"Tegmark's MUH is the hypothesis that our external physical reality is a mathematical structure — frank

Fine. I'd say instead that it's a way of talking consistently about the stuff around us. That strikes me as less mystical. That is, maths fits the world becasue we built ( or chose, if you prefer) it to do so. Simple.

Interesting, thanks. I'll have a listen and a look.

Fine. I'd say instead that it's a way of talking consistently about the stuff around us. That strikes me as less mystical. That is, maths fits the world becasue we built ( or chose, if you prefer) it to do so. Simple. — Banno

I'm just pointing out that you're expressing your bias.

I'm just pointing out that you're expressing your bias. — frank

Would you prefer it if I expressed yours?

Tough.

:lol:

You want to say that all truth is constructed, but that we can't make claims about what it is constructed from. — Banno

Fair. In Buddhist philosophy, it is not constructed from an underlying something. That's one of the meanings of emptiness (śūnyatā). Chögyam Trungpa — 'The bad news is you're falling through the air, nothing to hang on to, no parachute. The good news is, there's no ground.' And that's why I often point out (much to your annoyance) that much the same can be said in modern physics, which doesn't tell us about what nature is, but only how nature responds to our methods of questioning.

Yes, only minds can know things. However, it doesn't seem to be a necessary truth that there can be knowledge without minds. The opposite - that there can't be any knoweldge without any minds - seems to be a necessary truth. By contrast, it does seem to be a necessary truth that if something exists, then it is true that it exists. It's that apparent self-evident truth of reason that seems inconsistent with the conclusion that truth depends on minds. And so it is that apparent self-evident truth of reason that ideally needs to be debunked, for otherwise the thesis that truth depends on minds at least appears to be false — Clearbury

I'm having trouble parsing this one.

Fair. In Buddhist philosophy, it is not constructed from an underlying something. — Wayfarer

You are not in freefall... that's were the argumentum ad lapidem fits. You can believe anything, but there are restrictions on what works.

And waiving the word "quantum" doesn't help your case...

To shut up and calculate, then, recognises that there are limits to our pathways for understanding. Our only option as scientists is to look, predict and test. This might not be as glamorous an offering as the interpretations we can construct in our minds, but it is the royal road to real knowledge. — Timothy Andersen

And waiving the word "quantum" doesn't help your case... — Banno

'Waving'. You can't waive physics, it's supposed to be the arbiter here.

Fair. Though many try.

(Edit: I suppose you think I should abbreviate your name to "Wayf" instead of "Waif", too? )

that would be preferable, not that it's important.

I would say instead:If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then there would still be gold in Boorara. — Janus

But you already said that <here>, and we already went on to talk about it.

With your statement about the gold in Boorara you have with our condition "if everything else is undisturbed" guaranteed that it is true that there will be gold. — Janus

Yes, it begs the question as to whether truth is undisturbed when minds disappear. This was of course pointed out to Banno.

Apparently the relationship between truth and actuality is a weird and tricky business. — Janus

Yep.

that much the same can be said in modern physics, which doesn't tell us about what nature is, but only how nature responds to our methods of questioning. — Wayfarer

Highly recommend you watch this video:

https://youtu.be/7oWip00iXbo?si=bxEOt_Iau2tJmQa7

You may want to start at the clip from 01:30:00 to 01:33:40 to get an idea about what the video is about.

This was of course pointed out to Banno. — Leontiskos

...the mysterious, indeed inexplicable disappearance of the foxes. Hmm.

Yep. — Leontiskos

But in any case, our usual way of speaking about it suffices. So, pedantic concerns aside, does it really matter whether it is said that when humans disappear it will still be true that there is gold or that when humans disappear there will still be gold? Surely the salient point is that there will still be gold.

I did start on that a couple of weeks ago, although didn't watch the whole edition. (I subscribe to Kurt Jaimungal.) I will attempt it again, now you've mentioned it. Besides, I don't know how 'mystical' I need physics to be, to make my basic point, which is, again, that whatever we designate as real or reality has an inextricably subjective pole. To which the usual response is: oh yeah, where is that?

He says, just after that section, that 'this' (meaning, his take) 'takes the human mind out of the picture'. I still say this is an oxymoronic proposition. But let's leave it, it's invariably a rabbit-hole. (Although I should mention I recently published a Medium essay on the topic, I don't know if I mentioned it to you - The Timeless Wave. I don't think it is really 'mystical' although it does consider the idea of what is outside space-time.)

For the proximate argument, supposing that the only minds that exist are human, and all (human) minds cease to exist, it does not follow that the existence of other objects is necessarily altered. But the question of whether they truly exist at least becomes moot.

But isn't the fundamental problem or challenge that all of this speaks to the fact that it appears possible for propositions to be true in the absence of any minds, which is inconsistent with the idea that truth requires minds? — Clearbury

Yes, and we are slowly getting at the transcendent quality of truth, namely the idea that truth transcends the thinking subject. Classically we would say that truth transcends the thinking subject without transcending mind itself, but that over-stepping of transcendence is understandable, especially in a post-theistic culture.

Do you think that, that there is gold in the ground at Boorara is dependent on there being someone around who knows or sees or believes that there is gold at Boorara? Or do you think that there will be gold in the ground at Boorara despite anyone knowing or seeing or believing it? — Banno

This is basically the original error coming up again: conflating the presence of perceptions or beliefs with the existence of minds. One need not say that truth exists where there are no minds in order to say that a ball continues to roll when you look away from it.

But in any case, our usual way of speaking about it suffices. So, pedantic concerns aside, does it really matter whether it is said that when humans disappear it will still be true that there is gold or that when humans disappear there will still be gold? Surely the salient point is that there will still be gold. — Janus

My point applies either way. None of the alternative phrasings evade the fact that you are positing truths without minds. "Whatever the case, there will still be gold," is just another way of saying that it will be true that gold exists even when there are no minds, and that truth therefore does not require any mind.

This is basically the original error coming up again: conflating the presence of perceptions or beliefs with the existence of minds. One need not say that truth exists where there are no minds in order to say that a ball continues to roll when you look away from it. — Leontiskos

In all honesty, I don't see what it is you are attempting to say here. It just looks confused.

There may be gold in the hills, even if no one knows.

There may be gold in the hills, even if no one knows. — Banno

Sure, but that does not commit me to your claim that there are truths about the existence of gold even if there are no minds.

One need not say that truth exists where there are no minds in order to say that a ball continues to roll when you look away from it. — Leontiskos

This is the same point we debated in the mind-created world thread, about the objective properties of boulders. It's another version of 'when a tree falls in the forest and nobody is around, does it make a sound?'

The way I approach it is by asking: 'which ball (or tree) do you mean'? The point being that even to consider the reality of the unseen object brings the mind to bear on the question. That's the sense in which the supposedly unseen object is 'mind-dependent'. We can't really know whether an unseen object exists or not, but don't loose sight of why the question matters. Recall we're discussing the question of knowing what is real. One could argue that the whole question of the existence of unseen or unknown objects is a red herring. The very act of raising the question is already embedded in a mind-mediated framework, and it is this framework that gives the question its meaning.

Which is why the existence of unseen objects—like the ball rolling after you look away—is a red herring. The key issue is not whether unseen objects exist but whether their existence can be meaningfully affirmed or denied without the involvement of mind. That is where metaphysical realism and idealism differ. The former assumes that unseen objects exist in a way that is entirely independent of any observer or consciousness - although that is a presumption. Idealism emphasizes that to consider or speak of existence, we must already bring mind to bear on it. There is no meaningful way to discuss the reality of the unseen object without that framework. That is the sense in which it is not 'mind-independent' - not that it stops rolling, or doesn't exist, or whatever, when it's not being looked at.

(This is also represented by constructive empiricism, as advocated by Bas Van Fraassen, who argues that scientific theories do not assert the reality of unobservable entities but only their usefulness in explaining phenomena. Similarly, the status of unseen objects may be pragmatically assumed but cannot escape the fact that they are understood within the context of thought. It is a non-dogmatic attitude. )

This is the same point we debated in the mind-created world thread, about the objective properties of boulders. — Wayfarer

There I believe we argued over whether the shape of a boulder is mind-dependent in the sense that it relies upon perception.

We can't really know whether an unseen object exists or not... — Wayfarer

We can infer that balls keep rolling and that boulders retain shape even when they are not perceived.

The key issue is not whether unseen objects exist but whether their existence can be meaningfully affirmed or denied without the involvement of mind. That is where metaphysical realism and idealism differ. The former assumes that unseen objects exist in a way that is entirely independent of any observer or consciousness - although that is a presumption. Idealism emphasizes that to consider or speak of existence, we must already bring mind to bear on it. — Wayfarer

I am not familiar with these uses of "metaphysical realism" and "idealism." It strikes me as uncontroversial that existence cannot "be meaningfully affirmed or denied without the involvement of mind."

There is no meaningful way to discuss the reality of the unseen object without that framework. — Wayfarer

So you say. But in the example you gave -

Yes, way back at you gave the unattributed quote...

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies—but all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer.

My responses:

So the gold at the new Boorara gold project near Kalgoorlie in Western Australia was there before it was discovered. It did not come into existence at the discovery. — Banno

and

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed.

Then there would still be gold in Boorara. It would be true that there was gold in Boorara. — Banno

That the gold is still there is explicitly set out in the words "but everything else is undisturbed".

And here, we are discussing the reality of unseen objects, against the claim you made above.

I can't see how you could intelligibly disagree.

My bolding.

And here, we are discussing the reality of unseen objects, against the claim you made above.

I can't see how you could intelligibly disagree. — Banno

Argumentum ex auro.

That passage, incidentally, was the abstract of the first chapter of an entire book. In itself it doesn't stack up to much of an argument. Pinter develops this argument:

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds.

Over the subsequent chapters, with respect to how the sensory apparatus of animals, up to and including humans, have developed in response to the requirements of adaptation.

Now you come along at the end of that entire hundred million year process, knowing as you do about what 'gold' is, and where Boorara is, and much else besides. But your knowledge of that, and our discussion of it, is still dependent on those fundamental sensory operations that can make such distinctions and, yes, find and identify gold. Recall from the very outset of my presentation on this question, 'though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective.' Because 'existence' is a manifold, comprising numerous elements, including those brought to bear by the subject.

It strikes me as uncontroversial that existence cannot "be meaningfully affirmed or denied without the involvement of mind." — Leontiskos

That I take as the point at issue.

But your knowledge of that... — Wayfarer

Yes, our knowledge of that.

But not the truth of that.

A basic difference.

The bit about truth not being a propositional attitude.

It strikes me as uncontroversial that existence cannot "be meaningfully affirmed or denied without the involvement of mind."
— Leontiskos

That I take as the point at issue. — Wayfarer

You guys seem not to understand the difference between affirming that something is true and it's being true.

You guys seem not to understand the difference between affirming that something is true and it's being true. — Banno

So are you are saying that a world without any minds still has truths, just not affirmations?

That I take as the point at issue. — Wayfarer

If that is the point at issue then presumably you disagree with what I take to be uncontroversial, no? In that case you would claim that <existence can be meaningfully affirmed or denied even without the involvement of mind>, which does not seem like something you would say.

So you are saying that a world without any minds still has truths, just not affirmations? — Leontiskos

This is the bit where you fabricate rather than read.

For "A world without any minds", isn't it true at the very least that there are no minds?

So we have at least one truth.

But you can't split them. You're trying to divide or separate knowledge from what is real. I say it's because you're taking a view above or outside both the subject (you) and the object (world) - or trying to (cf Nagel's 'view from nowhere').

I recall the name of that recent textbook on classic metaphysic - Knowing Being. I think the thrust of it is - and here I'm on both shaky ground and deep water, to mix metaphors - is that only what is real can be a valid object of knowledge. And that what is real is not a physical object per se, but that which is grasped by reason. Physical objects are always contingent or dependent, and knowledge of them likewise. They're not actually mind-independent, because knowledge of them is dependent on our senses and minds (which is where Kant comes into the picture). But that metaphysic is a very different perspective to today's empirical realism.

In that case you would claim that <existence cannot be meaningfully affirmed or denied without the involvement of mind>, which does not seem like something you would say. — Leontiskos

But I am saying that. I'm arguing that things are mind-independent in an empirical sense, but in another sense, in that there must be a subject who recognises 'gold', etc, for any claim about it to be meaningful.

Go back to here:

As a classical theist I don't think things do exist in the absence of any minds (and particularly in the absence of the mind of God). I think the truth of creation is bound up in its intelligibility, which flows from its creator.

The atheist perhaps wants to say that truth emerges with the emergence of minds and disappears with the disappearance of minds, such that mind is accidental vis-a-vis the natural, as is truth. — Leontiskos

Overall, this resonates with me, with the caveat that I think classical theism is not well understood or favoured. But it is true about naturalism - not that many here tend to consciously defend that view, but it's the assumed background to debate. The human mind is an evolved capacity reliant on the physical brain and evolution. That is the assumed background of scientific realism.

So my line of attack on that is not an appeal to theism, but varieties of transcendental arguments along the lines of Kantian and phenomenological - about the irreducibility of reason etc.