There's a logical problem in your statement. In the situation of "time without a past," how can the "future" be prior to something that doesn't exist? — ucarr

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does logical priority imply causation?

Does causation imply temporal priority?

Can a cause exist before it's paired with its effect? For example: Can Cause A exist if Effect B doesn't simultaneously exist?

"time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover

As is indicated by the nature of "possibility", when there is only the first, and the first provides the possibility for a second, the second is not necessary. So you're correct to say that if there is only a first it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second. — Metaphysician Undercover

...we're looking back, after the second has come into existence, and realizing that the first was necessarily prior to the second. — Metaphysician Undercover

When there is only the first, and thus it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second, does it also follow that it makes no sense to posit the possibility of time without a past and only a future because such a possibility has neither present nor past, but only future. Given this setup, the temporal future tense has no present and thus no presence and therefore cannot exist and therefore cannot look backwards to a past that follows the future?

Given this train of logic, does it follow that the arrow of time, logically speaking, must move from one empirical present to another empirical present, with each empirical present possessing the past and future tenses as mental abstractions relative to the phenomenal_empirical present?

We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it make sense to always pair both the future tense and the past tense with the present tense because the present tense is necessary for the other two, relative tenses to exist, i.e., to possess presence?

The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "tense" here. so I can't answer this.

To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr

Ontology, I would say.

Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr

You are speaking about the future, because by saying it is "possible" to lift your arm you are referring to something which would occur in the future. Anytime you say that such and such action is possible, you are saying that it may occur in the future. Your act of speaking is in the past though, by the time I hear it.

Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr

No, I would not say that the dictionary is wrong, it represents the way we speak. But I'd characterize "existing now" as an inductive conclusion. If I observe a chair in my room, in front of me for a duration of time, I will conclude "the chair exists now", or "is actual", meaning that I believe the chair will continue to be as it has been observed to be. That is correct by our conventions, and the dictionary indicates this. But it doesn't take into account the fact that the true nature of "now" consists equally of future as it does past. So by the time that I finish speaking that sentence, or by the time you hear it, the chair might cease to exist. That's why i would say that "actual" represents the past part of now, but not the future part.

Dimensions are a part of time.

How are dimensions connected to time?

Does time have other kinds of parts? — ucarr

A dimension is an aspect, or facet of a thing, it is not really \"a part" of a thing. Time has dimensions just like space has dimensions, but since space and time are completely different, the dimensions of time are in no way similar to the dimensions of space. The two dimensions of time are past and future, and since these two overlap at the present, the present is two dimensional.

In your example, does time start in the present? — ucarr

Due to the priority of the future, and the logical conclusion that there could be only future and no past, when time starts, we'd have to say that time started from the future. Only after time started to pass (i.e. after there is a present), could there be a past. Past is everything which is after (past) the present.

Does logical priority imply causation? — ucarr

No, not necessarily, though I think it could in some applications.

Does causation imply temporal priority? — ucarr

I think so, but there are different senses of "cause", as Aristotle outlined, and the different senses may require a different temporal ordering. So for example "efficient cause", which is the determinist sense, requires the Past-tp-future ordering. "Final cause", which allows for freewill requires a future-to-past ordering.

What is inevitable then, is that depending on the ontology you choose, one or the other becomes an invalid concept, and gets dismissed as illusion. So from the determinist ontology freewill and final cause are an illusion, but from the freewill perspective determinist causation loses the required necessity.

Can Cause A exist if Effect B doesn't simultaneously exist? — ucarr

It is temporal succession, not simultaneity.

When there is only the first, and thus it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second, does it also follow that it makes no sense to posit the possibility of time without a past and only a future because such a possibility has neither present nor past, but only future. — ucarr

No, why would you ask this? When there is the first, but not a second, it clearly makes sense to talk about the possibility of a second. In fact, in some interpretations, the first would itself be the possibility of the second. This is why possibility is in the future, and it is prior. When there is only future, all there is is possibility. However, something must act to actualize that possibility, and produce a past. This act is the act of time itself.

Given this setup, the temporal future tense has no present and thus no presence and therefore cannot exist and therefore cannot look backwards to a past that follows the future? — ucarr

That's right. something must act, and this act would bring about actual existence (past) from that dimension of possibility (future). This act we know as the passing of time.

Given this train of logic, does it follow that the arrow of time, logically speaking, must move from one empirical present to another empirical present, with each empirical present possessing the past and future tenses as mental abstractions relative to the phenomenal_empirical present? — ucarr

I suppose, I don't like your terminology though, "empirical present".

Does it make sense to always pair both the future tense and the past tense with the present tense because the present tense is necessary for the other two, relative tenses to exist, i.e., to possess presence? — ucarr

I don't agree with this. Future has the logical priority, as explained. It is necessary for the other two. Then present, as that act which creates a past from the future, is necessary for a past. So "present" requires future, and "past requires present and future.

Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "tense" here. so I can't answer this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just ignore "tense." So, it's the future flowing toward the past.

To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr

Ontology, I would say. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're examining a complicated arrangement of relative points of view (POV):

With the past_future POV, decisions of the past are completed and thus choices are excluded. With the future_past POV, decisions are not finalized and thus choices are available.

Does this correctly describe the important difference between the two POVs?

It's true, isn't it, that given: Man A with the past_future POV and Man B with the future_past POV, both make choices that come to pass, right?

If this is right, does it follow that Man A and Man B have an equal chance of realizing their choices? The difference, then, is that Man B has a more correct understanding about how his temporal path from choice to realization is organized in time?

So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they?

Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr

You are speaking about the future, because by saying it is "possible" to lift your arm you are referring to something which would occur in the future. Anytime you say that such and such action is possible, you are saying that it may occur in the future. Your act of speaking is in the past though, by the time I hear it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, we're examining a complicated arrangement of relative points of view, and it's one of the devils confronting us in our dialogue. On this note, let me ask,

When I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I connecting* my words to the dynamism of the event of my arm going upwards in the air? If so, does it follow that the words and the dynamism of my arm are synchronous? In other words, when one is true, the other must also be simultaneously true? Does it follow that if they are not synchronous, then my words are not true and thus the possibility does not exist? So, going the other way, when I verbalize a possibility, the words are synchronous with the possible physical event?

*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?

Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr

No, I would not say that the dictionary is wrong, it represents the way we speak. But I'd characterize "existing now" as an inductive conclusion. If I observe a chair in my room, in front of me for a duration of time, I will conclude "the chair exists now", or "is actual", meaning that I believe the chair will continue to be as it has been observed to be. That is correct by our conventions, and the dictionary indicates this. But it doesn't take into account the fact that the true nature of "now" consists equally of future as it does past. So by the time that I finish speaking that sentence, or by the time you hear it, the chair might cease to exist. That's why i would say that "actual" represents the past part of now, but not the future part. — Metaphysician Undercover

We appear to agree that the present contains past and future parts.

Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? This is what I think, and I justify my thinking thus: When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right?

Do you agree with the following generalization from the above: in our experience of passing time, all we ever do is travel from one present to another present? This true though we say, "Tomorrow I shall do such and such." However, when we're actually doing such and such, it's today. In the reverse direction, I talk about what I did yesterday, but when I was actually doing it, it was today.

Can we say, then, past_present_future or, if you prefer, future_present_past, form a triad that can never be broken into parts?

With the past_future POV, decisions of the past are completed and thus choices are excluded. With the future_past POV, decisions are not finalized and thus choices are available. — ucarr

The past is fixed, unchangeable. If time flows from past to future, the fixedness of the past causes what happens, in a determinist way, and there is no possibility of anyone making any real choices. If time flows from future to past, then we allow that what happens is not fixed by the past.

If this is right, does it follow that Man A and Man B have an equal chance of realizing their choices? The difference, then, is that Man B has a more correct understanding about how his temporal path from choice to realization is organized in time? — ucarr

Correct, Man A has a misunderstanding concerning this matter.

So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr

I think the issue is a bit more complex than this. People give all sorts of reasons for believing in determinism. And, a belief in determinism can produce a defeatist attitude, fatalism etc.. This attitude may be very detrimental to one's life, and prevent a person from getting a happiness which they might otherwise obtain.

When I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I connecting* my words to the dynamism of the event of my arm going upwards in the air? If so, does it follow that the words and the dynamism of my arm are synchronous? In other words, when one is true, the other must also be simultaneously true? Does it follow that if they are not synchronous, then my words are not true and thus the possibility does not exist? So, going the other way, when I verbalize a possibility, the words are synchronous with the possible physical event? — ucarr

I don't follow your logic. The phrase "possible for me to lift my arm" does not imply actually lifting an arm. So a person could repeat this phrase over and over, without ever lifting the arm, and it could be true. I do not understand the relation you are describing.

*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr

Sure, but the possibility to lift the arm is not the same thing as actually lifting the arm. The relation of necessity is only one way. After the arm is lifted, we can say that the possibility to lift the arm was necessarily prior to the actual lifting. However, when the possibility is real, and no arm is yet lifted, this does not imply that the arm will ever necessarily be lifted.

The key point is that the words do not connect to "the dynamism of the event", as you say. The words connect to the possibility of that dynamism being activated, so this is something which is prior to that event. The words do not connect to the event, but something prior to the event, which could be actualized, and cause that event.

Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr

As I said, I do not agree with "movement in time". We move in space, as time passes. Therefore time moves, we do not move in time.

When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr

I'll reply to this with your own words:

"If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?"

Talking about time travel is fantasy. Unless you can somehow show that it is real, it provides no evidence toward your claim that we move through time. Are you using fiction as evidence of the truth of what you say? How could that make sense to you?

So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr

I think the issue is a bit more complex than this. People give all sorts of reasons for believing in determinism. And, a belief in determinism can produce a defeatist attitude, fatalism etc.. This attitude may be very detrimental to one's life, and prevent a person from getting a happiness which they might otherwise obtain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a scientific question, isn't it?

I don't follow your logic. The phrase "possible for me to lift my arm" does not imply actually lifting an arm. So a person could repeat this phrase over and over, without ever lifting the arm, and it could be true. I do not understand the relation you are describing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If possibility is logically connected to realization of possibility, and logical continuity is atemporal, then the reality of the realization of possibility must be contemporary with the reality of the possibility. This doesn't, however, mean that possibility demands it be enacted; it just means the reality of its realizationability is simultaneous with the reality of its possibility. So possibility is not prior to realization, right?

*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr

Sure, but the possibility to lift the arm is not the same thing as actually lifting the arm. The relation of necessity is only one way. After the arm is lifted, we can say that the possibility to lift the arm was necessarily prior contemporary to with the actual lifting. However, when the possibility is real, and no arm is yet lifted, this does not imply that the arm will ever necessarily be lifted. — Metaphysician Undercover

The key point is that the words do not connect to "the dynamism of the event", as you say. The words connect to the possibility of that dynamism being activated, so this is something which is prior to that event. The words do not connect to the event, but something prior to the event, which could be actualized, and cause that event. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. Moreover, this verification must continue to occur simultaneous to the possibility; this is known as ongoing experimental verification of a theory that can never be proven, only repeatedly, experimentally verified. This is furthermore known as a verification that is public and repeatable, so possibility is always simultaneous with realization.

Does this suggest passing time is not prior to physics?

Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr

As I said, I do not agree with "movement in time". We move in space, as time passes. Therefore time moves, we do not move in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you uncoupling space and time?

If we move in space as time passes, is this how we're experiencing time, i.e., as movement through space? If so, how is movement through space, and the time elapsing in sync with that movement, different from things moving in time?

Does this posit time as necessary to our movement through space, i.e., time is necessary to physics?

Does time have physics as either a dimension, or as a multiplex of dimensions?

Since time moves, does its motion imply its physicality? If not, what is non-physical motion?

Can time move without causing things to change?

Can time move without causing things to move?

When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr

I'll reply to this with your own words: — Metaphysician Undercover

"If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?" — ucarr

Talking about time travel is fantasy. Unless you can somehow show that it is real, it provides no evidence toward your claim that we move through time. Are you using fiction as evidence of the truth of what you say? How could that make sense to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

My thought experiment draws its rationale from some interpretations of Relativity and QM that allow time travel. In the realm of science, time travel has not been denounced wholesale.

Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right?

Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a scientific question, isn't it? — ucarr

You ask me a psychological question, concerning the difference between believing in freewill, and believing in determinism, and how this might affect one's life. I answered accordingly.

But determinism and causation are not the same, and this is the central issue of our discussion. Determinism reduces causation to one type of cause, known in philosophy as efficient cause. The concept of freewill allows for the reality of what is known in philosophy as "final cause". This type of causation is completely distinct from "efficient cause". "Final cause" is only intelligible when we allow that the force from the future is causal.

If possibility is logically connected to realization of possibility, and logical continuity is atemporal, then the reality of the realization of possibility must be contemporary with the reality of the possibility. This doesn't, however, mean that possibility demands it be enacted; it just means the reality of its realizationability is simultaneous with the reality of its possibility. So possibility is not prior to realization, right? — ucarr

No, I don't think that follows logically. First, any specific possibility must have a temporal extension, what might be called colloquially as "the window of opportunity". Realization must occur within that period of time, so to say that the two are "contemporary" would be misleading. Also possibility is required for the actualization, and it is highly improbable that the actualization would occur at the exact moment that the possibility arises.

Furthermore, the moment that the actualization occurs, the possibility is gone, because "possibility" implies more than one option, and when actualization occurs, other options are rendered impossible by the fact of actualization. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the possibility and the actualization occur at the same time. So we must conclude that the possibility is temporally prior to the actualization.

From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr

That is an incorrect description. Possibilities must be a reality prior to being actualized, or else they could not be act on. Therefore they have a place in reality which is other than "actual".

Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr

Of course, as I explained, this is necessary for a proper understanding.

If we move in space as time passes, is this how we're experiencing time, i.e., as movement through space? If so, how is movement through space, and the time elapsing in sync with that movement, different from things moving in time?

Does this posit time as necessary to our movement through space, i.e., time is necessary to physics?

Does time have physics as either a dimension, or as a multiplex of dimensions?

Since time moves, does its motion imply its physicality? If not, what is non-physical motion?

Can time move without causing things to change?

Can time move without causing things to move? — ucarr

I think I've already addressed all this.

Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr

Not quite. The passing of time causes changes. You notice these changes, and name the days according to the way you were taught and understand, "Friday", "Saturday", etc.. To make things easier, imagine that the clock says 1:00, so you say "it is one o'clock". The passing of time causes changes, and you notice that the clock says 2:00, so you say "it's two o'clock".

Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a physics question, isn't it? — ucarr

You ask me a psychological question, concerning the difference between believing in freewill, and believing in determinism, and how this might affect one's life. I answered accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't ask you a psychological question. We've established a context within our dialogue. We're examining the role of time in the physics of our world. Our focus has been on the facts of time passing within physics. Our standard of judgment has been whether our claims, respectively, have been verified logically and empirically. You've been claiming the arrow of time, one way, supports free will, and the other way blocks it. We've agreed that members of both groups make plans and realize them.
So, our topics have been physics and philosophy, not psychology.

But determinism and causation are not the same, and this is the central issue of our discussion. Determinism reduces causation to one type of cause, known in philosophy as efficient cause. The concept of freewill allows for the reality of what is known in philosophy as "final cause". This type of causation is completely distinct from "efficient cause". "Final cause" is only intelligible when we allow that the force from the future is causal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since determination and efficient causation overlap, we conclude the former is a component of the latter. This being the case, we know embrace of determination does not necessarily exclude embracing the other three types of causation. This peaceful coexistence of the two things can operate within the free will advocate. We know this because everyone with intentions acts so as to determine outcomes.

No, I don't think that follows logically. First, any specific possibility must have a temporal extension, what might be called colloquially as "the window of opportunity". Realization must occur within that period of time, so to say that the two are "contemporary" would be misleading. Also possibility is required for the actualization, and it is highly improbable that the actualization would occur at the exact moment that the possibility arises. — Metaphysician Undercover

Furthermore, the moment that the actualization occurs, the possibility is gone, because "possibility" implies more than one option, and when actualization occurs, other options are rendered impossible by the fact of actualization. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the possibility and the actualization occur at the same time. So we must conclude that the possibility is temporally prior to the actualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

By saying a possibility has a window of opportunity, you're saying: On Thursday, P → A (possibility = P; actualization = A; and Thursday = the window of opportunity, so P implies A during a twenty-four time period). Why do you think P has temporal priority to A? Why do you think the P → A relationship ends when a specific P is actualized as a specific A?

From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr

That is an incorrect description. Possibilities must be a reality prior to being actualized, or else they could not be act on. Therefore they have a place in reality which is other than "actual". — Metaphysician Undercover

I underlined the key sentence in your statement. If a possibility is a reality before being realized, then a possibility is always a reality, so how is it a possibility, i.e., how is it's reality conditional? We transform possibilities into realities via experimental confirmation. After transformation, we know the former possibility will actualize, so possibility becomes abstract reality. As an example, consider: The demolition charges will vertically drop the condemned building. We know that dynamite explodes and we know buildings implode vertically. Before the demolition charges are ignited, we know in abstraction what will happen. As another example, consider: We're looking for the Higgs-Boson particle at Cern prior to its discovery. At this time, the particle is a possibility, not an abstract reality. That changes if and when it's experimentally verified.

Now for the tricky part: Before discovery of the particle, although we cannot know it, the possibility of the particle and its realizationability are contemporary. They are contemporary because the possibility of its discovery can only exist if it can be realized, even before actual realization by experimental verification. There’s no such thing as a possibility not being realizable before its realization. Were that the case, a magic trick would be required to change what’s not realizable into what is realizable prior to realization.

Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr

Of course, as I explained, this is necessary for a proper understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I've already addressed all this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you briefly recap your answers to the two questions below?

Can time pass without causing things to change? — ucarr

Since time passes, does its passing imply is physicality? If not, what is non-physical passing? — ucarr

When things change how they're changing, doesn't time follow suit by changing how it's changing?

Example: I'm driving my car at thirty-five miles per hour. I decide to accelerate my speed to forty-five miles per hour. Relativity tells me that by accelerating, I slow down the rate at which times passes for me. Is that an example of me having a causal effect upon time passing?

Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr

Not quite. The passing of time causes changes. You notice these changes, and name the days according to the way you were taught and understand, "Friday", "Saturday", etc.. To make things easier, imagine that the clock says 1:00, so you say "it is one o'clock". The passing of time causes changes, and you notice that the clock says 2:00, so you say "it's two o'clock". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you're saying time changes me and not I change myself in time, then that difference seems to have zero effect on the changes we're discussing. In both situations, an hour of time passes and the earth changes its position in relation to the sun. The motion of the earth in its orbit around the sun is not uniform; at some points in its orbit, the earth is closer to the sun than at other points. At the closer points the time on earth passes more slowly because, as with the example of my acceleration of my car, time passing changes in reaction to acceleration and gravity. Aren't these examples of physical phenomena having a causal effect on time?

In continuation of this reasoning, when time changes the earth through its orbital by a measure of twenty-four hours, aren't I always in my present? I'm never in my past, or in my future, am I?

I didn't ask you a psychological question. We've established a context within our dialogue. We're examining the role of time in the physics of our world. Our focus has been on the facts of time passing within physics. Our standard of judgment has been whether our claims, respectively, have been verified logically and empirically. You've been claiming the arrow of time, one way, supports free will, and the other way blocks it. We've agreed that members of both groups make plans and realize them.
So, our topics have been physics and philosophy, not psychology. — ucarr

You asked a question concerning the psychology of committing oneself to a belief in determinism. And I answered that question the best I could, explaining that it is a complex matter. Look what you asked:
"So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they?"

Since determination and efficient causation overlap, we conclude the former is a component of the latter. This being the case, we know embrace of determination does not necessarily exclude embracing the other three types of causation. This peaceful coexistence of the two things can operate within the free will advocate. We know this because everyone with intentions acts so as to determine outcomes. — ucarr

I disagree with this. I believe that determinism excludes the possibility of freewill, because a freely willed act would violate the precepts of determinism. I also believe that the freewill perspective provides a different interpretation of efficient causation than does the determinist perspective. What I explained already, is that I think that the freewill perspective denies the necessity of efficient causation, in the way described by Hume, but the determinist perspective affirms the necessity of efficient causation.

By saying a possibility has a window of opportunity, you're saying: On Thursday, P → A (possibility = P; actualization = A; and Thursday = the window of opportunity, so P implies A during a twenty-four time period). Why do you think P has temporal priority to A? Why do you think the P → A relationship ends when a specific P is actualized as a specific A? — ucarr

I don't think I can explain this any better than I already did. Your representation here demonstrates that you don't understand my use of terms like "possibility". For example, if "P" represents the possibility of "A", how do yo conclude "so P implies A during a twenty-four time period"? Since P represents the possibility of A, not the necessity of A, P never implies A.

If a possibility is a reality before being realized, then a possibility is always a reality, so how is it a possibility, i.e., how is it's reality conditional? — ucarr

I don't understand what you are asking.

As an example, consider: The demolition charges will vertically drop the condemned building. We know that dynamite explodes and we know buildings implode vertically. Before the demolition charges are ignited, we know in abstraction what will happen. — ucarr

OK, let me explain with reference to this example. The explosive charges are planted in the building. If the charges are detonated the building should implode according to plan. However, the explosives might not ever be detonated, they may be removed, and the building may never implode as planned.

So, the possibility I am discussing here is the possibility of the building being destroyed by the explosive charges. That possibility is very real, as the charges are already planted. Further the possibility of the building being demolished is clearly prior to the actual demolition. Also, the possibility does not necessitate that the building will actually be demolished. The actualization of that possibility is the act of detonation, which may or may not occur.

When things change how they're changing, doesn't time follow suit by changing how it's changing? — ucarr

No, I don't believe that. I told you, I think relativity theory does not provide a good representation of time. This feature you discuss is the result of Einstein stipulating the relativity of simultaneity, in his theory of special relativity. I believe that replacing this principle with the multidimensional present (the fat present) provides a much more accurate description of time.

If you're saying time changes me and not I change myself in time, then that difference seems to have zero effect on the changes we're discussing. — ucarr

That's what I keep telling you, each is just a different way of modeling the same thing. So switching from one model to the other has "zero effect" on the understanding of many things. You kept insisting that the future-to-past representation reversed the flow of time, and I had to reiterate over and over, that there is no reversal of the flow of timem just a different way of looking at (modeling) the same flow of time.

However, as much as the difference between the two ways has little if any effect on many of the changes we are discussing, it has immense effect on the ability to understand freewill acts. This is because if you model yourself as traveling through time, the changes to yourself are necessary. But if you model time as changing you these changes are not necessary, because through freewill and will power we can resist some of those changes.

Notice, from your perspective the only way to avoid the changes caused by traveling through time, is through your fantasy "time travel". From my perspective, to avoid the force of time induced change, all one has to fo is use their will power. You know, if something is coming at your head, you duck out of the way. So my perspective readily allows for the reality of what we naturally understand through experience, as free will acts. But your perspective leaves free will as requiring magic.

...aren't I always in my present? I'm never in my past, or in my future, am I? — ucarr

Didn't we both agree that the present is both future and past?

In your example, are you establishing the shortest duration of time allowing physical change to occur? — ucarr

In your example, there is a quark at one moment, state A, then an anti quark at the next moment, state B, and you have proposed that nothing can be observed in the time between, hence the shortest duration allowing for physical change. So state B is different from state A, and there is time between these two. We can conclude that the change from state A to state B occurred during this time [one Planck length]. Do you agree with me, that something must have happened during this time, which constitutes, or substantiates "the change" from quark to anti-quark? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have lined through what is unclear to me.

Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.

For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2.

Is it true that first you establish the shortest duration of time allowing a physical change from state A to state B, and then, in the following paragraph, you continue talking about this same duration of time until you jump to establishing a non-physical change based on info instead of on physics? — ucarr

There is no "jump", only a sound logical conclusion. We have an observation at t-1, and an observation at t-2. The two states are different. Therefore we can conclude that change occurred during the duration of time which is between t-1 and t-2. "Change" requires that "something happened" which would account for the difference between state A and state B. We have determined that this "something" which happened cannot be a physical change because it would be in a duration of time shorter than the one defined by state A then state B, which has been determined as the shortest possible period of time for physical change. This duration is between state A and state B, therefore shorter, and so it is too short for physical change, therefore it is non-physical activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have made bold the letters where the jump appears to occur. You inexplicably claim we've established that physical change cannot happen. Apparently, you're jumping from the interval between T1 and T2 being one Planck length to being one half of one Planck length.

If you're agreeing physical change can happen in one Planck length, but stipulating physical change cannot happen in one half Planck length, then I'll agree.

We are no [sic] talking about the shorter period of time, between t-1 and t-2, so we must conclude that the change which occurs in this time is non physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

If “no” equals “now,” then okay.

Here's how I see the setup: There is a quark at T1; There is a quark_anti-quark pair at T2. The distance linking T1 to T2 is established as the shortest distance possible between a transformation of a physical system, such as a quark to a quark_anti-quark pair. Let's establish that the distance between the two physical systems measures as one Planck length: $5.39x10^-44s$.

Since it's conjectured space-time itself - the environment that affords parameters for physics - breaks down into sub-units below Planck length, it's impossible to define space-time distances smaller than one Planck length.

Now, let's imagine a theoretical distance between T1' and T2' measuring as 0.5 Planck length. T1' and T2' are theoretically linked by a distance of 0.5 Planck length: $2.70x10^-44s$. As it's established no physical system can transform from one state to another in this distance, any state transformation therein would have to be non-physical.

Now the question arises, "How are non-physical things measured?" Measurement itself implies physicality. What does a non-physical measurement of a non-physical thing entail? Assuming such measurements exist, how are they translated into something practically verifiable and useful?

If “no” equals “now,” then okay.

"Information" is the name which I gave to the non-physical, as I explained at the beginning why information is non-physical. So what happens between t-1 and t-2, by the use of this term, is a change in information. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume you're talking about what happens over the duration of one half of one Planck length.

The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider: In an election, at the national convention, the superdelegates for Party A are composed of some individuals committed to vote for Candidate A, and some not committed to vote for any particular candidate.

Let’s call the uncommitted superdelegates the free will superdelegates. Since we can only know what their vote will be in terms of the probability math that calculates the odds according to the total number of candidates, we conclude their vote is a probability. Each of five total candidates has a twenty per cent chance of being selected by a free will superdelegate.

Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option.

How is this an illusion of continuity?

Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.

For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr

How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?

Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time.

I have made bold the letters where the jump appears to occur. You inexplicably claim we've established that physical change cannot happen. Apparently, you're jumping from the interval between T1 and T2 being one Planck length to being one half of one Planck length. — ucarr

The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.

So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event.

If “no” equals “now,” then okay. — ucarr

Yeah, sorry, typo.

Now the question arises, "How are non-physical things measured?" Measurement itself implies physicality. What does a non-physical measurement of a non-physical thing entail? Assuming such measurements exist, how are they translated into something practically verifiable and useful? — ucarr

Are you seriously asking me these questions?

But here's the issue. In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established.

How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation?

So in your example, necessity is related to the "individuals committed to vote for Candidate A". What has occurred in the past (they said they would vote for A) is believed to predict the future (they will vote for A) in a necessary way. It is impossible for them to vote otherwise. This assumption is based on an assumed continuity of the delegates' commitment. Only by disallowing that there could be a break in that commitment (a discontinuity), can we conclude that the delegates will necessarily vote for A.

Notice the "illusion of continuity". The delegates may actually change their minds, the necessity is not a true necessity, and neither is the assumption of continuity which supports that necessity.

Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.

For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr

How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time? — Metaphysician Undercover

How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?

Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since we're doing a thought experiment, we're stipulating terms. Up front, we can stipulate scientific rigor, or not. If not, then I can stipulate: at T1 two quarks collide such that T2 has a pairing of one quark with one anti-quark.

If yes, then we have to do calculations based on the time for light to travel 1 Planck length in vacuum, which is a time interval of approximately $5.39x10^-44s$. Light being the greatest possible velocity of our world, this is a measure of the longest time possible for a physical event to occur within the boundary of one Planck length.

Since all other physical events are sub-light speed, and thus would have time durations greater than $5.39x10^-44s$, we know that, per scientific rigor, the only example of a physical event occurring within one Planck length is light traveling in vacuum.

So, per scientific rigor, I stipulate at T1 a photon emits, and at T2 the photon covers the distance matching one Planck length. So the change of state of our thought experiment is the change of position of a photon across one Planck length.

The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.”

So, thanks to your demand for scientific rigor, it appears that our contemplation of its requirements has imploded your project to establish a spacetime wherein no physical event can occur yet wherein a supposed non-physical exchange of info is possible.

For clarity, it should be stated that the Planck length is currently the smallest spacetime unit we can measure. Smaller spacetime units, such as those occurring at the time of the Big Bang, are not currently measurable.

The Big Bang theory makes it clear that some scientists believe physics persists all the way down to the singularity, which is infinitely small. So, by this reasoning, there is no pre-singularity point at which physics stops.

The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.

Firstly, I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded two of your statements that contradict each other. Given this contradiction, your argument is nonsense.

So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event. — Metaphysician Undercover

Firstly, again I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks.

So, per scientific rigor, I stipulate at T1 a photon emits, and at T2 the photon covers the distance matching one Planck length. So the change of state of our thought experiment is the change of position of a photon across one Planck length. — ucarr

You haven't stated this quite right. We have to say at T1 the photon is at position X, and at T2 the photon is at position Y. What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. That is why you hear some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. Because it cannot be observed in the meantime, the continuity of its existence cannot be verified, during that time. Therefore we cannot even conclude that the two instances are "the same photon".

All we can say is that a photon was produced at position X at T1, and a photon was produced at position Y at T2. Further, we can analyze "the causes" of these two occurrences, but if we adhere to the determinist principles, which limit causation to the temporal succession of observed events, then we restrict ourselves from considering that anything between T1 ant T2 could have occurred, and had causal influence on the state at T2, because this is outside the possibilities of "a physical event". Such an event would violate Newton's first law of motion, which describes temporal continuity. That law assumes temporal continuity of "the same body" between T1 and T2. At this scale, that temporal continuity cannot be verified

So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility.

However, let's take a look at what really happens, without that restrictive presumption of continuity. A photon occurs at PX , T1, and a photon occurs at PY, T2, and there is time between these two occurrences. A non-physical act (freewill acts are in this category), could act between T1 and T2, as a cause of what occurs at T2. See, when we remove the necessity of temporal continuity described by Newton's first law, because it cannot be verified at that temporal scale, then we have that gap between moments in time, which allows for the nonphysical to operate, and have influence over the physical.

The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr

The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present.

So, thanks to your demand for scientific rigor, it appears that our contemplation of its requirements has imploded your project to establish a spacetime wherein no physical event can occur yet wherein a supposed non-physical exchange of info is possible. — ucarr

The important thing to note is that the nonphysical, which we term "info" here, is not only active within its own realm of "nonphysical", but also, as freewill demonstrates, it is causal within the "physical". This implies a type of causation which "physics" cannot account for, or understand, due to the natural limitations of observability.

For clarity, it should be stated that the Planck length is currently the smallest spacetime unit we can measure. Smaller spacetime units, such as those occurring at the time of the Big Bang, are not currently measurable.

The Big Bang theory makes it clear that some scientists believe physics persists all the way down to the singularity, which is infinitely small. So, by this reasoning, there is no pre-singularity point at which physics stops. — ucarr

The problem here, obviously, is the limitations of observability. Since observation is necessary to verify the theories of physics, speculations and theories at this scale cannot be verified, and therefore cannot obtain to the level of "science", so it is wrong to call this "physics".

Consider this analogy, which I touched on already. We assume a continuity of time. We name a point in time as a boundary, or limit, and by the method of calculus we approach that point in description, but must cross infinite divisions before arriving at that point. We can never actually, truthfully determine what is at that point. We say this does not matter, because there is really nothing at that point, it is a nondimensional boundary. However, this is not really true, the point is actually dimensional, infinitesimal, as the "Planck length" demonstrates. Now, whatever lies behind that boundary, within that point, is completely inaccessible to the inquiring mind, because the method by which we approach it has made it impossible to get to it.

Firstly, again I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks. — ucarr

I don't see why you say the statement is invalid. It is the logical conclusion from the described conditions.

Using the new example, there is a photon at PX T1, and a photon at PY T2. The photon cannot have a physical presence at any position between PX and PY due to the prescribed limitations. This implies that "the photon" cannot have a physical interaction with anything in that space between PX and PY, nor in that time between T1 and T2. Any assumed interaction must be nonphysical.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks. — ucarr

That's exactly the issue, the conditions do not allow for such a physical "catalyst". Nothing physical can happen between T1 and T2, by the prescribed conditions. You say such and such "cannot happen without a catalyst", but the stated conditions have ruled out the possibility of a physical catalyst. Therefore we must look for something nonphysical as the catalyst.

In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe time is immaterial?

Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?

Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?

Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?

With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?

Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things?

Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option. — ucarr

How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction.

The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. $P↔︎Q$ is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic.

The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon

What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this your argument for adding immaterial causation into the mix?

So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read Newton again. His first law says, "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it."

...some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover

Overall, this is an argument that supports my position: "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it." So, as I said, the photon covers the Planck length. If its path is altered by another photon, then, from start to finish, we're looking at the physical activity you're trying to deny. Likewise, this applies to a photon having several possible paths. You admit a probability distribution is not afflicted with the identity problem you have brought up. You talk of possibility pairing with realization. So QM probability confirms rather than denies physics. Your conclusion of "no physical change," as based upon lack of empirical verification, stands invalid. Read up on the work conducted at Cern. All of this QM activity refutes your denial of physics at the Planck length.

The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr

The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role.

I continue to claim humans experience the empirical present, with abstract thoughts about the relative past and relative future.

Being unobservable to the senses is not proof something is non-physical; the EM waves feeding your tv are unobservable.

Describe some details of non-physical activity. Your example of info transfer was presented without details exposing the transferral process.

What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification, I think you should learn more about the scientific method before attempting to criticize it.

Do you believe time is immaterial?

Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?

Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?

Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?

With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?

Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr

Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence.

Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions.

I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr

I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed.

I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. P↔︎Q

↔
︎

is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr

Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional?

Read Newton again. His first law says, "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it." — ucarr

Right, and in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical.

So, as I said, the photon covers the Planck length. If its path is altered by another photon, then, from start to finish, we're looking at the physical activity you're trying to deny. Likewise, this applies to a photon having several possible paths. — ucarr

Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.

The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this.

It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr

Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something.

Being unobservable to the senses is not proof something is non-physical; the EM waves feeding your tv are unobservable. — ucarr

This is a whole can of worms in itself. This electromagnetism cannot be called "waves" unless there is a substance, a medium within which the waves are active, the aether. That's what a "wave" is, an activity of a substance. But many physicists deny the ether. Therefore we have to conclude that it's not EM "waves" feeding the TV. The waves are not observable as waves, and they are not "physical", because they have no substantial existence, no medium. What is observable is photons, particles, and the photons are "physical". The so-called "waves" become pure mathematics as "wave function".

Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr

What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try.

Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr

Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying.

Do you believe time is immaterial?

Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?

Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?

Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?

With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?

Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr

Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This question and response shows our work so far has been good: a) You've done a good job of communicating your system of beliefs to me; b) I've done a good job of listening and learning about your understanding of metaphysics.

Here's the most important confirmation:

• Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

• Pretty much "yes" to everything here...

Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do these dimensions include line, area and cube?

I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr

I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed. — Metaphysician Undercover

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity.

I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. $P↔︎Q$ is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr

The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon — ucarr

Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional? — Metaphysician Undercover

With my two above quotes, I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so $P↔︎Q$.
This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal.

In the real world, we have an iron pipe scheduled for vinyl dipping by a certain date. It's part of an outdoor support structure for the roof covering a veranda. On that date, the shipment of liquid vinyl to be used for the dipping fails to arrive due to bad weather interrupting and delaying shipping of the liquid vinyl. So, on that date, it rains and the iron pipe rusts.

From this event we don't declare that the bi-conditional logic is faulty because the pipe is rusty. Real life is temporal, and thus causal relationships are subject to interruptions. Logical relationships are atemporal, and the change of circumstances of life interrupting real and causal chains of events have no bearing upon the truth content of atemporal, logical relationships.

...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.

Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false.

Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.

The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have lined through your above statements because they repeat an argument based upon a false premise. Again, the singularity assumes the persistence of physics all the way down to the infinitely small interval of time. Were this not the case, the Big Bang couldn't happen.

It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr

Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something. — Metaphysician Undercover

For example, at Cern the math is applied to the spectral imaging of particle behavior.

Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr

What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your question reveals your belief the immaterial realm cannot be active, cannot do anything without converting into the material realm.

Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr

Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's what you've been saying.

What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover

You're falsely claiming the math interpretation of the ATLAS and CMS detection of particles at Cern is not empirical verification of physical phenomena. Can you present a math interpretation that contradicts the Cern math interpretation?

Note - From now on, lets post everything in this thread.

To me, consciousness is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. The mind however has another ability, namely the ability to cause as well. So, to summarize, the mind is an entity with the ability to experience and cause.

Do these dimensions include line, area and cube? — ucarr

No, I was describing the two dimensions of the present. Since future and past are distinct dimensions of time, and they overlap at the present, the present must be two dimensional.

Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr

You misunderstand the second quote then. Notice in the first quote, the assumption of necessity goes hand in hand with the illusion of continuity. These two are related. In the second quote I am saying that the assumption of necessity is false, what is really the case is that predictions are based on probability rather than necessity. This supports the first quote, saying that continuity is an illusion, and implying that the assumption of necessity is a false assumption.

So it's not probability itself, which creates the illusion of continuity, it is the practise of treating what is probable as what is necessary, which creates that illusion. And the point is that it is an illusion, not real. The first quote indicates what are the consequences of treating the probable as necessary, and the second quote states the consequences of treating the probable as it truly is, probable. So in the first it is the assumption of necessity which is related to continuity, and in the second, it is stated that what is often assumed to be necessary (determinism), is really just probable, therefore the continuity associated with this assumed necessity is an illusion. The necessity is false.

With my two above quotes, I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr

Sure, but the causal relation is a relation of necessity and also a type of continuity. It's an epistemic continuity. We could call it a "continuity of information". This continuity, which in physics is expressed as a temporal continuity, supporting Newton's laws, and the conservation laws, is taken as necessary. However, in reality the continuity is false. As evidenced by the law of entropy, conservation is not absolute. And what breaks the continuity is the fact that the relation is not a relation of necessity, but one of probability.

Then I believe, the logic becomes modal, and the bi-conditional feature is not valid. That's the problem explained above. Causation is assumed to be necessary, this implies continuous and bi-conditional. But the assumption of necessity is false, and this breaks the continuity and bi-conditionality.

If you do not understand the role of continuity here, look at it this way. Consider A is the cause, and Z is the effect. A necessarily implies Z, and Z necessarily implies A. We might say that A and Z are not necessarily contiguous, as there may be a whole alphabet between them, but there is necessarily a continuity of information between them. An empty gap would leave a hole in the chain of information which is required to assert cause/effect, and this would produce a break in the causal chain (an unknown feature), leaving no necessary pathway from A to Z or the inverse. The cause/effect necessity is epistemic, requiring the criteria of information. Without the continuity of information between A and Z we cannot conclude A is the cause of Z, because it might be something from within that informational gap which causes Z, rather than A .

So, this is what the concept of "probability" does, it recognizes the gap, the lack of informational continuity between A and Z. By removing necessity, the gap is acknowledged. Now there is no continuity (continuous causal chain) between A and Z as separate events, because the occurrence of Z, after A, is not necessary, but probable. Something may interfere during that time which constitutes the gap.

The problem which arises can be exemplified in this way. Every time we see the occurrence of Z, we observe A as the cause, and we are inclined to say that if Z occurs, it is necessary that A occurred. However, when we acknowledge the reality of probability, and the lack of bi-conditionality, we cannot say that A will necessarily cause Z, because there may have been a lot of other instances of A which did not cause Z. The conclusion of causation was produced from observance of "all Z", not from the observance of "all A". Without focusing observational attention on A it cannot be said that all A causes Z.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so P↔︎Q

↔
︎

.
This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal. — ucarr

We can readily see that this is seriously flawed. Just because "vinyl-dipped" produces the necessity of "non-rust", we cannot conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped. This is how the assumption of bi-conditionality may mislead.

From this event we don't declare that the bi-conditional logic is faulty because the pipe is rusty. Real life is temporal, and thus causal relationships are subject to interruptions. Logical relationships are atemporal, and the change of circumstances of life interrupting real and causal chains of events have no bearing upon the truth content of atemporal, logical relationships. — ucarr

I hope what I said above helps you to see how this is not a proper representation of the continuity I am talking about. The continuity I referred to is epistemic, it is a continuity of information. The continuity of information is a requirement for the judgement of causation because a lack of information allows for other unknown factors, and the judgement could be false.

So the problem here is that you have two incompatible premises which you try to unite. You say "logical relationships are atemporal". And you also have "real life is temporal". Because of this incompatibility the "logic" you are talking about cannot be applied to "real life". But then you attempt to apply this type of "atemporal" logic to "temporal" real life, through the concept of causation, and you produce a seriously flawed example. The obvious problem is that causation refers to "real life" temporal events, so the application of atemporal logic is faulty. Therefore modal logic has been developed for this purpose.

You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.

Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr

As I've explained, this is not relevant. The fact is that physics is restricted by the limitations of observation. The use of "Planck time" is just an example of such a restriction. So it doesn't matter if Planck time is replaced by some other temporal length, as the shortest time period, there will always be a shortest time period due to the limitations of observational capacity. And physical theories are verified through observation, so this is a restriction to "physics".

The further principle which I've tried to impress on you, is that this restriction necessitates an "informational gap". There will always be a shorter period of time, shorter than what observational capacity allows for, and physics will not be able to tell us what happens during this time period due to that restriction. Therefore something nonphysical could happen during this time period which could have a causal influence.

Consider entropy for example. As time passes entropy increases, and this is a violation of the law of conservation of energy within a system. Energy is lost to the system, and its loss cannot be accounted for. So in principle the law of entropy indicates a violation to the conservation law. Now, even during the shortest period of time, some energy must be lost, and we can ask what is the cause of this loss. Clearly, the activities of "physics" do not account for the increase in entropy, so the cause of it is nonphysical. "Entropy", commonly represented as "uncertainty" signifies the informational gap which I referred to, where something nonphysical has causal influence during the passing of time.

Again, the singularity assumes the persistence of physics all the way down to the infinitely small interval of time. — ucarr

You are not listening to me. Physics persists all the way down to the smallest observable interval of time. This is not an "infinitely small interval of time", it is an infinitesimal interval of time. Within that infinitesimal interval of time is a period of time during which physics is not applicable. Application of the "infinite series" mathematics represents this period as infinitely small. But application of the scientific method in physics, renders what is represented as "infinitely small" in numerical theory, as an infinitesimal period of time in the experimental practise of physics. This constitutes a misrepresentation. In numerical theory, the infinitely small is equivalent to "nothing". But in the practise of physics this is actually an infinitesimal "something". The numerical representation of nothing produces the illusion of continuity, and necessity in act, but what this really does is veil and obscure the "something", which is an informational gap within the assumed continuity.

For example, at Cern the math is applied to the spectral imaging of particle behavior. — ucarr

Observational data.

Your question reveals your belief the immaterial realm cannot be active, cannot do anything without converting into the material realm. — ucarr

That's a misunderstanding. My belief is that there is nonphysical activity which occurs during the period of time when observation is impossible. As discussed, as time passes at the present, what is known as "the present" consists of both past and future. Observational data is always information about the past, because it requires a duration of time to make an observation. This leaves the part of the present which is future, as unobservable. And, just like we observe activity to be occurring in the past part of the future, we can conclude that there is probably unobservable (nonphysical) activity occurring in the future part of the present. This is evidenced by the law of entropy, as explained above.

Furthermore, as I explained above, we must be very careful with our application of bi-conditional logic. We observe how the immaterial (nonphysical) influences the material (physical) through principles like freewill and entropy. These are the observed effects of the immaterial activity. From this, we cannot conclude that the immaterial "cannot do anything without converting into the material realm".

We can only say that the immaterial cannot do anything observable without converting that activity into material activity. But this does not mean that the immaterial is not highly active within its own realm, with most acts not having any effect on the material. This is evident from Aristotle's representation of contemplation, a thinking, which is thinking about thinking. In its pure form, this contemplation is an immaterial act which has no effect in the material world, and it is sometimes represented by the material image of an eternal circular motion. But Aristotle cautioned against this mode of representing the immaterial with material images. It is misleading. So the pure, immaterial activities (contemplation being a better representation), could be ongoing indefinitely, without having any influence in the material world. The more pure it is, the less it influences the material world.

You're falsely claiming the math interpretation of the ATLAS and CMS detection of particles at Cern is not empirical verification of physical phenomena. Can you present a math interpretation that contradicts the Cern math interpretation? — ucarr

As explained above, the mathematical representation is a false representation. The mathematical theories represent an infinitely small point, which is interpreted as "nothing", no time. However, in practise, what is represented as infinitely small is really infinitesimal, therefore "some time". It is within this "some time", being mathematically represented as "no time", which is where the informational gap known as "uncertainty" exists.

Consider the "uncertainty principle" in general, commonly represented as an inability to accurately state both a particle's position and its momentum. "Position" implies a fixed location. "Momentum" implies movement, therefore no fixed location. The two are fundamentally incompatible, because "position" of a moving particle implies a fixed point which is not consistent with movement. Further, measurement requires a duration of time. If that measurement is used to indicate "position", the particle must not be moving in that duration, to have a position, but if it is used to indicate momentum, it must be moving in that duration. These two are incompatible. So, the mathematics just fudges the incompatibility, and represents the duration of the measurement, as a point in time, rather than as a period of time, falsely implying that there could be momentum at a point in time when movement could not actually be happening. This fudging is very evident in the concept of "instantaneous velocity".

The uncertainty principle is a display of the way that mathematics falsely represents a duration of time as a point in time. Duration as points in time, would allow us to assemble a serious of contiguous points, conglomerating a complete "duration", thereby assuming a continuity of information, and epistemic necessity. However, what is represented as a point in time, is really an infinitesimal duration of time, and within this duration there is an informational gap known as uncertainty, Therefore any assumptions of continuity, or epistemic necessity, derived from the representation of these infinitesimals as infinitely small, are false assumptions.

what is often assumed to be necessary (determinism), is really just probable, therefore the continuity associated with this assumed necessity is an illusion. The necessity is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps I am speaking to my experience/reading but this struck me as a really profound treatment of determinism. Thank you for that. Much thinking to do..

To me, consciousness is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. The mind however has another ability, namely the ability to cause as well. So, to summarize, the mind is an entity with the ability to experience and cause. — MoK

I think ability to experience = enduring, personal point of view featuring impressions and judgments about them.

I think ability to cause = formulating a plan followed by execution of a logical sequence of steps to achieve the plan's goal.

What do you think?

Since future and past are distinct dimensions of time, and they overlap at the present, the present must be two dimensional. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does a person experience future and past empirically?

Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr

You misunderstand the second quote then. Notice in the first quote, the assumption of necessity goes hand in hand with the illusion of continuity. These two are related. In the second quote I am saying that the assumption of necessity is false, what is really the case is that predictions are based on probability rather than necessity. This supports the first quote, saying that continuity is an illusion, and implying that the assumption of necessity is a false assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

Directly below are your two quotes.

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read your above quote, I get: The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read your above quote, I get: The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

Compare, side-by-side, my two readings, which boil down your words to the gist of their meaning:

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other.

So it's not probability itself, which creates the illusion of continuity, it is the practise of treating what is probable as what is necessary, which creates that illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not what you say in your original quotes.

And the point is that it is an illusion, not real. The first quote indicates what are the consequences of treating the probable as necessary, and the second quote states the consequences of treating the probable as it truly is, probable. So in the first it is the assumption of necessity which is related to continuity, and in the second, it is stated that what is often assumed to be necessary (determinism), is really just probable, therefore the continuity associated with this assumed necessity is an illusion. The necessity is false.[/quote]

As I read you, you're charging QM physics with trying to pass off probability as necessity. The prominence of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle contradicts this wholesale mis-characterization of QM physics.

As the Schrördinger equation calculates the multiplicity of possible trajectories of a particle, there is no continuity issue for the individual possible trajectories, and therefore there is no continuity issue with the set of these possible trajectories.

Probability and continuity run on separate tracks here.

Regarding probability: There's a probability cloud of possible locations of the particle

Regarding continuity: Whether it's the same particle at the start and end of its journey across an interval of time is not necessarily in question. It's possible two different states express: a) two different positions of the same particle; b) the decay of, say, a proton, into a neutron.

Without focusing observational attention on A it cannot be said that all A causes Z. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've never denied causal chains can be broken.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so $P↔︎Q$. This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal.

We can readily see that this is seriously flawed. Just because "vinyl-dipped" produces the necessity of "non-rust", we cannot conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped. This is how the assumption of bi-conditionality may mislead. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your analysis is irrelevant because my statement never claims its logic establishes: we can conditionally conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped.

P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so $P↔︎Q$.

Vinyl-dipped iron pipes imply non-rusted iron pipes, but non-rusted iron pipes don't imply vinyl-dipped iron pipes. The two statements are not commutative. One does not allow us to assume the other.

By inserting the bi-conditional: non-rusted iron pipes imply vinyl-dipped iron pipes if and only if vinyl-dipped iron pipes imply non-rusted iron pipes, the two statements are equalized by definition, and thus they become commutative.

With P and Q equalized bi-conditionally, one allows us to assume the other.

The statement: "vinyl-dipped iron pipes imply non-rusted iron pipes," is an analytic truth, but it is not the way the world is. This shows us that sound logic does not always faithfully represent the world.

This distinction remains useful to my purpose because I want to show how the soundness of logic
is not necessarily refuted by contrary events. See below.

...I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't.

I hope what I said above helps you to see how this is not a proper representation of the continuity I am talking about. The continuity I referred to is epistemic, it is a continuity of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no clear distinction here. Logic and knowledge are both epistemic.

So the problem here is that you have two incompatible premises which you try to unite. You say "logical relationships are atemporal". And you also have "real life is temporal". Because of this incompatibility the "logic" you are talking about cannot be applied to "real life". But then you attempt to apply this type of "atemporal" logic to "temporal" real life, through the concept of causation, and you produce a seriously flawed example. The obvious problem is that causation refers to "real life" temporal events, so the application of atemporal logic is faulty. Therefore modal logic has been developed for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not uniting logic and events; I'm stressing their distinction: one atemporal, the other temporal. If your house is on fire, and it's logically true dousing it with water will extinguish the fire, but you're unable to get to water and the house burns down, this calamity blocking the link between real burning house and real water to save it has zero impact on the logical truth connecting water with extinguishing fire.

Furthermore, this stresses that causation is a logical concept of the abstract mind, and thus it too is atemporal. If it's true A causes B, then A in the role of cause and B in the role of effect are contemporaries. If B is not an effect of A simultaneous with A being a cause of B, then A is just A, it's not an effect. This is why we understand causation is an abstract thought, not an event.

...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.

Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr

As I've explained, this is not relevant. The fact is that physics is restricted by the limitations of observation. The use of "Planck time" is just an example of such a restriction. So it doesn't matter if Planck time is replaced by some other temporal length, as the shortest time period, there will always be a shortest time period due to the limitations of observational capacity. And physical theories are verified through observation, so this is a restriction to "physics". — Metaphysician Undercover

If what I wrote is now irrelevant, it's because you've shifted from denying physics below Planck scale to asserting physics has measurement limitations, an assertion nobody disputes. The difference between what you say now and what you said directly below is obvious.

...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

The further principle which I've tried to impress on you, is that this restriction necessitates an "informational gap". There will always be a shorter period of time, shorter than what observational capacity allows for, and physics will not be able to tell us what happens during this time period due to that restriction. Therefore something nonphysical could happen during this time period which could have a causal influence.[/quote]

Since your "observations" of immaterialism are restricted by the observational limitations of physics, your suppositions about immaterial info and causation are really just speculations made possible by the work of physicists. Your dependency on physics doesn't make a strong case for believing immaterialism has logical and existential priority over materialism.

Consider entropy for example. As time passes entropy increases, and this is a violation of the law of conservation of energy within a system. Energy is lost to the system, and its loss cannot be accounted for. So in principle the law of entropy indicates a violation to the conservation law. Now, even during the shortest period of time, some energy must be lost, and we can ask what is the cause of this loss. Clearly, the activities of "physics" do not account for the increase in entropy, so the cause of it is nonphysical. "Entropy", commonly represented as "uncertainty" signifies the informational gap which I referred to, where something nonphysical has causal influence during the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

The first law of thermo-dynamics says the total energy of a system remains constant, even if it is converted from work into heat energy.

Entropy is the loss of a system's available energy to do work. There is no violation of the first law.

You acknowledge that, "As time passes entropy increases..." This statement has you acknowledging passing time and increase of entropy are moving in the same direction. Since increase of entropy is experienced by humans as getting old and dying, how do you deny our getting born infantile, and then growing through childhood, adolescence, first adulthood, and middle age all come before old age, given your contention the future, which for the child is old age, comes before the past, which for the old person, is childhood?

We can only say that the immaterial cannot do anything observable without converting that activity into material activity — Metaphysician Undercover

To me this looks like an acknowledgement, by implication, that immaterialism, i.e., abstract thought, is an emergent property of physic.

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

This is your declaration. Where is your supporting argument?

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity:

probability distribution — Metaphysician Undercover

is not

of probability — Metaphysician Undercover

a relation of probability — Metaphysician Undercover

Does a person experience future and past empirically? — ucarr

I think we already went through this. If by "empirically" you mean through sense observation, then "no", because everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. However, the word "experience" is nuanced with a number of different meanings. In one sense we say that if we are in any way affected by something we experience it. And in this way we "experience" the future by way of emotions like desire and anticipation.

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — ucarr

Correct, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity.

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — ucarr

It is when the prediction of probability is taken as a prediction of necessity, which creates the illusion of continuity.

So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. However, when we assume the cause/effect relation to be one of necessity, and we assume therefore that the prediction is one of necessity rather than one of probability, this creates the illusion of continuity.

Therefore, the illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution itself, it is related to the assumption (belief) that the prediction which is based in probability is a prediction of necessity.

Where is the contradiction here?

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

I really don't see how you apprehend contradiction here. The prediction is based in a relation of probability, not in a relation of necessity. However, when this relation (the cause effect relation) is taken to be a relation of necessity, the illusion of continuity is created.

If you are still having difficulty, try this. Assume a continuous causal chain of cause/effect, from the past until now. Also, assume that what happens from now onward will be a continuation of this cause/effect chain, determined by the past, onward into the future. The determinist continuation in this model is produced from the assumption of necessity in the cause/effect relation. The cause/effect chain cannot be otherwise, it is necessary. and therefore a continuity between past and future is declared.

Now, in comparison, allow that any prediction of the future, is based on probability rather than necessity. If this is the case, then anything which happens is not necessary, but contingent, and there is no continuity from the past into the future, through the present.

I take as fact, that the cause/effect relation is a relation of probability. So what is at issue is how we relate to the cause/effect relation, what we believe about it. If we (wrongly) believe that it is a relation of necessity, in the determinist way, this is consistent with the illusion of continuity. But if we (correctly) believe that it is a relation of probability, then there is no illusion of continuity.

As I read you, you're charging QM physics with trying to pass off probability as necessity. — ucarr

I'm doing no such thing. I never mention QM physics in this context. What I said was that the determinist perspective, which treats the cause/effect relation as a relation of necessity rather than a relation of probability (with reference to Hume), results in the passing off of probability as necessity.

Probability and continuity run on separate tracks here. — ucarr

Exactly, continuity is associated with the determinist necessity of cause/effect. So, how continuity enters the track is through conservation laws.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so P↔︎Q

↔
︎

. This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal. — ucarr

Did you not even read what I wrote? The relation between "dipped in liquid vinyl", and "non rusted" is not biconditional. This is obvious, because other things can cause "non-rusted". I explained this problem to you thoroughly, but you've completely ignored it, and continue to represent this as if people would actually believe it to be biconditional.

Furthermore, this stresses that causation is a logical concept of the abstract mind, and thus it too is atemporal. — ucarr

You continue to misrepresent "causation", as if it is a necessary, and biconditional concept. That is the determinist falsity. A true understanding of causation would not represent it in this way. If you look at the way logicians actually do treat causation, it is through modal logic.

Your attempt to distinguish between atemporal and temporal only has you confusing categories. How can you even validate this category of "atemporal" which you are proposing?

If what I wrote is now irrelevant, it's because you've shifted from denying physics below Planck scale to asserting physics has measurement limitations, an assertion nobody disputes. The difference between what you say now and what you said directly below is obvious. — ucarr

From the outset of the use of this example, I defined "physics" as being restricted to the observable. This is not a shift.

Since your "observations" of immaterialism are restricted by the observational limitations of physics, your suppositions about immaterial info and causation are really just speculations made possible by the work of physicists. Your dependency on physics doesn't make a strong case for believing immaterialism has logical and existential priority over materialism. — ucarr

Yes, metaphysics is by its very nature, speculative. But as I explained, it is the deficiencies of physics which supports the possibility of the nonphysical, as more than just possible, but highly probable as well. You can deny this all you want, but that's what I mean about the physicalist attitude interfering with honest inquiry, making discussions like these with physicalists impossible.

The first law of thermo-dynamics says the total energy of a system remains constant, even if it is converted from work into heat energy.

Entropy is the loss of a system's available energy to do work. There is no violation of the first law. — ucarr

It is veiled contradiction. Look, energy is defined as "the capacity to do work". As time passes, the energy of a system remains constant. However, some of that energy becomes not available to do work, as "entropy". Do you not see the contradiction between "the capacity to do work", and "not available to do work"? In reality, energy is lost, in violation of the conservation law. However, instead of admitting this violation people just say that this lost energy is converted to a different form of energy, which contradicts the definition of "energy".

This statement has you acknowledging passing time and increase of entropy are moving in the same direction. — ucarr

Right, this is the common representation which I argue is faulty.. It's faulty because it leads to the contradiction outlined above. And the desire to maintain the necessary continuity of the conservation law inclines you to say that time is not really passing, but you are passing through time. All this indicates that this common representation is faulty.

To me this looks like an acknowledgement, by implication, that immaterialism, i.e., abstract thought, is an emergent property of physic. — ucarr

Sorry, I don't see that.

Consciousness, in its role as boundary administrator, acts like a juggler suspending in air three juggling pins: time, space, spacetime. — ucarr

Is consciousness only reactive? — ucarr

Wow, I love this. What an interesting question! Has me thinking...


What does consciousness do? My immediate answer I draw attention towards privately in my mind as I am thinking these thoughts sitting on my back porch, in front of a screen, staring into the back yard my focus is all mental....my back hurts and my eyes strained but my thinking thoughts have now consumed me in this moment, as i lose track of time in this position, I still have my self but the attention is drawn to certain words in particular...

My simple answer to the question [see thread title] is: "participates"

I believe consciousness is nothing without humans...it has limiting control, power or perhaps none at all when with and without the heart, mind, and soul of the human it is attached to. We move day to day living our lives, caused by the time passing [according to MU's "force" causing motion=time passing], chances to be took, we can change our minds as updated intel comes in, and we have choices, and options. We made it through another day, ahhhh I can relax in that for a slightttttt moment then remember another one awaits, [off topic slightly now im wondering now about the sun and the moon.... day time vs night time, motion or caused it but in motion themselves displaying light vs dark without a number or clock, just life to see, and live in it, nature aka earth--ill get back to this another time, i ought to at least...trust i will but don't hold your breath] :death:

:eyes: :monkey: :naughty: :halo:

As I was trying to say--- we make these choices, decisions for whatever reason[not important now] but whatever that reason is, IS NOW known to our consciousness, which I think may participate with us during these life experiences or events, moments. Its learning, becoming itself? We become conscious perhaps not from unconscious states but with awareness of it.

It is NOT always there or present with us for just those times. It may come and go, not emerging but dipping in and out as it ought to, with pleasure of us to be in such presence. If it's along with us both growing, evolving, learning, reminding, does that mean its of the living???? Has lived? Alive? :flower:

It seems to be emerging, we can use that term if you will/must... but I dont think that's good enough....it seems to be but maybe its actually just growing with us, our beings. When we were born it began its journey too, we both start out small [it is not there yet to us because our baby brain is not aware yet but it was there just not present as it was gaining its power through us? thats why it seems to emerge from no where but what if its there from our start just finding its way to get there, through our minds, to our awareness) We then grow old (it grows too...wisdom and in size/power), I'd like to think...but humans die, does that mean for my ideas here to make sense that so does consciousness? Is it alive? Or linked to it..."it" being a living being....which circles back to my first line of the paragraph above....."I believe consciousness is nothing without humans...it has limiting control, power or perhaps none at all when with and without the heart, mind, and soul of the human it is attached to."

I don't particularly care for the term "supervenience," but I do think consciousness matures with human experiences over one's life not emerges from no where... Awareness, on the other hand, varies for each person—it's the random component in this equation. We're like future word problems, solvable by others before we even realize it.

How well do you know yourself, how little do you trust yourself? Can you notice? Can you spot your habits and how does this affect ones self image or worth? How poor or well do you PARTAKE in self loving actions? When you do, or plan to, are you just going through the motions or are you mindful, do you believe yourself when you say you really mean it, you know when you really mean something..Do you say what you really mean, do you think about it? What is the difference? Perhaps the mindfulness/attention/focus while doing it.

I guess thats like intentionality....but they matter. They meaning, "intentions". They matter when they can be character based...but for me its hard not to bring up time talk....Timing is wild to me. Does chance, luck, freak accidents have any value to account for...this would be interesting to determine or give slack for its unknown potential? Of what? Anyways, intentions are interesting and how they link to behavior...and the will. I think both behaviors and will is/are known/knowable by the consciousness...that is intel, that is reflected and/or displayed back for us to use...or ignore. You will do what was going to happen. Trust it. Trust consciousness, listen to it. It is nothing without you....a beautiful character.

I believe consciousness participates in human experiences at a personal level. That is my answer to the question of, what it DOES but what WILL it do? What CAN it do? Another story....
It gestures, to the lengths it ought of the power from the person. The person with the power to not USE the consciousness but become acquainted with it. See yourself in another.