There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I believe that for Bertrand Russell, there is something that is an apple and is red.

Being an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication.

Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?

It is not as if something exists and then at a future date a predication is attached.

Being an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication. — RussellA

Agree. Not-being also seems to be a predicate, so it is true that I am not batman, but not true that Santa is not batman, at least if EPP holds

Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?

You're contrasting this with 'prior', right? It is not an assertion of temporal ordering. That just means that predication cannot apply to a nonexistent thing, not that the predication has some sort of temporal confinement to the duration of the existence. Some things don't exist in time. Is 17 prime? EPP says only if 17 exists. 'Contemporaneous' says only during times that it exists, a fairly meaningless concept.

Meinong says 17 is prime, period, regardless of its ontology. Santa is fat. Prove Meinong wrong.

I think this is a categorical or contextual error. Things that exist I would say have real predications and fictions which are constructs of the mind have predications also, but those predicates are every bit the imaginary construct that the fictional object is. An apple exists and it's predications are a matter of experience. Santa exists but only as a fictional object or construct of a mind and therefore Santa's predicates are known through the fiction and not experience. The properties of "real" objects and fictional objects are not the same category of things. They both exist but in different contexts. I know you didn't want to hear this kind of analysis but I think it's relevant to your following paragraph.

I looked through the SEP article and Santa shows up frequently as an example of properties being assigned to something presumed nonexistent, but by exactly what definition of 'existence' is being used when making this presumption if this property makes no meaningful difference? If Santa can be fat without existing, then it does not follow that Santa exists from the presumption of his girth. So "I think, therefore I am" becomes a non-sequitur in the absence of the subject principle. — noAxioms

I think you conclusion is correct.

Things that exist I would say have real predications [sosein und sein]^ and fictions which are constructs of the mind have predications also, but those predicates are every bit the imaginary construct [sosein ohne sein]^ that the fictional object is [ ... ] The properties of "real" objects and fictional objects are not the same category of things. — philosch

:up: :up:

Thus, we can sensibly imagine and talk about fictions (or lies).

(à la Meinong)^

As you're demonstrating, it's possible to make a sensible recommendation about how to talk about existence, and make some further distinctions based upon it, concerning e.g. the kinds of existence and how they might connect, structurally.

But the question is, Is there anything further to be said in favor of some particular recommendation? That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? If there was -- if there was a correct way to conceive of existence, and/or talk about it -- how would we show this?

Isn't Sherlock Holmes a genius? Hannibal Lecter a cannibal? What about if I had a scary dream? Do I really mean I had a scary sequence of brain states? But who talks like that? It doesn't even make sense. Brain states aren't the kind of thing that can be scary (except maybe for ones that show you have a tumor).

That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? If there was -- if there was a correct way to conceive of existence, and/or talk about it -- how would we show this? — J

I can't discern what it is you're asking for: a conceptual definition? or a logical demonstration / mathematical proof? or a fundamental physical theory? :chin:

But the question is, Is there anything further to be said in favor of some particular recommendation? That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? If there was -- if there was a correct way to conceive of existence, and/or talk about it -- how would we show this? — J

If I understand what you are asking my answer would be no, there is no "correct" way, there is no truth of the matter, there would be different ways, each with more or less utility depending on the context of each. As I mentioned in another post, Sean Carroll does a good job of talking about this kind of categorical situation in his discussion of "free will" along with other constructs that appear to be contradictory in terms of what they say about existence. We cannot escape subjectivity which is absolutely bounded by context. His book The Big Picture does not address free will but he does introduce this categorical or context based problem we seem to have in these discussions.

The only way to conceive of or talk about a "truth of the matter" would be to have some absolute context or perspective which is primary or absolute itself and that's illusory. I don't believe there could be an absolute context, the terms are almost mutually contradictory. Think about it. How could there be an absolute "perspective"? The word is necessarily contingent or dependent on it's subjective position or location or point of view. Can't ever be absolute. There cannot be a "truth of the matter" that is absolute and not contingent upon the category that it occupies.(relativity)

Any of the above, really. And, clearly, I'm doubtful if my wish can be granted.

Joe offers a particular doctrine about existence, Mary offers a different one. Is there anything either can appeal to, in order to determine whether one is correct? Let's just pick "conceptual definition" from your list. Would Joe and Mary be able to consult such a definition in order to resolve a disagreement between them?

If I understand what you are asking my answer would be no, there is no "correct" way, there is no truth of the matter, there would be different ways, each with more or less utility depending on the context of each. — philosch

That's about how I see it. The term "existence" simply doesn't lend itself to being identified with some particular thing/event/item, which could be checked in the case of disagreement, in the way that, say, "table" does.

That's about how I see it. The term "existence" simply doesn't lend itself to being identified with some particular thing/event/item, which could be checked in the case of disagreement, in the way that, say, "table" does. — J

Yes we are essentially agreeing that there is no objective reality that makes any sense with regard to human consciousness. We have no way of experiencing or expressing anything truly objectively. We can however be more or less close to objective for a given categorical perspective.(context)

Yes we are essentially agreeing that there is no objective reality that makes any sense with regard to human consciousness. — philosch

Yikes, no! I'm speaking about a particularly troublesome term -- "existence" or "being" -- that has no clearly correct usage. But the vast majority of our terms do, and it is objective reality that makes this so. For that matter, there is probably something objectively real about whatever it is that philosophers want to call "existence," it's just that the language we use is so imprecise and contentious that it would be better to describe it another way -- structurally or mathematically, perhaps.

Yikes, no! I'm speaking about a particularly troublesome term -- "existence" or "being" -- that has no clearly correct usage — J

Didn't mean to scare you, lol. It's not objective reality that makes it so, it's a common language and vernacular. You can define objective reality in such a way that it may theoretically exist but we could never know it. We are 100% subjective beings. No part of any human knowledge or understanding or experience can be a part of or close to an "absolute objective reality". Our experience of the universe around us is subjective by definition. It is not possible, by experience or thought, to escape our subjective "selves". Buddhists might argue that one can; by meditating one can shed the "self" and experience the truly objective reality or the divine or the ground of being, call it anything you like. I can't say that's not possible just not likely.

Dr. Donald Hoffman(see Lex Freidman podcast 293) theorizes using the latest in theoretical physics and mathematics that space-time is dead as a place where objective reality might have been and that it's somewhat obvious that we have evolved precisely to NOT be able to see objective reality as it wouldn't allow us to survive very well in the space-time reality we do see. So if he is correct I would say what we call objective reality can be considered true in the context of human experience but it's not true in an absolute sense. This isn't that big a deal though as everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. What I mean to say is that practically speaking there could be an objective reality for space-time on which we could rely even if it isn't absolute, for our purposes it would be.

Existence is another one of those concepts as well. We exist beyond spacetime like everything else in our universe(other dimensions beyond space-time) but we have no way of even being able to grasp it even as a concept, let alone experience it directly. Consciousness is another one of those concepts. It appears to be an emergent property in spacetime but we can't even understand that very well. So every single word or concept that a human mind has ever uttered had it's meaning derived subjectively by a human being and then agreed upon by appealing to shared experience. ALL WORDS are qualifications. The types of words giving us trouble here are the hardest. They are ineffable, or rather they are referencing things that are ineffable.

Didn't mean to scare you, lol. :wink: — philosch

No problem, I scare easily! Had to go to urgent care after reading Derrida.

We are 100% subjective beings. No part of any human knowledge or understanding or experience can be a part of or close to an "absolute objective reality". Our experience of the universe around us is subjective by definition. — philosch

Let's grant, ex hypothesi, the first and the last sentences. Why would the second sentence follow?: that objective reality is unreachable by subjective knowledge? That seems to import a lot of preconceptions about how objectivity and subjectivity relate, preconceptions which to say the least are controversial.

What we call objective reality can be considered true in the context of human experience but it's not true in an absolute sense. — philosch

And that may be good enough. Intersubjectivity often makes more sense than "absolute objectivity." Certainly the idea is good enough to establish the distinction I want to make between ambiguous, controversial terms like "existence" and every-day words for things we can verify. We don't need to engage in a debate about whether a table is "objectively a table," as long as we can agree that, unlike "reality" or "being", we know how to verify whether object X is a table or not. And also, we shouldn't be distracted by the fact that any noun can be subject to bizarre exceptions or quibbles. Again, the point is that the problem with "existence" is not bizarre exceptions to an otherwise clear concept; the baseline concept itself is unclear. So while I agree that there is a sort of continuum of imprecision involving language, as you suggest, it doesn't amount to saying that everything is imprecise (or "subjective") in the same way.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat — noAxioms

What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean?

From SEP - Existence

There are two sets of reasons for denying that existence is a property of individuals. The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. What is the difference between a red apple and a red existing apple? To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties

The thing's existence is prior to any predication to it and so it is incoherent to think of existence as a property had by the thing. This thought is behind Aristotle's thesis that existence is not a further feature of a thing beyond its essence.

Hume argued (in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.6) that there is no impression of existence distinct from the impression of an object, which is ultimately on Hume's view a bundle of qualities.

From Merriam Webster, "prior" may mean i) earlier in time or order ii) taking precedence (as in importance).

For an apple to be red, the apple must exist.

It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added, so meaning i) is not relevant.

In Hume's view, existence is no more than a bundle of properties. Therefore for Hume, ii) is not relevant.

We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties. If we never observed the property red we could never know about the existence of an apple in the world.

In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?

Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?

It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?

I have admittedly been slow to reply to the topic as I am busy looking up pages and trying to not just give flippant replies without thought.

Things that exist I would say have real predications and fictions which are constructs of the mind have predications also, but those predicates are every bit the imaginary construct that the fictional object is. — philosch

OK, but this concerns mental abstractions, something I am trying to exclude per the disclaimer at the bottom of the OP.

Sure. abstractions themselves have predications, as potentially do the things being abstracted. But I am trying to avoid any anthropocentric definition of existence that centers itself on human epistemology and/or experience.

That said, an apple being an apple is a mental construct, as is its redness. It is actually difficult to identify a predicate of anything that is free from human abstraction. OK, 17 is prime, and while being a human discovery, it is not a human designation/predicate.

Santa is another case: Existing only as a mental construct and not in any way that is free from contradiction. Santa is not a possible thing AFAIK, so any predicate of Santa seems necessarily to be a reference to an ideal, not to a Santa. I acknowledge this unavoidability.

Thank you for your input. I have to agree with much that you post.

(à la Meinong)^ — 180 Proof

This got me down the pipe of sosein vs sein. Still not sure if I get it since the difference seems to hinge on a prior agreed state of existence or not, but nobody seems to have answered how that distinction might be made. Who am I to declare the unicorn to not exist? Pretty sure the unicorn doesn't consider me to exist either, so we're even on that score.

A typical sein statement might be "Bob is hungry", which apparently translates to "There exists an x such that x is hungry" which seems to invoke a sort of existential quantification definition of 'exists'. But that definition seems to mean "x is a member of some implied set", a relation.

That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? — J

I suspect no truth of the matter, and the best one can reach for is utility (usefulness). I am trying to explore the options since I find little utility in the typical realist position.

Joe offers a particular doctrine about existence, Mary offers a different one. Is there anything either can appeal to, in order to determine whether one is correct? — J

That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity.

What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean? — RussellA

It seems to mean that predication requires existence. The rejection of the principle that says this is what I'm trying to explore here.
If this holds, the existence itself is not a predicate, but if it doesn't hold, then yes, it becomes just another predicate.
Your SEP quote seems to answer your question, but the temporal definition is not the one being leveraged here.

...The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. — SEP - Existence

With the EPP, existence becomes redundant and adds nothing to a statement. Without EPP, existence needs to be more clearly defined to have meaning, but it seems to be inherited. Existing parents beget existing children, but nonexistent parents beget nonexistent children. The two worlds seem disjoint, but other than that, there seems to be no obvious way to tell the two worlds apart.

It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added.

Got news. Apples turn red after a while and don't start that way any more than I started out as cynical.

We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties.

OK, but I'm not really concerned with knowing about something's existence since I'm not using an epistemic definition of existence. I'm explicitly avoiding it since it's a different path.

In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?

Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. This is a good quote for something like aether theory or Russel's teapot. It has properties, sure, but none of them are experiential.

Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?

This statement doesn't follow if EPP is not presumed, and I'm not presuming it here.

Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?

Which gets me hunting for a counterexample of something existing, but with no properties.

I have admittedly been slow to reply to the topic as I am busy looking up pages and trying to not just give flippant replies without thought. — noAxioms

God bless you! (or substitute "the Universe" if you prefer). If only more posters did the same.

That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? — J

Suppose two scientists are arguing over whether the Northern White Rhino still exists (which is at least an endangered species). The thesis in question is <The Northern White Rhino exists>.

Now is the term "exists" meaningful within that thesis-proposition? Because I would contend that such a term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful. Specifically, if you want to say that an argument over the meaning of existence is not meaningful or substantial or truth-apt, then I would contend that you must also say that the term "exists" as found within the scientific thesis is unmeaningful.

But perhaps the deeper issue here is your hangup with "metaphysical superglue," as if truth could apply to a term and not a proposition. Term-tokens do not have inherent meaning or truth, and the term-token e-x-i-s-t-e-n-c-e is no exception.

And, clearly, I'm doubtful if my wish can be granted. — J

The difficulty is that you don't seem to be asking a meaningful question at all. Even your claim that some recommendation can be "sensible" and yet "nothing can be said in its favor" looks to lack coherence. I grant your claim that "X exists" is different from "X is a table," but I'm not sure what that claim is supposed to prove.

- I should point out that your OP is very much related to my recent reading group on parasitic reference, which offers one kind of alternative to Meinong's theory, namely a medieval alternative (i.e. "ampliation"). See also Lukáš Novák's, "Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?"

That said, an apple being an apple is a mental construct, as is its redness. It is actually difficult to identify a predicate of anything that is free from human abstraction. OK, 17 is prime, and while being a human discovery, it is not a human designation/predicate.

Santa is another case: Existing only as a mental construct and not in any way that is free from contradiction. Santa is not a possible thing AFAIK, so any predicate of Santa seems necessarily to be a reference to an ideal, not to a Santa. I acknowledge this unavoidability.

Thank you for your input. I have to agree with much that you post. — noAxioms

I agree that it is difficult and I get the prime number claim but is that really a predicate that is outside of the human notion of prime numbers? I am asking as I'm not sure either. It just may be that there's nothing that can escape the mind-construct reality.

Other than that I think I agree with the rest of your post, especially that there is no "Truth of the matter".

That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity. — noAxioms

<Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist>

Does that proposition have no truth value? @noAxioms? @J?

In philosophy it is common to confuse oneself by conflating something that is not obvious with something that is impossible. When two philosophers offer two different accounts of existence, it is hard to discern who is correct (if anyone). But if you take from that the idea that no existence claims are truth-apt, then I think you have fallen into all sorts of absurdities.

• "The Northern White Rhino exists."
• "Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist."
• "Jimmy Carter no longer exists."

Moving from what is not obvious to a generalization of the impossible would commit us to the absurd claims that these propositions are not truth-apt. It's a bit like saying, "The Riemann Hypothesis has no obvious truth value, therefore mathematical claims are not truth-apt, therefore 2+2=4 is not truth-apt."

(What is likely happening is a form of Empiricism which only permits a narrow form of justification. But those forms of Empiricism are reliably self-defeating. Just because two people are arguing doesn't mean neither one is right.)

et's grant, ex hypothesi, the first and the last sentences. Why would the second sentence follow?: that objective reality is unreachable by subjective knowledge? That seems to import a lot of preconceptions about how objectivity and subjectivity relate, preconceptions which to say the least are controversial. — J

Yeah I blew it with that sentence as you rightly pointed out, it doesn't necessarily follow. It's just difficult to understand how subjectively bounded subjects could perceive objects without their subjectivity filtering the perception.

And that may be good enough. Intersubjectivity often makes more sense than "absolute objectivity." Certainly the idea is good enough to establish the distinction I want to make between ambiguous, controversial terms like "existence" and every-day words for things we can verify. We don't need to engage in a debate about whether a table is "objectively a table," as long as we can agree that, unlike "reality" or "being", we know how to verify whether object X is a table or not. And also, we shouldn't be distracted by the fact that any noun can be subject to bizarre exceptions or quibbles. Again, the point is that the problem with "existence" is not bizarre exceptions to an otherwise clear concept; the baseline concept itself is unclear. So while I agree that there is a sort of continuum of imprecision involving language, as you suggest, it doesn't amount to saying that everything is imprecise (or "subjective") in the same way. — J

Excellent. I agree totally with your post here. Your distinction between types of words is really related to the categorical problems that Sean Carroll points out. For instance with a concept like free will he points out a way in which free will can certainly be experienced by humans and yet free will we can know doesn't really exist in the absolute sense because of determinism. It has to do with different ways of categorizing things, at what level do we look at them. It seems like a contradiction but it's not. Very interesting.

It's just difficult to understand how subjectively bounded subjects could perceive objects without their subjectivity filtering the perception. — philosch

It certainly is. I don't know what your philosophical background is, but this is one of most entrenched questions in philosophy. Often, it's not a question of mere "filtering" but a challenge to whether there could ever be contact with objective reality at all -- Idealism, very broadly. A good overview of this issue is The View from Nowhere by Thomas Nagel.

I like the concept of intersubjectivity for many reasons, but does it always fit? Do we want to say that when physicists describe the quantum world, they are working toward intersubjective agreement rather than truth? At the quantum level, with its notorious perplexities, perhaps we should say that. But since we know that any intersubjective agreement can be challenged, this still seems to leave room for asking, But is it true? Similarly, describing the Law of Non-Contradiction as "intersubjectively agreed upon" doesn't seem to do justice to what we mean when we assert that law. So, I don't think one can abandon objectivity in favor of intersubjectivity in all cases without explaining why the "is it true" question would be incoherent. Which many philosophers have tried to do, of course. But we can't simply assert it.

Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. — noAxioms

The problem is that it is impossible to talk about properties independent of our experiences of them.

The question is about the relationship between existence and properties. But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences.

However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced. We can only talk about things we have experienced. We cannot talk about things we haven't experienced. We can only talk about those aspects of properties that we have experienced. We cannot talk about those aspect of properties that we haven't experienced

Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it. It is impossible to know about something about which we have no experience. It is impossible to know how those aspects of properties we have experienced relate to those aspects of properties we haven't experienced.

When we do discuss properties, we can only discuss those aspects of the property that we know about, and we can only know something by experiencing it. There may well be aspects of the property that we haven't experienced, but these aspects must remain unknown to us. Being unknown, we cannot talk about them. Everything we know about our experiences we can describe in words as part of language. The properties we describe in language only includes those aspects of properties that we have experienced.

We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness. We are only able to describe the properties we have experienced in words, within language, and this surely is the distinguishing feature of what we know about properties. Everything we know about properties can be described in words. For us, a property is a description. We can only describe what we have experienced.

A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world. Such a thing would be a thing-in-itself, an unknown unknown.

What we mean by "properties" is of necessity confined to our experiences, and exist as propositions within language.

Suppose two scientists are arguing over whether the Northern White Rhino still exists (which is at least an endangered species). The thesis in question is <The Northern White Rhino exists>. — Leontiskos

Different thesis since the whole temporal reference has been dropped.
The thesis <There is a living NWR presence on our Earth at some implied moment in time>, which leverages a specific definition of 'exists', and there plenty of alternative definitions, as you seem to point out. So I left the word out of my version of the thesis statement.

I looked at the reading group thing. Interesting, but better to participate in parallel while it's going on and not a month later.

I get the prime number claim but is that really a predicate that is outside of the human notion of prime numbers? — philosch

I use it as an example of a real predicate. It can be (and is) independently discovered (and not invented) by anything with rudimentary math skills. It, like Fibonacci numbers is found in nature. A pine cone always has rows and columns that number a pair of adjacent Fibonacci numbers. There are many species of cicadas that come out every X years, and the various species have various cycles, but the cycles are always prime numbers (and for a reason). The 17 year ones are numerous where I live now, but we have some 13 year ones as well. Cicadas rely on a real predicate of some numbers being prime that has nothing to do with human concepts. I actually don't know the purpose served by the Fibonacci thing, but it's found in so many places. It has something to do with being an integer approximation of the golden ratio (another non-human-ideal predicate).

<Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist>

Does that proposition have no truth value? noAxioms? — Leontiskos

The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail.

When two philosophers offer two different accounts of existence, it is hard to discern who is correct (if anyone).

I care little about who is correct. I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case.

I can think of several definitions of 'exists' that one might use, but some possibilities:
E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality"
E2 "I know about it"
E3 "Has predicates"
E4 "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world"
E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"
E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

There are probably better wordings.
E1 is kind of an objective wording, and 17 being part of that seems to come down to Platonism. There seems to be no way to test for E1, rendering it pretty useless.
E2 is idealistic, and essentially solopsistic, but not necessarily non-realist.
E3 is a converse of EPP. Santa exists then? Unclear since it isn't clear if Santa can be fat.
E4 is closely related to E2 in that reality is what we see/infer and not what something else sees. Yet when asking if the northern white rhino exists, it seems to be an E2/4 sort of question.
E5 is relational (as opposed to objective) and applies only to states within a causal structure. So 17 doesn't exist, not being part of a causal structure. E5 has nothing to do with epistemology.
E6 is like E1, but just a different set than 'reality'.

E7: I welcome other definitions to add to the list.

It's a bit like saying, "The Riemann Hypothesis has no obvious truth value, therefore ..."

Why does the truth value need to be obvious for there to be a truth value?

It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"? — RussellA

Different answer: Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that.

But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences. — RussellA

A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic.

However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced.

Given that abstraction is itself experience, I agree. Talking about something is experiencing it, or at least experiencing the abstraction of it the same way that we experience only the abstraction of something that actually (supposedly) exists.

Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it.

Kant's concludes the ideals (the experience) is all there is, and all that is talked about. So fine, abstract something, and talk about that, but with the realization that it's not the experience that's the subject being discussed, only the means of doing so.
Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it.

I have zero experience of Santa, yet I can discuss Santa and his properties. I have experience of say an image of Santa, but the image is not Santa, nor is either the image or the experience of it the subject of the discussion..Properties of Santa are not properties of either the image nor any of my experience.

We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness.

I can talk about colours that I've not experienced. There's plenty of colours out there that say a bee can see but we cannot. Point is, I don't see personal experience limiting what can be discussed.

A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world.

We definitely differ in this opinion. I do not define a property, nor existence, in any anthropocentric way. Human (solipsistic) epistemology works that way, but not metaphysics.

The thesis <There is a living NWR presence on our Earth at some implied moment in time>, which leverages a specific definition of 'exists', and there plenty of alternative definitions, as you seem to point out. So I left the word out of my version of the thesis statement. — noAxioms

So do you agree with my claim that the term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful? I assume we agree that by removing the word “exists” you did not remove the concept of existence from the proposition.

I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case. — noAxioms

I agree with you. I don’t think Quinian Actualism is defensible. I haven’t seen anyone who promotes that view other than @J, and I haven't seen him offer real arguments for his position.

The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail. — noAxioms

Sure, but I would want to remember that we can always think of a definition of "exists" in which that proposition is made either true or false. But if our definitions are arbitrary then it makes no difference, and this seems to prove that not all definitions are on a par. For an example of an arbitrary definition, we could say that "exists" means "able to be conceived," on which definition it is false that <Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist> (given that both are able to be conceived). But again, arbitrary definitions are of no help in resolving real questions.

So do you agree with my claim that the term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful? — Leontiskos

Hard to parse that, but you're apparently claiming that the meaningfulness of arguments is what makes a definition meaningful. Not sure if I can agree with that since no argument is necessary at all if ambiguities are dispelled by careful wordings.

I assume we agree that by removing the word “exists” you did not remove the concept of existence from the proposition.

Not removed, just worded more carefully for clarity sake.

I don’t think Quinian Actualism is defensible.

I had to look that one up. It all seems to be a bunch of synonyms that are not clearly distinct. X exists. X is being X. X is real. X is actual. X is. X relates to ...
These are all supposedly different, but the exact distinctions are rarely spelled out.

Sure, but I would want to remember that we can always think of a definition of "exists" in which that proposition is made either true or false. But if our definitions are arbitrary then it makes no difference,

Definitions should never be arbitrary. They're sometimes context dependent. The dictionary is full of words that have different meanings in different contexts,. but 'X exists' needs more context than that.

I don't know what you mean by a proposition being 'made true/false' as opposed to it just having a truth value, known or not.

For an example of an arbitrary definition, we could say that "exists" means "able to be conceived," on which definition it is false that <Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist> (given that both are able to be conceived). But again, arbitrary definitions are of no help in resolving real questions.

That did not seem to be an arbitrary definition. It was 1) specifically chosen so that the proposition could be false, and 2) it was far less ambiguous than the usage of the term in the thesis posed. BTW, your definition was very close to the one I chose for the same purpose, and it is quite an idealistic definition.

Let's have a quick look at the sort of reasons we have for not treating existence as a predicate. One example:

From

Circular Quay is in Sydney

we infer

Something is in Sydney

And write
( ∃x) (x is in Sydney)

yet from

There is no such thing as Pegasus

we do not infer:
( ∃x) (there is no such thing as x)

"Circular Quay is in Sydney" treats being in Sydney as a predicate. If we were to treat existence as a predicate, the second inference would be valid.

So instead of parsing "There is no such thing as Pegasus" as Pegasus not having the property of existence, ~∃!(Pegasus), we pars it as there not being any thing that is Pegasus: ~∃(x)(x is pegasus).

This is the approach of Frege and Russell, and others, mentioned in the SEP article.

I had to look that one up — noAxioms

The Possibilism-Actualism Debate | SEP

Could you provide links to the resources you consulted before writing your OP? I'm trying to understand where you are coming from.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

I'm not convinced that self-contradiction is a great way to look at it, given that Meinong and his opponents are not usually accused of self-contradiction. A better approach to disputed questions would probably be to present rationale and arguments pro and con, Medieval style.

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that. — noAxioms

I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property.

Both the EPP and Meinong accept that properties are attributed to objects. A property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects (Wikipedia - Property (philosophy). The EPP means that the existence of an object is prior to the object's predication. Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist.

Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property

For the EPP, the lack of properties means the lack of any property. For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. Therefore, the lack of properties cannot be a property.