I certainly did, you're asserting that the mind has no affect on the physical that's simply not true, from my position, as the mind incites physical production within the body.

Mind and Body are parallel heterogeneous productions born of the same cause: the CNS. That doesn't equate to monism.

I certainly did, you're asserting that the mind has no affect on the physical that's simply not true, from my position, as the mind incites physical production within the body.

Mind and Body are parallel heterogeneous productions born of the same cause: the CNS. That doesn't equate to monism. — DifferentiatingEgg

But to you, the mind is simply the arrangement of physical. That certainly is monism. And I didn't talk about the mind and its role in the body but the experience.

The problem here is you're unaware of reification. Since you don't know what Emergence is, you equate it to monism...

Fortunately for me there's not a big empty internal cavernous extra dimension space within the human body where the mind is. Thoughts don't exist in a vacuum. There's a physical object utilizing the laws of physics to create everything that occurs in your mind. Every thought you have is physically tradeable by an EKG... thought requires physics and biology to work because it's substantial. Doesn't mean thought is a lego block in my mind.

Thought isn't a thing that occurs freely.

Thought isn't a thing that occurs freely. — DifferentiatingEgg

But it can.

Since you don't know what Emergence is, you equate it to monism... — DifferentiatingEgg

I know what emergence is and I think we discuss the consequence of accepting that emergence of consciousness from the physical, namely epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism is unavoidable if you accept that the physical move on its own based on the laws of nature and consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. Consciousness is a phenomenon and a problem within materialism but it is not a substance. Therefore, even if we accept that one day we can explain the emergence of consciousness and solve the Hard Problem of consciousness, we are still dealing with monism since consciousness is not a substance.

Back to my question now: Accepting that experience is real, how the experience can affect physical?

Nonsense. Abstractions do not "exist" (A. Meinong) and are not "subject to change". Thus your conclusions are not valid.
— 180 Proof
I am not talking about the abstract objects here. I am talking about experience. Are you denying that you experience and your experience is not subject to change? — MoK

I didn't talk about the mind and its role in the body but the experience. — MoK

Define "experience". A boulder rolling down a mountain has "experienced" the roll, and has been altered in the process. Similarly our "minds" are altered by sensory perceptions and by its own inner processes.

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change — MoK

Accepting that experience is real, how the experience can affect physical? — MoK

"Experience" is a feature (output?) of "mind" and mental and physical – the former either an epiphenomenon or emergent (strange loop-like) from the latter – are complementary descriptions of the manifest activities of – or ways of talking about – natural beings (i.e. property dualism¹). For example, both a stone and a human are manifestly physical but humans manifest, or exhibit, purposeful activity that we describe as mental whereas stones do not.

A more fundamental, or metaphysical, version of property dualism is (Spinoza's) parallelism²: physical and mental are conceived of as parallel aspects of every natural being (not to be confused with panpsychism or epiphenomenalism) which do not interact causally (or in any other way) and we attribute to each natural being to the degree either or both aspects are actively exhibited.

So whether a mental property¹ or mental aspect², it doesn't make sense to conceive of "experience" as an independent causal entity (re: Descartes' interaction problem ... disembodied mind).

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism [1]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism [2]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-aspect_theory [2]

Re: "experience" ...

What is non sequiturs here? — MoK

:roll:

I believe in De Broglie–Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics, so no Schrodinger cat paradox, no particle-wave duality, Wheeler's delayed-choice experiment is explained well, etc. — MoK

:sweat:

Emergence doesn't end up in Epiphenominalism

Define "experience". — Relativist

A conscious event that contains information.

Similarly our "minds" are altered by sensory perceptions and by its own inner processes. — Relativist

What do you mean by the mind here?

"Experience" is a feature (output?) of "mind" and mental and physical – the former either an epiphenomenon or emergent (strange loop-like) from the latter – are complementary descriptions of the manifest activities of – or ways of talking about – natural beings (i.e. property dualism¹). — 180 Proof

What do you mean by the mind here? Property dualism explains the experience's emergence (weak emergence) but cannot explain how the experience can affect the physical. Therefore, we are dealing with epiphenomenalism.

A more fundamental, or metaphysical, version of property dualism is (Spinoza's) parallelism²: — 180 Proof

You don't want me to believe in parallelism, whether the Spinaza, Leibniz, or Malebranche versions. Do you?

physical and mental are conceived of as parallel aspects of every natural being (not to be confused with panpsychism or epiphenomenalism) which do not interact causally (or in any other way) and we attribute to each natural being to the degree either or both aspects are actively exhibited. — 180 Proof

We know that change in the physical is due to experience. Spinoza's version of parallelism does not explain this since he was not aware of the change in the texture of the brain due to experience. It does not explain how experience is possible; it just says that it is.

So whether a mental property¹ or mental aspect², it doesn't make sense to conceive of "experience" as an independent causal entity — 180 Proof

Experience is a separate thing. It is not the direct cause of change in physical but the change in physical as I mentioned in OP is due to it.

(re: Descartes' interaction problem ... disembodied mind). — 180 Proof

I am not defending Descartes here. I have my version of substance dualism.

Emergence doesn't end up in Epiphenomenalism. — DifferentiatingEgg

It does. If not please explain how experience can cause a change in matter considering that the state of matter is subject to change by the laws of nature and experience is not a substance.

I put "minds" in quotes. I don't believe a "mind" is an object that exists. Rather, a brain engages in mental activities (perceptions, moderating between stimulus and response intentional behaviors, deliberations, learning...). IMO, experience is the constant flow of these mental activites, which entails changes in the brain

Now you tell me what you mean by "experiences".

I put "minds" in quotes. I don't believe a "mind" is an object that exists. Rather, a brain engages in mental activities (perceptions, moderating between stimulus and response intentional behaviors, deliberations, learning...). IMO, experience is the constant flow of these mental activites, which entails changes in the brain — Relativist

I have three questions for you: 1) How experience can affect the brain knowing that it is not a substance, 2) Do you believe that physical motion is deterministic and is only based on the laws of nature? and 3) If yes, then how could the brain be affected by experience?

Now you tell me what you mean by "experiences". — Relativist

A conscious event that is perceived by the Mind and contains information.

I have three questions for you: 1) How experience can affect the brain knowing that it is not a substance, 2) Do you believe that physical motion is deterministic and is only based on the laws of nature? and 3) If yes, then how could the brain be affected by experience? — MoK

1)Your question reifies "experience". The brain is changed by new perceptions and the act of thinking.
2) Yes to laws of nature, but there may be some indeterministic elements, due to quantum collapse.
3) See #1, and (finally) provide your definition of "experience".

experience doesn't need to be a substance to alter us... lol wild assumption but okay...

"Experience alters us, as all nutrition, which does not aim merely to conserve, as all physiologist know..."

Experience alters neuroplasticity and neuroplasticity reinforces itself.

Emergence is when something emerges between dimensions...Emergence comes from thebidea of our extremely fractal biology... and we can show that the patterns of emergence of a fractal are between dimensions.

If you take a line and double it you have 2 copies ... 2¹ ... take a square and double the sides of it you end up with 4 copies ... 2² ... take a cube and double the sides of it and you end up with 8 copies or ... 2³ ...

The line is 1 dimension 2¹
The square is 2 dimensions 2²
The cube is 3 dimensions 2³

We see that when we double the sides of something we end up with number raised to some power depending on the dimensions of the object...

So we end up with 2^d = number of sides after the doubling process

where d is the dimension of the object

Take the Sierpenski's Gasket, a fractal. Every time you double the sides you get 3 copies... so we end up with an equation of:

2^d = 3

To solve for d utilize the property of logarithms ... ln of 3 divided by the ln of 2 = d
d = 1.5 something something...

Thus fractal emergence is something that occurs between dimensions... a 3d body with fractal biology with have emergent properties that exist nested between 2d and 3d... so it's a phenomenon that occurs nested within our fractal biology.

1)Your question reifies "experience". The brain is changed by new perceptions and the act of thinking. — Relativist

So you agree that the brain changes by new experiences, whether the experience is perception, thoughts, etc. You however didn't answer my question: How could the experience change the brain knowing that the experience is not a substance?

2) Yes to laws of nature, but there may be some indeterministic elements, due to quantum collapse. — Relativist

I think the De Broglie–Bohm interpretation is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics because it is paradox-free. The wave function of the universe is not subject to collapse in this interpretation so everything changes according to laws of physics deterministically.

3) See #1 — Relativist

But, that leads to overdetermination in the state of matter. If the change in the state of the brain is determined by laws of physics then it cannot be subject to change because of experience. So, we either have horizontal causation by which the state of matter determines the state of matter later or we have vertical causation but we cannot have both because of overdetermination. Horizontal causation however leads to epiphenomenalism in which no room is left that experience can change the state of matter. This is against common sense so we are left with vertical causation.

and (finally) provide your definition of "experience". — Relativist

I already did: A conscious event that is perceived by the Mind and contains information.

experience doesn't need to be a substance to alter us... lol wild assumption but okay... — DifferentiatingEgg

So do you agree or disagree? If you disagree then what is the experience to you?

Experience alters neuroplasticity and neuroplasticity reinforces itself. — DifferentiatingEgg

How could experience change the brain if it is not a substance?

How can seeing something truamatize a person?

How can seeing something traumatize a person? — DifferentiatingEgg

The change in the state of matter is due to experience. I guess we agree with this. But experience cannot change the state of matter since it is not a substance. Therefore, the Mind exists with the ability to experience and cause matter.

The mind exists within the flesh.

The mind exists within the flesh. — DifferentiatingEgg

What is your definition of the mind?

You defined "experience" as:

A conscious event that is perceived by the Mind and contains information. — MoK

You're defining "experience" with more vague terms: "Event", "conscious event", "information".

So you agree that the brain changes by new experiences, whether the experience is perception, thoughts, etc. You however didn't answer my question: How could the experience change the brain knowing that the experience is not a substance? — MoK

The brain changes due to perception (sensory and bodily) and due to thoughts. This is all there is to mental experience. You're treating "experiences" as something more than the brain changes. This is the source of your error in claiming there's overdetermination.

I think the De Broglie–Bohm interpretation is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics because it is paradox-free. — MoK

What paradox is entailed by an actual quantum collapse from entanglement?

the mind is an emergent property within our flesh. That doesn't mean it's seperate. It grows out of... there's unconscious and consciousness. We can see there are gradations from the body of purely structural for Form...then it becomes more superfluous...through the CNS and unconscious, and then, thoughts arise from the unconscious body into the consciousness... consciousness is perhaps the internalization of our senses...

You're defining "experience" with more vague terms: "Event", "conscious event", "information". — Relativist

It is not vague. By event, I mean something that happens. A conscious event therefore is something that happens and affects our awareness. And finally, by the information, I mean a quality of conscious event that informs us in a certain way. Think of experiencing a red rose for example. That is a conscious event since it affects your awareness. The experience however has certain qualities like the redness of the rose, its shape, etc. These qualities come in a single package that I call information.

By the way, what is your definition of experience?

The brain changes due to perception (sensory and bodily) and due to thoughts. This is all there is to mental experience. You're treating "experiences" as something more than the brain changes. This is the source of your error in claiming there's overdetermination. — Relativist

I think I was clear in OP. The experience is due to matter and change in matter is due to experience. But we cannot equate matter or change in matter with experience. Could we? The experience is a phenomenon that we cannot deny it. It is however not matter or change in matter for sure since matter and its change have clear definitions that cannot be equated to experience.

the mind is an emergent property within our flesh. — DifferentiatingEgg

I asked for a definition of the mind. Saying that the mind is an emergent property is not informative enough.

read the rest then?

read the rest then? — DifferentiatingEgg

I read the rest. But you are talking about conscious and unconscious minds. They need their own separate definitions.

An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories).

But we cannot equate matter or change in matter with experience. Could we? — MoK

Yes, we can. An unperceived event is not an experience. Perceptions entail physical changes to the brain. The experience is therefore a physical phenomenon.

It seems that you're trying to disprove physicalism by using phrasing that you interpret in ways inconsistent with physicalism.

An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories). — Relativist

You need to define perception. The perceptions are not changes in the brain. The rest of your definition is ambiguous at best.

Yes, we can. An unperceived event is not an experience. Perceptions entail physical changes to the brain. The experience is therefore a physical phenomenon. — Relativist

Matter by definition is a substance that undergoes changes governed by the laws of physics. It seems that you are unfamiliar with the Hard Problem of consciousness. Experience is not a physical phenomenon since matter according to physicalism works on its own without any need for consciousness.

It seems that you're trying to disprove physicalism by using phrasing that you interpret in ways inconsistent with physicalism. — Relativist

I am defending a new version of substance dualism and I am attacking physicalism for two main reasons, 1) The Hard Problem of consciousness and 2) The common sense that tells us that the change in physical is due to experience.

I am defending a new version of substance dualism — MoK

Basically, more or less you think the mind exists free of the body.