To say that Kant says something that one knows he does not say is lying, and this is what Rodl does. He demonstrates that in the endnote. — Leontiskos

So the idea is supposed to be that Rodl lies in the text, and then quotes the source in the endnote that demonstrates it was a lie? Please. It doesn't pass the laugh test. Possibly Rodl is wrong in his interpretation of Kant, though I don't think he is; see Wayfarer's explanation.

The whole issue is putting an enormous amount of weight on a very minor difference of wording: "the I think must be able to accompany all my representations" versus "the I think accompanies all my thoughts". Should we hold out for the possibility that, in some cases, we have a representation which the I think, though able to accompany this representation, does not so accompany? Is this what Kant has in mind when uses the term "able to accompany"? -- able but not willing, so to speak? Surely not. He's trying to make it plain that, since the I think does in fact accompany all our representations, it has to be the sort of thing which is able to do so.

Or is it a distinction between thoughts and representations? I'm open to hearing what this distinction would be, and the difference it would make, in this context.

So the idea is supposed to be that Rodl lies in the text, and then quotes the source in the endnote that demonstrates it was a lie? — J

Rodl says, "Kant said: the I think accompanies all my thoughts." Did Kant say that or not?

Surely not. — J

You're twisting yourself in knots to read the text contrary to what it says. Does "X must be able to accompany Y" mean that "X always accompanies Y"? Yes or no?

He's trying to make it plain that, since the I think does in fact accompany all our representations, it has to be the sort of thing which is able to do so. — J

Except he doesn't say that at all. Kant gives a reason for his claim, but it is not the reason you supply. In fact Kant seems to contradict you. He says of the manifold representations given in a certain intuition, "(even if I am not conscious of them as such)." I.e. There are representations which we need not be conscious of.

Kant says, "All hamburgers are able to be accompanied by ketchup." Rödl says, "Kant thinks every hamburger has ketchup on it." — Leontiskos

---

Related:

I didn't mean it was a mistranslation of the possessive. I meant that different languages (and different eras) have different senses of what connotes "possession," what sorts of things can be mine. — J

But that's worse, not better.

• "The text doesn't support your theory." "No, I'm right. It's probably just a translation issue."
• "The text doesn't support your theory." "No, I'm right. It's probably just a linguistic-cultural connotation issue."

It is post hoc rationalization to blindly appeal to things like this in favor of one's position. My issue here is that the texts are being ignored in favor of some ideology. The example is, "Rodl is worth reading, therefore he couldn't be lying, therefore 'X must be able to accompany Y' means (or at least entails) 'X always accompanies Y'." The a priori judgment is so strong (and biased) that it overpowers the fact that there is a difference between possibility and necessity.

What puzzles me in your charge of dishonesty is that it dissolves Rödl's efforts to separate first person thinking from objective judgment. Whatever unity the two modes may have in a larger notion of consciousness such as Hegel presented, Rödl maintains they have two distinct, even mutually exclusive "characters" in our experience.

That distinction disappears if: "every hamburger has ketchup on it."

The matter of duality is not dissolved but framed in way outside of contending dependencies — Paine

Could you explain that a little further? A passage that I highlighted, adjacent to the one you quoted, is:

The aim of this essay, as an introduction to absolute idealism, is to make plain that it is impossible to think judgment through this opposition: mind here, world there, two things in relation or not. To dismantle this opposition is not to propose that the world is mind dependent. Nor is it to propose that the mind is world-dependent. These ways of speaking solidify the opposition; they are an impediment to comprehension. — p16

That seems to at least suggest the non-duality of mind and world, saying that construal of 'two things' is an 'impediment to comprehension'.

Note on sources:


Notes on Self Consciousness in Rödl.

Rödl's uses 'self-consciousness' in a way completely different to normal usage ('I felt very self-conscious entering the room with all of those famous people.')

For Rödl, self-consciousness is the implicit awareness that accompanies any act of thought or judgment. When you think <p>, you are not just aware of <p> as an object but also of yourself as the thinker of <p>. Thought is self-conscious because it contains within it a reflexive awareness of its own activity (which is what Rödl means by it being 'internal to thought'.) This inseparability of thought and self-awareness is what Rödl highlights as essential to understanding judgment.

Self-consciousness involves the first-person perspective, which is irreducible to a third-person description. This perspective is not simply a way of referring to oneself (e.g., with the pronoun "I") bu foundational to thinking —it is the form in which all thought occurs. This is where he criticizes Frege, as summarised in an earlier post:

Frege’s contention is that the content of thought (<p>) can be entirely objective and independent of any subject. Frege’s emphasis is on the idea that thoughts exist as abstract, objective entities in a “third realm,” independent of whether anyone thinks them. According to Frege, thoughts are, in principle, accessible to any rational being, and their validity does not depend on any individual subject’s act of thinking. Frege lays this out in a famous essay called ‘The Thought: A Logical Investigation’.

Summary of main points of Frege "The Thought":



Rödl’s self-consciousness aligns with Kant’s transcendental apperception: the 'I think' that must be able to accompany all representations. It is not a contingent property of individuals but a universal structure that makes thought and knowledge possible.

Comparison from CPR:

The matter of duality is not dissolved but framed in way outside of contending dependencies — Paine

Could you explain that a little further? A passage that I highlighted, adjacent to the one you quoted, is:

The aim of this essay, as an introduction to absolute idealism, is to make plain that it is impossible to think judgment through this opposition: mind here, world there, two things in relation or not. To dismantle this opposition is not to propose that the world is mind dependent. Nor is it to propose that the mind is world-dependent. These ways of speaking solidify the opposition; they are an impediment to comprehension. — Wayfarer

This says to me that the problem is not an unnecessary division. Rödl objects to Nagel and Moore in this way:

They hold fast to the notion that the objectivity of judgment resides in its being of something other, something that is as it is independently of being thought to be so. In consequence, their result is an ultimate incomprehensibility of our thought of ourselves as judging and knowing. — ibid. page 14

The proposed solution is not to find a register where the two terms are one but to preserve the dynamic of 'first person thinking' over against 'objectivity' that does not have them jockeying against one another as possible grounds of experience. Rödl is saying we have valid reasons for thinking the former differences exist that we have projected into the idea of the latter.

What puzzles me in your charge of dishonesty is that it dissolves Rödl's efforts to separate first person thinking from objective judgment. — Paine

I am saying that Rodl lies about what Kant says (and this issue was a theme throughout the early parts of this thread). Why think that if Rodl had not misrepresented Kant then he wouldn't have been able to separate first person thinking from objective judgment?

It's sort of like if Rodl had written an open letter and forged Kant's signature at the bottom of it. Not a huge deal, but the OP depends heavily on that signature.

Edit: Or perhaps you are claiming that Rodl mildly disagrees with the idea that he attributes to Kant? The issue here has primarily to do with the early effort of trying to address the OP at a time when no one had Rodl's book (except J).

I am saying that Rodl lies about what Kant says — Leontiskos

And I for one am not persuaded by your claim. I spelled out the exact passage in which you said he does this, and compared it to the passage in Kant, and could discern no difference between them, nor have you explained how they differ.

I spelled out the exact passage in which you said he does this, and compared it to the passage in Kant — Wayfarer

But that was already done on page 6 and even earlier than that. This began when our resident Kantian, Mww, kept telling us that Kant does not say what Rodl says he does in the OP. So we finally tracked it down, back on page 3, and it looks like Mww was (unsurprisingly) correct.

Here is what Rodl claims Kant says on page 6:

• "the I think accompanies all my thoughts."

And here is what Rodl admits Kant actually says in the endnote:

• "the I think must be able to accompany all my representations."

As noted earlier in the thread, there are two issues here: thought vs. representation, and "accompanies" vs. "must be able to accompany." Rodl misrepresents on both accounts, but the latter is more egregious.

I [...] could discern no difference between them — Wayfarer

I find that hard to believe.

---

Of course Rodl hides behind the strange words, "More precisely..." But that's like saying, "Kant told me that he lives in Virginia. More precisely, he told me that he lives in the United States." That makes no sense. It would have only made sense for Rodl to go in the other direction, "Kant told me he lives in the United States. More precisely, he told me that he lives in Virginia." Rodl is trying to make his interpretation of Kant more than an interpretation, by claiming that Kant himself affirms that interpretation.

When Kant writes, "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations," he underscores that this "I think" is the unifying activity of consciousness, presupposed in every act of thought. Rödl is arguably drawing out this implication rather than making an unsupported claim. Kant’s texts are notoriously dense and subject to varying interpretations. Rödl is working within the tradition of Kantian scholarship that sees self-consciousness as central to Kant’s project. Like others, he will build on or extrapolate from the texts to make broader arguments, but that does not amount to lying.

Rödl’s interpretation may emphasize aspects of Kant that others downplay or read differently, but this is part of philosophical engagement, not dishonesty. I see it as a plausible and defensible reading of Kant’s argument.

To claim that Rödl is "lying" presupposes not just a disagreement but an intentional misrepresentation, which is a serious charge requiring compelling evidence. I don't think it's justified on the basis of the discussion.

our resident Kantian, Mww — Leontiskos

also said

Anyway….not that big a deal. — Mww

he underscores that this "I think" is the unifying activity of consciousness — Wayfarer

No, he doesn't. He says that the unity of the pure apperception is the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, and that the pure apperception produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all other representations. Indeed, the I think is not an activity at all, as Mww has pointed out for us.

That's the thing: if we want to use a text we have to read it. We can't just make it mean whatever we want it to mean, to suit our purposes. That is the big sweep of my complaint here. (It's also why I would defer to Mww on Kant or Paine on many thinkers - because they are careful in handling texts and do not warp them.)

On my limited view, if Kant thought the I think accompanied all thoughts (or even representations), he would have said so! It would be a bit wild to deftly say all the things he does about self-consciousness, the I think, and accompaniment, without stating that much more straightforward claim. He seems to actually be going out of his way to avoid saying that the I think accompanies all our representations. I mean, why would someone continually say, "X is able to accompany Y," if they hold that X always accompanies Y? That makes no sense at all.

but that does not amount to lying. — Wayfarer

Of course it does. If someone claims that Kant has said things that they know Kant has not said, then they are lying. And if we are averse to that word, then at the very least he mislead, misrepresented, deceived, or spoke in a knowingly inaccurate way.

Kant’s texts are notoriously dense and subject to varying interpretations. Rödl is working within the tradition of Kantian scholarship that sees self-consciousness as central to Kant’s project. — Wayfarer

If someone with an expertise in Kantian scholarship told me such a thing I would probably believe them, but I think we both agree that you are not that person, don't we? Else, if you do have the requisite knowledge for such claims, then give me a handful of other individuals who belong to this same school and would affirm Rodl's interpretation of Kant.

Indeed, I am familiar with thinkers who are considered transcendental Kantians, but I have never heard them claim that the I think accompanies all our thoughts.

To claim that Rödl is "lying" presupposes not just a disagreement but an intentional misrepresentation, which is a serious charge requiring compelling evidence. — Wayfarer

And the evidence is present in the endnote.

This is a line from the early part of the thread: "Kant said that?" "I don't think he did." "Where is he supposed to have said it?" "Maybe here... or here?" "But neither matches up." *More digging* "Oh, there's an endnote here where Rodl is clear that Kant doesn't say what he said he did." "Wtf?"

also said — Wayfarer

The point being, "This isn't a thread on Kant, so we don't need to belabor the point." Relevant here too, I think.

The point to cash out is this: if Rodl (or J) wants to argue for the strange thesis, he is going to have to do more than make a false allusion to Kant. This has more to do with the OP than Rodl, because I would presume that Rodl does make arguments for his central thesis.

if Kant thought the I think accompanied all thoughts (or even representations), he would have said so! — Leontiskos

I’m saying it’s an arguable implication of Kant’s intent, and that you’re making a polemical mountain out of an interpretive molehill.

If Rodl had said that Kant arguably implies it there would be no problem at all. What he was doing was name-dropping Kant in favor of his theory.

The weird thing here is that you and J seem unable to admit that Rodl has done something which is strongly misrepresentative of Kant in at least a prima facie way.

I canceled probably 3 full pages here, because the arguments therein were Kantian, in opposition to the main character in the thread. Threads are invariably derailed this way and I didn’t want to be guilty of it. Rödl deserves his own limelight no less than any other, however briefly, and deserves proper respect for his bringing the relatively unfamiliar to the forefront.

Idealism writ large generally grants the validity of cognitive faculties, assigns them their respective functions, unites them into a system, toward a certain goal. Absolute idealism, by way of introduction, grants those faculties as that which, as Rödl says, “we already and always know”, but turns them back into themselves, rather than uniting them into a system. Judgement just is the consciousness of judging; knowledge just is the consciousness of knowing. It follows necessarily that thinking just is the consciousness of thought, the end result being the absoluteness of the idealism of each of those faculties. All of which is fine for an introduction to a doctrine, even if such introduction itself is not intended to account for what is to be done with those faculties after the exposition for how the author requires them to be understood.

I found no internal contradictions or inconsistencies in the introduction to absolute idealism, even though there are a veritable plethora of contradictions to other metaphysics. I also didn’t immediately find any use for it, insofar as the possibility that e.g., judgment just is the consciousness of judging, doesn’t tell me a damn thing about what judging does, and thereby its function in a system. If my primary concern is the comprehension of my relation to the external domain, for which of course, a system of some nature is requisite, I must have precious little need for absolute idealism, and lose nothing by dismissing the entire doctrine.

I am in agreement with with respect to an important initial premise attributed to Kant, and the intentional misappropriation of it in the furtherance of a doctrine in which that very same initial premise is invalid. In addition, I’m somewhat dismayed to read Rödl claims Kant’s position presupposes his own, and would have been demonstrated if Kant had seen fit to elaborate. It is my comprehension, that Kant didn’t elaborate for the simple reason to do so, such that Rödl’s position is justified, would be to falsify the very thing he just stated as the case, re: “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations.

It is not the case that “I think” must be able to accompany all my thoughts, if the origin of thought is the faculty of understanding, and the origin of “I think” is transcendental pure reason, the objects of which are principles. Understanding is that faculty by which thought is possible, in the synthesis of conceptions, the object of which is cognition. “I think” is not of a cognitive faculty as such, but of a mere human condition, and represents nothing more than “…the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding….”, which is nothing more than the consciousness of having conjoined conceptions regardless of whatever the cognition following from it. From which, at least in this respect, it may even be said Kant was more absolute than Rödl.
(Sidebar: the implication of intuition serves as proof we as humans, actually do unite all our representations, in this case empirical ones only, and while not necessarily conscious of doing it, must possess the consciousness of having done it. For otherwise, it is impossible that all the perceived parts of objects, each represented in us by its sensation, can be understood as the unity of conceptions, from which cognition of a whole in a single experience follows as a methodological necessity. The “I think” is nothing more than representing that the system recognizes the understanding as having fulfilled its function, which we simplify into the term “consciousness”.)

The explanatory conditions for why representation is not the same as thought, and therefore why “I think” must be capable of accompanying one but not the other, are legion in Kant, but of no use whatsoever in Rödl, insofar as absolute idealism is not concerned with representations as much as is speculative metaphysics regarding human cognition.

Which is what I meant by:

Anyway….not that big a deal. — Mww

Which is what I meant by:
Anyway….not that big a deal.
— Mww — Mww

And I by

The whole issue is putting an enormous amount of weight on a very minor difference of wording — J

But I appreciate your take on it.

Yes, what some term a priori cognition under empirical conditions. Nevertheless I can’t think a possible cat a priori without having the antecedent experience, in order to reduce the possibility to a particular object. Otherwise, I have no warrant for representing the conception with the word “cat”. — Mww

I wasn't talking about terms or words (scribbles). I was talking about the visual of a cat in your mind - the cat that you think of when thinking of cats. Maybe when thinking of cats you might think of different types of cats if you had the experience viewing various cats, but then what was it about those different cats that allowed you to place them all under the umbrella of cat (not the term, but the image)? Your imagined visuals of cats somehow allows you to recognize actual cats by the way they appear in your mind compared to how they appear in the world. Language (scribbles) is not needed to recognize similar objects to predict their behavior. It seems to me that you have to be able to categorize similar visuals and sounds together prior to learning a language as you have to be able to discern the differences and similarities between scribbles and sounds to learn a language in the first place.

how would you recognize a cat that is different than the one in front of you…..
— Harry Hindu

Isn’t that just another possible cat? As far as my cognitive operation is concerned, it is. — Mww

That wasn't my question. How would you categorize an animal you have not seen before but looks like an animal you have seen before? What key characteristics do they share to then place them in the same visual category?

Doesn’t matter that an in abstracto object in general is represented by a universal idea, it isn’t a cat until I cognize that thing as such. — Mww

What is that process like? What goes on in your mind to cognize some thing if it does not include an abstract object?

It seems to me that your mental object of cat is the very cat you first experienced until you've experienced other cats in which your mental object changes to leave out certain characteristics and retain others. For instance, cats can have long or short hair. If your first cat you observed had short hair and you saw a similar looking animal but it had long hair, why or why would you not cognize that thing as a cat?

….we can never get at the world as it is independent of us, only at the relation itself.
— Harry Hindu

Close enough, but given relations alone is insufficient for knowledge. — Mww

Knowledge is itself a relation. If everything is a relation then it would it be fair to say that getting at relations is getting at the world?

Personally, I think it warrants the weight, and a perfect example for why I wholeheartedly detest OLP, but simply dismiss analytic philosophy. More than mere words, it’s a matter of conceptual meaning…what can this word mean, what does it indicate and thereby what can it do, that the another word cannot. If that is all given beforehand in a certain context, but consequently disavowed within that same context, that upon which the disavowal rests, must be considered undeserving.

But you’re quite correct, in that Rödl’s philosophy would stand if he hadn’t mentioned Kant, insofar as his targets were specifically members of his own peer group, Nagel and Moore. Nevertheless, the reality that he did, requires accounting, which we know because he did it himself.

Interesting. I actually think Kant may be more important to Rodl than you're saying. So I do want to understand any Kantian subtleties here. I may have asked this before, but is it possible to give a simple discrimination between "representation" and "thought," in Kantian terms, if that is indeed the issue that warrants the weight?

Or perhaps you are claiming that Rodl mildly disagrees with the idea that he attributes to Kant? — Leontiskos

I think Rödl is greatly influenced by Hegel's criticism of Kant. The expression of common ground can be found here:

This bears repeating: there is no meaning in saying that, in an act of thinking, two things are thought, pu and I think p. Kant said: the I think accompanies all my thoughts.3 Hegel calls this way of putting it “inept”. However, in defense of Kant, we note that he hastened to add that the I think cannot in turn be accompanied by any representation. Thus he sought to make it plain that the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such. When I say, the I think is contained in what is thought, this may with equal justice be called inept. It suggests that there are two things, one containing the other. Perhaps we should say, what is thought is suffused with the I think. But here, too, if we undertake to think through the metaphor, we come to grief before long. — ibid. page 6

Where Rödl diverges from Kant relates to Hegel's objections to the role of 'intuition' giving us objects to understand or not:

S]ince an object can appear to us only by means of … pure forms of sensibility, i.e., be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are thus pure intuitions that contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of appearances, and the synthesis in them has objective validity. The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding. … [T]hat objects of sensible intuition must accord with the formal conditions of sensibility that lie in the mind a priori is clear from the fact that otherwise they would not be objects for us; but that they must also accord with the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thinking is a conclusion that is not so easily seen. For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking. — Kant, CPR A89-91/B122-123

I read Rödl's rejection of the mind/world opposition to include the unknowable "things in themselves". That is more than a mild disagreement.

….is it possible to give a simple discrimination between "representation" and "thought," in Kantian terms. — J

Oh man. One but not the other. Possible but not simple. Very little in Kant is simple.

“…thought is cognition by means of conceptions….” (A69/B94), from which can be inferred thought is an activity. Conceptions are representations of the faculty of understanding in the same way phenomena are the representations of the faculty of intuition. So if thought is by means of conceptions, and conceptions are representations, then it follows representations are antecedent to that activity which cognizes by means of them.

Kant does not define representation (vorstellung), thus consideration of his time is paramount, insofar as the Scholastic tradition, in which properties of things belonged to them and were “transferred” to the mind when thought about, had been overturned by Descartes with “thinking substance”. Subsequently, because “thinking substance” contradicts the categories, Kant replaced the ontology of things as having properties belonging to them, with the ontology of having the properties of objects already in us, and we transfer them to the objects, from which arises the proverbial “Copernican. Revolution”.

All that we have in us that can be “transferred” to a thing as properties, which we call judgement, and expanded to relations of those properties to each other, which we call logic, Kant denoted as “representation”. How we come by them, by what means to they arise, he does not expound, but it’s pretty obvious, whatever they really are…we got ‘em.

Probably not much help, I know. But it’s a simple as I can make it without saying nothing. Sorry.

Thanks for that, . Your posts in this thread have helped me understand Kant.

Personally, I think it warrants the weight — Mww

I agree. I don't see principled reasons for why it wouldn't.

- :up:

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- Okay, thanks. So is the idea that he follows Hegel in disagreeing with Kant about noumena but he does not disagree with respect to his interpretation that, "The I think accompanies all my thoughts"?

How would you categorize an animal you have not seen before but looks like an animal you have seen before? — Harry Hindu

This is contradictory. If I haven’t seen a thing before, I can’t say it looks like one I have. If I’ve not seen this cat, but I’ve seen those cats, I’m justified in characterizing the unseen as the same kind as the seen. The difference is, in the first the thing is undetermined, in the second the thing is determined as cat.

what was it about those different cats that allowed you to place them all under the umbrella of cat — Harry Hindu

The quantity of conceptions that sufficiently correspond with the original experience. Those conceptions that do not sufficiently correspond are those which tell me I’m justified in cognizing a different version of the original experience; those that do not correspond at all tells me I’m not justified in cognizing a cat at all.

What key characteristics do they share to then place them in the same visual category? — Harry Hindu

That condition belongs to sensation, not cognition. For different things be placed in the same visual category is for each to have congruent visual representation.

Doesn’t matter that an in abstracto object in general is represented by a universal idea, it isn’t a cat until I cognize that thing as such.
— Mww

What is that process like? What goes on in your mind to cognize some thing if it does not include an abstract object? — Harry Hindu

All my cognition includes abstract objects; they are representations. The objects represented in my cognitions are particulars, not universals.

It seems to me that your mental object of cat is the very cat you first experienced…. — Harry Hindu

Yes, so the metaphysical story goes. As such, it is entered into consciousness, and serves as that by which all other similar perceptions are judged.

….until you've experienced other cats in which your mental object changes to leave out certain characteristics and retain others. — Harry Hindu

There isn’t a definitive cut-off for similar or different characteristics. There was already a whole boatload of representations in order to cognize cat in the first place, so altering some relatively minor number of them wouldn’t be sufficient to cause an entirely different experience. Although, I suppose given one or two glaring differences, one could only cognize what a thing is not, relative to his experience, but not what it is.

Your posts…. — Leontiskos

Thanks for that, but we all know stuff expressed in here is mere opinion, however well-supported.

And we all know there’s no substitute for first-hand exposure to the original, for then the exposure and the opinion at least belong to the same subject.

So is the idea that he follows Hegel in disagreeing with Kant about noumena but he does not disagree with respect to his interpretation that, "The I think accompanies all my thoughts"? — Leontiskos

I need to read and think more about it but perhaps Rödl may not want to accept all of Hegel either. Mww's account of the 'thinking substance' underscores some of the problems with distinguishing first person thought and objective judgement. The way Rödl separates them is that first person thoughts do not raise the problem of validation that objective judgements do. That preserves some of the isolation expressed in Kant's version of given objects. I think Rödl is inept in getting rid of Kant's "can accompany each thought". The region of "self-consciousness" is neither expanded nor reduced by the formulation.

Another element that makes me wonder about Rödl's relationship with Hegel is the impending chapters that incorporate Aristotle's' view of the thinker coming into being. I haven't gotten that far.

Thanks , that is helpful, especially insofar as you shine a light on the role that Hegel is playing here. I am pretty ignorant when it comes to Hegel.

Probably not much help, I know. — Mww

Not at all, very helpful indeed. I've read the entire CPR exactly once, and that was decades ago, so I appreciate the elucidation.

So, to put it crudely, representations would be the stuff of thought via conceptions. In particular, they are those representations of the faculty of understanding, not those of the faculty of intuition, which we call phenomena rather than conceptions. Representations are unexplained, a sort of axiom of epistemology. All we know is, we have them.

I think, based on this, that I see where some of the questions via Rodl arise. Again, forgive me if a simple question prompts a long answer, but if I may: You say that "thought is an activity," something done by means of concepts. But does Kant have anything to say about what the noun "thought" refers to? I always assumed we could harmlessly substitute "conception" or "representation," but how does he in fact understand this?

Thanks Paine, that clears up my apparent misunderstanding.

My response to the op, without reading though the whole thread:

Rodl is correct (leaving aside whether Kant supports him). I would answer Pat with something like 3.

To translate the mental event thinking-p into propositional form, you must include "I think". Because, the declaration "p" alone does not do this job. You can claim p without understanding it. You can mouth the words, with no internal representation accompanying your recitation. You can say p without believing it, by lying about it, or merely disagreeing internally.

The claim p alone is not the same as the event thinking-p, and so to convey this event accurately, "I think" must be included. But this is not at all the same as actually thinking, or experiencing, "I think p". This is reflecting on your own thought, which you do sometimes, but certainly not always, as Pat points out.

And so, there is a confusion caused by language: accurately notating that you are indeed thinking-p, and reflecting on your own thought, can both be represented as "I think p" in English.

But this is not at all the same as actually thinking, or experiencing, "I think p". This is reflecting on your own thought, which you do sometimes, but certainly not always. — hypericin

I agree.

And so, there is a confusion caused by language: accurately notating that you ate indeed thinking-p, and reflecting on your thought, are both notated as "I think p". — hypericin

Are they, though? The issue I see is that you cannot notate that you are thinking p without self-consciously thinking p. If the words "I think p" are uttered, then the self-reflection on thought is already present. And so it seems that the "notation" cannot be first-personal if it is to properly prescind from this self-reflection. It must be, "He thinks p," or, "p is thought." For this reason I don't find the I think to be ambiguous in this manner.

accurately notating that you are indeed thinking-p, and reflecting on your own thought, can both be represented as "I think p" in English. — hypericin

This, and other related puzzles about the use of "think", generated a lot of back and forth in the thread.

I want to think more about your post. You say:

To translate the mental event thinking-p into propositional form, you must include "I think" — hypericin

I need to check back in Rodl to see if I think it's a good paraphrase, but leaving aside Rodl-world, it's a good test case to help us understand what job the "I think" is supposed to be doing in all this.

You say that "thought is an activity," something done by means of concepts. But does Kant have anything to say about what the noun "thought" refers to? — J

Yes, an activity of the faculty of understanding, which makes thought an object, or product of the activity, hence, a noun. Even to say I think something is to say I have a thought that refers to that something, so again, that thought stands as an object of my thinking, hence a noun.

Cognition is what is done, synthesis is how cognition is done, conceptions are what synthesis is done with. Thought, then, is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions.
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“…. But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining à priori and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest in all human cognition….”

By this is shown the difference between uniting representations into a conception, re: apperception, and uniting conceptions into a cognition, re: thought. It also supports the argument that “I think” must not always be able to accompanying all my thoughts, insofar as self-consciousness is that by which alone conjunction is possible which is not thought, whereas understanding is that by which synthesis is possible, which is.

It is a process after all, right? Getting to knowledge from mere appearances?

Again…..dunno if this helps or hopelessly occludes.