:up:

I want to know what "The Absolute" means to you, in whatever sense you mean it. You keep saying the ultimate truth is the Hegelian concept of the Absolute; and I have no clue what you mean by that. — Bob Ross

The Absolute, as I understand it, is what is ontologically greater than subject and objects. It is better than them, in some sense of the term. It is similar to what Lao Tzu calls Tao. It is the symbol of the ying and the yang. It is the Holy Spirit in Christianity. It is the number 3 in some sense of the term. It is what truly, properly transcends. "Transcends what?", you might ask?

Everything. Including itself. It is why there is an External World, called Nature, in the first place. The Absolute Spirit is the realization of this as a brute fact, as something that one simple "encounters". It is a presence of some sort, but in the way that Derrida spoke about Heidegger's "metaphysics of presence". It is the phenomenon of oddness itself as a psychological phenomenon. And it is a great source of poetry (how could it not be?), at the same time it is a great source of philosophical perplexity (how could it not be?), and of scientific inquiry (could it not be?).

Now, if you ask me personally if I just happen to like the number 3, then I well tell you no, that I prefer the number 4. After all, it is literally Hegel's concept of the Absolute, not mine. Therefore, my personal commitment to the number 4 is greater than my personal commitment to the number 3.

@Wayfarer @Banno @Joshs @Janus and whoever wishes to express some opinion on the Ultimate Truth about Reality.

The Absolute, as I understand it, is what is ontologically greater than subject and objects

Are you conveying here that you accept a version of non-dualism? Viz., the idea that there is some substance which unites both the mental and physical and of which is neither?

I don’t know what else it could possibly mean to say that something exists as neither a subject nor an object. EDIT: unless by this you mean some transcendental mode (Kantian style).

"Transcends what?", you might ask?

Everything. Including itself

Well, with all due respect, Arcane, that’s patently incoherent. You are saying here that some third substance and being of that substance exists, and it exists in a manner where it is not identical to itself.

. It is why there is an External World, called Nature, in the first place.

How?

Absolute Spirit is the realization of this as a brute fact, as something that one simple "encounters"

Oh, are you an ontological idealist?

It is a presence of some sort, but in the way that Derrida spoke about Heidegger's "metaphysics of presence". It is the phenomenon of oddness itself as a psychological phenomenon. And it is a great source of poetry (how could it not be?), at the same time it is a great source of philosophical perplexity (how could it not be?), and of scientific inquiry (could it not be?).

This may make sense to you because you are familiar with the ‘Absolute’; but I have no clue what you are trying to say here.

Are you conveying here that you accept a version of non-dualism? Viz., the idea that there is some substance which unites both the mental and physical and of which is neither? — Bob Ross

I accept a version of non-dualism (I accept several versions of non-dualism, actually), yet I disagree that there is some substance (if by that, you mean something like an Aristotelian substance) which unites both the mental and the physical (because the mental, as far as I'm concerned is physical). If by "the mental" and "the physical" you are speaking non-scientifically, as a mere folk would, then yes, I'm saying "something like that", if you will. The absolute is not a object, it is not one more thing in the world like this stone on the floor or this table. And it is not a subject, it is not like you, and it is not like me. It is something else. Or, again, perhaps I am deluded.

Oh, are you an ontological idealist? — Bob Ross

No, I am not. I will tell you what I am, and you can call me deluded all you want: I won't change the following five premises of my personal philosophy. Those are:

1) Realism
2) Materialim
3) Atheism
4) Scientism
5) Literalism

Those are my axioms, my "premises", if you will. I am not an idealist, as Hegel was, since I am a materialist. As for the term "ontological", sure, you could call me an ontological materialist, if that makes any sense to you.

This may make sense to you because you are familiar with the ‘Absolute’; but I have no clue what you are trying to say here. — Bob Ross

Well, I'm trying to explain it to the best of my ability. I'm not the best philosopher in the world, you know. And "Explain the Absolute to another human" is not exactly the type of question that I would expect for a midterm exam or whatnot.

Well, I'm trying to explain it to the best of my ability. I'm not the best philosopher in the world, you know.

That’s ok: most of us on here aren’t the best philosophers.

I accept a version of non-dualism (I accept several versions of non-dualism, actually), yet I disagree that there is some substance

I mean it in the Analytic Philosophy sense of a substrate which bears the properties of things.

yet I disagree that there is some substance (if by that, you mean something like an Aristotelian substance) which unites both the mental and the physical (because the mental, as far as I'm concerned is physical). If by "the mental" and "the physical" you are speaking non-scientifically, as a mere folk would, then yes, I'm saying "something like that", if you will

Ok, so you are a ‘materialist’; so there’s, so far, two types of substrates for you: the physical and the kind that bears the properties of this ‘Absolute’. Are you a bundle theorist? Otherwise, how does things which are of this non-physical (and non-mental) interact with or relate to the stuff which is bore by the physical substrate? The hard problem of interaction seems to plague this theory.

The absolute is not a object, it is not one more thing in the world like this stone on the floor or this table. And it is not a subject, it is not like you, and it is not like me. It is something else.

Ok, it isn’t physical. What is it? When you say ‘The Absolute’, I am thinking of just reality as it is in-itself. Why should be posit this thing as being real?

1) Realism
2) Materialim
3) Atheism
4) Scientism
5) Literalism

I think this detracts from the conversation: I think you should be able to briefly explain what the Absolute is, conceptually, if you have a firm grasp of what it is.

I mean it in the Analytic Philosophy sense of a substrate which bears the properties of things. — Bob Ross

In that case no, there is no such thing (not to my mind, at least). I'll give you three examples why not:

1) From an ordinary point of view (the POV of ordinary life), Reality is not a single, gigantic, homogeneous block. It's a bunch of stuff, it's a plurality of entities. That's just how it seems.
2) And that leads us to the concept of intuition. You simply intuit many things around you, or you simply have the intuition that there are many things around you, like this stone on the floor, or this desk, that table, this computer, and so forth.
3) From a metaphysical point of view (as developed in the Analytic Tradition, particularly in the field known as Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects), it makes more sense to be a metaphysical conservative, than to be a metaphysical eliminativist or a metaphysical permissivist. Likewise, it makes more sense to give a particularist answer to van Inwagen's Special Composition Question, or SCQ for short, than to give an nihilist or a universalist answer.

Ok, so you are a ‘materialist’; so there’s, so far, two types of substrates for you: the physical and the kind that bears the properties of this ‘Absolute’. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's correct, but I'll just ignore it, for now. Unless you want to make that point clearer, because I didn't understand what you said there.

Are you a bundle theorist? — Bob Ross

No, I am not. There are things that have a metaphysical substrate. It just so happens that not everything does, or even is, a metaphysical substrate to begin with. I don't believe in disembodied universals: there is no redness apart from red things, like this rose or that brick. But there are pseudo-things, if you want to call them that: a pack of six wovles is a pseudo-thing, the pack itself is not a substance, the only substances there are the six individual wolves.

Otherwise, how does things which are of this non-physical (and non-mental) interact with or relate to the stuff which is bore by the physical substrate? The hard problem of interaction seems to plague this theory. — Bob Ross

Everything that is mental is physical, but not everything that is physical is mental. That's what seems the most reasonable thing to say here.

Ok, it isn’t physical. What is it? When you say ‘The Absolute’, I am thinking of just reality as it is in-itself. Why should be posit this thing as being real? — Bob Ross

It isn't. Reality Itself and the Absolute are two different "entities", if you will. They belong to different categories. Reality is what exists, and the Absolute, in the Hegelian sense, is the truth (it is the Ultimate Truth) about that (about Reality itself)

I think you should be able to briefly explain what the Absolute is, conceptually, if you have a firm grasp of what it is. — Bob Ross

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.

1) From an ordinary point of view (the POV of ordinary life), Reality is not a single, gigantic, homogeneous block. It's a bunch of stuff, it's a plurality of entities. That's just how it seems.

Substance theory doesn’t deny that: it is claiming that each ‘entity’ has a substrate for its existence whereof its properties are bore by it. E.g., the apple has a bear existence which provides the compresence for its properties (like redness).

2) And that l

Again, substance is being used here in the sense of substrates; which doesn’t negate the possibility of a plurality of objects.

3) From

I am not familiar enough with what you are referring to by metaphysical conservatism, eliminativism, and permissivism to comment adequately on this one; but I suspect you are addressing a view which has no relevance to substance theory (in the sense of rebuking a position that holds that everything is one concrete entity).

I'm not sure that's correct, but I'll just ignore it, for now. Unless you want to make that point clearer, because I didn't understand what you said there.

So, I mean that we can describe the type of substrate a substance is to meaningfully discuss things. Idealists accept hat there is a mental substrate; physicalists accept a physical substrate; a substance dualist accepts both; a non-dualist adds a third; etc.

No, I am not. There are things that have a metaphysical substrate.

Ok, cool. So, then, under your view, is this “Absolute” of a different type of substrate than physical stuff?

Reality is what exists, and the Absolute, in the Hegelian sense, is the truth (it is the Ultimate Truth) about that (about Reality itself)

Ok, so are you just noting by “The Absolute” the totality of reality and negation? I know that much about Hegel haha….

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.

Then why do you believe in it?

I am not familiar enough with what you are referring to by metaphysical conservatism, eliminativism, and permissivism to comment adequately on this one; but I suspect you are addressing a view which has no relevance to substance theory (in the sense of rebuking a position that holds that everything is one concrete entity). — Bob Ross

Hmmm... well, you see, here's where I personally disagree with you (I'm not attacking you, BTW). Here's what I'm saying about that: mereological nihilism is the opinion that composition never occurs. An object A never composes an object B. Does that mean that the objects A and B exist? No, it does not. So what does the nihilist say? She says that only atoms exist ("atoms" in the sense mereological sense, literally "in-dividual", you cannot divide them). And what are those? The elementary particles of contemporary physics. In other words, the nihilist is a realist about physical, elementary particles. She is not a realist about anything else. You, me, these other fine folk, we don't exist, technically speaking. That's what the nihilist says. So, what are we? Well, just a bunch of good ol' particles, and nothing more.

So Bob, you see why these debates are not restricted to formal mereology. There are of interest and relevance to metaphysics, as I've hoped to have shown.

So, I mean that we can describe the type of substrate a substance is to meaningfully discuss things. Idealists accept hat there is a mental substrate; physicalists accept a physical substrate; a substance dualist accepts both; a non-dualist adds a third; etc. — Bob Ross

Maybe, I don't know. Sounds reasonable enough to me, but I'm not sure if I agree with what all of that implies, from a technical standpoint.

Ok, cool. So, then, under your view, is this “Absolute” of a different type of substrate than physical stuff? — Bob Ross

God damn, that's a hard question. What do you want from me, Bob? You just want to "beat the metaphysical truth out of me, whatever that metaphysical truth might happen to be". I mean, it feels like intellectual torture, "mate".

Ok, so are you just noting by “The Absolute” the totality of reality and negation? I know that much about Hegel haha…. — Bob Ross

I have no idea, I'd have to think about it. See my comment above.

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.


Then why do you believe in it? — Bob Ross

Because I'm a simple peasant from Argentina at the end of the day, mate.

So Bob, you see why these debates are not restricted to formal mereology. There are of interest and relevance to metaphysics, as I've hoped to have shown.

I agree mereology is important; and I would say it is a branch of philosophy—specifically metaphysics.

God damn, that's a hard question. What do you want from me, Bob? You just want to "beat the metaphysical truth out of me, whatever that metaphysical truth might happen to be". I mean, it feels like intellectual torture, "mate".

This is how philosophy works, lol. I want to know what you believe and why you believe it. E.g., I would go for a physical substrate—as a physicalist myself—and no other substrates. This is important because once you posit two it gets zesty.

I have no idea, I'd have to think about it. See my comment above.

Hegel’s concept of the truth being the whole of negativity and reality is the closest I’ve got to whatever you are trying to say. For Hegel, subjectivity is inherently negativity—it isn’t real, but rather negates what is real. So there’s the real and there’s the negativity that negates it; and both makeup the totality of what exists. Hence Hegel’s triad of negativity, reality, and totality.

I am going to be honest, I don't think you know what 'The Absolute' means (based off of the fact that you can't explain it at all); and I therefore don't think you have good reasons to believe it exists. No offense meant.

I am going to be honest, I don't think you know what 'The Absolute' means (based off of the fact that you can't explain it at all); and I therefore don't think you have good reasons to believe it exists. No offense meant. — Bob Ross

None taken. Does one have to know or understand something to believe in it? If one does not have good reasons to believe that X exist, does that mean that one should stop believing in X, whatever X might be?

Then he’s already shot himself in the foot, insofar as the uncondition-ed is beyond human reason, and the uncondition-al is itself a rather suspicious conception. — Mww

An unconditional good would be a good that was good in itself—a good that relied on no other conditions to establish its goodness. Perhaps it could also be referred to as an unconditioned good. I don't believe there is anything either unconditional or unconditioned—the very ideas seem incoherent—or at least I can make no sense of them beyond being able to say what I said in the first two sentences.

Better he propose a claim that there is that which is conditioned by good alone, which makes good a quality under which the conceptual object of the claim is subsumed, rather than the condition of that conceptual object’s possibility. Thereby, he is justified in claiming that in which resides good as its sole quality, serves as the singular necessary condition for that which follows from it. — Mww

I am not sure I'm grasping what you want to say here. If something could be conditioned by the good alone, would that not entail that the good could not be conditioned by any further thing? Would that not lead us directly back to the idea of an unconditional, unconditioned good?

That there is that in which resides good as a sole quality is a claim restricted to mere opinion, yes, but the justification for that which follows from it, in the form of pure speculative metaphysics, can be logically demonstrated as a prescriptive practice, which is not mere opinion. — Mww

While that which is claimed to be good in itself is mere opinion, it can still be the case that whatever follows from it, iff logically consistent hence irrational to deny, that the ground for the claim is the subsequent affirmative justifications given from it. — Mww

So the premise that there could be a pure, unconditioned good is a claim restricted to opinion, but if that opinion be granted the logical entailments that follow from it are not? If that is what you meanI would say that is true of any premise, however unsound.

But, as in any speculative domain, it’s off to the rodeo, and the commoners get lost in the minutia paving the way. — Mww

So, it would seem!



.

Yes. Why would one be justified in holding belief in X if they recognize that they have no good reasons to believe X?

Yes. Why would one be justified in holding belief in X if they recognize that they have no good reasons to believe X? — Bob Ross

They wouldn't (they wouldn't be justified). But some people would still believe it. A lot of people believe in God, and they have no good reason for it. I'm an atheist myself, but I'm not going to tell folks that they should stop believing in God just because they can't rationally explain their beliefs to me.

Most Theists would not say that they lack good reasons to believe. What you are describing here is something that is irrational: you are saying that one is justified in believing X when they know they are unjustified in believing X.

Most Theists would not say that they lack good reasons to believe. What you are describing here is something that is irrational: you are saying that one is justified in believing X when they know they are unjustified in believing X. — Bob Ross

Sure. Some philosophers embrace irrationality. Kierkegaard, for example. He didn't claim to have rational knowledge of God. He seemed to have an irrational belief in God. Irrationalism also permeates the work of other (pre)existentialists, such as Nietzsche. There's even some degree of irrationality in Augustine. The irrational belief in God was even a slogan for Tertullian: credo quia absurdum, "I believe because it is absurd".

There you are!!! I thought I’d let my mouth get away from me, there, I didn’t hear back. Done went and pissed you off somehow.

If something could be conditioned by the good alone, would that not entail that the good could not be conditioned by any further thing? — Janus

No, that statement only says the something cannot be conditioned by any further thing, which makes that something good in itself, not good for the attainment of something else.

Thing is, it is said there is only one thing that can be good in itself, for the attainment of no other end, except to duty according to law. Hence the limit of this good to a moral disposition alone. Got nothing to do with good things, of good feelings or good anything. Except a good will.

Not a popular doctrine, I must say. But a doctrine nonetheless.

There you are!!! I thought I’d let my mouth get away from me, there, I didn’t hear back. Done went and pissed you off somehow. — Mww

No, it was simply my forgetfulness—

If something could be conditioned by the good alone, would that not entail that the good could not be conditioned by any further thing?
— Janus

No, that statement only says the something cannot be conditioned by any further thing, which makes that something good in itself, not good for the attainment of something else. — Mww

My statement and yours here seem to be saying the same thing. Perhaps I am misreading you.

Thing is, it is said there is only one thing that can be good in itself, for the attainment of no other end, except to duty according to law. Hence the limit of this good to a moral disposition alone. Got nothing to do with good things, of good feelings or good anything. Except a good will. — Mww

Kant's deontological ethics seems to me to be a kind of consequentialism—pertaining to the whole human condition, not to particular circumstances. He seems to be saying that if lying, for example, was acceptable then human society could not function because there would be no trust to act as a social binder. That makes the acceptance of lying (and theft, murder, rape, assault and so on) a kind of self-contradiction for a society, because acceptance of such things contradicts the very idea of social harmony.

I think that Kant is right in the universal context—for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty.

I think that Kant is right in the universal context—for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty. — Janus

For what it's worth this is my read of Kant too. The old saying, often attributed to Kant - 'Do what is right, though the heavens may fall.' - hints at what the consequences of a rigid consequentialism might be. I sometimes think of this categorical imperative as a kind of blunt scientism of morality, if that makes sense.

for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty. — Janus

Agreed, hence its relative unpopularity. But upon closer examination, all he’s saying is, it is by this means alone, that a human can call himself a true moral agent, even, at the same time, admitting it’s virtually impossible to actually be one, and even moreso, that we can all be one at the same time.
(Sidebar: this is why Schopenhauer took will out of the subject and put it in the world, so we could all be subjects of the same general criterion. Doing so removes our humanity, but somehow, he thought that was ok. (Sigh))

Moral philosophy according to respect for law, answers the question, what does it mean to be a true moral agent. Whether or not the criteria is met, is beside the point.

That's fair; but I don't think most people would agree with you, and, beyond that, even if they did, one should hold only justified beliefs (I would say). Kierkegaard is a radical example: in most versions of Theism, there is a recognition that one has good reasons to believe in God but that also they have to have faith in God because they cannot explain all of it. My only point is that one must have good reasons, if it be just in the sense that they think they are good, in order to be justified in believing something. Wouldn't you agree?

EDIT: Also, when you speak of Nietzsche, the way he talks about being irrational is really more about 'arationality' than irrationality (viz., being beyond the purview of rationality vs. violating rationality).

one should hold only justified beliefs (I would say) — Bob Ross

But I have unjustified beliefs, about very ordinary things, and I'd argue that everyone does. For example, the classical problem of induction, that Hume emphasized so much. Can I guarantee that the Sun will rise tomorrow? I'm not entirely sure. I mean, I don't doubt it, I'm quite confident that it will rise tomorrow. But that's inductive reasoning, Hume would say. You're not 100% justified in believing any conclusion that has been induced instead of deduced. What would be your honest answer to that problem?

Wouldn't you agree? — Bob Ross

Well, I can give you a politically correct answer to that question, or I can give you the honest answer. The politically correct answer is that in philosophy, we can doubt everything, yadda yadda. The honest answer is that I've been doing too much philosophy for my own good, sadly, and I've been doing it for too long. This is why, in recent years, I'm moving more and more towards good common sense. Intuition is important, I've no quarrel with that, but I think we need common sense as a complement. Is it infallible? Of course not. But we shouldn't throw common sense in the trash bin just because it's not infallible. Anyways, what do I know.

EDIT: Also, when you speak of Nietzsche, the way he talks about being irrational is really more about 'arationality' than irrationality (viz., being beyond the purview of rationality vs. violating rationality). — Bob Ross

Perhaps.

(edited because apparently I forgot what good grammar is)

I think that Kant is right in the universal context—for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty. — Janus


For what it's worth this is my read of Kant too. The old saying, often attributed to Kant - 'Do what is right, though the heavens may fall.' - hints at what the consequences of a rigid consequentialism might be. I sometimes think of this categorical imperative as a kind of blunt scientism of morality, if that makes sense. — Tom Storm

The way I read the categorical imperative (and I might be wrong here) is that it basically boils down to two common sense things:

1) Don't harm others, in the sense that you would expect others not to harm you.
2) Help others in the same sense that you would expect help from them.

For example, if a person is drowning, and you have a rope, the morally correct thing to do is to throw them one end of the rope and save them. Why? Because that is what duty says that you have to do. Why? Because it's the rational thing to do. Why? Because if the situation were reversed, and you were the one drowning, you would expect someone else to throw you a rope.

Is that right?

EDIT: Of course, if you save the person because they owe you money, or because that particular person is one of your loved ones, in neither of these cases is your action morally good. It is simply morally neutral (since you would be acting, in those two cases, out of inclination, not out of duty)

What would be your honest answer to that problem?

Good question. I don’t think Hume’s problem of induction holds any weight: I think he gave an interesting, radical, and skepticistic perspective—but at the end of the day it is a self-refuting position (in terms of his entire pure empiricist position).

Specifically with the problem of induction, it is no longer a problem if we do not allow ourselves to be absolutely certain of anything induced or abduced. At the end of the day, all Hume is really noting, IMHO, is that we cannot be completely confident of these forms of logical inference; but that doesn’t mean that we aren’t justified in having good reasons to conditionally believe things through induction or abduction.

Let’s take your example:

Can I guarantee that the Sun will rise tomorrow?

Of course not: does this mean that you don’t have good reasons to believe it will rise tomorrow? Of course not. You are arguing that, somehow, the ample evidence you have for the Sun rising every morning—of the sheer regularity of experience and of nature—is not good evidence that the Sun will rise tomorrow ceteris paribus; and I don’t see why one should believe that.

Of course not. But we shouldn't throw common sense in the trash bin just because it's not infallible.

I agree insofar as radical skepticism doesn’t work.

You are arguing that, somehow, the ample evidence you have for the Sun rising every morning—of the sheer regularity of experience and of nature—is not good evidence that the Sun will rise tomorrow ceteris paribus; and I don’t see why one should believe that. — Bob Ross

So, inductive reasoning (if I understood you correctly) might be a case-by-case thing. Perhaps in the case of the Sun rising the next day we do indeed have good reason to believe such a thing. But there are other examples. The other textbook example is the one about swans. Up until the 1700s, people thought that all swans were white. Their reasoning was arguably inductive: people saw a bunch of individual swans, and all of them were white. At the end of the 1700s (around 1790, more or less) black swans were discovered. So, the statement that "all swans are white" was technically false: some swans are not white. So, if the expectation was, that the next swan to be observed was going to be white, then that expectation was not met when that very next swan turned out to be black.

This is the same problem that gamblers have. Gamblers have to rely on inductive reasoning. Even the blackjack players that can count cards have this problem.

So, I guess my argument is that having the justification for some beliefs is a matter of degrees. In some cases it will be an all or nothing deal, sure. But there are cases in which it doesn't seem to be an "either, or" type of situation.

I don't know, these are difficult philosophical problems.