There's a logical problem in your statement. In the situation of "time without a past," how can the "future" be prior to something that doesn't exist? — ucarr
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
"time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
As is indicated by the nature of "possibility", when there is only the first, and the first provides the possibility for a second, the second is not necessary. So you're correct to say that if there is only a first it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second. — Metaphysician Undercover
...we're looking back, after the second has come into existence, and realizing that the first was necessarily prior to the second. — Metaphysician Undercover
We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. — Metaphysician Undercover
The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr
To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr
Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr
Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr
Dimensions are a part of time.
How are dimensions connected to time?
Does time have other kinds of parts? — ucarr
In your example, does time start in the present? — ucarr
Does logical priority imply causation? — ucarr
Does causation imply temporal priority? — ucarr
Can Cause A exist if Effect B doesn't simultaneously exist? — ucarr
When there is only the first, and thus it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second, does it also follow that it makes no sense to posit the possibility of time without a past and only a future because such a possibility has neither present nor past, but only future. — ucarr
Given this setup, the temporal future tense has no present and thus no presence and therefore cannot exist and therefore cannot look backwards to a past that follows the future? — ucarr
Given this train of logic, does it follow that the arrow of time, logically speaking, must move from one empirical present to another empirical present, with each empirical present possessing the past and future tenses as mental abstractions relative to the phenomenal_empirical present? — ucarr
Does it make sense to always pair both the future tense and the past tense with the present tense because the present tense is necessary for the other two, relative tenses to exist, i.e., to possess presence? — ucarr
Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr
I don't understand your use of "tense" here. so I can't answer this. — Metaphysician Undercover
To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr
Ontology, I would say. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr
You are speaking about the future, because by saying it is "possible" to lift your arm you are referring to something which would occur in the future. Anytime you say that such and such action is possible, you are saying that it may occur in the future. Your act of speaking is in the past though, by the time I hear it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr
No, I would not say that the dictionary is wrong, it represents the way we speak. But I'd characterize "existing now" as an inductive conclusion. If I observe a chair in my room, in front of me for a duration of time, I will conclude "the chair exists now", or "is actual", meaning that I believe the chair will continue to be as it has been observed to be. That is correct by our conventions, and the dictionary indicates this. But it doesn't take into account the fact that the true nature of "now" consists equally of future as it does past. So by the time that I finish speaking that sentence, or by the time you hear it, the chair might cease to exist. That's why i would say that "actual" represents the past part of now, but not the future part. — Metaphysician Undercover
With the past_future POV, decisions of the past are completed and thus choices are excluded. With the future_past POV, decisions are not finalized and thus choices are available. — ucarr
If this is right, does it follow that Man A and Man B have an equal chance of realizing their choices? The difference, then, is that Man B has a more correct understanding about how his temporal path from choice to realization is organized in time? — ucarr
So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr
When I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I connecting* my words to the dynamism of the event of my arm going upwards in the air? If so, does it follow that the words and the dynamism of my arm are synchronous? In other words, when one is true, the other must also be simultaneously true? Does it follow that if they are not synchronous, then my words are not true and thus the possibility does not exist? So, going the other way, when I verbalize a possibility, the words are synchronous with the possible physical event? — ucarr
*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr
Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr
When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr
So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr
I think the issue is a bit more complex than this. People give all sorts of reasons for believing in determinism. And, a belief in determinism can produce a defeatist attitude, fatalism etc.. This attitude may be very detrimental to one's life, and prevent a person from getting a happiness which they might otherwise obtain. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't follow your logic. The phrase "possible for me to lift my arm" does not imply actually lifting an arm. So a person could repeat this phrase over and over, without ever lifting the arm, and it could be true. I do not understand the relation you are describing. — Metaphysician Undercover
*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr
Sure, but the possibility to lift the arm is not the same thing as actually lifting the arm. The relation of necessity is only one way. After the arm is lifted, we can say that the possibility to lift the arm was necessarilypriorcontemporarytowith the actual lifting. However, when the possibility is real, and no arm is yet lifted, this does not imply that the arm will ever necessarily be lifted. — Metaphysician Undercover
The key point is that the words do not connect to "the dynamism of the event", as you say. The words connect to the possibility of that dynamism being activated, so this is something which is prior to that event. The words do not connect to the event, but something prior to the event, which could be actualized, and cause that event. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr
As I said, I do not agree with "movement in time". We move in space, as time passes. Therefore time moves, we do not move in time. — Metaphysician Undercover
When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr
I'll reply to this with your own words: — Metaphysician Undercover
"If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?" — ucarr
Talking about time travel is fantasy. Unless you can somehow show that it is real, it provides no evidence toward your claim that we move through time. Are you using fiction as evidence of the truth of what you say? How could that make sense to you? — Metaphysician Undercover
Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a scientific question, isn't it? — ucarr
If possibility is logically connected to realization of possibility, and logical continuity is atemporal, then the reality of the realization of possibility must be contemporary with the reality of the possibility. This doesn't, however, mean that possibility demands it be enacted; it just means the reality of its realizationability is simultaneous with the reality of its possibility. So possibility is not prior to realization, right? — ucarr
From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr
Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr
If we move in space as time passes, is this how we're experiencing time, i.e., as movement through space? If so, how is movement through space, and the time elapsing in sync with that movement, different from things moving in time?
Does this posit time as necessary to our movement through space, i.e., time is necessary to physics?
Does time have physics as either a dimension, or as a multiplex of dimensions?
Since time moves, does its motion imply its physicality? If not, what is non-physical motion?
Can time move without causing things to change?
Can time move without causing things to move? — ucarr
Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr
Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a physics question, isn't it? — ucarr
You ask me a psychological question, concerning the difference between believing in freewill, and believing in determinism, and how this might affect one's life. I answered accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover
But determinism and causation are not the same, and this is the central issue of our discussion. Determinism reduces causation to one type of cause, known in philosophy as efficient cause. The concept of freewill allows for the reality of what is known in philosophy as "final cause". This type of causation is completely distinct from "efficient cause". "Final cause" is only intelligible when we allow that the force from the future is causal. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't think that follows logically. First, any specific possibility must have a temporal extension, what might be called colloquially as "the window of opportunity". Realization must occur within that period of time, so to say that the two are "contemporary" would be misleading. Also possibility is required for the actualization, and it is highly improbable that the actualization would occur at the exact moment that the possibility arises. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, the moment that the actualization occurs, the possibility is gone, because "possibility" implies more than one option, and when actualization occurs, other options are rendered impossible by the fact of actualization. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the possibility and the actualization occur at the same time. So we must conclude that the possibility is temporally prior to the actualization. — Metaphysician Undercover
From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr
That is an incorrect description. Possibilities must be a reality prior to being actualized, or else they could not be act on. Therefore they have a place in reality which is other than "actual". — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr
Of course, as I explained, this is necessary for a proper understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think I've already addressed all this. — Metaphysician Undercover
Can time pass without causing things to change? — ucarr
Since time passes, does its passing imply is physicality? If not, what is non-physical passing? — ucarr
Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr
Not quite. The passing of time causes changes. You notice these changes, and name the days according to the way you were taught and understand, "Friday", "Saturday", etc.. To make things easier, imagine that the clock says 1:00, so you say "it is one o'clock". The passing of time causes changes, and you notice that the clock says 2:00, so you say "it's two o'clock". — Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't ask you a psychological question. We've established a context within our dialogue. We're examining the role of time in the physics of our world. Our focus has been on the facts of time passing within physics. Our standard of judgment has been whether our claims, respectively, have been verified logically and empirically. You've been claiming the arrow of time, one way, supports free will, and the other way blocks it. We've agreed that members of both groups make plans and realize them.
So, our topics have been physics and philosophy, not psychology. — ucarr
Since determination and efficient causation overlap, we conclude the former is a component of the latter. This being the case, we know embrace of determination does not necessarily exclude embracing the other three types of causation. This peaceful coexistence of the two things can operate within the free will advocate. We know this because everyone with intentions acts so as to determine outcomes. — ucarr
By saying a possibility has a window of opportunity, you're saying: On Thursday, P → A (possibility = P; actualization = A; and Thursday = the window of opportunity, so P implies A during a twenty-four time period). Why do you think P has temporal priority to A? Why do you think the P → A relationship ends when a specific P is actualized as a specific A? — ucarr
If a possibility is a reality before being realized, then a possibility is always a reality, so how is it a possibility, i.e., how is it's reality conditional? — ucarr
As an example, consider: The demolition charges will vertically drop the condemned building. We know that dynamite explodes and we know buildings implode vertically. Before the demolition charges are ignited, we know in abstraction what will happen. — ucarr
When things change how they're changing, doesn't time follow suit by changing how it's changing? — ucarr
If you're saying time changes me and not I change myself in time, then that difference seems to have zero effect on the changes we're discussing. — ucarr
Didn't we both agree that the present is both future and past?...aren't I always in my present? I'm never in my past, or in my future, am I? — ucarr
In your example, are you establishing the shortest duration of time allowing physical change to occur? — ucarr
In your example, there is a quark at one moment, state A, then an anti quark at the next moment, state B,and you have proposed that nothing can be observed in the time between, hence the shortest duration allowing for physical change. So state B is different from state A, and there is time between these two. We can conclude that the change from state A to state B occurred during this time [one Planck length]. Do you agree with me, that something must have happened during this time, which constitutes, or substantiates "the change" from quark to anti-quark? — Metaphysician Undercover
Is it true that first you establish the shortest duration of time allowing a physical change from state A to state B, and then, in the following paragraph, you continue talking about this same duration of time until you jump to establishing a non-physical change based on info instead of on physics? — ucarr
There is no "jump", only a sound logical conclusion. We have an observation at t-1, and an observation at t-2. The two states are different. Therefore we can conclude that change occurred during the duration of time which is between t-1 and t-2. "Change" requires that "something happened" which would account for the difference between state A and state B. We have determined that this "something" which happened cannot be a physical change because it would be in a duration of time shorter than the one defined by state A then state B, which has been determined as the shortest possible period of time for physical change. This duration is between state A and state B, therefore shorter, and so it is too short for physical change, therefore it is non-physical activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
We are no [sic] talking about the shorter period of time, between t-1 and t-2, so we must conclude that the change which occurs in this time is non physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Information" is the name which I gave to the non-physical, as I explained at the beginning why information is non-physical. So what happens between t-1 and t-2, by the use of this term, is a change in information. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.
For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr
I have made bold the letters where the jump appears to occur. You inexplicably claim we've established that physical change cannot happen. Apparently, you're jumping from the interval between T1 and T2 being one Planck length to being one half of one Planck length. — ucarr
If “no” equals “now,” then okay. — ucarr
Now the question arises, "How are non-physical things measured?" Measurement itself implies physicality. What does a non-physical measurement of a non-physical thing entail? Assuming such measurements exist, how are they translated into something practically verifiable and useful? — ucarr
How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr
Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.
For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr
How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time? — Metaphysician Undercover
How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?
Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time. — Metaphysician Undercover
The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.
Firstly, I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.
Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded two of your statements that contradict each other. Given this contradiction, your argument is nonsense.
So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event.— Metaphysician Undercover
So, per scientific rigor, I stipulate at T1 a photon emits, and at T2 the photon covers the distance matching one Planck length. So the change of state of our thought experiment is the change of position of a photon across one Planck length. — ucarr
The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr
So, thanks to your demand for scientific rigor, it appears that our contemplation of its requirements has imploded your project to establish a spacetime wherein no physical event can occur yet wherein a supposed non-physical exchange of info is possible. — ucarr
For clarity, it should be stated that the Planck length is currently the smallest spacetime unit we can measure. Smaller spacetime units, such as those occurring at the time of the Big Bang, are not currently measurable.
The Big Bang theory makes it clear that some scientists believe physics persists all the way down to the singularity, which is infinitely small. So, by this reasoning, there is no pre-singularity point at which physics stops. — ucarr
Firstly, again I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.
Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks. — ucarr
Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks. — ucarr
In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established. — Metaphysician Undercover
Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option. — ucarr
How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover
What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
...some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover
The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr
The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you believe time is immaterial?
Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?
Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?
Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?
Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?
With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?
Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr
I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr
I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. P↔︎Q
↔
︎
is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr
Read Newton again. His first law says, "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it." — ucarr
So, as I said, the photon covers the Planck length. If its path is altered by another photon, then, from start to finish, we're looking at the physical activity you're trying to deny. Likewise, this applies to a photon having several possible paths. — ucarr
It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr
Being unobservable to the senses is not proof something is non-physical; the EM waves feeding your tv are unobservable. — ucarr
Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr
Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr
Do you believe time is immaterial?
Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?
Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?
Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?
Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?
With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?
Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr
Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr
I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr
The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon — ucarr
Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional? — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.
The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this.— Metaphysician Undercover
It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr
Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something. — Metaphysician Undercover
Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr
What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr
Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover
Do these dimensions include line, area and cube? — ucarr
Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr
With my two above quotes, I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr
Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so P↔︎Q
↔
︎
.
This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal. — ucarr
From this event we don't declare that the bi-conditional logic is faulty because the pipe is rusty. Real life is temporal, and thus causal relationships are subject to interruptions. Logical relationships are atemporal, and the change of circumstances of life interrupting real and causal chains of events have no bearing upon the truth content of atemporal, logical relationships. — ucarr
You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.
Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr
Again, the singularity assumes the persistence of physics all the way down to the infinitely small interval of time. — ucarr
For example, at Cern the math is applied to the spectral imaging of particle behavior. — ucarr
Your question reveals your belief the immaterial realm cannot be active, cannot do anything without converting into the material realm. — ucarr
You're falsely claiming the math interpretation of the ATLAS and CMS detection of particles at Cern is not empirical verification of physical phenomena. Can you present a math interpretation that contradicts the Cern math interpretation? — ucarr
what is often assumed to be necessary (determinism), is really just probable, therefore the continuity associated with this assumed necessity is an illusion. The necessity is false. — Metaphysician Undercover
To me, consciousness is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. The mind however has another ability, namely the ability to cause as well. So, to summarize, the mind is an entity with the ability to experience and cause. — MoK
Since future and past are distinct dimensions of time, and they overlap at the present, the present must be two dimensional. — Metaphysician Undercover
Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr
You misunderstand the second quote then. Notice in the first quote, the assumption of necessity goes hand in hand with the illusion of continuity. These two are related. In the second quote I am saying that the assumption of necessity is false, what is really the case is that predictions are based on probability rather than necessity. This supports the first quote, saying that continuity is an illusion, and implying that the assumption of necessity is a false assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
So it's not probability itself, which creates the illusion of continuity, it is the practise of treating what is probable as what is necessary, which creates that illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Without focusing observational attention on A it cannot be said that all A causes Z. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can readily see that this is seriously flawed. Just because "vinyl-dipped" produces the necessity of "non-rust", we cannot conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped. This is how the assumption of bi-conditionality may mislead. — Metaphysician Undercover
...I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr
I hope what I said above helps you to see how this is not a proper representation of the continuity I am talking about. The continuity I referred to is epistemic, it is a continuity of information. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the problem here is that you have two incompatible premises which you try to unite. You say "logical relationships are atemporal". And you also have "real life is temporal". Because of this incompatibility the "logic" you are talking about cannot be applied to "real life". But then you attempt to apply this type of "atemporal" logic to "temporal" real life, through the concept of causation, and you produce a seriously flawed example. The obvious problem is that causation refers to "real life" temporal events, so the application of atemporal logic is faulty. Therefore modal logic has been developed for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.
Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr
As I've explained, this is not relevant. The fact is that physics is restricted by the limitations of observation. The use of "Planck time" is just an example of such a restriction. So it doesn't matter if Planck time is replaced by some other temporal length, as the shortest time period, there will always be a shortest time period due to the limitations of observational capacity. And physical theories are verified through observation, so this is a restriction to "physics". — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider entropy for example. As time passes entropy increases, and this is a violation of the law of conservation of energy within a system. Energy is lost to the system, and its loss cannot be accounted for. So in principle the law of entropy indicates a violation to the conservation law. Now, even during the shortest period of time, some energy must be lost, and we can ask what is the cause of this loss. Clearly, the activities of "physics" do not account for the increase in entropy, so the cause of it is nonphysical. "Entropy", commonly represented as "uncertainty" signifies the informational gap which I referred to, where something nonphysical has causal influence during the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can only say that the immaterial cannot do anything observable without converting that activity into material activity — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD
probability distribution — Metaphysician Undercover
of probability — Metaphysician Undercover
a relation of probability — Metaphysician Undercover
Does a person experience future and past empirically? — ucarr
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — ucarr
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — ucarr
It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
As I read you, you're charging QM physics with trying to pass off probability as necessity. — ucarr
Probability and continuity run on separate tracks here. — ucarr
Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so P↔︎Q
↔
︎
. This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal. — ucarr
Furthermore, this stresses that causation is a logical concept of the abstract mind, and thus it too is atemporal. — ucarr
If what I wrote is now irrelevant, it's because you've shifted from denying physics below Planck scale to asserting physics has measurement limitations, an assertion nobody disputes. The difference between what you say now and what you said directly below is obvious. — ucarr
Since your "observations" of immaterialism are restricted by the observational limitations of physics, your suppositions about immaterial info and causation are really just speculations made possible by the work of physicists. Your dependency on physics doesn't make a strong case for believing immaterialism has logical and existential priority over materialism. — ucarr
The first law of thermo-dynamics says the total energy of a system remains constant, even if it is converted from work into heat energy.
Entropy is the loss of a system's available energy to do work. There is no violation of the first law. — ucarr
This statement has you acknowledging passing time and increase of entropy are moving in the same direction. — ucarr
To me this looks like an acknowledgement, by implication, that immaterialism, i.e., abstract thought, is an emergent property of physic. — ucarr
Consciousness, in its role as boundary administrator, acts like a juggler suspending in air three juggling pins: time, space, spacetime. — ucarr
Wow, I love this. What an interesting question! Has me thinking...Is consciousness only reactive? — ucarr
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.