Settle down. I will do as I want. — Tom Storm

I am settled in my chair. I will not approach the floor any further. Why are you angry at me?

I’m not looking for a rebuttal, I am looking for some expertise on Kant, perhaps a scholar on this matter. What is the expert consensus (if there is one) on this frequently touted weakness of the CI?

I’m not looking for a rebuttal, I am looking for some expertise on Kant, perhaps a scholar on this matter. What is the expert consensus (if there is one) on this frequently touted weakness of the CI? — Tom Storm

Well, since it's expertise that you want, I teach Kant's epistemology and ethics to my students at the Uni, though we never have enough time to go over his aesthetics. So, no, I'm not an expert on Kant, by any stretch of the imagination. Have I read some of Kant's books? Yes, I have. Have I understood them? For the most part, I would like to believe. Have I read what some of his scholars have written about his philosophy? Yes, I have, though not to the degree that a specialist in Kant's philosophy would. Can I dismiss that frequently touted, so-called weakness of the categorical imperative, by means of a simple, valid and sound argument, that is supported by the literature on Kant's Ethics, and by what Kant himself has written? Yes, I believe I can, and I believe that I have already done so.

If that's not good enough for ya, I got some more 'roo jokes waiting for you in the Australian politics thread.

I'm looking for some recognised expertise, not just an anonymous member of a forum, like us. I want something that I can cite. You seem to be making this all about you and it's actually about Kant. :wink:

I'm looking for some recognised expertise, not just an anonymous member of a forum, like us. I want something that I can cite. You seem to be making this all about you and it's actually about Kant. :wink: — Tom Storm

In that case, the best that I can recommend in Arendt's book, Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Because Eichmann himself tried to plead not guilty, by arguing that "he did what he had to do because of Kant's categorial imperative". Those aren't his literal words, but that was his idea. Arendt explains in the book why that is not sound reasoning on Eichmann's part. Most of the discussion about "Kant and the problem of the Nazis" is rooted in Eichmann's trial, and especially in Arendt's report and analysis of it. So, I figure that would be a good place to start. As for an actual consensus about the categorical imperative, scholars still debate to this very day what the underlying concept even is, to say nothing of the meaning of its different formations. In short, there's no universal consensus. There's some good interpretations, and some good arguments in support of those interpretations, nothing more.

For example, if a person is drowning, and you have a rope, the morally correct thing to do is to throw them one end of the rope and save them. Why? Because that is what duty says that you have to do. Why? Because it's the rational thing to do. Why? Because if the situation were reversed, and you were the one drowning, you would expect someone else to throw you a rope. — Arcane Sandwich

Or perhaps you feel for them in their plight.

Agreed, hence its relative unpopularity. But upon closer examination, all he’s saying is, it is by this means alone, that a human can call himself a true moral agent, even, at the same time, admitting it’s virtually impossible to actually be one, and even moreso, that we can all be one at the same time. — Mww

That's a good point. If to be a true moral agent is to act entirely free from self-interest and entirely in accordance with the moral law derived from reason alone, then that is indeed the only way to be a true moral agent.

Virtue ethics may have something different to say about what being a true moral agent consists in, though. For example, if someone had to choose between saving their child and a stranger, the person who chose to save the stranger on the grounds that it would be the more truly moral thing to do, being free from personal desire as saving one's child would not, that person would not be lauded, but would rather be considered to be a psychopath.

If to be a true moral agent is to act entirely free from self-interest…. — Janus

Well said.
————-

I want something that I can cite. — Tom Storm

“On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies From Beneficial Motives”, 1797

http://philosophical.space/f325/KantLies.pdf

Thanks. So Kant actually addresses this concern directly. :smile:

Christ, it's hard to read. What does it say...

Yes, directly addressed; yes, hard to read, and it says….don’t lie. Ever. For any reason. IFF your intent is to be a moral agent in possession of rational cognition, and practical reason. Which is…everyone.

“…. To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency….”

Yes, directly addressed; yes, hard to read, and it says….don’t lie. Ever. For any reason. IFF your intent is to be a moral agent in possession of rational cognition, and practical reason. Which is…everyone.

“…. To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency….” — Mww

There is not a single mention of the categorical imperative in Kant's On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives. Don't take my word for it, take a look for yourself. Use the search tool and type in "categorical imperative", or even just "imperative", you won't find a single instance of it. Is he alluding to the categorical imperative without mentioning it? That's a different animal of a discussion, I would say.

Furthermore, check out Varden's article from 2010, which begins with the following words:

Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim—and that if one does lie and despite one's good intentions the lie leads to the murderer's capture of the victim, then the liar is partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this is correct, then Kant's account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another's wrongdoing. After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway? Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his discussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant's universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command. In this paper, I argue that Kant's discussion of lying to the murderer at the door has been seriously misinterpreted. — Helga Varden

Furthermore, there is Hannah Arendt's refutation of Eichmann's appeal to Kant's categorical imperative. Essentially, Eichmann fails to understand the reciprocity implied in the categorical imperative, which is also what the person who thinks that "you should never lie" also fails to take into account in the scenario in which it is indeed morally correct to lie to someone with murderous intent (i.e., a Nazi soldier) in order to protect potential victims (i.e., civilians who happen to be Jewish).

Great, thanks. Now there's a direct source for this.

But that source doesn't mention the categorical imperative even once.

Does he need to use those words? He is obviously responding to the famous criticism of it as I have outlined earlier. The following appears to be a clear response to the CI, stating almost identically the famous critique.

“The moral principle that it is one’s duty to speak the truth, if it were taken singly and
unconditionally, would make all society impossible. We have the proof of this in the very direct
consequences which have been drawn from this principle by a German philosopher, who goes so far as to affirm that to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had not taken refuge in our house, would be a crime.”

Does he need to use those words? — Tom Storm

Yes, he does, because a rigorous, technical author such Kant, who likes to coin specific philosophical terms, or otherwise re-conceptualize technical terms that already existed in his time, needs to be specific when he speaks. Otherwise, he leaves things up to interpretation, which exactly what his scholars have been doing ever since, and which is exactly what we're doing right now.

The moral principle that it is one’s duty to speak the truth, if it were taken singly and
unconditionally, would make all society impossible.

Please understand that Ethics and moral principles are not the same thing, just as Aesthetics and artistic principles are not the same thing. Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy that studies artistic principles (among other artistic topics), and sometimes may even offer some aesthetic principles. What is the difference between an artistic principle and an aesthetic one? The latter is philosophical, while the former is not, or at least not to the same degree. By comparison, Ethics is the branch of philosophy that studies moral principles (among other moral topics), and sometimes may even offer some ethical principles. What is the difference between a moral principle and an ethical principle? The latter is philosophical, while the former is not, or at least not to the same degree.

One's duty to speak the truth is a moral principle. By contrast, the categorical imperative is an ethical principle. To say that one has the duty to speak the truth is to say a mere triviality. To argue for it, to the best of one's philosophical ability, is a daunting task for any philosopher, because morality itself, as we ordinarily understand it, contains some degree of semantic vagueness (at the very least). It is much better to propose a formal Ethical theory, in which the semantic vagueness of ordinary language is reduced. This is a source of potential contradiction between the moral ideas and the ethical ideas of an author who, like Kant, has something to say about what is right and what is wrong, from two different points of view: the point of view of morality, as the common person understands it, and the point of view of ethics, as the philosopher understands it. So perhaps it's no coincidence that Kant does not mention the categorical imperative even once in his On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives

But what do I know? I'm just an anonymous forum person.

I didn’t mention it, but the bolded part of that little bit I quoted, re: the unconditional command of reason, just IS an imperative, the exposition for which was already given in a 1785 treatise. He had scant motivation to mention the construct of imperatives in a response to a mere French journalist, who he might have considered too dumb to comprehend proper metaphysics anyway.

:up: Yep. Thanks again for the reference.

I apologize: I forgot to respond.

The other textbook example is the one about swans

I would say that they were justified in believing that Swans were all white until they had sufficient counter-evidence to refute the evidence they had. The thing with induction is that the more the occurrence, the higher the (bayesian) probability that it is true. Again, you have to argue not that they were wrong but, rather, that they were irrational for believing it prior to seeing a black swan. What’s the argument you have for it?

This is the same problem that gamblers have. Gamblers have to rely on inductive reasoning. Even the blackjack players that can count cards have this problem.

No. You are confusing induction with abduction: the former is when there is a sheer repetition in results such that a correlation is derived (which may or may not be causal at all) (e.g., expecting to get slapped if you pick up the lolipop because your mom has slapped you a ton in the past for it, seeing the sun rise and expecting it to rise tomorrow, etc.) where abduction is reasoning about evidence which you have by making inferences which do not necessarily hold (e.g., she committed the murder because she was there at the time caught holding the bloody knife used in the stabbing, he’s probably just in the bathroom because I heard him talking someone about having to go, etc.).

Gamblers are usually abducing, and abducing, at that, in irrational ways. E.g., the average gambler doesn’t count cards; and they just expect to win even though the probability is severely low: they have an irrational expectation to win.

Good gamblers aren’t just abducing: they are deducing. E.g., card games can be counted and their strict probabilities calculated.

Most imortantly, neither tend to induce. E.g., most people don’t walk into a casino and see a certain bet always win repeatedly a 1000 times and then decide to make that same bet.

So, I guess my argument is that having the justification for some beliefs is a matter of degrees

You were arguing that it is irrational; which is not implied by arguing that beliefs have different credence levels. Are you changing your position, and agreeing with me that induction isn’t irrational? If not, then what argument do you have to the contrary?

I apologize: I forgot to respond. — Bob Ross

No problem. Sometimes I forget where I left the keys to my own house, that's the sort of forgetfulness that actually worries me.

Are you changing your position, and agreeing with me that induction isn’t irrational? — Bob Ross

Induction is not irrational. At least not entirely. I would say that deductive reasoning is 100% rational, and that inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning are not 100% rational, since the truth of the conclusion isn't guaranteed by the truth of the premises, which is something that is indeed guaranteed in deductive reasoning. I don't know, I wouldn't be able to say what "percentage of rationality" induction has, if that expression even makes any sense, but if it does, I'd say that it's greater than 0% percent and less than 100%.

Does that make sense?