From our temporal view how can statements about future events be true or false? Are you proposing that bi-conditional logic presupposes determinism and other logics indeterminism?

No. But determinism might use biconditional logic, while indeterminism might include an "undecided" evaluation.

I understand the idea that there is no universal now. No obsevers see time in reverse though do they? — Janus

No. If you don't want to watch the video, you can read the transcript by clicking on the title and scrolling down to where it says "transcript."

What leads you to believe I didn't watch the video?

What is it that you think the video shows? It doesn't appear to provide an answer to the titular question...

What is it that you think the video shows? It doesn't appear to provide an answer to the titular question... — Banno

The question about whether there are unknown true propositions about the future. The answer is: probably.

That's not an answer. But where and how does it say that? It looks to me to just hand wave at "quantum". Physics doing philosophy, badly.

But where and how does it say that? — Banno

Watch the video. He's an American, but he sounds Australian, so it should be easy in your ears. He's a physics professor in NY.

I'll not watch the video. I did look at the transcript. I do not think the author provides an answer to his own question. You seem to think he does. Where does he commit?

What leads you to believe I didn't watch the video? — Janus

Sorry, the point was that there are a number of options for answering the question about propositions regarding the future.

I'll not watch the video. — Banno

That's fine. He's one of the best sources for questions about physics. You're missing out.

He's one of the best sources for questions about physics. — frank

Seeing as he doesn't provide an answer, that's pretty sad. But also probably accurate.

Missing out on what? He doesn't say much at all, ending up waffling on about Venusian factories.

Seeing as he doesn't provide an answer, that's pretty sad. But also probably accurate. — Banno

He's not an evangelizer, he walks you through what physicists know about the topic, sort of like a flow chart. Toward the end of the video he addresses what path you have to go down in order to avoid solipsism and maintain a materialist stance. Yes, there's some philosophy in there, but that's just the nature of the topic.

Ok. You previously implied that he answered the question of the facticity of future events, by offering the video as a reply to Janus' "Does it have a truth value before the coin toss is completed?" He doesn't answer that question, but only provides a bit of physics as background.

Yep. Take it as a warning not to try to answer that question via your homegrown intuitions.

Who, me? I didn't offer an answer, either.

Folk thinks such questions are profound metaphysics, when they are just differences in ways of talking about the issue. We can choose to talk about the future as fixed or as indeterminate; we can choose to use classical or non classical logics. The choice depends on what we are doing and what we want to say.

Once again what looks like metaphysics is a choice of language.

Truth is a property of sentences. — Michael

Is it? Shouldn't it at the very least be a property of a pair <sentence, interpretation>? (Or a triple that includes as well a world.)

Here's an analogy.

Suppose you have a little wagon, and the wheels are held on by cotter pins but one's broken. You bend a paperclip so that it stays in place as the cotter pin did, and then test it, concluding "It's holding, for now anyway."

Is "holding" a property of the paperclip? If you remove it, would it still be "holding"? Was it "holding" before you bent it into a cotter-pin shape?

Shouldn't it at the very least be a property of a pair <sentence, interpretation> — Srap Tasmaner

The wouldn't you need an interpretation of the interpretation?

isn't saying things that are true is just something we (sometimes) do? Like using a paperclip to replace a cotter pin?

Once again what looks like metaphysics is a choice of language. — Banno

Right. I mentioned earlier that worldview (or hinge propositions) are in play regarding dinosaur truths. It's not something that gets worked out logically.

But also the language we use about time can use some influence from physics.

The wouldn't you need an interpretation of the interpretation? — Banno

Usually we can pick out the meaning of an utterance from context. If we can't, we can ask. For instance if Bill is looking at a global weather Doppler and says, "It's raining.". We can ask him: where?

Well what am I supposed to do with a post like that? There's nothing here to disagree with, nothing to take umbrage at, not even a pernickety point to pick apart. No fun at all.

I'll do worse next time.

Is it? — Srap Tasmaner

I think so, much like accuracy is a property of paintings (that resemble their subject).

I certainly don’t think that accuracy is a property of the landscape being painted, and I don’t think we need some intermediate thing that sits between the painting and the landscape.

Like using a paperclip to replace a cotter pin? — Banno

That was the sense in which I was using "interpretation". Using a paperclip as a cotter pin. More or less.

much like accuracy is a property of paintings — Michael

Hmmmm.

So if you set up your easel in front of my house and make a lovely painting of it, will it seem, even to you, to be accurate if you look at my house from the back? (Or after dark? Or in the rain?)

(Or a triple that includes as well a world.) — Srap Tasmaner

I think world is the key missing element here. To say that a painting is accurate in itself makes no sense without reference to something outside the painting.

To say that a painting is accurate in itself makes no sense without reference to something outside the painting. — Leontiskos

Yes, that was my reservation about saying truth is a property of a sentence.

The case of paintings is curious. If you paint a nice picture of a farm, with a house in the foreground and a barn in the background, your painting may show the barn as being much smaller, even if the actual barn is much larger than the actual house.

Is that accurate? Yes, it is, but accurate as a representation of the world? Or as a representation of a perspective on the world?

(So even the pair <painting, world> looks inadequate.)

Okay, then I can see why you want to include interpretation. I would err on the side of saying that interpretation/perspective can simply be taken for granted. It could be added as a relata but it isn't strictly necessary to add it. If we feel it necessary to add it then I fear we will need to add other things as well (although we could perhaps fold all interpretive elements into one representative element).

(And this relates somewhat to Wayfarer's approach, for I think he underestimates how widely accepted a perspectival element is in theories of perception or knowledge.)

:ok:

Yes, it is, but accurate as a representation of the world? Or as a representation of a perspective on the world? — Srap Tasmaner

Careful...you'll have @Wayfarer coming to tell you that there is no size difference absent a perspective.

:ok:

So if you set up your easel in front of my house and make a lovely painting of it, will it seem, even to you, to be accurate if you look at my house from the back? (Or after dark? Or in the rain?) — Srap Tasmaner

It's an accurate painting of the front of your house on a rainless day.

To say that a painting is accurate in itself makes no sense without reference to something outside the painting. — Leontiskos

Sure, and being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3, but being an integer greater than the number 3 isn't a property of the number 3; it's a property of the numbers 4 and 5 and 6 and so on.