3. "there is gold in those hills" is true is semantically equivalent to there is gold in those hills — Michael

I'm not at all sure how to approach this. Is it saying that ( "there is gold in those hills" is true) is extensionally equivalent to (there is gold in those hills)? And if not, than what?

It's saying that they mean the same thing, much like "bachelor" and "unmarried man" mean the same thing.

But if you prefer, I'll make it simpler:

P1. "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

C2 and C3 appear to entail either Platonism about propositions or that the existence of gold in those hills depends on the existence of language.

P2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists. — Michael

So you are objecting to existential generalisation over a truth statement? Ok.

So you are objecting to existential generalisation over a truth statement? — Banno

No, I'm asserting existential generalisation and then showing what follows from it.

Do you agree that the argument is valid? Do you agree that both premises are true? Do you agree that the conclusions entail what I suggest they entail?

That there is gold in hills in the absence of minds follows from your worldview. There is no logical or empirical proof for it. The status of propositions doesn't really have anything to do with this.

That there is gold in hills in the absence of minds follows from your worldview. — frank

What is my worldview?

The status of propositions doesn't really have anything to do with this. — frank

I'm just talking about the adjective "true" (and the adjective "false"). I am saying that a) being true (or false) is a property of propositions, that b) the existence of propositions depends on the existence of language, and so that c) if language does not exist then nothing exists that has the property of being true (or false).

I'm not the one claiming that the existence of gold depends on the existence of something which has the property of being true.

The existence of gold and the truth of the proposition "gold exists" are two different things.

I'm just talking about the adjective "true" (and the adjective "false"). I am saying that a) being true (or false) is a property of propositions, — Michael

Right.

b) the existence of propositions depends on the existence of language, — Michael

I would just say the idea of a proposition comes from analysis of the way we think. In particular, as demonstrated by Scott Soames, propositions are a necessary part of agreement. In other words, when we agree, it's not on an utterance or sentence. It's the content of an uttered sentence that we agree on. That content is called a proposition.

This doesn't require you to admit propositions, though. You can adopt a behaviorist view. It's just that if you adopt a behaviorist view and then appear to worry over whether you're actually agreeing with anyone, you end up looking kind of schizoid.

I'm not the one claiming that the existence of gold depends on the existence of something which has the property of being true. — Michael

I don't think anyone thinks that. I think it's more that we imagine an alien might divide the world up in such a way that there is no such thing as gold. So gold is part of our own form of life.

The existence of gold and the truth of the proposition "gold exists" are two different things. — Michael

You're denying that propositions and states of affairs are the same thing. Some philosophers would agree with you, some wouldn't.

You're denying that propositions and states of affairs are the same thing. — frank

I like to keep things simple. Gold exists and we either truthfully say "gold exists" or falsely say "gold doesn't exist" (or we say nothing, and so nothing true or false is said).

Anything more than this is unnecessary.

I like to keep things simple. Gold exists and we either truthfully say "gold exists" or falsely say "gold doesn't exist".

Anything more than this is unnecessary. — Michael

ok

the existence of propositions depends on the existence of language — Michael

I dunno, when I look up the definition of "proposition" on wikipedia, and it says that they are "the type of object that declarative sentences denote", then it is not clear to me that "the type of object that declarative sentences denote" should depend on the existence of language. Is that a faulty analysis?

It goes back to the way we think about the world. We could think of it as made up of a bunch of objects, or we could think of it as made of states. The world as states means it's not just that the world contains the sun and the earth, but it contains the earth orbiting the sun, and so forth.

There are advantages to the state angle, one being that it's closer to the way we think about the world. For a materialist, the ontological implications are a problem tho.

I dunno, when I look up the definition of "proposition" on wikipedia, and it says that they are "the type of object that declarative sentences denote", then it is not clear to me that "the type of object that declarative sentences denote" should depend on the existence of language. Is that a faulty analysis? — Apustimelogist

There is gold and there is the sentence "gold exists". Why add some third thing? Having a piece of gold, a sentence, and a proposition is superfluous.

There is a) the Earth orbiting the Sun and there is b) the sentence "the Earth orbits the Sun". There's no need for c) the proposition that the Earth is orbiting the Sun, distinct from (a) and (b).

We just need (a) and (b), with (b) being true if (a) occurs and false if it doesn't.

Fair enough. When I was thinking of object, I wasn't thinking about it in any way that I think would be different from what you are saying is a state.

There is gold and there is the sentence "gold exists". Why add some third thing? Having a sentence, a proposition, and gold seems superflous. — Michael

Not sure there is a third thing, based on the wikipedia definition. There are sentences and objects (states). Propositions are arguably also a special case of states insofar as they are states that sentences denote. Sentences themselves are arguably a special case of states too insofar that utterances, written words (and generalizations of those things) are states in the world.

I keep it simple:

1. How old are you?
2. I am 25 years old.

(1) is a question and (2) is a proposition. Both are sentences.

Question-sentences aren't truth-apt, proposition-sentences are.

If a 25 year old says (2) then what they say is true, and if a 26 year old says (2) then what they say is false. And if nobody says (2) then nothing true or false is said.

Sentences mean different things in different contexts, so do you want to throw some context into your mix? It's not raining, btw.

If a 25 year old says "I am 25 years old" then what they say is true.
If a 26 year old says "I am 25 years old" then what they say is false.
If a 27 year old says nothing then nothing true or false is said.

There is a person and there is, optionally, a truth-apt proposition-sentence. That's all we need to make sense of the above.

There's certainly no need to bring up mind-independent abstract objects that exist even if language doesn't.

There's certainly no need to bring up mind-independent abstract objects that exist even if language doesn't. — Michael

I agree with this.


So we need to know who uttered the sentence, we need to know when they uttered it, and in some cases what the intention was, right?

Then later, we can think about what the person meant and decide if we think it was true or false. It could also be that we're wrong about what they meant. We might have to ask for clarification. So we can add all these things on top of just gold and sentences.

So we can add all things on top of just gold and sentences. — frank

That's not what I was getting at. I was getting at the suggestion there there is gold, there is the sentence, and there is the mind-independent proposition – with it being the proposition rather than the sentence which is either true or false, and which is either true or false even if nothing is said.

This is what I find nonsense.

I've told you a couple of times that nobody believes in mind-independent abstract objects that exist in the absence of humans.

It was literally in the SEP article you referenced:

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote <there are rocks>, does not entail the existence of any beings that have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is possible in the broadest sense for <there are rocks> to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now, if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states, then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence of at least some propositions.

...

But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about propositions seems ruled out.

...

Many philosophers deny that there are propositions precisely because they accept the validity of these Easy Arguments (and the truth of certain attitude ascriptions).

There are people who claim that mind-independent truth-apt propositions exist.

There are people who claim that mind-independent truth-apt propositions exist. — Michael

You're misunderstanding that. It's saying this:

P is the proposition that there are rocks.

P (that there are rocks) does not entail the existence of entities with mental states.

Compare this to this:

S is the taste of vanilla.

S entails the existence of entities with mental states.

The definition of propositions you're using is a misconception you picked up from somewhere.

It is literally saying that the easy argument entails Platonism about propositions and that many philosophers reject propositions because of that. If it were just discussing whether or not rocks exist without us then it would only be the few idealists who take issue with it.

I suggest you re-read it carefully because it is clearly you who is misunderstanding it.

P1. "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills. — Michael

This is a helpful argument, but this is what I said earlier regarding C3:

For the proximate argument, supposing that the only minds that exist are human, and all (human) minds cease to exist, it does not follow that the existence of other objects is necessarily altered. But the question of whether they truly exist at least becomes moot. — Leontiskos

That is, supposing the latter half of P1 represents a truth, the absence of minds does not result in a falsehood, it results in a non-truth. Your emphasis on sentences and propositions is very likely parallel to minds, but it may not be.

Similarly:

1. If Michael is flying a black kite, then I will see a kite.
2. I do not see a kite.
3a. Therefore, Michael is flying a non-black kite.
3b. Therefore, Michael is not flying a kite.

When we are construing <there is gold in those hills> as a truth vis-a-vis minds, the absence of minds does not prove that there is no gold in those hills (which would be an opposed truth). Instead, it negates the truth's assertoric force. It is like the man who goes blind and concludes that someone turned out the lights. That he has gone blind does not prove that the lights have gone out. But they may have gone out. He doesn't know.

It is literally saying that the easy argument entails Platonism about propositions and that many philosophers reject propositions because of that. If it were just discussing whether or not rocks exist without us then it would only be the few idealists who take issue with it. — Michael

Where you're misunderstanding is that you think propositions exist at a certain time and place. Think of the number 4. Where is it? When did it come into existence? Is it a mental state? If so, it's mind dependent in the SEP sense.

Propositions do not exist at a certain time and place.

of being true (or false). — Michael

Would you delineate between this and "existing"? The phrase "there is gold in them hills" might not be open to the truth/false issue but if there are gold deposits in those hills, then those gold deposits exist, as does the state of affairs in the statement.

Let me know what i'm getting wrong here, as I assume I am.

I keep it simple — Michael

Sure, and nothing there is different from what I implied in the post I said. You make the distinction between the sentence "I am 25 years old" and what that sentence is about, the 25 or 26 year old. What the sentence is about doesn't depend on language.

There's certainly no need to bring up mind-independent abstract objects that exist even if language doesn't. — Michael

I don't think you necessarily have to be determinate on ontologies here for the definition to still be valid or at least intelligible. And I think it is intuitively reasonable to talk about the difference between a sentence in terms of words or sounds, and what the sentence is about, a proposition then being "the type of states that declarative sentences denote".

I'm happy to go along with it's being valid, with some reservation about what it means to use existential generalisation over a truth statement. That is, it's not clear what <"There is gold in those hills" exists> is saying, beyond that "There is gold in those hills" is an element in the domain under discussion.

Sure, there are sentences such as "There is gold in those hills". Does that imply Platonism? I don't think so.

So what do you take it to imply? Where does this lead?

I keep it simple — Michael

Sure, and nothing there is different from what I implied in the post I said. You make the distinction between the sentence "I am 25 years old" and what that sentence is about, the 25 or 26 year old. What the sentence is about doesn't depend on language.

There's certainly no need to bring up mind-independent abstract objects that exist even if language doesn't. — Michael

I don't think you necessarily have to be determinate on ontologies here for the definition to still be valid or at least intelligible. And I think it is intuitively reasonable to talk about the difference between a sentence in terms of words or sounds, and what the sentence is about, a proposition then being "the type of states that declarative sentences denote".

Edit:

I realize that I am thinking about states in terms of literally what sentences are about, so it doesn't make total sense to identify propositions with them strictly.

I see further down the wikipedia page I see the definition:

"propositions are often modeled as functions which map a possible world to a truth value."

I guess then propositions are more about the mapping between states that sentences are about and truth values??

Or maybe propositions are the mappings between sentences and what sentences are about? The communication about something??

But I don't think that changes much of what I intended because it seems to me that the truth value of what sentences are about does not depend on the existence of language. Maybe the sentence existing does but then the sentence is just sounds or scribbles. Whether 'what a sentence is about' is true doesn't seem to depend on language based on my intuitive notions.

Similarly it doesn't seem to me that [the truth of what "there is gold on these hills" is about] {} entails the existence of the sentence "there is gold on these hills".

So what I mean by saying that the proposition "there is gold on these hills" is true is that what the sentence "there is gold on these" is about is true. And that shouldn't depend on language; but when I say it, it effectively comes out to:

"There is gold on these hills is true iff there is gold on these hills."

Maybe that makes more sense, I dunno.

Edit: deleted the word doesn't where {} now is.

[ ] just to enclose this phrase