@Mww - like others, I appreciate your guidance in these difficult matters. But I'm kind of stuck on something arising from the discussion of the last few days. So forgive me for reproducing these rather lengthy passages from Rödl and from Kant's section on 'the synthetic unity of apperception', but it seems to me that Rödl's appeal to Kant seems well-founded. Forgive me if some of this has already been discussed. First Rödl then Kant.

Kant said: the I think accompanies all my thoughts. Hegel calls this way of putting it “inept”. However, in defense of Kant, we note that he hastened to add that the "I think" cannot in turn be accompanied by any representation. Thus he sought to make it plain that the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.

When I say, the I think is contained in what is thought, this may with equal justice be called inept. It suggests that there are two things, one containing the other. Perhaps we should say, what is thought is suffused with the I think. But here, too, if we undertake to think through the metaphor, we come to grief before long. People have tried saying that the I think is in the background, while what is thought is in the foreground, or that what is thought is thematic, while the I think is unthematic. These metaphors are apt to solidify the notion that there are two things represented, the object and my thinking of it: in a visual scene, what is in the foreground and what is in the background are distinct things seen (the house in the foreground, say, the trees in the background); in a piece of music, the theme is heard alongside its accompaniment. But we must not take issue with these figurative ways of speaking; it is not through metaphors and images that we understand self-consciousness. We will continue to talk of containment, not to provide illumination, but to have a convenient way of speaking. — Rödl, p7

The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think,” in the subject in which this diversity is found. But this representation, “I think,” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of à priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many important results. ....

...The thought, “These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me,” is accordingly just the same as, “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them”; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious. — Kant, On the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception

Doesn't this lend support to Rödl's contention that 'As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the 'I think' is thought in every act of thinking.' It seems a perfectly reasonable interpretation of Kant's 'original synthetic unity of apperception' to me.

Even to say I think something is to say I have a thought that refers to that something, so again, that thought stands as an object of my thinking, hence a noun. — Mww

Hmm. Let q be any thought (not necessarily a proposition). It isn't clear whether q is 1) the product of thinking, that is, an event that occurs at time T1 to a particular person, or 2) the "something" (content, to use a non-Kantian term) which is thought, and might equally well be thought by someone else.

Tell me if that makes any sense, and then I'll try to address the question of the "I think" accompanying all our thoughts.

The issue I see is that you cannot notate that you are thinking p without self-consciously thinking p. If the words "I think p" are uttered, then the self-reflection on thought is already present. And so it seems that the "notation" cannot be first-personal if it is to properly prescind from this self-reflection. — Leontiskos

Interesting. I would say this is usually, but not necessarily the case, that uttering "I think p" entails thinking about thinking p. In the same way, uttering "p" usually, but not always, entails thinking p. But this does not change the meaning of the utterances. "p" means "p", not "I think p", even if uttering "p" usually entails thinking p. We need to keep the meaning of utterances and their side-effects distinct.

- Okay, but then what would be a case where one utters "I think p" without thinking about thinking p? Or where one utters "p" without thinking p? I can't think of any such cases.

I have in mind speaking in a language you don't understand. Speaking on a subject you don't understand. Lying.

Also, you might include cases such as LLM speech.

I have in mind speaking in a language you don't understand. Speaking on a subject you don't understand. Lying. — hypericin

Let's revisit your original claim (my bolding):

accurately notating that you are indeed thinking-p, and reflecting on your own thought, can both be represented as "I think p" in English. — hypericin

If someone lies or says something they do not understand then we cannot "accurately notate that they are indeed thinking-p." My "utterance" was meant to track that idea of yours wherein we accurately notate. Whether one can inaccurately notate "I think p" without self-consciously thinking p is sort of an interesting question, but it looks to be beside the point.

So if the three cases you gave are all inaccurate notations of "I think p," then it looks like they won't function as counterexamples.

So if the three cases you gave are all inaccurate notations of "I think p," then it looks like they won't function as counterexamples. — Leontiskos

That's fine. I don't want to overfocus on natural language, and I think the sentence of mine you quoted was mistaken. For one, self-consciously thinking p would be rendered as something like "I'm thinking about thinking p", not "I think p". So, I don't think there is necessarily ambiguity there.

The confusion is a philosophical one, not a linguistic one. There are three distinct propositions under consideration:

1. p
2. I think P
3. I think about thinking about P

Rodl says, afaict, only 2 and 3 can occur in thought. Pat's confusion is conflating 2 with 3.

@Mww

This is how it strikes me as well, though Mww has certainly brought out details in the Kantian scheme that are more, well, detailed, than what Rodl provides. (And I'm looking forward to Mww's response, if they have the time, to my question about whether "thought" should be understood as mental product or propositional content in Kant.) But your comparison of the two passages allows us to take a breath, and a step back, and ask, What is our target here? What are we aiming to understand?

For myself, I am always curious to improve my understanding of Kant, and in general to understand any interesting philosophical position at the level of detail. But the larger issue has to do with consciousness and thinking -- how our thoughts connect the world (objectivity) and ourselves (self-consciousness). I want to say that Kant and Rodl are in agreement here -- details of terminology aside, they both present the same picture. “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them,” says Kant of the representations given in intuition. Why does he not say "in one consciousness"? Why "self-consciousness"? I suggest this is because he would endorse Rodl's view: "Being self-conscious, thought is thought in the first person: I think." Put Kant and Rodl in an ideal room together and I have no doubt they'd argue the details for hours, but also recognize the common conception that unites them.

We can worry about the best ways to use terms like "representation", "conception," "thought", "judgment" et al. -- and these are perfectly good worries, especially if we were all as erudite as Mww in Kantian matters. I'm just trying to pull our focus toward what this entire issue opposes, namely a philosophical view that claims that objectivity is strictly a matter of what is "out there," and that there is a clear separation between what I judge and the act of judging it. It is in this context that the entire fraught issue of "I think" can most usefully be considered.

How would you categorize an animal you have not seen before but looks like an animal you have seen before?
— Harry Hindu

This is contradictory. If I haven’t seen a thing before, I can’t say it looks like one I have. If I’ve not seen this cat, but I’ve seen those cats, I’m justified in characterizing the unseen as the same kind as the seen. The difference is, in the first the thing is undetermined, in the second the thing is determined as cat. — Mww

Strange. I posed the same question in the exact same way to ChatGPT and it did not think it was a contradiction. It understood the question as I intended on the first try. Either you are intentionally being obtuse or you're less intelligent than artificial intelligence.

If you encounter an unfamiliar animal that resembles an animal you've seen before, you would likely categorize it based on similar physical features or behaviors. This process involves analogical reasoning, where you relate the unknown animal to known categories based on observed similarities. Here's how it works:

Visual Comparison: You compare features such as size, shape, fur, scales, or feathers. For instance:

If it has feathers and wings, you might categorize it as a bird.
If it has four legs, fur, and a tail, you might think of it as a mammal.
Behavioral Clues: You observe its actions, such as flying, swimming, or climbing, to relate it to known animals with similar behaviors.

Habitat Context: You consider the environment where you see the animal. For example, an animal in water might lead you to think of fish or amphibians.

Scientific Classification Framework: Even without formal training, humans intuitively use a simplified version of taxonomic classification, grouping animals by broad categories (e.g., birds, reptiles, mammals).

Trial-and-Error Refinement: If the initial categorization doesn't seem to fit (e.g., a mammal-like animal lays eggs), you might refine your understanding, possibly creating a new subcategory.

In essence, you'd rely on existing mental schemas and adapt them to fit the new information, aligning your understanding of the unknown with the known. — ChatGPT

What I don't see here is any use of language being necessary (like, "I think...") in the perceiving and the interpreting of our experiences.

What key characteristics do they share to then place them in the same visual category?
— Harry Hindu

That condition belongs to sensation, not cognition. For different things be placed in the same visual category is for each to have congruent visual representation. — Mww

Yet you just described the visual representations as conceptions and the act of categorizing as cognizing here:

The quantity of conceptions that sufficiently correspond with the original experience. Those conceptions that do not sufficiently correspond are those which tell me I’m justified in cognizing a different version of the original experience; those that do not correspond at all tells me I’m not justified in cognizing a cat at all. — Mww

Categorization is a type of cognition. ChatGPT called it "analogical reasoning".

All my cognition includes abstract objects; they are representations. The objects represented in my cognitions are particulars, not universals. — Mww

So when we simulate others' thoughts we are representing universals with universals? Are you not having particular thoughts that I am trying to represent in my mind to get at your particular state of mind? Or maybe everything is both a particular and a universal depending on what (simulated) view you are taking at a given moment.

To translate the mental event thinking-p into propositional form, you must include "I think". — hypericin

Having given this some thought (ha!), I'd say it captures one of Rodl's ideas about self-consciousness provided we're very careful about what "include" means. Rodl is clear that by "include" we can't mean "have a second thought along with p". The nature of the inclusion -- or "accompanying," to use Rodl's preferred term -- is a bone of contention on this thread. Would you like to say more about how you understand "include"?

Let q be any thought….. — J

Nahhhh….I ain’t doin’ that. Language use is tough enough without that nonsense. Sorry.
————-

Sorry for the delay; I changed my mind regarding the type and depth of reply.

As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the 'I think' is thought in every act of thinking. — Wayfarer

…..thinking that things are so….
(is a judgement relative to those things; thinking things, is thought as such)

….as thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think things are so….
(Judgement, with respect to its form, cannot be self-contradictory; if I judge this plate is round it is necessarily valid that I’ve already conceived a thing as conjoined with its shape)
“…. for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect…” B129)

….the “I think” is thought in every act of thinking.
(As thinking that things are so, this thinking, this unity of conceptions, only relates to things judged to be so. “I think” is not to be found in thinking of things, for such act belongs to understanding, but merely represents the consciousness that the unity of conceptions for things which understanding thinks, is given)

If all that Kantian counterargument is the case, and Rödl mandates his metaphysics to be absent the character** of the subject in order to be absolute idealism, he must eliminate the transcendental unity of apperception, which JUST IS the character of the subject in his empirical nature, and in keeping with strict Kantian dualism, his moral disposition being his rational nature.

If “I think” is self-consciousness, and “I think” is thought in every act of thinking, and I am conscious of my act of thinking, which quite obviously is the case, then very idea of self-consciousness as underlaying the subjective character has lost its validity, the character of the subject disappears, and that particular condition for absolute idealism is true.
**ibid, 1.2, pg 4, and others
—————-

The unity of apperception, represented by “I think”, makes explicit the presence of representations, insofar as “I think”, by assertion, must be able to accompany all of them. In the proposition, As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the 'I think' is thought in every act of thinking, there doesn’t appear to be any representations. That was a general statement, having nothing given as cognized, so…..what is contained therein for “I think” to accompany?

I don’t fathom a connection between accompanying all my representations and accompanying all my thoughts, with an identical self-consciousness.

“…. Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representation to an object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself. (…)

The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception. (…)

The synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object for me; because in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness. This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for it states nothing more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to connect them, as my representation with the identical self, and so to unite them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the general expression, “I think.” B137-139

Condition of all cognition, of all thought, if an analytical principle, explicates necessity; must be able to accompany is because necessity has already been given. As well, condition for, as analytical principle, is systemically antecedent to that which is conditioned by it.

Ya know….the deeper we go the cloudier it gets. Not sure there are any A-HA!!! moments here.

Either you are intentionally being obtuse or you're less intelligent than artificial intelligence. — Harry Hindu

…..and with that, I’m out.

Would you like to say more about how you understand "include"? — J

I mean include in a textual proposition describing my mental state .

If I think p, in response to "what is going on in your head", I must include "I think" in my response, if I am to be strictly accurate: "I think p". "p" alone will not suffice.

In this sense, "I think" is always bound to any proposition that is thought.

I don't think this is vacuous or tautological either. "P" strictly speaking cannot occur in a brain. What can occur is a mental perspective on p. Given any proposition p, each of us considering it will mentality instantiate it in our own way. Rather than p, thinking p, the thought of p, is what is going on. This all happens without necessarily self consciously considering the thought of p itself.

Let q be any thought…..
— J

Nahhhh….I ain’t doin’ that. Language use is tough enough without that nonsense. Sorry. — Mww

No problem, but sometime I'd love to hear why you think it's nonsense. Sounds as radical as Rodl!

Oh, no real reason. It’s just that’s not the way humans normally do things.

I'm just trying to pull our focus toward what this entire issue opposes, namely a philosophical view that claims that objectivity is strictly a matter of what is "out there," and that there is a clear separation between what I judge and the act of judging it. It is in this context that the entire fraught issue of "I think" can most usefully be considered. — J

Agree.

Thanks for your input, as always. I think I will continue with this book now, having previously been having second thoughts about it.

…..and with that, I’m out. — Mww

Redundant information. I already knew you weren't in it to begin with, which was the point I was making.

For one, self-consciously thinking p would be rendered as something like "I'm thinking about thinking p", not "I think p". — hypericin

If someone says "I think p" they are thinking p self-consciously. This seems pretty basic, but perhaps you are thinking in extraordinarily mundane terms instead of philosophical terms. For example, perhaps you think that someone who says, "I think Putin is a nut," is not thinking self-consciously. That may be, but the I think of Kant or Rodl is not based in that sort of off-the-cuff, half-conscious utterance. In that half-conscious sense, thinking p and saying "I think p" would be exactly the same.

For example, perhaps you think that someone who says, "I think Putin is a nut," is not thinking self-consciously. That may be, but the I think of Kant or Rodl is not based in that sort of off-the-cuff, half-conscious utterance. — Leontiskos

Clearly not, the "I think" of common speech self-attributes or weakens a claim, it doesn't reference consciousness in any way. What I'm pointing out is that language itself isn't the source of this confusion, since "I'm thinking about thinking p" is available if we ever need to point out we are self-consciously reflecting on our thought.

If someone says "I think p" they are thinking p self-consciously. This seems pretty basic — Leontiskos

Not really, since "I think" as a attributer/weakener dominates English usage, any other use is very unusual and requires clarification. Far from being learned in either philosopher's work, I nonetheless see two possibilities for a "philosophical" "I think".

1: Thinking p.
2: Self consciously thinking p.

Given what was posted in the op, I favor 1, at least for Rodl.

Claiming that stating 1 immediately leads to 2 muddies the water. Even if this were so, this doesn't change the meaning of 1. Especially since we are speaking philosophically, not over the dinner table.

Not really, since "I think" as a attributer/weakener dominates English usage, any other use is very unusual and requires clarification. Far from being learned in either philosopher's work, I nonetheless see two possibilities for a "philosophical" "I think". — hypericin

My take: If Jones says “I think p,” Jones is conscious of his own thinking of p, and is therefore self-conscious. Maybe he says that he thinks without realizing that he thinks, but that is what would be unusual. Generally if I say that I am doing something I realize that I am doing it, and this form of self-narration constitutes a form of self-consciousness. See also my post <here>.

You are effectively pointing to a kind of slang that has become very common, where someone who is very unsure of p and is therefore wary of saying, “I know p,” will instead resort to saying, “I think p,” which means, “I have a mere opinion that p is true, but my opinion may well be wrong.” If you want, you can take my word that the OP is not about that sort of weak opinion. I don’t know that I will say more, as I don’t want to belabor the point.

Chapter 3, Denial of Self-Consciousness, 3.1 Knowledge of Self-Consciousness.

The chapter re-states that judgment is inherently self-conscious, meaning that when one judges, they are aware of their own act of judging. 'This is so because judgment is self-conscious: in judging what I do, I think myself judging it. The I judge is inside what I judge' (p38).This self-consciousness implies that judgment cannot be separated into force and content, as doing so leads to confusion.

He anticipates a critic, who says that judgment is a propositional attitude where the act of assenting a proposition is separate from the proposition itself. This objection assumes that self-consciousness is a secondary, reflective act (e.g., “I am judging that p”) rather than something inherent in judgment.

Rödl begins his counterargument by rejecting the demand for further arguments or proofs of his claim. He argues: If judgment is self-conscious, then this is something already known in every act of judgment. It is not a hypothesis or assumption that needs external validation. (And besides, what could be external to that act of judgement? This is elaborated more fully in later comments on Nagel's 'thoughts we can't get outside of'.)

The act of judgment inherently involves stating its validity. This is not a separate thought but part of the judgment itself.

So - ask a critic who is defending the separation of force and content: 'Do you really think so?' If the opponent continues to insist on the force-content distinction, they are still engaging in an act of judgment, which inherently involves self-consciousness by replying 'Yes, I really think so'—thus affirming Rödl’s claim that self-consciousness is intrinsic to judgment,

Bottom of page 39 he introduces the 'science without contrary' which will be elaborated in Chap 4:

The term “science” in its traditional use signifies an articulated body of general knowledge. This is the meaning of “episteme” in ancient Greek and the meaning of “Wissenschaft” in German. As what I say about judgment is to be knowledge, self-conscious, then the science of judgment is peculiar: it is the science without contrary.

If judgment is self-conscious, then the first and fundamental apprehension of an act as a judgment is the act so apprehended. The first use of the concept of judgment, in which the science of it must be grounded, is the self-consciousness of judgment; it is the 'I judge'. The science of judgment is nothing other than the articulation of the self-consciousness of judgment. And what is contained in the self-consciousness of judgment anyone always already knows: as the I judge is inside p, inside the object of judgment, judging anything at all is thinking I judge. It follows that the science of judgment, articulating the I judge, says, says only, what has no contrary. For there is no judging counter to what is known in any judgment. The science of judgment does not stake out a position, located in a space of positions structured by relations of exclusion or inclusion. It says only what anyone always already knows, knows insofar as she judges at all.

The question might be asked, what of incorrect judgement? Rödl does not imply that every judgment is infallible or correct. Instead, the self-consciousness of judgment means that in the act of judging, we take it to be right to judge as we do, and this act itself contains an awareness of its validity. When a judgment is incorrect, it does not negate the self-conscious aspect of judgment; rather, it indicates that the grounds or reasons upon which the judgment was based were flawed or incomplete. In cases of incorrect judgments, the self-consciousness is still present in the sense that the individual believes their judgment to be valid at the time of making it. The error arises from a misalignment between the judgment and the reality it seeks to represent, not from a lack of self-consciousness in the act of judging itself.

Thanks for the excellent synopsis. Here's what I've realized about Rodl's claims here:

On p. 38, in laying out the objection of his critic, he says (speaking for the critic):

My thought of judging that things are so is a different act of the mind from my judging that they are so. The former is about my judgment, a psychic act, a mental state; the latter, in the usual case, is not; it is about something that does not involve my judgment, my mind, my psyche. It is about a mind-independent reality. — Rodl, 38, my emphases

Now combine this with what Rodl tells us about his terminology:

I use "judgment" and "thought" interchangeably, following ordinary usage: "He thinks that things are so" represents him as judging, as holding true, that things are so. — Rodl, 4

(Whether this is the only ordinary usage is debatable, but let that go. We're trying to understand Rodl's scheme.)

So Rodl believes that the force/content distinction is a discrimination between a "psychic act" or "mental event" and a "mind-independent reality" that does not involve "my mind, my psyche." It is this that he denies.

Earlier, I suggested distinguishing two uses of "thought". Thought1 is meant to refer to what Rodl is calling a mental event. Thought2 refers to the (somewhat mysterious) propositional content that is the subject of a thought1, and, as Rodl says, is understood to be independent in some important sense from any particular mental event.

What Rodl is claiming, using the synonymy of "thought" and "judgment," is that thinking that things are so is not different from being conscious or aware of so thinking. So the million-dollar question is, When I think about my judgment, which we know is a thought1 (a mental event), is my new thought about that judgment also a thought1? I think much of Rodl's thesis rests on denying this. Self-consciousness has got to be a thought2 item, something "accompanying" any thought1, not an additional simultaneous thought1 (mental event).

One important qualification: As Pat noted in the original OP, one can "think about one's thought" in a perfectly ordinary reflective way, pondering its occurrence, wondering if it's true, etc. Sometimes we do that, sometimes we don't. In doing this, we are engaging in a mental event, a new thought1. That is not the kind of "thinking about thought" that Rodl means, and I certainly wish he had made this clearer from the outset. Or maybe he thought he did, simply by asserting that the "I think" is not a new thought. In any case, we mustn't get confused and say either that we never have a separate, self-reflective thought about thought, or that the ubiquitous "I think" is that kind of thought.

The question might be asked, what of incorrect judgement? — Wayfarer

Your explication here is clear, and we ought to agree with Rodl, regardless of whether we endorse all of his views. Incorrect judgments are not made so by virtue of anything within the act of judging itself, but rather because of the facts on the ground. As you put it,

When a judgment is incorrect, it does not negate the self-conscious aspect of judgment; rather, it indicates that the grounds or reasons upon which the judgment was based were flawed or incomplete. — Wayfarer

Is all this consistent with your understanding of Rodl so far?

What Rodl is claiming, using the synonymy of "thought" and "judgment," is that thinking that things are so is not different from being conscious or aware of so thinking. So the million-dollar question is, When I think about my judgment, which we know is a thought1 (a mental event), is my new thought about that judgment also a thought1? I think much of Rodl's thesis rests on denying this. Self-consciousness has got to be a thought2 item, something "accompanying" any thought1, not an additional simultaneous thought1 (mental event). — J

I think the problem of talking about what is a new 'thought' has to first pass through the issue of the first person being the one making the judgement:

The Fregean account conceives the first-person pronoun as a variety of reference, which singles out an object in a special way, indicated by the phrase, as the one who is affirming the proposition.This alleged manner of singling out an object explodes the conception of thought that it brings to first-person thought: a thought that is of her who affirms it as affirming it contains the subject’s affirmation of it. It is not a proposition. The first-person pronoun is no variety of reference, but an expression of self-consciousness: it signifies the internality to what is thought of its being thought. The Fregean attempts to represent self-consciousness, which dissolves the force-content distinction, as a special content. If we are to understand the first-person pronoun, we must understand self-consciousness. The first step to this is abandoning the force-content distinction. — ibid. page 25

The problem of one thought and then another is a product of the view of propositions Rödl is militating against.

As I think this in the first person, I represent that substance as thinking that she is a human being. That she thinks this is one thing, that she is what she thinks herself to be, another. As we shall see, the semantic framework deriving from Kaplan and Lewis in effect imposes this articulation on first-person thought: she who thinks a first-person thought thinks something of a certain substance, which substance, in a separate thought, she thinks to be herself. — ibid. 27

The isolation of the "private thinker" on page 23 culminates in this rejection of the "affirming subject":

In this sense, all propositions will be related to the one who thinks them, and thus in this sense, it may be said that all propositions are first-person propositions. This is a technical ploy; it has no philosophical significance. In the same way, all sentences may be treated as bearing a tense, even if they are tenseless. They will turn out to be true at all times if they are true at one. — ibid. page 28

The discussion at this point reminds me of a passage in the Theaetetus where true and false opinions are compared:

Soc Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

Theaet. How do you define it?

Soc: As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it? — Plato, Theaetetus, 189e4, translated by Fowler

Rödl is speaking more strictly about what Plato also recognizes as a limit to description.

So the million-dollar question is, When I think about my judgment, which we know is a thought1 (a mental event), is my new thought about that judgment also a thought1? I think much of Rodl's thesis rests on denying this. Self-consciousness has got to be a thought2 item, something "accompanying" any thought1, not an additional simultaneous thought1 (mental event). — J

I think you're being caught in a kind of recursion which is central to this whole argument and in so doing trying to reinstate the very distinction which Rödl is criticizing. The force-content distinction is a close parallel to the distinction you're trying to draw between thought1 (the act) and thought2 (the content). For Rödl, these are not separable aspects of judgment. When I judge that p (e.g., "the sky is blue"), the act of judging (I think) is not external to the content (p) but is inherently part of it ('internal' to it). Judgment is a unified act that includes both the self-conscious activity of thinking and the propositional content. So I think you're wanting to maintain the division between the subjective act and the objective content.

I think the error lies in the attempt to objectify thought (although that is not Rödl's terminology or method.) But it relates to his later point from Thomas Nagel about 'thoughts we can't get outside of'. Nagel emphasizes that there are perspectives—like the validity of reason or the unity of thought—that we cannot evaluate "from the outside" because they form the very framework within which all thinking and evaluation occur.

This is what ties into the 'science without contrary' that is subject of the next chapter.

But it relates to his later point from Thomas Nagel about 'thoughts we can't get outside of'. Nagel emphasizes that there are perspectives—like the validity of reason or the unity of thought—that we cannot evaluate "from the outside" because they form the very framework within which all thinking and evaluation occur. — Wayfarer

So, what do you make of Rödl's statement that Nagel is making a similar mistake? (as pointed to previously}.

So, what do you make of Rödl's statement that Nagel is making a similar mistake? (as pointed to previously}. — Paine

I've yet to absorb his criticism of Nagel. But the reason he brings Nagel in, is that they start from a similar ground, is it not? But, we'll get to that in Chapter 5.

Very good! I can't give this the response it deserves right now, but I will, next time I'm online here.

My thought of judging that things are so is a different act of the mind from my judging that they are so. The former is about my judgment, a psychic act, a mental state; the latter, in the usual case, is not; it is about something that does not involve my judgment, my mind, my psyche. It is about a mind-independent reality.
— Rodl, 38, my emphases — J

Hmm.

If someone disagrees with this, if they perhaps insist that their thought of judging that things are so just is judging that things are so...

What are we to do? How are we to settle such an issue? Are we to say they are mistaken? Wrong? Misunderstanding the issue?

Is it not at all possible that one person be correct in holding to the first view for their mind, while another is correct tin holding to the second view, for their own mind? Why presume that all minds function in the same way in this regard?

Why presume there is even some fact of the matter?

Are you saying this in response to actually reading the book or stating an opinion in general about such attempts?

Hmm — Banno

Note the passage you quote was given as an objection to Rödl.

Why presume that all minds function in the same way in this regard? — Banno

“Banno goes PoMo”.