I think a lot of this conversation is rather lost in the weeds of Rödl's terminological minutiae. It might benefit from standing back and calling out what the book is about at a high level (gleaned from various sources).

I don’t think Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity is a direct argument for absolute idealism, despite the title. Rödl meticulously analyses foundational questions about self-consciousness, judgment, and objectivity in ways that challenge implicit assumptions within analytic philosophy. His goal is not to advocate idealism but to build a case that shows how idealist principles resolve issues that other frameworks cannot. In doing this, Rödl reframes concepts like the nature of judgment and the role of self-consciousness, implicitly demonstrating how idealism underpins intelligibility, rationality, and objectivity.

It is very much written for the philosophical professoriate, particularly those trained in analytic methods, who dominate the discourse in the modern academy. Its style and structure reflect this intent, and as such it operates at a high level of abstraction. By embedding idealist principles in dense, systematic arguments, Rödl avoids presenting idealism as a speculative doctrine. His strategy is to show how it emerges necessarily from a deeper analysis of thought and reality.

Myself, I don't think I'm going to persist with it. I'm not well-equipped for this kind of technical philosophy and it really doesn't interest me that much. I'm already a convinced philosophical idealist, which I'll continue to explore and advocate for through other means. What with the abundance of information available in the Information Economy and the availability of time, I'm going to take leave of this topic and concentrate efforts elsewhere.

Do you think Rodl might believe that what occurs is consciousness of the activity itself? — Leontiskos

I’m not sure. When he says…

“…. And I use “consciousness” to designate a genus of which thought, judgment, knowledge are species….” (1.4, pg 4)

….it appears he’s grouping things under a heading, the soundness of which escapes me, just yet. For me, all that which he calls species, thought and judgement belong to understanding, and knowledge, not being a faculty at all, doesn’t belong to any of them. And consciousness isn’t a genus iff it’s merely a condition. Consciousness isn’t how thought is possible; it only represents that to which thought belongs, re: “I think”.

On the other hand, if there is sufficient justification contained in the text as a whole, for the genus/species thing he’s got going on, then maybe he can affirm what Kant had denied.

Like I said….hard to unpack.

I appreciate everything you've contributed.

I’ll only add, because of the title, a lot of people will read it to find fault with it, while others (like myself) will read it to find support for their view

And that ain’t philosophy - that’s human nature :wink:

Yes, and there are those fortunate few who aren't sure!

But how is it different after many repetitions from the initial time, when, upon seeing the word, you heard it in your mind? What has changed after the many repetitions? — Patterner

I was thinking about how we learn the meaning of a word. When we see something that is named "apple", this has to be repeated several times before we are able to associate the name "apple" with our concept of "apple".

but the "content" that Frege is upholding isn't the apples, it's the proposition "There are apples in that tree". — J

Frege's "content" surely does not mean any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true, which means only those propositions that are able to correspond with the world.

Frege said force is separate to content.

Frege's position is that there can be propositions having content independent of being judged or asserted. Such that "p" is independent of "I judge p is true" or "I assert p is true".

There is a difference between "I judge p is true" and "I judge "p" is true". The thread is titled p and "I think p" not p and "I think "p"",

Suppose Frege means by content the proposition, such that "I judge "p" is true""

Then "p" can be anything. For example, "p" could be "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus", in which case "I judge "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" is true".

But "p" can be any one of an almost infinite number of possibilities, an almost infinite number of possible propositions, an almost infinite number of possible contents.

But Frege wrote in 1915 - ‘‘My basic logical insights’’: ‘‘When something is judged to be the case we can always cull out the thought that is recognized as true; the act of judgment forms no part of this’’

The thought must be recognized as true, and the thought "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" can never be recognized as true.

It makes more sense that what is being discussed is "I judge p is true", where p is not just any possible proposition but only those propositions that can be judged to be true.

This is why Frege himself gave the example of "the accused was in Rome" rather than "the accused dressed only in a hat flew over the rooftops of Rome" and why this thread gives the example of "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" rather than "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus".

Frege says that the content is separate to the force, where p in "I judge p is true" is separate to "I judge_is true"

The content cannot be any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true.

And those propositions that are capable of being true correspond with the world. Hence a foundation of Realism.
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Hence "absolute idealism." — J

As a cat is an animal, an Absolute Idealist is an Indirect Realist. Absolute Idealism is a type of Indirect Realism.

Hegel was idealist — Wayfarer

True, and he also believed in the existence of an external world.
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Berkeley denies the existence of matter as an independently real substance, but he does not deny the reality of the external world. — Wayfarer

As you say, Berkeley believed in the existence of an external world.
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His book is titled ‘an introduction to absolute idealism.’ If he was an indirect realist perhaps he wouldn’t have used that description. — Wayfarer

I presume that you haven't found a quote by Rodl in his book An Introduction to Absolute Idealism where he says that a mind-independent world doesn't exist.

I gotcha.

Interesting post. Let me see if I understand you. You want to say:

I judge p is true = refers to a proposition that can be judged true
I judge "p" is true = refers to any proposition whatsoever

You're saying that only the former can be "recognized as true." What I don't understand is how this recognition differs from judging that it is true. Do you mean "recognition" to refer to a pre-linguistic or pre-propositional experience?

Frege says that the content is separate to the force, where p in "I judge p is true" is separate to "I judge_is true"

The content cannot be any possible proposition, but only those propositions that are capable of being judged true. — RussellA

There seems to be a misunderstanding about "capable of being judged true." The statement about the blue creatures is capable of being judged true, but as it happens, the correct judgment is "false." When Frege and Fregeans talk about truth-aptness, they're not referring to facts on the ground about what is the case. They're talking about the kinds of propositions to which assent could be given.

That said, it's true that Fregean "content" can't be "any possible proposition" if you agree with Rodl and others that there's a deep problem involving 1st person propositions and whether we can indeed separate the 1st personal from assertion.

Pretty open-ended question, isn’t it? Within the context I was talking about, though, there isn’t any third-person to be found, the very notion is absurd. — Mww

Could we say that one can simulate one view within another? Can we simulate a third person view from the first person?

The view belonging to the subject, yet without the pitiful nonsense of Cartesian theater, right? — Mww

I'm not sure. It seems that the very idea of a "view" is what invokes the nonsense of a Cartesian theater and homunculus.

What about when we talk to ourselves in our head? Who are we talking to? If language is representation and we think in language, what does that say about which view we are participating in when thinking in a language rather thinking in images, sounds, feelings, tastes and smells? In thinking in representations are we not relegating ourselves to the third person?

I don't know how to answer the question, because I don't know the difference between the way I can think and the way I think. If there are different ways a person can think, do we each choose different ways at different times? Or do we each have just one that, for whatever reason, we settled on, perhaps very early in life? — Patterner

I don't know either. You were the one that used the phrase "the way we think" and I was just going with the flow. I assumed you knew what you were talking about when using those words.

What did you mean when you said that language changes the way we think?

I assumed that "ways we think" include things like problem-solving, reason, logic, representation, categorizing, interpreting, recalling, etc.

It seems to me that we must already possess these ways of thinking to be able to learn a language in the first place and learning a language is like learning to ride a bike. When you master the skill, you outsource some of the work to unconscious processes. You no longer need to focus on balance and the movement of your legs. It is all done unconsciously. Mastering language is the same. Once you master the skill you outsource some of the processes to your non-conscious parts of your brain, so it makes you more efficient in riding your bike and using your language. While language does not change the way we think. It represents the way we think and improves the efficiency in our thinking.

My focus has been on things and types of things we think about, not the way we think. Thinking about an object, say, a boulder on a hill, and thinking about what that boulder might do in the future, say, roll down the hill, are different kinds of thoughts. Thinking about that boulder landing on me leads to thinking about my mortality, which is yet another kind of thought. Thinking about these different kinds of thoughts Is a fourth kind of thought. At least it seems this way to me.

But I don't know that I'm not thinking these different kinds of thoughts in the same way. If they are different ways of thinking, I guess they are the thingd that might answer your question? But what are those ways? — Patterner

Do you need language to think those things, or is language merely representative of your thinking in images, sounds, feelings, etc.? When thinking about a boulder on a hill and the possibility that it might roll down the hill, are you experiencing that thought as the visual of scribbles, "That boulder might roll down the hill.", the sound of your voice saying "That boulder might roll down the hill.", or visuals of the boulder and it rolling down the hill? If you say you experience hearing the sound of your voice saying that, then does the sound of your voice refer to the visual of the boulder rolling down the hill, or is the boulder rolling down the hill just sounds in your head?

There are many definitions of "truth" (SEP - Truth)

My favourite is a correspondence between something that exists in the mind and something that exists in the world, such that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is true IFF the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Unfortunately, being an Indirect Realist, I don't think we can ever know what exists in the world, meaning that we can never know "the truth".

What you want seems to be similar to the Anti-Realist approach to truth, such as Dummett's, where truth is not a fully objective matter independent of us, but is something that can be verified or asserted by us. (SEP - Truth - 4.2). — RussellA

You say that your favorite version of "truth" is one where you can never know what the "truth" is. :meh:


How is your version independent of us if it is a correspondence between something that exist in the world and something that exists in the mind? :roll:

"Think" exists in my mind as an imagined sound. — RussellA

Then you are talking to yourself when thinking? What are you talking to yourself ABOUT? Do the imagined sounds in your mind represent other things that are not sounds in your mind? If so, couldn't you just think in those things instead of thinking only sounds in your mind?

"Think" exists in my mind in its own right, and doesn't refer to anything else. — RussellA

So the act of thinking is only the act of hearing the sound "think" in your mind?

If "think" in my mind didn't exist in its own right, and referred to something else, such as "A", then this "A" must refer to something else, such as "B", ending up as the infinite regress homunculus problem. As I see it, I am my thoughts rather than I have thoughts.

Therefore things in my mind must exist in the own right without referring to anything else. — RussellA

Then I don't understand how you can be an indirect realist that asserts that your thoughts are not the world, but about the world. You are describing solipsist stance, not an indirect realist one.

When I see the word "think" on the screen I hear the sound "think" in my mind. After many repetitions, in Hume's terms, this sets up a constant conjunction between seeing the word "think" and hearing the word "think". Thereafter, when I see the word "think" I instinctively hear the word "think", and when I hear the word "think" I instinctively see the word "think".

The sound "think" doesn't refer to the image "think", but corresponds with it. — RussellA

You're saying that the act, or process, of thinking is simply seeing those scribbles and hearing that sound in your head. For you, the scribble and the sound do not refer to anything, like the act of thinking.

I judge p is true = refers to a proposition that can be judged true
I judge "p" is true = refers to any proposition whatsoever
You're saying that only the former can be "recognized as true." What I don't understand is how this recognition differs from judging that it is true. Do you mean "recognition" to refer to a pre-linguistic or pre-propositional experience? — J

Thankyou for the fun thread, but several days of sunshine abroad beckon.

Recognition and Judgement
Frege says force is separate to content. I take this to mean that the content p in "I judge p is true" is separate to the force "I judge _is true".

My belief is that proposition p must be truth apt prior to being able to be judged. A proposition is truth apt if it corresponds with the world. This means that a proposition must be recognized to be truth apt before being able to be judged.

Therefore, before judging a proposition, we must recognize that the proposition ""The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is truth apt and the proposition "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" isn't.

The problem with Frege's belief that force is separate to content
However, we can only recognize a proposition such as "a b c d e" as being truth apt if we know the meaning of a,b, c , d and e. IE, we know the content of the proposition.

This begins to support Rodl's point that the content cannot be separate to the force, as we are already making a judgment that the proposition is truth apt even before we start to judge whether the contents of the proposition are true or not.

It is interesting that all the examples of propositions I have come across have been truth apt, whether on this thread, such as "That oak tree is shedding its leaves", "the grass is green", "the Earth is round" or Frege's "the accused was in Rome".

IE, the content cannot be separate to force, as the content must be known prior to judging that the content is suitable to be judged.

The problem if the proposition is not truth apt
But suppose proposition p does not need to be truth apt before we can try to judge it.

Consider an example of a proposition that is not truth apt, such as "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus". On what grounds can we judge the content when the content is meaningless.

A judgment about a content can only be made when the content has meaning, and as content cannot give itself meaning, any meaning must be external to the content itself, such as the world.

For Rodl, force is inside content
If force is inside the content, and the content doesn't correspond with the world, then what is the content to be judged against. It can only be judged against itself, which leads into an infinite regress.

If force is inside the content, and the content corresponds with a world external to it, then any judgment is founded within the world, and there is something for the judgment to be made against

Therefore, for Rodl also, where force is inside content, judgment is only possible if the content has a meaning external to itself, such as the world.
===============================================================================

When Frege and Fregeans talk about truth-aptness, they're not referring to facts on the ground about what is the case. They're talking about the kinds of propositions to which assent could be given. — J

But this means that a judgement must be made about what kind of proposition can be assented to even before a judgment can be made about the content of that proposition.

A judgement about what kind of proposition can be assented to can only be made if the contents are known. For example, a judgment cannot be made giving assent to the proposition "a b c d e" without knowing what a, b, c, d and e mean. But what a, b, c, d and e mean is the content of the proposition.

The contents of the proposition must be known before being judged. This means that the contents of the proposition are already known before being judged. If the contents are known in order for a judgment to be made, the contents cannot be separate to the judgment

You say that your favorite version of "truth" is one where you can never know what the "truth" is — Harry Hindu

Thank you for your replies, but am now off on holiday.

Perhaps deflationary towards truth. As the SEP article on Truth writes

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism.

===============================================================================

How is your version independent of us if it is a correspondence between something that exist in the world and something that exists in the mind? — Harry Hindu

In my vision there is a postbox, which I know because it exists in my mind. I believe that there is something outside my mind that caused me to see a postbox in my mind, but I don't know what that something is.

The correspondence theory of truth doesn't apply, as there is no correspondence between a known thing in my mind and an unknown thing in the world.

Can we simulate a third person view from the first person? — Harry Hindu

Yeah, I suppose, when I think about what another person thinks iff he speaks of it.

It seems that the very idea of a "view" is what invokes the nonsense of a Cartesian theater and homunculus. — Harry Hindu

I don’t think it’s the view that invokes the nonsense, in that a view presupposes a viewer, or that which represents agency, which is a necessary condition for philosophical theory in general, and metaphysics in particular. Otherwise, what’s the point? Multiple instances of either, is the problem, and that occurs when all that’s left for affirmation is “….recourse to pitiful sophisms…”, from which follows the conclusion that I am “…as many-colored and various a self as there are representations of which I am conscious….”.

But I see your point: there isn’t a view, in the proper sense of seeing; there is only the modus operandi of an intellect, the same intellect that allows the construction of pitiful sophisms, such that an irreconcilable mess is made in attempting to explain itself.
(As in….what follows below *grin*)
————-

What about when we talk to ourselves in our head? — Harry Hindu

That’s not what we’re doing. Ok, fine. I reject that’s what I’m doing. I’m processing an extent understanding given from experience, subsequently the possibility of expressing it coherently.

If language is representation and we think in language…. — Harry Hindu

I agree language is representation, but reject thinking in language. Thinking, as such, in and of itself, is cognition by means of conceptions, conceptions are the representation of extant images, again, from experience. The mental act of composing an expression, is nonetheless a thought, albeit perhaps moreso a complex arrangement of them, even a succession of arrangements into a whole.

……what does that say about which view we are participating in when thinking in a language rather thinking in images, sounds, feelings, tastes and smells? — Harry Hindu

It says there must be a difference in the view in which the subject participates, and the view the subject represents. No matter the many things I think, it is still only me thinking.
(Not sure what you’re trying to elucidate here, but that’s my understanding of it)

In thinking in representations are we not relegating ourselves to the third person? — Harry Hindu

We don’t think in representations, but by means of them in their relation to each other. I’m not getting a third-person out of that.

Anyway….for what all that’s worth.

That’s not what we’re doing. Ok, fine. I reject that’s what I’m doing. I’m processing an extent understanding given from experience, subsequently the possibility of expressing it coherently. — Mww

Would you say you are simulating expressing it coherently, essentially thinking what you are going to say before saying it?

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expression
Expressing is the act of representing or symbolizing something else.

In expressing something are you not using some form of representation? Are the sounds coming from your mouth representing, or referring to your simulation (thinking it before saying it), or to some other thought that is neither the thought of you expressing it nor the sound you are making. When expressing something to me, what exactly are you trying to express - more words, or some other type of sensory experience?

We don’t think in representations, but by means of them in their relation to each other. I’m not getting a third-person out of that. — Mww

So when you think of the image of a cat, that is not a representation of all possible cats? Isn't the primary purpose of thinking to simulate the world as accurately as possible? What type of relation exists between your mind and the world?

I’ll only add, because of the title, a lot of people will read it to find fault with it, while others (like myself) will read it to find support for their view — Wayfarer

The OP left a bad taste in my mouth given the way it handles Kant. And after an excessive amount of digging we learned that Rodl contradicts himself in the endnote, which to me constitutes a lie:

Kant said: the I think accompanies all my thoughts.³

[3] Critique of Pure Reason, B 131. More precisely, he says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. This presupposes (what is the starting point of Kant’s philosophy and not the kind of thing for which he would undertake to give an argument) that the I think accompanies all my thoughts. — Rodl, Self-Consciousness and Objectivity

Maybe it was just an unfortunate coincidence that the thread began on such shaky ground, but after the Kimhi threads took a very long time to go nowhere, this sort of equivocation deters.

Yes, and there are those fortunate few who aren't sure! — J

But as the thread on Kimhi demonstrated, you are sure. You are sure that Kimhi and Rodl are important and worth reading. But you don't seem able to give any reasons for that rather dogmatic position. You insist it's worth it and you don't know why:

I have gotten so frustrated with Kimhi over the past month that I've literally screamed, trying to untangle him. But I insist it's worth it. — J

That's fine, but I don't see a neutral or objective reader. I see more of that from Paine, and that is why I am so interested to hear his thoughts.

The only thing that worries me is captured by Srap's response. If anti-Analytic lunges all miss their mark badly, then a real problem is being created. That is, if Kimhi and Rodl don't make any sense, then touting them--explicitly or implicitly--as the champions against Analytic Fregianism only aids the cause of Analytic Fregianism. Honestly, after reading Kimhi I think more of Frege, not less. It's not great when arguments against [Frege] have the effect of improving the general opinion of [Frege].

Additionally, philosophy forums are usually filled with people pretending to do calculus, who do not know how to do algebra. With Kimhi everyone came to the same conclusion, including you, "We don't really know what he is talking about, or where he is going with any of this." The problem created by this can't just be deferred ad infinitum. At some point you have to face the music. But of course Rodl could be different than Kimhi.

Thank you for your replies, but am now off on holiday.

Perhaps deflationary towards truth. As the SEP article on Truth writes

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism. — RussellA

According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

So something is true simply by saying it? What happens when someone else says, "Snow White isn't white"? Can contradictory statements be true? If every statement is true simply by saying it that seems to deflate the meaning of truth to meaninglessness.

How is defining truth as a correspondence between some proposition and its usefulness in achieving some goal any different?

If one were to say, "Snow White is white", and another say the opposite, we verify the truth of the statements by using them to achieve some goal. If we succeed, the statement is true, if we fail, the statement is false.

In my vision there is a postbox, which I know because it exists in my mind. I believe that there is something outside my mind that caused me to see a postbox in my mind, but I don't know what that something is.

The correspondence theory of truth doesn't apply, as there is no correspondence between a known thing in my mind and an unknown thing in the world. — RussellA

But you just said that something outside your mind caused you to see a postbox in your mind, how is that not a correspondence - a link of causation?

And after an excessive amount of digging we learned that Rodl contradicts himself in the endnote, which to me constitutes a lie — Leontiskos

The paragraph preceeding the endnote is as follows:

As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the I think is thought in every act of thinking: an act of thinking is the first person thought of itself. As being conscious of thinking that things are so is not a diferent act from thinking this, the act of the mind expressed by So it is is the same as the one expressed by I think it is so. As the act of thinking is one, so is what it thinks; as the I think is thought in every act of thinking, the I think is contained in every thing thought. This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p. On the contrary. Since thinking p is thinking oneself to think it, there is no such thing as thinking, in addition to thinking p, that one thinks this. If our notation confuses us, suggesting as it does that I think is added to a p that is free from it, we may devise one that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.

This bears repeating: there is no meaning in saying that, in an act of thinking, two things are thought, p and I think p. Kant said: the I think accompanies all my thoughts.³ — SCAO, P3

^3. Critique of Pure Reason, B 131. More precisely, he says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. This presupposes (what is the starting point of Kant’s philosophy and not the kind of thing for which he would undertake to give an argument) that the I think accompanies all my thoughts. — Footnote

Norman Kemp Smith translation of the Critique of Pure Reason p153:

The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.

(I take it that Rödl's comment that this is 'not the kind of thing for which he would give an argument' is tantamount to 'it goes without saying' or 'it is assumed'.)

So - what about this constitutes a lie or a contradiction?

//

A little further along in the same section from the CPR, further argument which lends weight to Rödl's interpretation

The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me is therefore precisely the same as the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For other wise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thought. Combination does not, however, lie in the objects, and cannot be borrowed from them, and so, through perception, first taken up into the understanding. On the contrary, it is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge. — Critique of Pure Reason, Sythetic Unity of Apperception

//

Yes, and there are those fortunate few who aren't sure! — J

Looks like I'm not done yet, after all ;-)

….essentially thinking what you are going to say before saying it? — Harry Hindu

Close enough.

In expressing something are you not using some form of representation? — Harry Hindu

Everything my form of intelligence does, is predicated on representation, despite what the materialists or spiritualists would have me think.

So when you think of the image of a cat, that is not a representation of all possible cats? — Harry Hindu

No. Representations are not for universals, which are objects of reason, concepts without representation. We don’t think all possible cats; we think either the one right in front of us, or the one that might be.

Isn't the primary purpose of thinking to simulate the world as accurately as possible? — Harry Hindu

Nothing wrong with that, but specifically I rather think the primary empirical purpose of thinking is to understand the world’s relation to us, the way we are affected by it. Bu empirical thinking is not the limit of thought, so technically, the primary purpose depends on the domain in which object thought about, is found.
————-

The OP left a bad taste in my mouth given the way it handles Kant. — Leontiskos

Me too, but I laid it off to my seriously entrenched predispositions. But I like to think I gave it a good ol’ fashion continental examination, donchaknow.

You are sure that Kimhi and Rodl are important and worth reading — Leontiskos

They have been for me, and evidently for others. I guess not for you, though you've seemed pretty engaged! :wink:

Just a basic difference about what the point of it all is. I prefer understanding to being right, or deeming a philosopher right or wrong, and it takes me a long time to understand difficult things.

Given two (or more) positions on a basic, entrenched problem in philosophy, I assume that, if there was an obviously correct resolution, it would have been discovered long ago, and recognized as such. So the task is hermeneutic -- we need an interpretation, an understanding, of why this is so, why certain problems continue to provoke and stimulate. If you've gotten nothing from reading what you have of Kimhi and Rodl, that's OK, then they aren't stimulating thought for you, they aren't helping you understand or helping you articulate questions. No reason to pursue them.

No. Representations are not for universals, which are objects of reason, concepts without representation. We don’t think all possible cats; we think either the one right in front of us, or the one that might be. — Mww

One that might be is the same as a possible cat. If you can only think of the cat in front of you or one that might be, how would you recognize a cat that is different than the one in front of you and the one you imagine might be, if the universal does not represent all possible cats?

What purpose is a universal? How are they used in our thinking, if not to stand for the characteristics of a cat?

Isn't the primary purpose of thinking to simulate the world as accurately as possible? — Harry Hindu

Nothing wrong with that, but specifically I rather think the primary empirical purpose of thinking is to understand the world’s relation to us, the way we are affected by it. Bu empirical thinking is not the limit of thought, so technically, the primary purpose depends on the domain in which object thought about, is found. — Mww

Sounds like we're saying the same thing. To simulate the world as accurately as possible includes the world's relation to us and how we are affected by it, as we are part of the world. The mind is a relation between body and world so one might even say that all we can never get at the world as it is independent of us, only at the relation itself.

Perhaps the problem is I'm not sure what you mean "last exit from the highway of absolute idealism". — Janus

Rödl proposes "absolute idealism" as the way forward from where Nagel and Moore stopped:

As the concept of knowledge is contained in the self-consciousness of judgment, there can be no account of knowledge that does not represent the subject who knows as understanding herself to do so. An account of knowledge seeks to bring to explicit consciousness the self-knowledge of her who knows; it articulates what is contained in her knowing herself to know. If we are to express in language the self-consciousness of judgment, we need to articulate the idea of a judgment in which and through which she who judges comprehends that judgment to be knowledge, comprehends it to be true to, agree with, reality. This task is rarely confronted in epistemology today. Thomas Nagel and Adrian Moore confront it. We will discuss their thoughts in Chapter 5. While both are oriented by the understanding we have of judgment in judging, they fail to appreciate the significance of this; they fail to appreciate the significance of the self-consciousness of judgment. They hold fast to the notion that the objectivity of judgment resides in its being of something other, something that is as it is independently of being thought to be so. In consequence, their result is an ultimate incomprehensibility of our thought of ourselves as judging and knowing. — SC&O, page 14

According to absolute idealism the world just is the world as experienced by humans—"the rational is the real", so it doesn't seem clear that Rödl is moving beyond absolute idealism. — Janus

As your reference to the Hegel formula suggests, the goal is not to move beyond but to learn how to accept absolute idealism. The matter of duality is not dissolved but framed in way outside of contending dependencies:

There is a major obstacle to the reception of absolute idealism, the history of it and, more importantly, the thought of it: this is the notion that absolute idealism is a species of—idealism. In an appropriately vague and vulgar way, idealism can be represented as the idea that the world, nature, the object of experience, depends on the mind. Reality is mind-dependent. Absolute idealism is the most radical, the most thorough, and the only sound rejection of that. — ibid. page 16

The tension between the first person and objective judgement is maintained but approached through understanding knowledge as a power. To that end, Rödl introduces Aristotle, who figures largely in Chapter 4:

The recent reintroduction of the idea of the power of knowledge into epistemology is a huge step. Yet the idea is confounding. It is confounding on account of the objectivity of judgment. Since judgment is objective, the power of knowledge is not a power to this or that; it is the power, the power überhaupt. And this makes it hard to understand how it can provide for the recognition of the validity of a particular judgment. We make progress as we see that the power of knowledge is not a given power. It is not a power that is as it is anyway, independently of being understood in acts of this very power. (As Aristotle notes, this distinguishes the power of knowledge from powers of sensory consciousness.) As the power of knowledge is nothing given, it is what it is only in its own exercise: it determines itself. The power of knowledge is what is known; it is what we know, or the knowledge (Chapter 8). — ibid. page 17

the proposition "five legged blue creatures that breathe fire freely roam in Cyprus" isn't [truth apt]. — RussellA

This is sort of nit-picking, but I consider this sentence to be truth apt. After all, I can envision some evil super genius genetically engineering such creatures and setting them loose on Cyprus. Of course it's false.

"The non-existent apple threw the square root of the Eiffel Tower"

Now that is most definitely not truth apt.

One that might be is the same as a possible cat. — Harry Hindu

Yes, what some term a priori cognition under empirical conditions. Nevertheless I can’t think a possible cat a priori without having the antecedent experience, in order to reduce the possibility to a particular object. Otherwise, I have no warrant for representing the conception with the word “cat”.

how would you recognize a cat that is different than the one in front of you….. — Harry Hindu

Isn’t that just another possible cat? As far as my cognitive operation is concerned, it is.

…..if the universal does not represent all possible cats? — Harry Hindu

Doesn’t matter that an in abstracto object in general is represented by a universal idea, it isn’t a cat until I cognize that thing as such.
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….we can never get at the world as it is independent of us, only at the relation itself. — Harry Hindu

Close enough, but given relations alone is insufficient for knowledge.

So - what about this constitutes a lie or a contradiction? — Wayfarer

To say that Kant says something that one knows he does not say is lying, and this is what Rodl does. He demonstrates that in the endnote. And even if we grant for the sake of argument that Kant presupposes Rodl's position (and it seems that he doesn't), it remains false that Kant affirms that position.

A little further along in the same section from the CPR, further argument which lends weight to Rödl's interpretation — Wayfarer

Yes, after listening to McDowell's lecture on Rodl I was able to understand that this is what Rodl is doing, but it still doesn't justify his claim. Unity in a single consciousness is not self-consciousness, even for Kant.

McDowell chastises Rodl for misreading Davidson in a way that helps Rodl justify his own position, and I think that is also what is happening with Kant. The OP itself is premised on that false attribution in the same way: depending on Kant saying something he did not say.

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They have been for me — J

And yet you can't say what you have gained or even answer the question, "What are they saying?" The danger of obscure thinkers is that they are very easy to read one's own ideas into, thus approving one's preconceptions. The opaque Other is not Other at all, and becomes only one's reflection in the water.

- Thanks Paine. :up:

To say that Kant says something that one knows he does not say is lying, and this is what Rodl does. He demonstrates that in the endnote. — Leontiskos

But I can't see how he does that. Rödl says:

More precisely, he (Kant) says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. — Rödl, Endnote

Which I checked against the Norman Kemp Smith translation of the Critique:

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.

So, again, how is it a lie? I just can't see it.