Clearly. It was a kind of placeholder "I don't know what to put here" word. But it is the natural word, in one sense, since you intend to attribute properties to these whatever-they-ares. So why are you backing away from it? — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not. There’s just nothing special going on when I say that the sentence “it is raining” is written in English, contains three words, is true, and is my preferred example case when doing philosophy.

There is no need to read into this some deeper metaphysics.

I think Wittgenstein has a point here. Some are being bewitched by language about language.

This whole discussion is directly related to the metaphysical status of truth bearers — Leontiskos

I think it’s directly related to the metaphysical status of truth makers.

Are the things that make a sentence true mind-independent or not? Are they verification-transcendent or not?

Here is the point of origin for the discussion:

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara. — Banno

It turns into this: If minds (or else truth-bearers) do not exist, does truth exist? The idea is that the state of affairs is left intact. The focus is on the mind or truth-bearer. You yourself hone in on this exact same thing:

C3. Therefore, if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills. — Michael

...you were literally presenting arguments about the existence of sentences, so it is not realistic for you to go on to deny that the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is irrelevant.

(And of course you were presenting this argument as a sort of dilemma for Banno, not for your own position, but the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is nevertheless central to the discussion.)

Then I'll say a sentence is true when it corresponds to the facts. And I don't mean anything special by that.

I'm curious whether you have anything to say about these entities. — Srap Tasmaner

I do.

There are a few things that are not physical, but are constructed by our talk. Money is a good example, especially now that it is found in accounts rather than pockets. Those accounts are themselves not something to be found on the shelf at a bank. Indeed the bank will still be there if you burn the building down, as will the debt.

We just allow some things to "count as" money, an account, or a bank. We can similarly allow a piece of land to count as a piece of property, or bring a marriage into existence by going through a ceremony, or by simply acting as if it is so. The range and variety of tings that we "bring into existence", effectively by acts of fiat, is enormous.

When we do these things we do them in more or less consistent ways. We place limits on somethings - the money that goes in to your account is supposed to equal the money that comes out; the bishop is supposed to stay on it's own colour.

Sentences are a form of "counts as", too. Some of them count as setting out what is the case. Some, as what might be the case. Some as what is not the case. Some as what we want to be the case. Some as inducement to make something the case. Some as making something the case.

All of this is just stuff we do with words, in the world.

In amongst these "counts as" items as some sentences that count as setting out what is the case. Of course, that "setting out" is something we do with the sentence, not something the sentence does by itself.

Sometimes we use those sentences as if they have set out what is the case, and call them true. Sometimes, we use them to set out what is not the case, and call them false. Sometimes, we act as realists, and say that sentences must be either true, or they are false, with nothing in between. Sometimes we act as antirealists, and allow situations where sentences are not either true or false, but take on other values. We have ways of making such situations more or less coherent, if not consistent.

Which way we should act - realist or antirealist - is sometimes an issue of contention. Sometimes an issue of convention. But always an issue of what "counts as".

It's not so much that one can prove that sentences are the sort of thing that is true or false, as deciding that being true or false is the sort of thing that sentences - statements in particular - are able to do. Or, more accurately, as deciding that statements are the sort of thing we can treat as being true or false.

That's the "metaphysical status of truth bearers", . We don't discover that a sentence is a truth bearer so much as assign it to that role. There's no esoteric metaphysics here. It's just what we do with words.

, for you, too.

It turns into this: If minds (or else truth-bearers) do not exist, does truth exist? The idea is that the state of affairs is left intact. The focus is on the mind or truth-bearer. You yourself hone in on this exact same thing: — Leontiskos

You misinterpret what is being said, still.

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara. If everything else stays the same, then by that very stipulation, there will still be gold in Boorara. Read that bit, without the "mind" stuff you add on, and tell us if it is correct or not.

My guess is that you will reply that you cannot seperate the mind from the gold. That's a personal foible of yours. If you read the supposition - which is not mine, but was provided by @Wayfarer - it is clear that, that there is gold does not change if life disappears. There are no sentences, but there is still gold.

I agree. Whether it's property exchange or information exchange, community confidence is necessary. That confidence is engineered. It's one part technology and one part social practice. Time in use proves and reinforces the value of the strategy, whatever it is. A sentence is a piece of technology.

Then I'll say a sentence is true when it corresponds to the facts. And I don't mean anything special by that. — Srap Tasmaner

The trouble is the baggage that goes along with "corresponds". I'll agree with you, provided that "corresponds" doesn't add any more than the truth-functionality found in a T-sentence.

Cheers.

Notice the bit where we can chose between realism and antirealsim? That's my suggestion for the answer to the OP. That the choice between realism and antirealism is a choice about how we talk about stuff, not a debate about metaphysical actualities.

It turns into this: If minds (or else truth-bearers) do not exist, does truth exist? The idea is that the state of affairs is left intact. The focus is on the mind or truth-bearer. You yourself hone in on this exact same thing: — Leontiskos

What I’ve been trying to explain is that it’s not at all clear what you mean by saying “truth exists” without minds given that truth is a property of sentences.

I would just say that if minds did not exist then stars and planets and gold would still exist. The existence of physical objects does not depend on the existence of a mind or a true sentence. Unless you’re an idealist this is not a controversial claim.

...you were literally presenting arguments about the existence of sentences, so it is not realistic for you to go on to deny that the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is irrelevant.

(And of course you were presenting this argument as a sort of dilemma for Banno, not for your own position, but the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is nevertheless central to the discussion.) — Leontiskos

I was presenting it as a peculiar consequence of the biconditional “‘X’ is true iff X”, and I resolved it myself by amending the premise to “if ‘X’ exists then it is true iff X”.

Notice the bit where we can chose between realism and antirealsim? That's my suggestion for the answer to the OP. That the choice between realism and antirealism is a choice about how we talk about stuff, not a debate about metaphysical actualities. — Banno

I asked Nagase once how Davidson's stuff squares with realism vs antirealism, and he said that stuff gets tacked on later by personal biases. :up:

I'll add this.

Suppose you are right and truth disappears along with all life. Then, falsehood disappears along with truth. If you can't claim that there is gold in Boorara, nor can you claim that there is no gold in Boorara. If you were correct, you are not telling us about the state of the world without life, but suggesting that there is no such world. You are in the pseudo-Kantian position of telling us yet again about the ineffable. You are talking about that about which we cannot talk. That's the nonsense position found in Antigonish. If you can't say that it is true that there is gold in Boorara, it's becasue you have stepped outside of language, in which case you cannot say anything.

But what can we say? Well, if all life disappears, and nothing else changes, there will still be gold. Becasue gold is not alive.

What I’ve been trying to explain is that it’s not at all clear what you mean by saying “truth exists” given that truth is a property of sentences. — Michael

My quibble with the argument you gave earlier is much the same.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/32/Donald_Davidson

Do you consider yourself a philosopher who works beyond the distinction of realism/anti-realism?

There isn’t one clear distinction. If by realism you mean the idea that entities, perhaps facts or states of affairs, make our sentences true, then I think nobody has ever succeeded in giving a clear account of how that should work. If that is realism, I’m not a realist. But what’s an anti-realist? One form of anti-realism is Dummett’s. For Dummett, one is an anti-realist in some area if one thinks some sentences in that area are neither true nor false. This may be right. It may well be that the most appropriate semantics will declare, say, that some sentences with non-referring names are neither true nor false. I don’t think of this as a deep metaphysical issue, but as a matter for semantic engineering. On the other hand if anti-realism means that a sentence, the truth value of which we have no way to determine, lacks a truth value, then I think anti-realism is false. There are lots of sentences we know for certain we’ll never know to be true or false, those about the distant past for example. There’s no way we can check up on these things. So I’m not an anti-realist but neither am I a realist in the only clear senses I understand.

It may well be that the most appropriate semantics will declare, say, that some sentences with non-referring names are neither true nor false. I don’t think of this as a deep metaphysical issue, but as a matter for semantic engineering.

This is pretty much what I have set out above. thanks for the quote.

My quibble with the argument you gave earlier is much the same. — Banno

Perhaps this makes it clearer:

P1. The painting of the woman with red hair is accurate if and only if the woman has red hair
C1. Therefore, the woman has red hair if and only if the painting of the woman is accurate
P2. If the painting of the woman with red hair is accurate then the painting of the woman with red hair exists
C2. Therefore, if the woman has red hair then the painting of the woman with red hair exists
C3. Therefore, if the painting of the woman with red hair does not exist then the woman does not have red hair

Like with the previous example I think the issue is with P1, not with P2. It should be:

P1. If the painting of the woman with red hair exists then it is accurate if and only if the woman has red hair

Then we no longer derive the bizarre C1 and C2.

P1. The painting of the woman with red hair is accurate if and only if the woman has red hair — Michael

Why IFF? Why not "The painting is accurate if the woman has red hair"? But this is a small thing. I think that you are right to say to that 'it’s not at all clear what you mean by saying “truth exists”'...and add that this applies to your argument as well.

Why IFF? Why not "The painting is accurate if the woman has red hair"? — Banno

Because if the woman does not have red hair then the painting is inaccurate.

Why IFF when you say that "it is raining" is true iff it is raining?

Because if the woman does not have red hair then the painting is inaccurate. — Michael

So the argument treats accuracy as all-or-nothing. One could not have an otherwise accurate painting in which the hair was pink when it ought be black. "Accurate" is somewhat problematic in this regard.

Google "accurate painting" and the response includes many inaccurate pictures of Jesus.





https://www.popularmechanics.com/culture/a41336100/real-jesus-face/

I don't see as the change makes the argument clearer.

So the argument treats accuracy as all-or-nothing. One could not have an otherwise accurate painting in which the hair was pink when it ought be black. "Accurate" is somewhat problematic in this regard. — Banno

Well so is truth.

As an example, "the painting is accurate" is true if and only if the painting is accurate.

I don't see as the change makes the argument clearer. — Banno

You don't understand P2? You don't know what it means for a painting to exist?

You don't know what it means for a painting to exist? — Michael

I don't think it is as clear as you suppose. Does that painting of the reconstruction Jesus's face exist? No, it's not a painting, it's digital. We do have a fairly clear understanding of what existential quantification is in an extensional context. But that is not how you seem to be using

the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists. — Michael

Again, that there is such a sentence in the domain of sentences is true, but not enough to carry your argument. The conclusion just becomes an example of "if P &~P then Q" - asserting that a sentence that is in the domain of sentences is not in the domain of sentences, implies anything.

And you will not agree with this analysis. Fair enough. I'll leave you to it.

My point is simple: truth-bearers are linguistic entities, and so if there is no language there are no truth-bearers and so nothing has the property of being either true or false. — Michael

I would say though that it is not the sentence itself as an object that is true or false - it is not the sequence of symbols that is somehow true. It is what the sentence is about that is true or is the case.

If you say:

It is is true that "it is raining"

Then you are saying whatever "it is raining" is about is true. When we say a sentence is true, we are talking about what the sentence is about, not the sentence itself as an object. If there is a world where sentences don't exist, it doesn't mean that what those sentences would be about wouldn't be true or the case in their absence. And I feel like this is how people think about it intuitively.

I'm not saying that the existence of rain depends on language — Michael

I think though, by your analysis, truth is implicitly embedded in here because truth is just talking about whatever is the case. And so: when you say there are no things with the property of being true or false, but you can nonetheless formulate a sentence about the existence of rain being true - it looks strange.

And this again just comes back to my earlier point that your approach leads to these kinds of paradoxes where you end up asserting that something would not be true and then immediately after asserting that it exists. It just doesn't seem coherent to me.

I’m not. There’s just nothing special going on when I say that the sentence “it is raining” is written in English, contains three words, is true, and is my preferred example case when doing philosophy.

There is no need to read into this some deeper metaphysics. — Michael

I agree; but imo that doesn't mean it is necessary to gerrymander your concepts to the point that they confound!

I argued that truth cannot exist without minds. You adapted that by replacing "minds" with "sentences." But then when you were pressed on what a sentence or a linguistic entity is, metaphysically speaking, you threw up your hands as if there is nothing to talk about. And 's response was both witty and important. If you think you get to appeal to "common sense" without any further explanation, then why do you think everyone else has to go further?

Srap Tasmaner's response was both witty and important. — Leontiskos

Although, to be fair, you could say this about most of my posts.

- And half of it about that one. :smile:

But then when you were pressed on what a sentence or a linguistic entity is, metaphysically speaking, you threw up your hands as if there is nothing to talk about. — Leontiskos

There is no deeper metaphysics. We say things, we write things, we sign things. There's no need to overthink this.

Again, that there is such a sentence in the domain of sentences is true, but not enough to carry your argument. The conclusion just becomes an example of "if P &~P then Q" - asserting that a sentence that is in the domain of sentences is not in the domain of sentences, implies anything. — Banno

I don't know what you're talking about here. You seem to understand what it means for gold to exist or to not exist, so why is it so difficult to understand what it means for a painting or a sentence to exist or to not exist?

If you want to make it simpler then let's assume that as a species we have no spoken or signed language, only a written language. If a sentence exists then a written sentence exists.

Does that painting of the reconstruction Jesus's face exist? No, it's not a painting, it's digital. — Banno

OK, well I'm talking about a painting. There's a canvas with paint on it. It's really not complicated.

When we say a sentence is true, we are talking about what the sentence is about, not the sentence itself as an object. — Apustimelogist

When we say that the sentence "it is raining" is true we are saying that the sentence is true, we're not saying that the rain is true, and when we say that the sentence "it is raining" is false we are saying that the sentence is false, we're not saying that the rain is false. Rain isn't truth-apt. Rain just exists or doesn't.

Rain isn't truth-apt. — Michael

Is it satisfaction-apt? That was my point.

Is it satisfaction-apt? That was my point. — bongo fury

I don’t know what you mean.

Rain exists or it doesn’t.