I'm happy to go along with it's being valid, with some reservation about what it means to use existential generalisation over a truth statement. That is, it's not clear what <"There is gold in those hills" exists> is saying, beyond that "There is gold in those hills" is an element in the domain under discussion. — Banno

It's just the ordinary sense of "exists": the Earth exists but ghosts don't.

So is it clearer if the argument is phrased like this?

P1. The sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true then the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

So what do you take it to imply? Where does this lead? — Banno

It leads to C3, which suggests either that the sentence "there is gold in those hills" can exist without the existence of language or that gold being in those hills depends on the existence of language.

You're not wrong.

Gold exists and, if said, "gold exists" is true and "gold does not exist" is false.

If nobody says anything then gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false.

"true" and "false" are just adjectives used to categorize speech and writing and thoughts and beliefs.

Although I'm not sure what you mean by this:

then those gold deposits exist, as does the state of affairs in the statement. — AmadeusD

The gold exists and the state of affairs exists? These aren't two different things. There's just the gold.

If nobody says anything then gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false. — Michael

But now you should go on to ask yourself how it is that you are claiming, "(It is true that) gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false." You've highlighted sentence-Platonism, but you still haven't reckoned with your own truth-Platonism.

"true" and "false" are just adjectives used to categorize speech and writing and thoughts and beliefs. — Michael

What is needed is to move beyond propositions construed as reified and accidental.

But now you should go on to ask yourself how it is that you are claiming, "(It is true that) gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false." — Leontiskos

But I didn't say "it is true that gold still exists". I said "gold still exists".

It's just the ordinary sense of "exists": the Earth exists but ghosts don't. — Michael

I do not think it is that complicated. To make use of existential generalisation all one needs is for "there is gold in those hills" to be in the domain. A pretty minimal existential commitment to there being sentences. No need to decide if it exists like a ghost, or like a chair, or like a number.

Sentences are also abstract objects.

I do not think it is that complicated. — Banno

It's not. The sentence "gold exists" doesn't exist if the English language doesn't exist (unless sentences are mind-independent Platonic entities). The sentence "gold exists" exists if someone says or writes "gold exists".

So, with that in mind, if we have:

P1. The sentence "gold exists" is true if and only if gold exists

We eventually conclude:

C1. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist

There's nothing here about "being an element in the domain under discussion"; there's just the ordinary sense of "exists" that is described in the opening paragraph of this discussion.

No need to even mention propositions. Using that word will only cause confusion.

I didn't mention propositions.

IF you like. For our purposes, this doesn't enter into consderation.

The sentence "gold exists" doesn't exist if the English language doesn't exist. — Michael

Sure. And the English language does exist. So if our domain includes English sentences, the sentence "Gold exists" is a member of that domain.

That's all that the argument can conclude.

I didn't mention propositions. — Michael

You did formerly. I told you that you weren't using the word correctly, we debated that, you persisted in referring to sentence-propositions, which isn't a thing, now you realize you shouldn't use that particular word.

Sure. And the English language does exist. So if our domain includes English sentences, the sentence "Gold exists" is a member of that domain.

That's all that the argument can conclude. — Banno

The argument concludes via valid inferences:

C2. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist

now you realize you shouldn't use that particular word. — frank

No I don't realize that.

Here are two sentences:

1. How old are you?
2. I am 25 years old.

(1) is a question and (2) is a proposition.

Sometimes I use the word "sentence" rather than "proposition" even though the word "sentence" includes questions.

Sometimes I use the word "sentence" rather than "proposition" — Michael

Even after reading the SEP article? I give up.

@Pierre-Normand

Hi! If you have a second, you could explain the difference between sentences and propositions for us?

But I didn't say "it is true that gold still exists". I said "gold still exists". — Michael

And by that you mean that it is true.

And by that you mean that it is true. — Leontiskos

I mean what I say, and what I said was "gold exists".

- You've clearly tied yourself in knots.

You've clearly tied yourself in knots. — Leontiskos

No I haven't. You're just putting words in my mouth.

C2. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist — Michael

So do you interpret this? That if the language English had not developed, then there would be no gold?

Perhaps you are.

So do you interpret this? That if the language English had not developed, then there would be no gold? — Banno

How else would you interpret it?

SO are you happy with that conclusion?

SO are you happy with that conclusion? — Banno

I'm just presenting the argument. I don't care either way. But if you're not happy with the conclusion then you must provide either an alternative interpretation of the conclusion or deny one or both of the premises.

It is suspicious that it predicates truth to sentences in it's own domain. I suspect it would fall apart if formalised, but how to formalise it? Using Tarski's approach we would have the sentence in the metalanguage; using Kripke's approach might be interesting.

It is suspicious that it predicates truth to sentences in it's own domain. — Banno

It's just taking Tarski's account:

The sentence "gold exists" is true if and only if gold exists

What's suspicious about Tarski?

But to make things more interesting:

P1. The sentence "gold does not exist" is true if and only if gold does not exist
C1. Therefore, gold does not exist if and only if the sentence "gold does not exist" is true
P2. If the sentence "gold does not exist" is true then the sentence "gold does not exist" exists
C2. Therefore, if gold does not exist then the sentence "gold does not exist" exists
C3. Therefore, if the sentence "gold does not exist" does not exist then gold exists

Hi! If you have a second, you could explain the difference between sentences and propositions for us? — frank

I usually understand sentences to be linguistic devices that are being used to express propositions. In Fregean terms, a proposition is the sense of a sentence, or the thought expressed by it.

:up:

Jerrold Katz's Metaphysics of Meaning offers a critique of semantic theories that reduce meaning to empirical and psychological factors. Katz argues that such theories fail to account for the objectivity and normativity of meaning, proposing instead that meaning is rooted in an abstract, non-empirical domain. He draws on the Platonic tradition to frame his argument, suggesting that meanings are akin to abstract objects—like numbers or geometrical shapes—that exist independently of human cognition but are accessible through intellectual apprehension.

Katz's central thesis is that linguistic meaning is a sui generis metaphysical category, irreducible to physical or mental phenomena. He critiques various reductionist approaches, including behaviorism, functionalism, and computational theories of mind, for conflating the properties of meaning with the contingent processes of language use. Instead, Katz advocates for a "realist" theory of meaning, where meanings are intrinsic properties of linguistic expressions and part of an objective semantic reality.

The book also addresses the epistemological implications of this metaphysical stance, arguing that our knowledge of meanings comes through rational intuition rather than sensory perception or introspection. Katz defends this view against charges of metaphysical extravagance, contending that recognizing an abstract domain of meanings is necessary to explain linguistic phenomena like synonymy, ambiguity, and the systematic structure of language.

In essence, Metaphysics of Meaning seeks to establish a rigorous, non-reductive foundation for semantics, challenging contemporary theories that treat meaning as contingent on empirical or psychological processes. Katz's work aligns linguistic theory with a broader philosophical tradition that regards abstract entities as fundamental to understanding reality.

What's suspicious about Tarski? — Michael

Nothing. It's your argument that is suspicious. I made the mistake of understanding P2 as an instance of existential generalisation, but it isn't. Existential Generalisation would allow "If the sentence "gold does not exist" is true then some sentence is true". But your P2 claims something different. And it's not at all clear what it might mean for a sentence to exist.

And it's not at all clear what it might mean for a sentence to exist. — Banno

You know what it means for a language to exist surely? Especially given that we have been discussing the nature of a world without a language. Sentences are particular features of a language.

And if you're going to start saying that sentences have properties, such as being true or English, then surely you know what it means for those sentences to exist, because the suggestion that a non-existent sentence can be false or French makes no sense.