorical strategy.

If his own nature is a "totality of things bestowed by God," surely this is the soul, rather than a thinking thing. — J

In the language of theology it is a soul, but in Descartes terminology a mind.

All these represent criticisms of Descartes on his own terms, pointing out contradictions or inconsistencies. — J

I am attempting to point beyond the contradictions and inconsistencies. It is part of his art of writing to conceal certain things that the attentive reading will attempt to make sense of. A few quotes from the
online appendix to Arthur Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines":

Descartes writes to one of his more imprudent disciples:
Do not propose new opinions as new, but retain all the old terminology for
supporting new reasons; that way no one can find fault with you, and those who
grasp your reasons will by themselves conclude to what they ought to understand.
Why is it necessary for you to reject so openly the [Aristotelian doctrine of]
substantial forms? Do you not recall that in the Treatise on Meteors I expressly
denied that I rejected or denied them, but declared only that they were not
necessary for the explication of my reasons?
– René Descartes to Regius, January, 1642, Œuvres de Descartes, 3:491-
92, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’
Sincerity,” 363

From the first paragraph of Descartes’ early, unpublished “Private Thoughts”:
I go forward wearing a mask [larvatus prodeo].
– René Descartes, “Cogitationes Privatae,” in Œuvres de Descartes, 10:213

Descartes took care not to speak so plainly [as Hobbes] but he could not help revealing
his opinions in passing, with such address that he would not be understood save by those
who examine profoundly these kinds of subjects.
– G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, 2.1:506, quoted and translated
by Richard Kennington in On Modern Origins, 197

For example, here is Leibniz, reacting to Descartes’ seeming embrace of the view that all
necessary truths, like the principle of non-contradiction, are the product of God’s free and
arbitrary will:
I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously of this opinion….
He only made pretence to go [there]. It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his
philosophic feints: he prepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he
discovered a trick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican in
the strictest sense.
– G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, 244 (2.186)

Whatever he recounts about the distinction between the two substances [mind and body],
it is obvious that it was only a trick, a cunning devise to make the theologians swallow
the poison hidden behind an analogy that strikes everyone and that they alone cannot see.
– Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Machine Man, 35

After corresponding with Descartes concerning the issue of whether animals were mere
machines, Henry More concluded that Descartes was “an abundantly cunning and abstruse
genius” who insinuated that mind as an incorporeal substance is a “useless figment and
chimera.”
– Henry More, Philosophical Writings, 184, 197-98

Thus one is right to accuse Descartes of atheism, seeing that he very energetically
destroyed the weak proofs of the existence of God that he gave.
– Baron d'Holbach, Système de la nature, 2:150, quoted and translated by Hiram
Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’ Sincerity,” 355

But Descartes' concern was not simply personal. It was to displace the authority of the Church from the mind of the thinking man, — Fooloso4

He wanted the Church to reform, and he thought he could help it do that. He was a wild guy. He travelled around engaging in warfare when he felt like it, he was actively seeking members of esoteric groups (we know he knew one of them, but the connection was never revealed to him.) He was a rich man and a genius. He wasn't under anyone's thumb, and he knew it.

But all thoughts are private to the thinker. — Corvus

Not f he reveals them of makes them public.

Therefore your claim that whoever thinks, must exist, is false? — Corvus

I don't see how this follows.

Would you not agree it is a commonsense knowledge rather than a contemporary Science? Even ancient Greeks would have known about it. — Corvus

You asked about the scientific point of view, which is not the same as common sense knowledge. In any case, he cannot be deceived about his existence because he must exist in order to be deceived. As to whether he first exists and only subsequently thinks, he rejects this. He exists as a thinking thing. As such, it makes no sense to separate his existing and this thinking.

He wanted the Church to reform, and he thought he could help it do that. — frank

Wouldn't the Church consider this heresy? Rather than reform the Church he attempts to reform man,

Wouldn't the Church consider this heresy? — Fooloso4

The Counter-Reformation happened a few decades before Descartes was born, so no. During his lifetime, the Church was focused on losing ground to the Protestants.

Rather than reform the Church he attempts to reform man, — Fooloso4

I'll just comment that you do this a lot. You come up with some weird subterfuge related to a famous philosopher and then announce your theories as if they're facts. Just signal that you're doing this so you don't end up causing confusion.

It's hard to know how to respond to this line of thought. All I can do is read Descartes as carefully as I can, noting problems as they come up. If he was in fact playing a devious game of disguising his true thoughts, using inconsistencies as spurs to help us think more deeply, deliberately conflating "soul" and "mind" in contradictory statements . . . then perhaps he was a "cunning and abstruse genius" but this sounds more like a 19th century way of reading than 17th century. Neither of your quotes from Descartes himself seems to support such a reading. To say in one's unpublished Private Thoughts that one "goes forth wearing a mask" surely speaks to the difference we all experience between our private and public selves, no? Why would you think he was referring to his philosophical writings?

when a careful writer says things that seem contradictory . . . — Fooloso4

But that's just it -- on the basis of these contradictions, I don't think he was a careful writer. He just seems muddled about minds and souls -- understandably, since the theology of his era didn't give him much to work with, soul-wise.

I suppose it depends on how you evaluate Descartes' status as a philosopher. I grant his historical importance but have never found him especially deep or insightful. That said, the challenge to try to read ever more deeply is always appropriate.

I'll just comment that you do this a lot. You come up with some weird subterfuge related to a famous philosopher and then announce your theories as if they're facts. — frank

My interpretation like any other is just that, an interpretation. Is your claim that Descartes wanted the Church to reform your own theory. If so, you do not announce it as such. If it is a fact, what is the evidence to support it?

Let's look at some facts:

From the Dedication to the Meditations:

For us who are believers,it is enough to accept on faith that the human soul does not die with the body, and that God exists; but in the case of unbelievers, it seems that there is no religion, and practically no moral virtue, that they can be persuaded to adopt until these two truths are proved to them by natural reason.

It is of course quite true that we must believe in the existence of God because it is a doctrine of Holy Scripture, and conversely, that we must believe Holy Scripture because it comes from God; for since faith is the gift of God, he who gives us grace to believe other things can also give us grace to believe that he exists. But this argument cannot be put to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular.

But in its eighth session the Lateran Council held under Leo X condemned those who take this position, and expressly enjoined Christian philosophers to refute their arguments and use ail their powers to establish the truth; so l have not hesitated to attempt this task as well.

In addition, I know that the only reason why many irreligious people are unwilling to believe that God exists and that the human mind is distinct from the body is the alleged fact that no one has hitherto been able to demonstrate these points. Now I completely disagree with this: I think that when properly understood almost all the arguments that have been put forward on these issues by the great men have the force of demonstrations, and I am convinced that it is scarcely possible to provide
any arguments which have not already been produced by someone else.
Nevertheless, I think there can be no more useful service to be rendered in
philosophy than to conduct a careful search, once and for all, for the best
of these arguments, and to set them out so precisely and clearly as to produce for the future a general agreement that they amount to demonstrative proofs. And finally, I was strongly pressed to undertake
this task by several people who knew that I had developed a method for resolving certain difficulties in the sciences - not a new method (for nothing is older than the truth), but one which they had seen me use with some success in other areas; and I therefore thought it my duty to make some attempt to apply it to the matter in hand.

But although I regard the proofs as quite certain and evident, I cannot therefore persuade myself that they are suitable to be grasped by everyone. In geometry there are many writings left by
Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus and others which are accepted by everyone as evident and certain because they contain absolutely nothing that is not very easy to understand when considered on its own, and each step fits in precisely with what has gone before; yet because they are
somewhat long, and demand a very attentive reader, it is only comparatively few people who understand them. In the same way, although the proofs I employ here are in my view as certain and evident as the proofs of geometry, if not more so, it will, I fear, be impossible for many people
to achieve an adequate perception of them, both because they are rather long and some depend on others, and also, above all, because they require a mind which is completely free from preconceived opinions and which can easily detach itself from involvement with the senses. Moreover, people who have an aptitude for metaphysical studies are certainly not to be found in the world in any greater numbers than those who have an aptitude for geometry. What is more, there is the difference that in
geometry everyone has been taught to accept that as a rule no proposition is put forward in a book without there being a conclusive demonstration available; so inexperienced students make the mistake of accepting what is false, in their desire to appear to understand it, more often than they make the mistake of rejecting what is true. In philosophy, by contrast, the belief is that everything can be argued either way; so few people pursue the truth, while the great majority build up their reputation for ingenuity by boldly attacking whatever is most sound.

He then asks for them to come to his aid by granting him their patronage. Rather than attempting to reform the Church, after asking for the help of the faculty he says:

The reputation of your Faculty is so firmly fixed in the minds of all, and the name of the Sorbonne has such authority that, with the exception of the Sacred Councils, no institution carries more weight
than yours in matters of faith; while as regards human philosophy, you are thought of as second to none, both for insight and soundness and also for the integrity and wisdom of your pronouncements.

but this sounds more like a 19th century way of reading than 17th century. — J

None of the quotes are from 19th century authors.

To say in one's unpublished Private Thoughts that one "goes forth wearing a mask" surely speaks to the difference we all experience between our private and public selves, no? — J

I take going forth to mean not just a public persona but putting forth his writings.

Why would you think he was referring to his philosophical writings? — J

This thought remained private because unpublished. His advise to his student:

Do not propose new opinions as new, but retain all the old terminology for
supporting new reasons; that way no one can find fault with you, and those who
grasp your reasons will by themselves conclude to what they ought to understand.

This is a masking of one's opinion.

I suppose it depends on how you evaluate Descartes' status as a philosopher — J

Good point.

Right. Descartes was clearly not on a quest to undermine the authority of the Church.

Descartes was clearly not on a quest to undermine the authority of the Church. — frank

Is that a fact or an opinion? Evidence?

Is that a fact or an opinion? Evidence? — Fooloso4

He dedicated the Meditations to the Jesuits with an appeal to consider his new way of approaching knowledge. It's clear that he was attempting to engage with the Church. If he'd wanted freedom from the Church, that was easily available in nearby Protestant territory.

He starts by saying:

I have a very good reason for offering this book to you, and I am confident that you will have an equally good reason for giving it your protection ...

and ends by asking for their help. He never gained their endorsement. Accepting his work is not the same as an appeal for them to change.

If he'd wanted freedom from the Church, that was easily available in nearby Protestant territory. — frank

Do you mean he could have avoided the fate of Galileo by escaping? Perhaps, but this would not save his writings from censorship by the Church. In addition, freedom of thought is not limited to his own thinking.

Not f he reveals them of makes them public. — Fooloso4

How does one reveal one's own contents of thoughts, and make them public?
Linguistic expressions are not thoughts themselves.

Therefore your claim that whoever thinks, must exist, is false? — Corvus
I don't see how this follows. — Fooloso4

"Whoever thinks must exist" is a guess at best. It is not a logical statement. Who is "whoever"? All thoughts are private to the individual who thinks. One can only be conscious of one's own thinking. All others' thoughts could be communicated to the others via language. But language itself is not thoughts.

You asked about the scientific point of view, which is not the same as common sense knowledge. — Fooloso4

You sounded as if Descartes had no contemporary scientific knowledge at his life time, hence he could be excused making a nonsense claim. And my point to that was, that one's bodily existence is precondition to mental operations is not a contemporary science, but a very basic biological fact which could be even classed as a commonsense knowledge.

As to whether he first exists and only subsequently thinks, he rejects this. He exists as a thinking thing. As such, it makes no sense to separate his existing and this thinking. — Fooloso4

It would be absurd reject one's own bodily existence prior to thinking that one exists. Therefore cogito is not a sound statement. "I exist, therefore I think." is a valid and sound statement.

Right, just where you deviate from the common narrative about Descartes, point out that you're offering your own theory. That reduces confusion.

Well, Descartes did die working for a Protestant queen of Sweden who converted to Catholicism of a Jesuit variety and then got in trouble opposing the Church upon other issues. How Descartes fits into all of that is not clear. SEP has their version of the story. It does seem clear he did not have an established home to work from.

But "Kristina Wasa" was an intellectual in her own right. The IEP gives a helpful view of her life and circumstances.

Yes, he seemed to have enjoyed traveling around. That's interesting about Kristina Wasa. :up:

Yes, he seemed to have enjoyed traveling around — frank

He did express pleasure in seeing new places. But the question of feeling compelled to move is the question raised above regarding opinions unpopular with those with power.

but this sounds more like a 19th century way of reading than 17th century.
— J

None of the quotes are from 19th century authors. — Fooloso4

I know. I meant that your reading of these contemporary comments is "19th century" a la Kierkegaard and the Romantics, full of mystery that (to me) isn't there. Admittedly, it's hard to tell because you give no context for them. I don't want to pursue this in great detail, but a for-instance would be this one from Leibniz:

Descartes took care not to speak so plainly [as Hobbes] but he could not help revealing
his opinions in passing, with such address that he would not be understood save by those
who examine profoundly these kinds of subjects.

What is the context? Which opinions is Leibniz referring to here? What are "these kinds of subjects"? I'm guessing this was about religious doctrine, where plain speaking in a Catholic country could get you in trouble.

He did express pleasure in seeing new places. But the question of feeling compelled to move is the question raised above regarding opinions unpopular with those with power. — Paine

He liked to follow armies around, staying in his own encampment. I think he was just hungry for adventure. Do you have reason to believe he moved around because he was in danger of being arrested?

I only mentioned the last move before his death. The SEP article I linked to may have the circumstances right or wrong. I was not proposing all of his movements were based upon a singular motive.

You said he could have switched camps regarding testimony of faith if he did not like where he was. The Sweden adventure is neither proof nor disproof of that idea. It does point to a fluid environment where intellectuals who are cool with the Church one day may become kindling the next.

Linguistic expressions are not thoughts themselves. — Corvus

Okay, but I don't see the point.

"Whoever thinks must exist" is a guess at best. It is not a logical statement. — Corvus

Can you explain how someone can think but not exist?

Who is "whoever"? — Corvus

Anyone and everyone who exists.

All thoughts are private to the individual who thinks. — Corvus

I don't see the connection with existence.

You sounded as if Descartes had no contemporary scientific knowledge at his life time — Corvus

To the contrary, he was on the forefront of science.

And my point to that was, that one's bodily existence is precondition to mental operations is not a contemporary science, but a very basic biological fact which could be even classed as a commonsense knowledge. — Corvus

Descartes uses the terms soul and mind interchangeably. There are plenty of people who do not lack commonsense who believe in the soul exists apart from the body.

Okay, but I don't see the point. — Fooloso4

The point is even if you said, I think therefore I exist, it doesn't say anything about the content of your thought. It is just a linguistic expression. I wouldn't know what your true thoughts would be like.

Can you explain how someone can think but not exist? — Fooloso4

It is not about "can think but not exist", but it is about "must exist first before can think."

Anyone and everyone who exists. — Fooloso4

Whoever exists, exists is a tautology, therefore meaningless.

I don't see the connection with existence. — Fooloso4

If all thoughts are strictly private to the thinkers, then your cogito is just a solipsistic utterance to me. It doesn't give any meaningful knowledge to anyone else.

To the contrary, he was on the forefront of science. — Fooloso4

If that is the case, then he would have known the fact that he must have existed before thinking.

Descartes uses the terms soul and mind interchangeably. There are plenty of people who do not lack commonsense who believe in the soul exists apart from the body. — Fooloso4

He still must exist before thinking. The body must exist first before the mind can start operating.

I'm guessing this was about religious doctrine, where plain speaking in a Catholic country could get you in trouble. — J

It think it likely that this is part of it. He did not want to suffer the fate of Galileo. But from a letter to Mersenne

...there are many other things in them; and I tell you, between ourselves, that these
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But that must not be spread abroad, if you please; for those who follow Aristotle will find it more difficult to approve them. I hope that [my readers] will accustom themselves insensibly to my principles, and will come to recognize their truth, before
perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.

.

The point is even if you said, I think therefore I exist, it doesn't say anything about the content of your thought. — Corvus

But the content of his thought is not relevant to his not being deceived about his existence.

Whoever exists, exists is a tautology, therefore meaningless. — Corvus

I meant to say whoever thinks. You asked:

Who is "whoever"? — Corvus

in response to my saying:

whoever thinks, must exist, — Fooloso4

If all thoughts are strictly private to the thinkers, then your cogito is just a solipsistic utterance to me. It doesn't give any meaningful knowledge to anyone else. — Corvus

Do you exist? Could you be mistaken or deceived about this?

If that is the case, then he would have known the fact that he must have existed before thinking. — Corvus

The issue is not as clear cut as you seem to think. Consider the current idea of the existence of sentient matter, panpsychism, and the idea that consciousness is fundamental. In Descartes time and for some in our time as well, the soul is believed to exist independently of the body. I am not advocating any of these beliefs. My point is simply that we cannot appeal to "science" as if the matter is settled or conclude that Descartes was ignorant of science because he argues that he is essentially a thinking thing.

In addition, as I pointed out in my discussion with J, Descartes also says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time. — Fooloso4