There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms
Agree. Not-being also seems to be a predicate, so it is true that I am not batman, but not true that Santa is not batman, at least if EPP holdsBeing an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication. — RussellA
You're contrasting this with 'prior', right? It is not an assertion of temporal ordering. That just means that predication cannot apply to a nonexistent thing, not that the predication has some sort of temporal confinement to the duration of the existence. Some things don't exist in time. Is 17 prime? EPP says only if 17 exists. 'Contemporaneous' says only during times that it exists, a fairly meaningless concept.Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?
I looked through the SEP article and Santa shows up frequently as an example of properties being assigned to something presumed nonexistent, but by exactly what definition of 'existence' is being used when making this presumption if this property makes no meaningful difference? If Santa can be fat without existing, then it does not follow that Santa exists from the presumption of his girth. So "I think, therefore I am" becomes a non-sequitur in the absence of the subject principle. — noAxioms
:up: :up:Things that exist I would say have real predications [sosein und sein]^ and fictions which are constructs of the mind have predications also, but those predicates are every bit the imaginary construct [sosein ohne sein]^ that the fictional object is [ ... ] The properties of "real" objects and fictional objects are not the same category of things. — philosch
I can't discern what it is you're asking for: a conceptual definition? or a logical demonstration / mathematical proof? or a fundamental physical theory? :chin:That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? If there was -- if there was a correct way to conceive of existence, and/or talk about it -- how would we show this? — J
But the question is, Is there anything further to be said in favor of some particular recommendation? That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? If there was -- if there was a correct way to conceive of existence, and/or talk about it -- how would we show this? — J
If I understand what you are asking my answer would be no, there is no "correct" way, there is no truth of the matter, there would be different ways, each with more or less utility depending on the context of each. — philosch
That's about how I see it. The term "existence" simply doesn't lend itself to being identified with some particular thing/event/item, which could be checked in the case of disagreement, in the way that, say, "table" does. — J
Yes we are essentially agreeing that there is no objective reality that makes any sense with regard to human consciousness. — philosch
Yikes, no! I'm speaking about a particularly troublesome term -- "existence" or "being" -- that has no clearly correct usage — J
Didn't mean to scare you, lol. :wink: — philosch
We are 100% subjective beings. No part of any human knowledge or understanding or experience can be a part of or close to an "absolute objective reality". Our experience of the universe around us is subjective by definition. — philosch
What we call objective reality can be considered true in the context of human experience but it's not true in an absolute sense. — philosch
There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat — noAxioms
There are two sets of reasons for denying that existence is a property of individuals. The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. What is the difference between a red apple and a red existing apple? To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties
The thing's existence is prior to any predication to it and so it is incoherent to think of existence as a property had by the thing. This thought is behind Aristotle's thesis that existence is not a further feature of a thing beyond its essence.
Hume argued (in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.6) that there is no impression of existence distinct from the impression of an object, which is ultimately on Hume's view a bundle of qualities.
OK, but this concerns mental abstractions, something I am trying to exclude per the disclaimer at the bottom of the OP.Things that exist I would say have real predications and fictions which are constructs of the mind have predications also, but those predicates are every bit the imaginary construct that the fictional object is. — philosch
This got me down the pipe of sosein vs sein. Still not sure if I get it since the difference seems to hinge on a prior agreed state of existence or not, but nobody seems to have answered how that distinction might be made. Who am I to declare the unicorn to not exist? Pretty sure the unicorn doesn't consider me to exist either, so we're even on that score.(à la Meinong)^ — 180 Proof
I suspect no truth of the matter, and the best one can reach for is utility (usefulness). I am trying to explore the options since I find little utility in the typical realist position.That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? — J
That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity.Joe offers a particular doctrine about existence, Mary offers a different one. Is there anything either can appeal to, in order to determine whether one is correct? — J
It seems to mean that predication requires existence. The rejection of the principle that says this is what I'm trying to explore here.What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean? — RussellA
With the EPP, existence becomes redundant and adds nothing to a statement. Without EPP, existence needs to be more clearly defined to have meaning, but it seems to be inherited. Existing parents beget existing children, but nonexistent parents beget nonexistent children. The two worlds seem disjoint, but other than that, there seems to be no obvious way to tell the two worlds apart....The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. — SEP - Existence
Got news. Apples turn red after a while and don't start that way any more than I started out as cynical.It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added.
OK, but I'm not really concerned with knowing about something's existence since I'm not using an epistemic definition of existence. I'm explicitly avoiding it since it's a different path.We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties.
Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. This is a good quote for something like aether theory or Russel's teapot. It has properties, sure, but none of them are experiential.In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?
This statement doesn't follow if EPP is not presumed, and I'm not presuming it here.Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?
Which gets me hunting for a counterexample of something existing, but with no properties.Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?
That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? — J
And, clearly, I'm doubtful if my wish can be granted. — J
That said, an apple being an apple is a mental construct, as is its redness. It is actually difficult to identify a predicate of anything that is free from human abstraction. OK, 17 is prime, and while being a human discovery, it is not a human designation/predicate.
Santa is another case: Existing only as a mental construct and not in any way that is free from contradiction. Santa is not a possible thing AFAIK, so any predicate of Santa seems necessarily to be a reference to an ideal, not to a Santa. I acknowledge this unavoidability.
Thank you for your input. I have to agree with much that you post. — noAxioms
That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity. — noAxioms
et's grant, ex hypothesi, the first and the last sentences. Why would the second sentence follow?: that objective reality is unreachable by subjective knowledge? That seems to import a lot of preconceptions about how objectivity and subjectivity relate, preconceptions which to say the least are controversial. — J
And that may be good enough. Intersubjectivity often makes more sense than "absolute objectivity." Certainly the idea is good enough to establish the distinction I want to make between ambiguous, controversial terms like "existence" and every-day words for things we can verify. We don't need to engage in a debate about whether a table is "objectively a table," as long as we can agree that, unlike "reality" or "being", we know how to verify whether object X is a table or not. And also, we shouldn't be distracted by the fact that any noun can be subject to bizarre exceptions or quibbles. Again, the point is that the problem with "existence" is not bizarre exceptions to an otherwise clear concept; the baseline concept itself is unclear. So while I agree that there is a sort of continuum of imprecision involving language, as you suggest, it doesn't amount to saying that everything is imprecise (or "subjective") in the same way. — J
It's just difficult to understand how subjectively bounded subjects could perceive objects without their subjectivity filtering the perception. — philosch
Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. — noAxioms
Different thesis since the whole temporal reference has been dropped.Suppose two scientists are arguing over whether the Northern White Rhino still exists (which is at least an endangered species). The thesis in question is <The Northern White Rhino exists>. — Leontiskos
I use it as an example of a real predicate. It can be (and is) independently discovered (and not invented) by anything with rudimentary math skills. It, like Fibonacci numbers is found in nature. A pine cone always has rows and columns that number a pair of adjacent Fibonacci numbers. There are many species of cicadas that come out every X years, and the various species have various cycles, but the cycles are always prime numbers (and for a reason). The 17 year ones are numerous where I live now, but we have some 13 year ones as well. Cicadas rely on a real predicate of some numbers being prime that has nothing to do with human concepts. I actually don't know the purpose served by the Fibonacci thing, but it's found in so many places. It has something to do with being an integer approximation of the golden ratio (another non-human-ideal predicate).I get the prime number claim but is that really a predicate that is outside of the human notion of prime numbers? — philosch
The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail.<Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist>
Does that proposition have no truth value? noAxioms? — Leontiskos
I care little about who is correct. I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case.When two philosophers offer two different accounts of existence, it is hard to discern who is correct (if anyone).
Why does the truth value need to be obvious for there to be a truth value?It's a bit like saying, "The Riemann Hypothesis has no obvious truth value, therefore ..."
Different answer: Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that.It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"? — RussellA
A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic.But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences. — RussellA
Given that abstraction is itself experience, I agree. Talking about something is experiencing it, or at least experiencing the abstraction of it the same way that we experience only the abstraction of something that actually (supposedly) exists.However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced.
Kant's concludes the ideals (the experience) is all there is, and all that is talked about. So fine, abstract something, and talk about that, but with the realization that it's not the experience that's the subject being discussed, only the means of doing so.Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it.
I can talk about colours that I've not experienced. There's plenty of colours out there that say a bee can see but we cannot. Point is, I don't see personal experience limiting what can be discussed.We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness.
We definitely differ in this opinion. I do not define a property, nor existence, in any anthropocentric way. Human (solipsistic) epistemology works that way, but not metaphysics.A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world.
The thesis <There is a living NWR presence on our Earth at some implied moment in time>, which leverages a specific definition of 'exists', and there plenty of alternative definitions, as you seem to point out. So I left the word out of my version of the thesis statement. — noAxioms
I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case. — noAxioms
The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail. — noAxioms
Hard to parse that, but you're apparently claiming that the meaningfulness of arguments is what makes a definition meaningful. Not sure if I can agree with that since no argument is necessary at all if ambiguities are dispelled by careful wordings.So do you agree with my claim that the term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful? — Leontiskos
Not removed, just worded more carefully for clarity sake.I assume we agree that by removing the word “exists” you did not remove the concept of existence from the proposition.
I had to look that one up. It all seems to be a bunch of synonyms that are not clearly distinct. X exists. X is being X. X is real. X is actual. X is. X relates to ...I don’t think Quinian Actualism is defensible.
Definitions should never be arbitrary. They're sometimes context dependent. The dictionary is full of words that have different meanings in different contexts,. but 'X exists' needs more context than that.Sure, but I would want to remember that we can always think of a definition of "exists" in which that proposition is made either true or false. But if our definitions are arbitrary then it makes no difference,
That did not seem to be an arbitrary definition. It was 1) specifically chosen so that the proposition could be false, and 2) it was far less ambiguous than the usage of the term in the thesis posed. BTW, your definition was very close to the one I chose for the same purpose, and it is quite an idealistic definition.For an example of an arbitrary definition, we could say that "exists" means "able to be conceived," on which definition it is false that <Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist> (given that both are able to be conceived). But again, arbitrary definitions are of no help in resolving real questions.
we inferCircular Quay is in Sydney
And writeSomething is in Sydney
we do not infer:There is no such thing as Pegasus
I had to look that one up — noAxioms
So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms
Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that. — noAxioms
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