What moral facts?

I think you're really talking about an act of war, and I don't think just war theory would permit initiating a war or a war-like act simply for the sake of preventing some country from engaging in immorality.

I am not just speaking about war, but also diplomacy.

Some immoralities may justify wars, but certainly not all.

I agree.

I think we have a Christian duty to help humans qua human, but not a natural duty
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For example, what is your rationale? What does it mean that we have a duty "for the sake of the entire moral project?"
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Presumably you would say we also have a duty to rational aliens on other planets, if they exist?
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Do you offer any reason for why we are responsible to people on the other side of the world?

I think we have a duty to help humans qua Justice. Our rational capacities mark us out, teleologically, as requiring of ourselves, among many other things, to be impartial, objective, and to bestow demerit and merit where it is deserved (objectively). Under my view, a human has a duty to be Just merely in virtue of being a person; and basic human rights are grounded in one’s nature as a person, and so, yes, a rational alien species would have those same basic rights.

By the entire moral project, I mean the human good which, as humans, we must embark on; or, more abstractly, the “person good”, as persons, which we must embark on. Human good includes Justice because we are persons.

I am not arguing that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations; but we do have a responsibility to stop immoralities when they are grave enough. Under your view, I am not following why one would be obligated to even do this; as it is not their community. Under your view, is it not a just war to invade Nazi Germany? Is it not an obligation other nations would have because they have no duty to victims of another nation?

For wealth, but usually not for necessity. But a nation would generally be seen as a kind of para-community.

Well, that’s my point: the whole of humanity is a para-community no differently. So if a person must be concerned about the pollution in their nation, then they should be concerned about it every else on planet earth.

Kant is attempting to rationalize Christian morality, and I don't think he succeeds

I don’t think he did either; because all he really noted is that reason requires universalizability of its maxims, and this doesn’t entail any objective moral truths whatsoever.

I also find his categorical vs hypothetical imperatives kind of suspect.

Humans are pretty much always dependent, but if there were a non-social species then yes, it would not have communal obligations. One does not have communal obligations if one does not belong to a community.

But they would still have moral obligations—no? One such obligation would be to use their excess of resources to help other persons (and then other non-person animals). No?

Supposing I have duties to random strangers on the other side of the world, in virtue of what teleological reality do I have those duties?

Ultimately, your teleology as a human. You are a rational animal, which is a person. Persons must pursue truth, knowledge, honesty, open-mindness, justice, impartiality, objectivity, etc. in order to fulfill their rational telos.

He says, "a voluntary act is one which is originated by the doer with knowledge of the particular circumstances of the act" (Nicomachean Ethics, III.i).

Yes, but I don’t think the lion is ignorant just because it lacks the sufficient ability to will in accordance with reason. My dog, e.g., wills in accordance with its own knowledge and conative dispositions all the time.

A lion is bound by nature to care for its young, but not by reason.

So is a human bound by nature to care for its young, does that mean that a woman who takes care of her babies is not dutiful to her maternal duties?

Or, perhaps, do you mean by “bound by nature” that it wills it not in accordance with its own will, but some other biological underpinning?

But you are trying to say that chess duties are not moral duties. I would say that if one breaks their promise to play chess then they are acting immorally, which can be done by cheating. I don't recognize non-moral duties.

If the duty is not (indirectly or directly) related to our Telos as a mind; then it is an amoral duty. To your point, since we are analyzing everything relative to our Telos, everything truly morally relevant.

If I take your argument seriously, then it sounds like all forms of moral relativism must express merely hypothetical imperatives. — Bob Ross

Sure, that sounds right to me.

Let’s take the most famous example of moral relativism that is a form of moral realism: Aristotelian Ethics. Do you believe that there are no categorical imperatives in Aristotle’s view? Perhaps not, as Kant’s idea of a hypothetical vs. categorical imperative is a bit shaky and useless, but there certainly are objective moral truths in it.

E.g., I would consider “I should live a virtuous life” to be a categorical imperative that is derivable from Aristotelian Ethics even though it is true relative to the Telos of living creatures.

The moral facts. I don't know what you are looking for here. I certainly am not going to try to enumerate all the moral facts to you. The point was that "might entails right" is false because the moral facts dictate what is right.

Is there 'moral might' and does it win out over 'moral wrong'? If so how so? If not how not?

Persons must pursue truth, knowledge, honesty, open-mindness, justice, impartiality, objectivity, etc. in order to fulfill their rational telos. — Bob Ross

Do they?

In my view the most successful political ideologies have been those that have made what the Catholic church considered a sin to a virtue. Capitalism has made greed to be a virtue and socialism has made envy to be a virtue, something that is justified. We have moral relativity and we are finding even objective truth to be somehow problematic and start to use truth as a talking point, subjective

The fact is that these trends are part of the Western culture, as are other far positive aspects. Marxism-Leninism is part of the Western heritage. So is the woke ideology too is part of this Western culture. The Iranian revolution isn't doing so good, the young people of Iran don't embrace the ageing theocracy so well. The ideology that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State preach isn't Western, but we aren't following those. The idea that the Ummah has to be unified under a new Caliphate and the detrimental effects of the West should be erased isn't what the majority of the muslim people adhere to.

It is racist to think that values like democracy and human rights aren't universal today in the World. People only admit to authoritarian rule when that rule lavishly gives them prosperity and free services, which are usually rentier states. The Gulf States, Monaco or Brunei can be undemocratic monarchies as people are prosperous and in those small countries people can go to the monarch with their troubles. Saudi-Arabia shows the tensions that happen when the society is too large.

Yet otherwise people in generally want things that the West stands for. A good example is that the new rulers of Syria have shed away from radical Islamism (and hence ISIS has declared the HTS to be heretics) and seek to build stronger institutions and at least try to unite a country where the last tyrannical regime put the ethnic and religious groups against each other. It just shows how the radical ideology of Al Qaeda/IS has failed.

Do they?

Yes, as I noted in my post. I did not follow how anything you said was relevant to it.

What is 'moral might'? I don't recognize any such conception.

Obviously many people simply don't follow what you say they must follow.

I am not just speaking about war, but also diplomacy. — Bob Ross

Okay, but in your OP you talk about "forcible imposition" and "taking over North Korea," which look like warlike acts (i.e. imposing some value on a country by taking it over).

I think we have a duty to help humans qua Justice. Our rational capacities mark us out, teleologically, as requiring of ourselves, among many other things, to be impartial, objective, and to bestow demerit and merit where it is deserved (objectively). Under my view, a human has a duty to be Just merely in virtue of being a person; and basic human rights are grounded in one’s nature as a person, and so, yes, a rational alien species would have those same basic rights. — Bob Ross

So is your answer, "We must help the guy on the other side of the world because justice?" I don't see a concrete argument here. Why does justice require it?

Note how clear my argument was when I spoke of justice:

"Suppose I see a source of mercury polluting the water supply. I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good."

This was based on what Aquinas says, "it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community..."

I am not arguing that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations; but we do have a responsibility to stop immoralities when they are grave enough. — Bob Ross

Why wouldn't you be? Why don't you require that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations? And isn't that precisely what we are doing when we intervene to prevent them from engaging in immoralities?

Under your view, I am not following why one would be obligated to even do this; as it is not their community. — Bob Ross

We are not obligated in a natural sense.

Under your view, is it not a just war to invade Nazi Germany? Is it not an obligation other nations would have because they have no duty to victims of another nation? — Bob Ross

You are mixing together the notions of obligatory and permissible. What by natural virtue is supererogatory is neither impermissible nor obligatory.

Well, that’s my point: the whole of humanity is a para-community no differently. So if a person must be concerned about the pollution in their nation, then they should be concerned about it every else on planet earth. — Bob Ross

Well the point is that a para-community does not possess obligations. The U.S. is so large, diverse, and diffuse, that what is at stake is more like an alliance than the natural obligations of a community.

But they would still have moral obligations—no? One such obligation would be to use their excess of resources to help other persons (and then other non-person animals). No? — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. Not on natural premises. Else, what is the argument for why a person with abundant resources is obligated to help others?

Ultimately, your teleology as a human. You are a rational animal, which is a person. Persons must pursue truth, knowledge, honesty, open-mindness, justice, impartiality, objectivity, etc. in order to fulfill their rational telos. — Bob Ross

The first problem is the idea that I have a duty to be virtuous. To whom is this duty owed? Strictly speaking, one does not owe oneself anything, because they are but one agent, not two.

The second problem is the idea that justice requires us to fulfill the things you want us to fulfill. How does it do that? I am not aware of any kind of justice that obliges me to help people on the other side of the world.

Yes, but I don’t think the lion is ignorant just because it lacks the sufficient ability to will in accordance with reason. My dog, e.g., wills in accordance with its own knowledge and conative dispositions all the time. — Bob Ross

For Aristotle your dog does not have knowledge, and it therefore does not have volition.

So is a human bound by nature to care for its young, does that mean that a woman who takes care of her babies is not dutiful to her maternal duties? — Bob Ross

A human is bound by reason to care for its young, unlike a lion.

Or, perhaps, do you mean by “bound by nature” that it wills it not in accordance with its own will, but some other biological underpinning? — Bob Ross

Yes, biological instinct dictates that lions care for their young. They do not engage in knowledge, volition, choices, etc.

Let’s take the most famous example of moral relativism that is a form of moral realism: Aristotelian Ethics. — Bob Ross

I don't take Aristotle to be a moral relativist.

E.g., I would consider “I should live a virtuous life” to be a categorical imperative that is derivable from Aristotelian Ethics even though it is true relative to the Telos of living creatures. — Bob Ross

Sure, so to speak.

Okay, but in your OP you talk about "forcible imposition" and "taking over North Korea," which look like warlike acts (i.e. imposing some value on a country by taking it over).

Correct; but war is the last resort. One of the central points of the OP was that it is a resort. I am merely elaborating that diplomacy and other tactics can be used; which would equally be banned if one is completely anti-imperialist.

I don't see a concrete argument here. Why does justice require it?

Justice’s essence is fairness; which is about judging merit and demerit impartially and objectively. To do so, requires that one judge merit and demerit based off of substances (viz., natures), relations (e.g., you are the father, you must take care of the baby), and decisions (e.g., you decided to spend all your money, now live with the consequences); for anything else, which would have to be the upshot of conative dispositions, is not impartial and objective. The just man, thusly, assigns merit and demerit, e.g., because this ‘thing’ is a person, a being that is alive, a being that has feelings, a being that is not alive, etc. and/or because this being decided to do this or that. The just man constructs a hierarchal structure of values based off of this sort of fairness, such that respecting persons is highest and non-living-things lowest (with everything in between).

One must help others, in general, ceteris paribus, because they are supposed to be just; and justice requires, as mentioned above, assigning merit and demerit impartially and objectively. Therefore, a just person should care, in general, about other people (and living things) in virtue that they are people (and are living things); because there nature sets them as worthy of protection.

The easiest way to demonstrate this is to think about the contrary: to believe that one shouldn’t help a person when they could at no or little cost to themselves, is to squarely value a non-person over persons; which misses, at best, the nature of a person vs. a non-person. E.g., the super rich man who spends a million dollars on a yacht, for no purpose other than to enjoy it, is valuing the satisfaction and enjoyment of a yacht over persons (which he could have helped with the money). Valuing a non-living-thing over a person is to improperly understand the nature of a person. The fact that they have a rational will marks them out as the most valuable; and the fact they are alive, can feel pain, etc. makes them more valuable than non-life (like a yacht).

"Suppose I see a source of mercury polluting the water supply. I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good."

Like I said before, this equally applies to all of life. Nature is one inter-connected body. We cannot survive and realize our good without the good of Nature herself. E.g., that’s why we hunt certain numbers of certain species to ensure the balance is stable. This equally applies to humanity as a whole, including itself in the whole of Nature. If I must care about mercury pollution in the water supply because my good is bound up with my community’s good (and vice-versa); then I should care about it because my good is bound up with Nature’s good (and vice-versa).

The reason I didn’t make this argument above is because it isn’t the ultimate reason why I think a rational agent is committed to the “moral project” of “the good of life”: like I stated above, it is the consequence of understanding properly how to analyze, impartially and objectively, the substances, relations, and decisions which exist in reality. I cannot be just and value a non-living-thing over a living-thing, all else being equal: that is to disrespect the nature of a living-thing in contrast to a non-living-thing. A living thing has a will (to some extent, albeit not necessarily proper), desires, emotions, can feel pain, etc.

Why don't you require that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations?

Because by this you are envisioning, I would say, a nation babysitting another nation; which is not what I am talking about. On the contrary, a nation does have a responsibility to take care of another nation if it does not pose a substantial risk to their duties to their own people; and that is why we do not go around advocating that nations, which have their own issues and are not in a position to help other nations, to take care of other nations. If a nation was super-abundant and rich and could give their excesses to helping an extremely poor nation—and at no risk of nuclear war or something like—in principle—I would say they have a duty to do so. But that duty does not supercede their more local duties.

This is no different than how, e.g., a father has a duty to take care of his kids and to care about water pollution for his community, but if the two conflict then he must uphold the former over the latter. Since father’s do not tend to have a super-abundance of resources and time, we do not generally advocate that fathers should spend an enormous amount of time solving water pollution: they don’t have the time or resources. They fit into society with certain more immediate roles that they must focus on.

There’s a hierarchy to duties.

Under your view, is it not a just war to invade Nazi Germany? Is it not an obligation other nations would have because they have no duty to victims of another nation? — Bob Ross

You are mixing together the notions of obligatory and permissible. What by natural virtue is supererogatory is neither impermissible nor obligatory.

That’s fair: I guess I would agree with that; as, by my own logic, a nation is not obligated to go to war with another nation to stop them from doing something egregious if it poses a significant risk to the integrity of their own prosperity. However, I can reword this to get at the main point: would you say that it is not obligatory for a nation who could stop Nazi Germany without any risk to their own prosperity, if that were possible, to do so? I think it would be, in principle.

Well the point is that a para-community does not possess obligations. The U.S. is so large, diverse, and diffuse, that what is at stake is more like an alliance than the natural obligations of a community.

So, to be clear, you are saying that I do not actually have a duty to care about water pollution in a state of the US which I do not live because the US is not a proper community?

This is a slippery slope. I can make the same argument for my local county vs. my state. They are just as much a “para-community”; and that was my original point.

The first problem is the idea that I have a duty to be virtuous. To whom is this duty owed? Strictly speaking, one does not owe oneself anything, because they are but one agent, not two.

Duties arise out of roles one has; and one has roles for themselves—no? E.g., one of my roles to myself is that I need to just with myself—no?

I don’t see why duty arises out of roles one has to others.

The second problem is the idea that justice requires us to fulfill the things you want us to fulfill. How does it do that?

What do you mean? Justice just requires us to be fair.

For Aristotle your dog does not have knowledge, and it therefore does not have volition.

I disagree with Aristotle on that point then. Evolution makes no leaps.

A human is bound by reason to care for its young, unlike a lion.

I am asking: what if a woman takes care of her young merely in virtue of an unbearable, primal, and motherly urge to do it? Arguably, a lot of mothers out there operate (at least sometimes) on primal motherly urges and are not committing themselves to their motherly duties because they rationally deliberated about it. In that case, then, your view seems to dictate that the woman would not be being dutiful because it is not being done through reason.

They do not engage in knowledge, volition, choices, etc.

I agree that they don’t engage in volition in accordance with reason; but there’s also volition in accordance with conative dispositions. I can will as an upshot of my passions, or my reasons for doing so. Animals have volition in the lesser sense; and knowledge in the sense that they also formulate beliefs about their environment (to some degree). Have you seen how smart some birds are? Belgian Malinois are way too smart to believe that they have no knowledge; unless by knowledge you mean something oddly specific.

I don't take Aristotle to be a moral relativist

I thought moral relativism meant something else: nevermind.

Correct; but war is the last resort. One of the central points of the OP was that it is a resort. I am merely elaborating that diplomacy and other tactics can be used; which would equally be banned if one is completely anti-imperialist. — Bob Ross

Not so. People who argue for institutions like the UN or ICC to have more power aren't imperialists. Imperialism starts with an empire, which starts with one state. You perfectly can have anti-imperialist demanding a New World Order of their liking.

Who is against any diplomatic measures against states like North Korea are isolationists, that see their isolationism as ideological basis.

by my own logic, a nation is not obligated to go to war with another nation to stop them from doing something egregious if it poses a significant risk to the integrity of their own prosperity. — Bob Ross

So better North Korea have those nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach Hawaii, if not the Western parts of the Continental United States.

ICBMs are the logical way, to keep the @Bob Ross away. :wink: