You recall incorrectly. I attempted to explain how pluralists and monists actually justify their arguments because the versions of the debate being presented made the debate completely trivial, and made the majority position appear ridiculous—refuted by the mere existence of non-classical logics.

Hubris, No?

How is it any more hubristic than:

A. Claiming that nothing is good or bad? Or;
B. Claiming that such knowledge is impossible?

Both of these involve claims that the overwhelming majority of people, both today and throughout history, and the overwhelming majority of philosophers have rejected. Oh well, sometimes the majority is simply wrong, and we have good reasons to reject their opinions. I don't think this necessarily requires "hubris."

However, I'll trade a caricature for a caricature. Certainly common formulations of A (including those regularly repeated on this site) often do have a strong flavor of hubris. Why has everyone been so wrong—wrong about a fundemental aspect of human life and the world? Common explanations often involve "almost everyone" being involved in massive, infantile coping projects. Religion, or sometimes "any notion of morality" as opiates for the weak minded, unready to take responsibility in a world beyond good and evil. Or else morality is simply a form of social control which the sheeple are unable to see through.

Is Nietzsche not hubristic? Or Marx, or Foucault?

Proponents of B are in the position of claiming that both proponents of moral realism and the folks in A cannot know what they think they know. But I think this sort of skepticism is every bit as radical as other forms of radical skepticism. For, to claim that we cannot know if being born addicted to heroin, or having your water filled with lead, is bad for one, or that "helping kids learn to read is better than molesting them," is a statement forever bereft of epistemic warrant, seems to go about as far a denying "I have hands," or "other people exist." Doesn't the embrace of these positions require a sort of hubris? Parmenides needs to tell virtually everyone else that they are delusional for thinking motion exists. The deflationist needs to claim that the truth claims of the sciences and most other philosophy are bunk and that people don't really know what is meant by terms like "true" and "real," which, pace their understanding, are tokens in games.

Of course, one can embrace A, B, or moral realism with relative gradations of enthusiasm or certainty. Perhaps those who are less certain or less committed are less hubristic? But I wouldn't want to fall into the trap of "bourgeoisie metaphysics" where anything is only allowed to be true if it allows everything else to be. My thoughts are that you should be about as certain or committed as you have good reason to be.

What would it be like, to have an ethical calculus that will tell us What To Do in every case?

In particular, how would we tell that we had the calculus right? To know we had it right would require that we had a way to evaluate it's results that was independent of the calculus.

But if we had such an independent way to evaluate the calculus, why not use that instead of the calculus?

A "moral calculus" strikes me as an analytic fever dream to be honest. Could we also have an epistemic calculus that always leads to true judgements? Wouldn't this epistemic calculus cover our moral cases too?

But if it doesn't seem possible to have such an "epistemic calculus," it hardly seems to me that we should conclude that nothing is true or false, or that nothing is knowable as such.

When we speak of what health is for organisms generally and what health is "for you," why it is "healthy (for you) to be healthy," we are not speaking of two totally equivocal concepts, nor do I see how this analagous relationship would render "health" conceptually vacuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It doesn't render "health" vacuous, it renders the statement vacuous.

This is a good example, and helps me clarify why the use of "good" is different. Try to imagine a circumstance under which someone would actually say "It's healthy for you to be healthy." What sort of response would be appropriate? I could say, "Well, duh!" Or scratch my head and say, "So you're saying that it's a healthy thing for me to be healthy?" or . . . I'm not sure what else. The point is that we don't say such a thing -- it doesn't mean anything in our normal discourse. It just expresses some kind of redundancy. (Perhaps a person might be trying to say, "You'll feel good if you're healthy," but that's an entirely different assertion.)

Now compare to "It's good for you to be good." This is often said, especially in ethical contexts. Why does it have such a common use? I contend that it's because here, the first "good" has a different meaning from the second "good." We would paraphrase the statement, and commonly understand it, as saying, "It will turn out to be a good thing for you if you do good things." The difference in meaning that's being employed is: "good" as a personal experience of some sort, versus "good" as a quality of actions you perform. (Importantly, this personal experience needn't be selfish in the pejorative sense. It just needs to be about you. "Experiencing your telos through flourishing" is a good of the first, personal kind.) Understood this way, not only is the statement not vacuous in the way that "It's healthy for you to be healthy" is vacuous, but it raises profound and difficult questions about the relation of personal goods like pleasure, flourishing, esteem, etc. with ethical conduct toward others. Would it be handier if English had a more precise vocabulary for expressing this distinction? Sure, but we don't.

So, on this analysis, you're absolutely right to defend the tradition of the Good as not being conceptually empty. But that's because it really does use "good" in two different ways, while searching for a metaphysical way to unite them. It's perhaps the most important question in ethics -- whether this union of the personal and the universalizable is possible, and how -- and I believe it was Kant who showed this most carefully, though I don't accept his solution in its entirety. But let me stop here and see whether this makes sense to you.

- :up:

A few days ago Peter Singer did an informal interview where he defends moral realism, which is helpful given his atheism:

We would paraphrase the statement, and commonly understand it, as saying, "It will turn out to be a good thing for you if you do good things." — J

And you could paraphrase the health statement as, "Your health will improve* if you engage in healthy activities." I don't see any difference.

The point is that we don't say such a thing — J

Rather, the point is that we do. Trying to convince someone to engage in healthy behavior is just an extrapolation of that basic claim, and we do that sort of thing constantly.

If there were no akrasia and we were purely intellectual creatures then perhaps such statements would be useless, but as it happens we are not. As it happens we engage in unhealthy behaviors even though we desire health.

* Or else, "Your health will be robust/optimal if..."

The OP is just asking if we do good because otherwise we'll be struck by lightning, or go to hell, or reap the crop of evil? Are we good for social acceptance and praise, or due to fear? If the highest earthly attainment is to live authentically, how does morality fit into that?

Or if we're just meaninglessly falling through a void, does it matter? It would help if we gave an example.

For instance, it's a moral good to treat people with respect. Do you do it? If so, why? Or why not?

It's possible my explanation is bad. I don't think these are two different uses at all, and I don't think Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Boethius, etc. intend them as such.

When people say, "it will be good for you to study philosophy," "it will be good for you to start exercising," or "it's good for you to learn to appreciate Homer, Hesiod, and Horace," they certainly don't mean "you will enjoy those things." People often tell people that "x will be good for them," precisely as motivation for them to do things they do not want to do, even when the primary proximate beneficiary of these acts is the person doing them (although it isn't only for the good of the person undertaking these challenges; the champions of the liberal arts tend to argue that all of society benefits from the student's efforts).

Perhaps pornography is a good example here. When people say, "you shouldn't consume pornography, it will mess with your ability to have healthy relationships," they are generally speaking about both one's ability to to enjoy a healthy relationship, but often even moreso one's ability to be a good partner for someone else. Yet what is good for the whole is good for the person who is part of the whole, and someone's inability to be a good "part" is "bad for them" for the same reasons that it is bad "for everyone else." For Aristotle, this analysis tends to stop at the limits of the polis (although not exclusively), whereas for someone like St. Augustine it extends to the entire world, but it's the same idea.

Second, consider Book X of the Ethics where Aristotle identifies the life of contemplation as the highest good, the most divine. Plenty of thinkers agree with Aristotle here (even seemingly some in Eastern traditions). Suppose he is right. Well, in this case, what is most "good for you," is to have your wonder (the first principle of philosophy and science) satisfied. Yet, on the classical view, this is simply impossible for the person who lacks virtue. Indeed, for Plato it seems that it is impossible to truly know the Good and to act wickedly (e.g. the Parmenides). Likewise, the beatific vision, St. Augustine's ascent with St. Monica in Book IX of the Confessions, or St. Bonaventure's ascent in The Mind's Journey to God cannot be accomplished by the wicked. One cannot fully achieve these while giving in to lusts (or perhaps even still being tempted by them), coveting, etc.

It's a contradiction in terms to say that one could "do wrong" while having the best for oneself. Consider St. Augustine's argument that the soul in Heaven, having been perfected, has become so free that it is incapable of sin (for the same reason that the person most free to run never trips and falls over). This isn't just a Christian idea though, Porphyry's Pythagoras and Philostratus' Apollonius of Tyana are both saints, and we might add Plato's Socrates here.* They have what is "best for them," and in having this they are going to be doing "the right thing." Likewise, St. Athanasius' St. Anthony has what is truly "best for him," Christ, and it is by/through his possession of this that he also does what is "right." They're the same thing at the limit.


So, perhaps I am explaining it poorly, or perhaps it is just hard to not read the equivocal division of modern ethics back into the earlier ethics (MacIntyre's point).

The reason I find MacIntyre's thesis plausible is because I certainly had this difficulty with ancient thought early on. But, perhaps my own problem was approaching it too hubristically, because, honestly, my original thoughts were that Hume's guillotine, the old "is-ought" chasm simply hadn't occured to prior thinkers precisely because religion and tradition were blinding them to it. I don't think that now though, I think Hume's guillotine simply makes no sense with how Plato and Aristotle see the Good or virtue.

I think history had to pull apart the concepts of "doing right," and this being "what is best to do 'for you.'" And ultimately, I think this goes back into the birth of nominalism, the univocity of being, and the way in which "human virtue," as classically conceived, is often (perhaps not always) problematic for a theology of "faith alone" or "total depravity." You need some changes before Luther can tell Erasmus:

"If it is difficult to believe in God’s mercy and goodness when He damns those who do not deserve it, we must recall that if God’s justice could be recognized as just by human comprehension, it would not be divine."

Here is a great example of the equivocity that separates the unknowable right, "God's Good," from what is or seems "good for us," human good. And of course I mention Calvin and Luther because they are the big names, but this is certainly a shift in Catholic theology too (it starts there in late-medieval nominalism)—some "Baroque Thomism" might be called "more Calvinist than Calvin."

* I really don't think we're supposed to pity Socrates as "receiving something that is 'bad for him.'" He explicitly tells us not to think this way. It's more like Sydney Carton's execution at the end of "A Tale of Two Cities:" "It is a far, far better thing that I do, than I have ever done; it is a far, far better rest I go to than I have ever known." I don't think Carton would think it is better "for him" to have not gone through with his plan to die in Darnay's stead.

I guess the other thing is that "doing the right thing" in contemporary ethics tends to be sensuously sterile, and this can make it seem bizarre how it could truly be "best for us."

But Plato talks about the desire to "couple" with the Good, which is apparently every bit as erotic as in the original Greek. We get this vision in the Symposium:

And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

Or St. Augustine in the Confessions:

Late have I loved you, beauty so old and so new: late have I loved you. And see, you were within and I was in the external world and sought you there, and in my unlovely state I plunged into those lovely created things which you made. You were with me, and I was not with you. The lovely things kept me far from you, though if they did not have their existence in you, they had no existence at all. You called and cried out loud and shattered my deafness. You were radiant and resplendent, you put to flight my blindness. You were fragrant, and I drew in my breath and now pant after you. I tasted you, and I feel but hunger and thirst for you. You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the peace which is yours.

I really feel fortunate to have someone like you describe the connections among these earlier philosophical views. You’re able to produce a world view that I understand and admire. I’m not sure whether this is a point in favor, or against, MacIntyre! Certainly what you’re doing is an act of translation, in part, but I don’t think I’d be reacting so favorably to it if there really was a deep incoherence between ancients and moderns.

So no, you are not explaining it poorly at all, quite the opposite.

Now perhaps it’s I who need to explain better. For you say,

When people say, "it will be good for you to study philosophy," "it will be good for you to start exercising," or "it's good for you to learn to appreciate Homer, Hesiod, and Horace," they certainly don't mean "you will enjoy those things." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I thought I had made clear that “enjoying things” is only one – and certainly not the most interesting – way of interpreting what I was calling personal goods. You can interpret “good for you” in the most ethically high-minded way possible (which some might criticize as “sensuously sterile” but shouldn’t; it merely takes a broader view of what one experiences as good). I only ask that you acknowledge the “for you” in “It will be good for you to study philosophy.” And it is a sensible and coherent thing to say. But again, consider “It will be good for you to [be good / do good things / live a good life – I’m not sure which way of filling this out you prefer].” What is being said here? That the good you do will also be good for you? But if, per Aristotle, the highest good is contemplation, then being tortured to death as a result of the good you do wouldn’t seem to qualify. The only way I can think of for “the good you do will also be good for you” to make sense with a single meaning for “good” is simply to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for “good” that excludes all our normal personal uses, and insist that, even though we don’t realize it, the virtuous person always experiences everything as “good for him.” I find this far-fetched and ad hoc.

I definitely see that your viewpoint is an attempt to create what I called a metaphysical unity between personal and universalizable goods. I also want to do that, I just don’t think this road is very promising.

I think history had to pull apart the concepts of "doing right," and this being "what is best to do 'for you.'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Really? I find this dichotomy occurring constantly in the Platonic dialogues. If these two concepts were so inseparable, why do so many of Socrates’ interlocutors dispute it? It reads to me like the debate was hot and heavy then, as it is now.

Here’s a different way to talk about this that might help. The ends of virtue ethics and Kantian ethics are the same – good action that gets good results, and in turns “bounces back,” so to speak, on the doer, improving them as well. The difference is direction of motivation. This is a broad-brush picture, but: The virtue ethicist wants to achieve eudaemonia, and she realizes that she can’t do that unless she acts virtuously, which (let’s say; it isn’t always so clear in Greek philosophy) means acting with justice, compassion, and honesty towards others. The Kantian wants to act with justice, compassion, and honesty toward others, and realizes that in doing so he will necessarily also improve his moral character and live a flourishing life, but that’s not the point.

Do we see the difference? It’s direction of motivation. Even though both persons’ actions have exactly the same consequences, one proceeds toward eudaemonia, the other proceeds toward right action. Kant thought this made all the ethical difference. I don’t completely agree, but laying it out in these terms is helpful, I hope.

, the point of the post was to inspire discussion, and to that effect, it accomplished its purpose. I stated my reason for believing something, and invited civil discourse.

The only way I can think of for “the good you do will also be good for you” to make sense with a single meaning for “good” is simply to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for “good”... — J

Have you noticed that you haven't produced an actual argument for your claim that the sentence is vacuous? You just keep asserting that it is so, without argument.* Timothy follows Aristotle and Aquinas in speaking about health:

When we speak of what health is for organisms generally and what health is "for you," why it is "healthy (for you) to be healthy," we are not speaking of two totally equivocal concepts, nor do I see how this analagous relationship would render "health" conceptually vacuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Doing healthy things makes you healthy."

From memory, Aristotle will talk about at least three senses of health:

• Walking is healthy / broccoli is healthy [Cause of health]
• J's urine is healthy / J's bloodwork is healthy [Sign of health]
• J is healthy [Subsistent health or state of health]

Given that these are three different but interrelated senses, a claim like, "Healthy food will make you healthy," need not be vacuous. Do you have an argument for why you think any of the claims in question are vacuous?

If "healthy" is the same in both instances then the claim is vacuous; if "healthy" is different then the claim is equivocal. That is the argument that seems to underlie your thinking. And the answer is analogical predication: the two terms are neither univocal nor equivocal.

(Note that health is one kind of goodness.)

* Edit: I now see that you did give a Kantian argument here: .

Can we ever know what "the good" is? If we accept that our knowledge is inevitably limited, then, in any given circumstance what one person thinks is good may not be what another person thinks is good. So at a bare minimum saying that we ought to do what is good endorses a moral relativism which can result in not doing the right, supposing that some people are better able to identify the good than others.....

I only ask that you acknowledge the “for you” in “It will be good for you to study philosophy.” And it is a sensible and coherent thing to say. But again, consider “It will be good for you to [be good / do good things / live a good life – I’m not sure which way of filling this out you prefer].” What is being said here? That the good you do will also be good for you?

Well, on the classical view, studying philosophy is "good for you" because it makes you a good person who loves justice and acts justly. In the Republic, each of Plato's interlocutors are a stand-in for one of Plato's "types of men" (e.g. 'tyrannical man," "timocratic man," etc.). Through their interactions with Socrates, each one "moves up a step" by the end of the dialogue (Sugrue's lectures on Plato are great for capturing all these subtle dramatic elements). In the conversation with Glaucon, Plato distinguishes between those things that are good in virtue of something else, those that are sought for their own sake, and those that are both. It seems that you are afraid that anything in the "both" category is at risk of becoming either vacuous or else must actually be composed of two equivocal notions, but I don't totally understand why this is.

But yes, doing the right thing is "good for you," this is precisely Boethius point in the Consolation. It's easy to misread his "all fortune is good fortune" as the sort of metaphysical optimism that Voltaire skewers with Candide's Dr. Pangloss. It isn't though. All fortune is good fortune for the one who is beyond fortune.

The only way I can think of for “the good you do will also be good for you” to make sense with a single meaning for “good” is simply to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for “good” that excludes all our normal personal uses, and insist that, even though we don’t realize it, the virtuous person always experiences everything as “good for him.” I find this far-fetched and ad hoc.

To be honest, I am not really sure why you think "good" must become arbitrary here. Do you think it would be "truly better" for Socrates to escape his execution by fleeing or by apologetically recanting at his trial? Would it be better for Carton not to save Darnay?

The point isn't necessarily that "getting executed is good for Socrates," although Boethius will make something like this argument, because it is indeed Socrates' execution that makes his message ring so clear, and which inspires his student Plato. If it was "good for Socrates to have people take his message seriously," then it was "good for him to be executed."

But the more general point would be that it is better not to flee, or more importantly, better to be the sort of person who will not flee. No man is totally self-determining.The world has challenges. Yet it is better to seek after what is truly good and not just what appears good or what others say is good. This is the only way in which one becomes united and self-determining. This is why Socrates says that if his sons fail to love justice they will "think themselves something when they are truly nothing." They will be more "bundles of external causes," less self-determining.

What is being said here? That the good you do will also be good for you? But if, per Aristotle, the highest good is contemplation, then being tortured to death as a result of the good you do wouldn’t seem to qualify.

Perhaps here is where part of the disconnect is. Modern philosophy has a strong tendency to atomize in its analysis. So, when we talk of freedom or goodness, we often speak of "free or good acts." Both rules-based ethical reasoning and consequentialism prioritize the act.

This allows for seemingly paradoxical scenarios. For example, suppose we have a relatively unvirtuous Frenchman, a young guy who is a boaster, a drunk, an adulterer, lazy, gets into fights, and is a bad father. But, due to a pang of conscience, he hides a Jewish neighbor from the Nazis. He does the right thing here. As a result, he gets caught and sent to a concentration camp. He has a terrible time and develops bad PTSD. His wife, thinking him dead, leaves him. He becomes a full time drunk, lives a miserable life, and dies in a Marseilles gutter at 45.

Now suppose that he was young during the war and had a rough childhood but, had he not hidden his neighbor, he would have grown out of some of his bad habits. Maybe he even would have found God and reformed in a major way, becoming deeply spiritual. He would have become virtuous, had a life of contemplation, better fortune, etc. all due to doing the wrong thing. Well clearly, it cannot always be good for us to do the right thing!

But this is the problem of focusing on acts and unknowable contingencies. Aristotle claims being is "primarily said of substances," things, most appropriately beings (i.e. chiefly organisms which possess a principle of self-organization and self-determination). The case for this is that acts don't occur without things. We do not have "running" in the absence of something that runs for instance. So, while we might usefully speak of free or good acts, it is primarily people (and perhaps organizations) that are good or free. And this particularly makes sense if we think of virtue as a habit, and happiness as being defined as a "good life" not a "good state" (Aristotle, Solon, Athens' great lawgiver, and the Wisdom of Solomon all note that we shouldn't consider a man's life happy until he is dead).

So the question is not primarily: "depending on the vicissitudes of fortune, will it always be better to commit to isolated 'good acts?'" The question, at least on the classical view, is: "will it always be better for a person to be more virtuous, to be a better person, to be the sort of person who enjoys doing good?"

In our example, we might say that our Frenchman's problem is not, in the end, that he "did the right thing and suffered for it," but rather that he lacked the virtues necessary to do the right thing and flourish despite the consequences. After all, Aristotle allows that we can be merely continent, forcing ourselves to do the right thing but hating it. The real question I think though is "would we rather be a person like Gandhi, Socrates, or Boethius, and do the right thing and be happy in this choice?" That is, would we prefer:

A. Not to want to do the right thing at all (vice).
B. To want to do the right thing, but to chicken out because of the consequences (incontinence)
C. Do the right thing, but end up hating it, or having it ruin you, like our example (continence)?
D. Do the right thing and be happy about it, and have it strengthen you? (virtue)

It seems to me we want to be D and are better off if we are D, particularly if we think of these as patterns of behavior, not in terms of isolated acts. And this doesn't require the absurdity that someone like Origen or St. Maximus enjoys being maimed and tortured. Rather, the point is that even this, the height of bad fortune, doesn't rob them of their flourishing.

So, we could ask things like: "well didn't Saint Augustine need his wealth, good education, and soaring career at the imperial court to get to the place where he could give up all his wealth, his status, sex, etc.?" Probably. Nowhere does the classical tradition suggest that good things like education, a stable childhood environment, etc. aren't conducive to virtue. The whole idea of the classical education, so well defended in C.S. Lewis' The Abolition of Man, is that virtue can be taught. The point is rather that these are simply means to what is sought for its own sake.

To sum up: it's better to be the sort of person who loves justice. Continence, doing the right thing when we don't want to, is good because it leads to being a virtuous person, not because every individual continent act situated in the contingency of the world results in long term benefit (how would one even confirm or deny such a thing?)

But the achievement of ataraxia is what's truly eudemon, no?

I think that the virtuous approach can define itself with respect to modern moral philosophy, taking up a stance like Anscombe's Modern Moral Philosophy.

But I don't think that by offering a coherent account of goodness synthesized with a whole philosophy that it escapes choice. It's just another framing device that then falls into similar conflicts.

The whole idea of the classical education, so well defended in C.S. Lewis' The Abolition of Man, is that virtue can be taught. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is what I'm skeptical of. Not in principle, but certainly in practice. We need look no further than the success of the Catholic church to realize that the program doesn't teach us to be virtuous -- else the society would have no need for rituals of cleansing.

But as it is it's basically set up with the belief that no one can achieve the good. What good is that good?

When people say, "it will be good for you to study philosophy," "it will be good for you to start exercising," or "it's good for you to learn to appreciate Homer, Hesiod, and Horace," they certainly don't mean "you will enjoy those things." People often tell people that "x will be good for them," precisely as motivation for them to do things they do not want to do, even when the primary proximate beneficiary of these acts is the person doing them (although it isn't only for the good of the person undertaking these challenges; the champions of the liberal arts tend to argue that all of society benefits from the student's efforts). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Its a question of immediate vs delayed gratification. Addictions are so hard to overcome because the reward is immediate and the negative consequences occur over a longer period of time. The challenge, then, is to ‘frontload’ those delayed painful consequences so that they are not only experienced alongside the immediate gratification but overpower them. One thing is certain. No one will
be motivated to do anything, whether for themselves or the ‘greater good’, if it doesn’t present it self to them within the context of an immediate, personal reward.

But the achievement of ataraxia is what's truly eudemon, no?

Maybe for many of the Stoics, and arguably for Aristotle, but I think what ataraxia normally describes is just the lower stages of the "beatific vision." We want to ascend beyond that! To henosis and hesychasm, and beyond even that, to the ultimate goal of theosis and deification.

That's the ultimate telos of man in the Christian development of the tradition at least(and from what I understand Sufism is quite similar). As St. Athanasius' says in On the Incarnation "God became man that man might become God." Or St. Paul: "Christ is the firstborn of many brethren," partaking in the "incomparable glory."

For Boethius, the "Stoic medicine" is a numbing agent to help him get back on track for the ascent after the whole death sentence thing. Lady Philosophy likens it to bending a bent stick too far in the other direction in order to straighten it.

This is what I'm skeptical of. Not in principle, but certainly in practice. We need look no further than the success of the Catholic church to realize that the program doesn't teach us to be virtuous -- else the society would have no need for rituals of cleansing.

I feel like there is a wealth of evidence from the psychology literature to support the notion that virtue (or some instrumental approximation of it) can be taught, or that education is conducive to virtue. But, since virtue is self-determining, no education ensures virtue. Alcibiades has Socrates as a teacher and it doesn't save him from vice.

Overall though, I think the effects of mass education, as poorly as it might be implemented, are still a huge net positive. For one, it makes societies more self-determining, more able to reach collective goals. Certain desirable social systems are unworkable without most citizens having some sort of education.

But as it is it's basically set up with the belief that no one can achieve the good. What good is that good?

I'm not sure if I get what you mean here.

Really? I find this dichotomy occurring constantly in the Platonic dialogues. If these two concepts were so inseparable, why do so many of Socrates’ interlocutors dispute it? It reads to me like the debate was hot and heavy then, as it is now.

BTW, this is absolutely true, but Plato is essentially the origin point of the classical metaphysical tradition. He is staking out the ground for what would become the philosophical "tradition." The other thing is that Plato is using the dialogues to contrast bad (and poorly informed) opinions with better ones, and apparent good with what is truly good. The "agreement" MacIntyre references respects what the philosophically/theologically adept generally thought vis-a-vis what constituted the "better opinions" and "real good," not what "everyone thought was good," or what the "learned" actually managed to pursue. Italian mercenaries probably weren't reading too much of Boethius for instance, even if he was the best seller of the middle ages.

Second, I don't think anyone wants to claim that "most people" had bought into the ethics that flow from "classical metaphysics," even when it was dominant. Due to the technological, political, and economic realities of the time "most people" were illiterate serfs. So, the claim of (relative) consensus is much more about the people serving as tutors for the nobility, those in the university system, the learned, etc.

Also, contemporary scholars might balk at my mixing Plato, Boethius, Aquinas, etc. into unified position. The common thing to do in contemporary analyses of this tradition is to break up the thinkers and show how they differ. But, per this tradition itself, this would be to fall victim to the "slide into multiplicity," to focus on "the Many" rather than the unifying "One," i.e., the unifying principles that run through the whole tradition from Plato up into St. Bonaventure and Meister Eckhart. Part of the reason medievals are comfortable throwing together Plato with Pseudo-Dionysus, right next to Muslim and Jewish scholars, is because of their conviction that the core of everyone's project is the same unifying principles. As St. Augustine says "all truth is God's truth." This is the "Logos universalism" that Tilich speaks about.

Really? I find this dichotomy occurring constantly in the Platonic dialogues. If these two concepts were so inseparable, why do so many of Socrates’ interlocutors dispute it? It reads to me like the debate was hot and heavy then, as it is now.

BTW, this is absolutely true, but Plato is essentially the origin point of the classical metaphysical tradition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That makes sense -- but do you read MacIntyre as saying that, as a result of the classical metaphysical tradition taking sway, it was no longer a "thinkable thought" that perhaps the good was not the same as what was good for me? Even limiting ourselves to the elite thinkers, or the "philosophically adept," or the ones with "better opinions," I find this a bit hard to believe. They could actually no longer put that forward as a position? But then, as you know, I take issue with MacIntyre's whole idea that there is a huge gap in ethical thinking between ancients and moderns. Considerable disagreement, yes, but not radical incommensurability of concepts. I could be wrong, but I think Socrates would have been able to follow our discussion here without difficulty. I think he might even have wanted to get into it!

Good stuff, thanks. I have to get offline for a period but I'll respond as quickly as I'm able.

Maybe for many of the Stoics, and arguably for Aristotle, but I think what ataraxia normally describes is just the lower stages of the "beatific vision." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd say the most notable exception is Epicurus, who would argue that the "later stages" are fine for contemplatives who want to live the life of the mind, but his task is to teach ataraxia because he has found it beneficial to himself.

And by that metric, at least...

I'm not sure if I get what you mean here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean that not many people achieve ataraxia in the Christian way of life. Some do, but I don't see it as any more or less than any other way of life. From what I see Christians are about as anxious as the rest of humanity, which leads me to believe that they do not have a special knowledge about what is good according to the Epicurean way of life.

This all by way of making the point that we can follow others in valuing virtue-theoretic approaches, but I don't see the virtue theorist as escaping any of the problems which deontologists or consequentialists or specifications therein deal with -- that this is something of an overpromise. The ancients are interesting because they give us a point to reflect from but they don't overcome the problem of choice -- which is to say, should I follow Christ, or should I follow Epicurus?

If all is atoms and void and there is no afterlife and God doesn't care how I live my life then surely the highest good is to be content with the unfolding of being no matter which way it goes because we have very little control. Or, at least, I'd put it to you that this is a different good from the Christian good, which relies upon the promise of everlasting life (be it tomorrow or now): The Epicurean cautions against such thoughts because they aren't knowable in the first place, and since the Gods care nothing for us it's clear that Christ couldn't have walked on this Earth -- there never was a God that became man. The Gods are already perfect unto themselves and do not concern themselves with our life. This is just another case of human beings wanting to be more than what they are, which puts them into a state of anxiety for not achieving what they cannot be.

Basically I think the reason the Stoics are read more now is because it got along with Christianity in its hatred of the body, while Epicurus wrote a material and bodily philosophy that has little patience for desires which lead one to be anxious.

I feel like there is a wealth of evidence from the psychology literature to support the notion that virtue (or some instrumental approximation of it) can be taught, or that education is conducive to virtue. But, since virtue is self-determining, no education ensures virtue. Alcibiades has Socrates as a teacher and it doesn't save him from vice.

Overall though, I think the effects of mass education, as poorly as it might be implemented, are still a huge net positive. For one, it makes societies more self-determining, more able to reach collective goals. Certain desirable social systems are unworkable without most citizens having some sort of education. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have no doubt that we can look at where our students are at now -- A -- and devise ways to help them grow and learn -- to become B.

I think education a good, but I'd separate it out from the topic at hand.

My point is more that we have to decide what B is.

So if we have a cohort of young people who have only known growing up and we need to turn them into soldiers then there are a set of steps we can take which will produce measurable outcomes whereby we can assert whether or not pupil 1 has or how they have become B.

We are all connected to one another, so I do not doubt that education can influence people.

But I think of this as a vertical point of view, whereas I'd emphasize a horizontal point of view -- there are some people for whom the life of the mind catches on and they are quite happy with it.

But can everyone do that?

I don't think so.

And how is everyone doing that isn't living up to this ubermensch, or doesn't even acknowledge the value of the path towards something greater?

Because it's the herd that I'm most concerned with. And I think that's where the good truly begins anyways.

It's a case of survival, one must do what is ought to survive.

Second, I don't think anyone wants to claim that "most people" had bought into the ethics that flow from "classical metaphysics," even when it was dominant. Due to the technological, political, and economic realities of the time "most people" were illiterate serfs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the key here is that in Plato's time a selfish doctrine was generally recognized as being unvirtuous and immoral. With Machiavelli we begin to see a societal shift towards embracing doctrines of selfishness.* So @J is right that the doctrine is represented in Plato, but the context surrounding that doctrine was quite different. Homer and Machiavelli represent different epochs. Ancient Athenians respected the individual, but they were not individualists.

Do we see the difference? It’s direction of motivation. Even though both persons’ actions have exactly the same consequences, one proceeds toward eudaemonia, the other proceeds toward right action. Kant thought this made all the ethical difference. I don’t completely agree, but laying it out in these terms is helpful, I hope. — J

This is a consequentialist reading of virtue ethics which is not at all in accord with actual, historical virtue ethics. It reads virtue as a means to happiness. It is the modern attempt at recovering virtue ethics that never actually overcame consequentialism.


* See Simpson's, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble."

In a lot of ethical thought, it is "good for you" to be good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Surely you can see the circularity? No further seems to clarify this. It seems to me, the biggest reason ethical thinking is so muddled and hard to reconcile as between differing views. It is always recourse to a subjective "good" which is, in turn, supported by the notion that its "good to be good". ?????? LOL.

Here is the analogy Boethius draws in the later parts of the Consolation for this situation. Flourishing is like trying to climb a mountain. At the top is the highest good, which is good per se, but also good for us. You'll be happiest if you make it to the top, but you'll also be happier if you make it higher up the mountain. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is relatively incoherent. I like the Consolation, and I think Boethius is undoubtedly one of the better medieval writers (particularly the lack of inherent divinity despite his obvious leanings). It is quite easy to read the above conceptualisation as nonsense. It's a nice metaphor, if you already know what "good" means, but here we don't. There's no reason to be climbing, other than accepting an assertion.

The vice addled — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite different to 'non-good' or somehow 'bad'.

Socrates gets sentenced to death and quips that "nothing bad can happen to a good man; — Count Timothy von Icarus

Which appears, on it's face, ridiculous. There's no reason to think Socrates was good, other than his assertion.

I appreciate this response, but I do not think it has addressed any of the issue. The question remains moot, in the absence of a non-circular, or at least non-self-referential concept of 'good'. The above amounts to "good is conceptualised as that which it is good to do".

If something is Good, it's because you have personally understood/decided it is good. You couldn't support that with any extrinsic facts.

The 'right' action is to do with achieving something. That something must be arbitrary, at base. — AmadeusD

Is one able to predict with some level of accuracy what others will deem good? If so, how could the good be arbitrary or disconnected from "extrinsic facts"?

But the more general point would be that it is better not to flee, or more importantly, better to be the sort of person who will not flee. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, no question. In the circumstances in which Socrates finds himself, he’s made the right choice. But I believe we’re all familiar with the expression “the lesser of two evils”? This, to me, is a much more accurate description of what is happening to Socrates, than to say he has chosen something that is “good for him.” This should not be read as denying or downplaying how admirable Socrates’ -- or Carton’s, or any martyr’s – decision is. What he does requires enormous bravery and integrity. These are virtues of the highest order. But no, it hasn’t been good for him. He has done good, which I’m trying to argue is quite different.

I’m essentially making a point about language, about how people use words and the meanings they hold for us – not so much about deep ethical questions. I’m trying to persuade you that using “good for him” in the context of what happens to Socrates is stretching words past the breaking point.

It’s the same (though for different reasons) with “It’s healthy for you to be healthy.” This is simply not something we have occasion to say, so it’s hard to know what it would mean. Intelligent people are disagreeing about this here, so before writing this, I sat down, cleared my mind, and tried to imagine a circumstance in which the statement “It’s healthy for you to be healthy” might occur. I imagined person A saying something, to which B replies with the statement in question, and then A responds. I could not find any dialogue that didn’t involve some kind of discrimination among meanings or connotations of “healthy.” Sample: A: “I don’t see what good will come out of exercising and eating a balanced diet.” B: “No, it’s healthy for you to be healthy.” A: “Oh, I see. Exercising and good nutrition will make me healthy, and being healthy is desirable and good for me.” I’m sure you can analyze this for yourself and see why it involves different uses of “healthy” to avoid vacuity. In contrast, when I imagine the statement being simply asserted, say to a 10-year-old child, if the child is bright then I imagine their response to be: “But that doesn’t say anything. That’s like ‛It’s fun for me to have fun.’ ”

In the conversation with Glaucon, Plato distinguishes between those things that are good in virtue of something else, those that are sought for their own sake, and those that are both. It seems that you are afraid that anything in the "both" category is at risk of becoming either vacuous or else must actually be composed of two equivocal notions, but I don't totally understand why this is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good, that’s a concise way of showing the problem. Let me see if I can clarify my position. You are arguing, if I’m understanding you, that ethical good is an example of the “third way” -- a good that is sought because it is made good by something else, and is also good for its own sake. I don’t think there’s anything vacuous about thinking this way. It’s an instance of what I called a “metaphysical union” of goods, and highly to be valued, if we can make a strong case for it. What I’m arguing is that the word “good” is necessarily doing double duty here; it has to be, otherwise there would be no issue of “union” at all.

Now you might accept this idea of some sort of union being proposed, but reply, “It’s not a union of two kinds of ‛goods,’ but of particulars and generals. I’m saying that when an individual does good things for their own sake, they are made good as a result. And the way in which they are now good is exactly the same as the way in which those good things are good. The concept of ‛good’ has remained the same; it’s the individual who has united themselves with the Good.”

And now we return to the question of the “good” of Socrates’ execution. If what you’re saying is that Socrates has become a better person by accepting his death, we have no argument. If you’re saying that Socrates has united himself, as an individual, with something we can broadly capitalize as the Good, again we agree. My contention is now twofold: 1) We have to resort to something like capitalizing “Good” because we want to show clearly that we mean a special use of good, an ethical use which is of enormous worth; and 2) When we talk about something being “good for you,” this is not the sort of good we’re talking about. If it were, then we would be forced into maintaining that being executed is good for you. And this offends common sense.

Laying all this out, I’m aware that it’s partially an appeal to something I find self-evident among English language-users, and I hardly know what more to say to justify that. I don’t mean I couldn’t be wrong, and what I’d actually like would be for you to show me some usages of “good” that contradict this in a relevant way. And mind you, I don’t mean good as in “better than” in the “lesser of two evils" sense. I mean an actual, positive "good for me." Maybe there’s some way we speak of "good for you" that I’m overlooking or failing to see clearly. But I hope this gives you a better sense of why I think the “two equivocal notions” idea is important.

And this doesn't require the absurdity that someone like Origen or St. Maximus enjoys being maimed and tortured. Rather, the point is that even this, the height of bad fortune, doesn't rob them of their flourishing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess this is also a good illustration of the point in dispute. I cannot conceive of being maimed and tortured as not robbing someone of their flourishing – unless you arbitrarily make “flourishing” torture-proof, thanks to previous "patterns of behavior." It seems the very epitome of such a robbery to me. Does it make them a bad person? Of course not. Was it the lesser of two evils? Yes, but . . . and here the argument begins all over again.

There are actually several more points you made that I wouldn't mind taking up, but no doubt this is enough for one post!

PS -- I like the story of the unvirtuous Frenchman. Is that from Sartre? :wink:

These are meant to be devil's-advocate questions, but they do demand answers. — J

Do any devil's advocate questions demand answers?

On a philosophy forum the question of the OP should probably be phrased, "Why ought one do anything at all?" Or, "Why ought one do any one thing rather than any other thing?"

At that point we can whittle the contributors down to two groups: those who recognize that some things ought to be done, and those who won't. I'd say that only the first group is worth hearing. (And we could have another thread for the second group, which shows that anyone who does things believes that things should be done.)

At that point everyone in the first group can contribute to a productive conversation given the common premise that some things ought be done.