Agree, nicely put. What might be an example of such an absolute good and how might we demonstrate this?

↪Arcane Sandwich
Agree, nicely put. — Tom Storm

Thank you very much Tom Storm, I do indeed know how "to muse", in the verb-sense of the term. As in, I am familiar with the human art of music, which is itself related to the Muses of ancient Greek mythology, as well as the word "museum", literally meaning "the place of the muses". In other words, yes, I'm somewhat familiar with poetry. Not exactly my field, but I did read Tolkien, so that must surely count for something (one would hope).

↪Arcane Sandwich
What might be an example of such an absolute good and how might we demonstrate this? — Tom Storm

Hmmm... Well, Platonic Ideas, if they exist, would be example of such absolute goods. Why is a mere thing, a mere ordinary object, good? Because in that context, relativism is somehow true (though it doesn't have much being, and consequently, it does not have much existence). However, in that very same context, there is a wider context. The real world, for Plato, is something like a subset of a larger world, and it runs parallel to "another subset" in that real world, which is the subset of the "Realm of Ideas". In that realm, "things" (i.e., Platonic Ideas) are good by themselves, that is, they are good in a non-relational way. So why are they good? It's not as if "something makes them good", since they're immaterial (i.e. they're not "made" of something, so nothing "makes" them good). So, why are they good to begin with?

Well... you just said so yourself, in your own mind: because they simply are that way. They just are good, simpliciter.

If anything is said to be good, we can always ask on what grounds is it deemed to be good. If someone claims there is an unconditional good, then you might ask "can that be more than a mere opinion?" or "what grounds do you have for claiming that there is an unconditional good?"

↪Arcane Sandwich
If anything is said to be good, we can always ask on what grounds is it deemed to be good. — Janus

Ah, but you see, that is the "magical" part of Cosmological Platonism: you don't even need ground to begin with, because the Idea of Good (in that system) is identical to the Ground itself. It is "That Which Grounds", in the sense of metaphysical grounding as an Academic discipline.

we can always ask on what grounds is it deemed to be good. — Janus

And the usual retort to that, is that language itself is a game, and since there is no arbiter (i.e., no "referee", if you will), it is an incomplete game.

If someone claims there is an unconditional good, then you might ask "can that be more than a mere opinion?" — Janus

I sincerely do not know, my friend. What would be your honest opinion on such a thesis, if it is indeed a thesis to being with?

"what grounds do you have for claiming that there is an unconditional good?" — Janus

None. That is the whole point of Ground. That is its function: it grounds other things, in a metaphysical sense, and it is not grounded by anything else. Think of it like Aristotle's Primer Mover: it moves other things, and nothing moves it.

Yet Aristotle wrongly assumed that the Prime Mover was diametrically opposed to Pure Matter. He had it, "backwards", if you will.

If someone claims there is an unconditional good…. — Janus

Then he’s already shot himself in the foot, insofar as the uncondition-ed is beyond human reason, and the uncondition-al is itself a rather suspicious conception. Better he propose a claim that there is that which is conditioned by good alone, which makes good a quality under which the conceptual object of the claim is subsumed, rather than the condition of that conceptual object’s possibility. Thereby, he is justified in claiming that in which resides good as its sole quality, serves as the singular necessary condition for that which follows from it.
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…..“can that be more than a mere opinion? — Janus

That there is that in which resides good as a sole quality is a claim restricted to mere opinion, yes, but the justification for that which follows from it, in the form of pure speculative metaphysics, can be logically demonstrated as a prescriptive practice, which is not mere opinion.
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If anything is said to be good, we can always ask on what grounds is it deemed to be good. — Janus

While that which is claimed to be good in itself is mere opinion, it can still be the case that whatever follows from it, iff logically consistent hence irrational to deny, that the ground for the claim is the subsequent affirmative justifications given from it.

Here’s an opinion, found in the opening paragraph of F.P.M.M., 1785: “…. Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will….”.

Me, I dunno if that’s true or not, but it doesn’t have to be, as long as it cannot be apodeitically proven false, and, as long as that which follows is logically consistent with it.

But, as in any speculative domain, it’s off to the rodeo, and the commoners get lost in the minutia paving the way.

My senses can deceive me, so if I cannot trust my senses, I might as well conclude that outside reality doesn't exist; It's just me and you; but if my senses cannot be always trusted then your existence must also might be an illusion. — A Realist

One should not dabble in philosophy.

Either get serious about it, or let it go altogether, there is no middle way.

A third alternative is that the notion of an objective reality can't be maintained.

It's true that you are reading this screen. What more is said by "It is objectively true that you are reading this screen"? — Banno

Notions of subjectivity and objectivity are introduced for the purpose of establishing and maintaining hierarchy between people. Those higher up have objective truth, those lower down have merely subjective truth.

People seem to want to identify the really real. It’s surely a kind of god surrogate. — Tom Storm

People want to have the upper hand, they want to have power. The ultimate power is to dictate to everyone else what they are supposed to consider real.


(I predict that much better outcomes for psychotic patients could be brought about if they could be made to (re)gain some power, some self-efficacy, rather than further disempowering them by dictating to them what they are supposed to consider real. Hence the relatively good results of work-as-therapy.)

My senses can deceive me, — A Realist

I believe your sense don't deceive you. When you hear a loud crash behind you and you jump, your senses were functioning in truth, and effectively.

It is the almost immediate displacement of your senses with a human made construction--perception--which is susceptible to deception.

When a traveler sees a rope in the distance and thinks it's a snake, it's minds displacement which deceived her. Not her eyes.

your existence must also might be an illusion. — A Realist

This is the "wrong part", in my opinion. Just look at the sentence: it's not even grammatical to begin with. Look at that part in the middle, it literally says "must also might be". That's not even English, in any sense of the term.

See what I mean?

I don’t. Isn’t ultimate reality the same as absolute reality?

But all that aside, you’re right: I would never admit to, nor be convinced of, the idea, much less the possibility, of knowing ultimate truth about reality, or, knowing reality absolutely.

Still, as in all the other similar occasions….thanks for respecting my opinions.

:up:

I don’t. Isn’t ultimate reality the same as absolute reality? — Bob Ross

Yes, it is. But, like North Americans like to say, "that's an opinion, not a fact". And all I'm saying is: "no, mate, that's not an opinion. That is indeed a fact. An absolute fact."

”See what I mean?”
-Mww

I don’t. Isn’t ultimate reality the same as absolute reality? — Bob Ross

I already granted the conceptual similarity, but, no, I wouldn’t say they are the same.

But that wasn’t the point. There’s a disconnect between what you were asked, re: knowing ultimate truth (about reality), and what you asked of me, re: knowing reality (absolutely).

One’s a truth claim conditioned by logic a priori, the other’s a knowledge claim conditioned by experience a posteriori. What you want from me doesn’t relate to what was asked of you, that’s all.

But never mind. Carry on.

wow

But never mind. Carry on. — Mww

I don't know, friend. It sounds to me like you just said something important, right there. Why do you seem to be so "secretive" about it?

Nothing to do with secrecy; ol’ Bob and me, we go down this dialectical inconsistency road every once in awhile.

The carry on is just meant to indicate my total shoulder-shrug with respect to the OP.

Nothing to do with secrecy; ol’ Bob and me, we go down this dialectical inconsistency road every once in awhile. — Mww

Yes, Dialectics is a pseudoscientific concept that some people have utilized for Evil. And yes, I said what I just said. For there is Evil in the world. It cannot be described, in moral terms, any other way.

The carry on is just meant to indicate my total shoulder-shrug with respect to the OP. — Mww

Yes, that is a High attitude, and justly so, rightly so. Objectively speaking, of course.

One’s a truth claim conditioned by logic a priori, the other’s a knowledge claim conditioned by experience a posteriori. What you want from me doesn’t relate to what was asked of you, that’s all.

Ah, I see what you are going for; but I don't think that's what Arcane is asking about. They seem to be asking how one can know what reality is as it were absolutely in-itself.

I am just asking if you would concur that knowledge of reality as it were in-itself would always be impossible under any cognitive system.

ol’ Bob and me, we go down this dialectical inconsistency road every once in awhile.

:heart:

I don't think that's what Arcane is asking about. They — Bob Ross

Well how nice of you, Bob. How genuinely nice of you to use the pronoun "They", in reference to me, as a signal that you are not taking for granted what my individual biology is like. That's very thoughtful of you, very moral in character. Everyone just calls me "he" on this forum, though I don't think I've given any explicit indication as to what my actual biology is (however, do not panic, as I can guarantee you that I am not a Mind Flayer, of that I am quite certain).

They seem to be asking how one can know what reality is as it were absolutely in-itself. — Bob Ross

No, I am not asking anything, dear Bob. I am not the author of this particular Thread, someone else is, someone who just so happens to share some of my beliefs about realism, it seems. I, for one, am not asking anything. I already know what the ultimate truth about reality is. For I have seen it with my very own set of eyes: It is Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit.

I don't expect you, or anyone else, to believe me, though. And you are of course free to disagree. After all, I might be wrong about this, right?...

... so, "carry on", and that sort of talk?

I am just asking if you would concur that knowledge of reality as it were in-itself would always be impossible under any cognitive system. — Bob Ross

I don’t know of any cognitive system other than the human, so I won’t concur with any supposed impossibilities inherent in them. But I will concur nonetheless that knowledge of any conceivable “-in-itself” of empirical nature, is impossible from within the purview of human intelligence of certain speculative composition in particular, as well as such congruent representational, discursive, tripartite intelligences in general.

Reality-in-itself is altogether useless to us, so why would we care whether or not we can know anything about it?

But wouldn't the search for such good generally always be a good which is fit for practical purpose founded in experiential practices, rather than a platonic notion of good?

I might have time to respond in more detail later, but for now I think it's important to note that the Platonic Good is not absent from anything that appears Good. And this is true for the classical tradition, and still is the dominant view in Orthodoxy and Catholicism. All goodness, even the good of mere appearances, is a reflection of the Good, like light refracted through different mirrors, some more smokey than others. We see now "through a glass darkly."

The transcendent, to be properly "transcendent" cannot be absent from what it transcends. Likewise, the absolute is not reality as set over and against appearances, but must encompass all of reality and appearances, both what is relative and in-itself.

So, the good of a good car is not a sort of sui generis sort of good for Plato, or for St. Augustine, or St. Maximus. Nor is the good of good food, or sex, a sort unrelated good. This is why folks like Augustine can write extremely sensuously of God:

Too late have I loved you, O Beauty so ancient, O Beauty so new.
Too late have I loved you! You were within me but I was outside myself, and there I sought you!
In my weakness, I ran after the beauty of the things you have made.
You were with me, and I was not with you.
The things you have made kept me from you – the things which would have no being unless they existed in you!
You have called, you have cried, and you have pierced my deafness.
You have radiated forth, you have shined out brightly, and you have dispelled my blindness.
You have sent forth your fragrance, and I have breathed it in, and I long for you.
I have tasted you, and I hunger and pant for you.
You have touched me, and I burn for your peace.

As for reason, the quotes in this post are fairly instructive on the old view: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/956012

The "rule of the rational part of the soul," taken in modern terms, sounds like being turned into a dispassionate robot. This is not what Plato means though, it is rather the means of desire's deepest fulfillment, as he has it when Socrates begins bursting out into ecstatic love poetry in the Phaedrus. It isn't the abrogation of the passions and appetites, but their proper orientation towards what most fulfills them (which, for various reason, we fail to achieve when "ruled over" by them.)

:up: Thank you. Plato's one thing, but what do you think? Later is fine. Personally, I struggle with theories. I just intuit my way around. I'm rarely caught short. :wink:

All goodness, even the good of mere appearances, is a reflection of the Good, like light refracted through different mirrors, some more smokey than others. We see now "through a glass darkly." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this your belief too?

The transcendent, to be properly "transcendent" cannot be absent from what it transcends. Likewise, the absolute is not reality as set over and against appearances, but must encompass all of reality and appearances, both what is relative and in-itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I get the theory. How would we demonstrate that this is the case? It also seems kind of circular: claiming that the absolute encompasses all reality and appearances, doesn't it take for granted what it is supposed to establish?

What I am interested in is how we might defend the idea of an absolute goodness which somehow is the grounding for all instantiations of goodness. I get the various schools, but they take this axiomatic. How could it be demonstrated? But let's not get into too much detail, a rough sketch would be perfectly adequate.

Well how nice of you, Bob

I do best not to assume people’s genders on here (: …. albeit not in the liberal sense.

It is Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit.

Again, which is what exactly? Can you explain it?

... so, "carry on", and that sort of talk?

We certainly can if you would like. With @Mww and I, we “carry on” because we’ve had extensive discussions about our worldviews. So it is easy for us to pass on by, commenting briefly, without leaving any confusion or need of elaboration. I am still as of yet not entirely sure what you believe, which is fine—it takes time.

Fair enough. I was thinking that maybe you would agree that any cognitive system would be incapable of absolute knowledge because every cognitive system has an a priori structure to it; but, then again, it technically could be possible for those a priori modes to luck into matching 100% the forms and modes of reality as it were in itself. The odds of that though....

It is Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit.


Again, which is what exactly? Can you explain it? — Bob Ross

That's a difficult question to answer, really, because it presupposes that the very concept of Hegel's Absolute Spirit is something that could be explained, that "someone can explain it", and all I'm saying is that I'm not so sure about that. In other words, I can tell you what it is, but I'm not so sure that I can explain it. What do you mean by "explaining"? Let's start with that if you don't mind.

And please try to pay little if any attention to the sort of Mind-Flayer-ish tone that my words seem to adopt from time to time, for no particular reason, apparently. Frustratingly so, one might add.

. I am still as of yet not entirely sure what you believe, which is fine—it takes time. — Bob Ross

My belief about what? About the Absolute Spirit, in the Hegelian sense? I believe that it is real, and that it exists. For those two notions, to wit, reality and existence, are not the same thing, as far as I'm concerned. However, the Absolute Spirit happens to have both: it is real, and it exists.

There is, of course, another possibility: that I am deluded.

What do you mean by "explaining"? Let's start with that if you don't mind.

I mean “explain” in the basic, common use of the term. If you can’t describe it, then that’s a huge issue which begs why you even believe it in the first place; and, no, I am not denying the idea of ineffability.

I mean “explain” in the basic, common use of the term. If you can’t describe it, then that’s a huge issue which begs why you even believe it in the first place; and, no, I am not denying the idea of ineffability. — Bob Ross

Hmmm... Fair enough, what do you want me to explain, then? Do you want me to explain why I believe that the Ultimate Truth about Reality Itself is Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit?

Or are you asking me to explain why I, Arcane Sandwich, truly believe that Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit really exists?

I was thinking that maybe you would agree that any cognitive system would be incapable of absolute knowledge because every cognitive system has an a priori structure to it — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree, unless you actually intended every human’s cognitive system has an a priori structure. But in saying every cognitive system generally, without the human qualifier, whatever kind of system that might be cannot be determined merely from the inference it is a system per se, which makes explicit there is no proper warrant for attributing an a priori structure to it, eliminating it as a condition for an argument.

Humans understand absolute empirical knowledge is impossible, humans have a representational, discursive tripartite cognitive system from which that understanding is given, from which follows, the best that can be said, the strongest affirmative judgement logically possible, is that systems congruent with the human system should also find that absolute empirical knowledge is impossible. We’ll know for certain if or when one presents itself to us.

I kinda question a priori structure as sufficient reason for human’s incapacity for absolute empirical knowledge. That such structure is an integral functionality of human cognition is not to say it is the reason for its limitations, if there is another more suitable reason.

I want to know what "The Absolute" means to you, in whatever sense you mean it. You keep saying the ultimate truth is the Hegelian concept of the Absolute; and I have no clue what you mean by that.