Basically, more or less you think the mind exists free of the body. — DifferentiatingEgg

Not only that. The Mind is the uncaused case.

define perception — MoK

Perception=a short term memory produced when our sensory organs sends electrochemical signals to a portion of the brain that channels the data to the cerebral cortex. E.g. photons stimilate the retina, signals are passed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex, and then the cerebral cortex. Physical changes throughout.

Experience is not a physical phenomenon since matter according to physicalism works on its own without any need for consciousness. — MoK

I accounted for experience as a purely physical phenomenon. What aspect of it can you prove to be nonphysical? Stipulating a non-physical definition isn't proving anything.

Regarding consciousness: I embrace the film analogy: at each point of time, the brain is in an intentional state (analogous to a frame of a film). Consciousness entails the running of the film- a sequencing of brain states.

Matter by definition is a substance that undergoes changes governed by the laws of physics. It seems that you are unfamiliar with the Hard Problem of consciousness. Experience is not a physical phenomenon since matter according to physicalism works on its own without any need for consciousness. — MoK

I am defending a new version of substance dualism and I am attacking physicalism for two main reasons, 1) The Hard Problem of consciousness and 2) The common sense that tells us that the change in physical is due to experience. — MoK

"Conmon sense" isn't an argument. Appearances can be deceiving.

Outline your theory. Explain what exists other than the physical, and how it interacts with the physical. E.g. is there a single conduit within the brain? Multiple? What ties this nonphysical thing to a specific body? I have many more questions, but need to know exactly what your theory is.

Perception=a short term memory produced when our sensory organs sends electrochemical signals to a portion of the brain that channels the data to the cerebral cortex. E.g. photons stimilate the retina, signals are passed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex, and then the cerebral cortex. Physical changes throughout. — Relativist

That is a physical process. You can call it perception. I asked you what is experience though.

I accounted for experience as a purely physical phenomenon. — Relativist

You are the only one with such a claim. Are you a physicalist?

What aspect of it can you prove to be nonphysical? Stipulating a non-physical definition isn't proving anything. — Relativist

I already defined experience. Given this definition, I distinguish between physical and experience. Let me ask you this question: Do you think objects around you experience anything? According to physicalists matter does not experience anything. It works on its own without any need for consciousness.

Then outline your theory. Explain what exists other than the physical, and how it interacts with the physical. E.g. is there a single conduit within the brain? Multiple? What ties this nonphysical thing to a specific body? I have many more questions, but need to know exactly what your theory is. — Relativist

Please read OP and let me know if you have any questions.

That is a physical process. You can call it perception. I asked you what is experience though. — MoK

I already answered that:

An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories)...An unperceived event is not an experience. Perceptions entail physical changes to the brain. The experience is therefore a physical phenomenon. . — Relativist

You then asked me to define "perception", which I did, and now you've ignored all that and are reasking the question I already answered.

I already defined experience. Given this definition, I distinguish between physical and experience. — MoK

Your definition ASSUMES there is something nonphysical, and then when a physicalist approach cannot account for it, you think you've proven something.

Is there some relevant uncontroversial fact that I haven't yet accounted for?

Do you think objects around you experience anything — MoK

They don't have mental experiences.

Please read OP and let me know if you have any questions — MoK

I read it. Here's a few questions:

• how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? Alternatively: does the mind actually have some material properties? If so, which ones?
• Explain the connection between mind an brain: is there one place in the brain that makes this connnection? Multiple places? Does every neuron connect to it? Every synapse?
• If minds occupy a specific location in space (at least in part, so it can interact with the brain) where is this? Does it occupy the same space as the brain? The brain, and it’s components, occupy physical space, so if the mind is to interact with it, there must be some sort of connection – one that connects to your brain, rather than your wife’s.
• How does the brain deliver sights and sounds to the mind? For example, does every neuron connect to the mind, or only certain ones, or combinations? I discussed physical activity associated with vision. Where does the non-physical mind fit in to that?
• Can a mind exist without a body? Can it become detached? If a mind can become detached from a body (as in an OBE or after death), how is it able to perceive what is happening in the absence of being connected to sense organs? If sense organs aren’t needed when disembodied, why are they needed when paired with the body?
• Do minds pre-exist bodies, or do they come into existence with the body? If the latter, when? At fertilization? Does it develop in parallel with the brain?
• What ties a specific mind to a specific body? E.g. if a mind causes me to raise my arm, why can’t my mind cause you to raise your arm?
• If my mind causes me to raise my arm, and simultaneously your mind causes you to raise your arm, how do we know it wasn’t my arm causing your arm to raise, and your mind causing my arm to raise?
• Memories are lost when brains are damaged from trauma or disease, showing that memories are encoded in the brain. If memories are physical, and destroyed as the brain decomposes at death, but your mind survives, in what sense is that mind still YOU? i.e. what aspects of YOU is your disembodied mind?
• How do you account for the impact of natural chemicals (such as hormones, seratonin) and artificial chemicals (e.g.hallucinogens, mood altering substances) on thought processes?

An unperceived event is not an experience. Perceptions entail physical changes to the brain. The experience is therefore a physical phenomenon. — Relativist

Much of our cognitive activity depends on sub- and unconscious processes, which by definition are not experienced (otherwise they'd be conscious). These include personal factors specific to the individual, but also autonomic and parasympathetic processes, and cultural factors, such as language and beliefs.

how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? — Relativist

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes in physicalist terms, without relying on the very processes of inference and reasoning which we're attempting to explain.

Logical relationships exist without being physical (e.g., modus ponens or the law of the excluded middle in logic). Arguably, so-called 'physical laws' are themselves not physical, in that they rely heavily on idealisation (perfect objects and contexts) and abstraction (per Nancy Cartwright).

Meanings are real, yet they are not physical objects, and furthermore, to arrive at any concept of what physical objects are, requires the use of definitions, rules of inference, and so on, which cannot themselves be regarded as physically objective.

Per the hard problem of consciousness, the experience of "redness" is not itself a property of neural firings, even if those firings correlate with it. You cannot ascertain what it is like to see something red on the basis of the examination of neural data.

A brain state may be correlated with an experience, but it does not contain meaning in the way that a sentence does. Studies of neuroplasticity demonstrate that there is no discernable 1:1 relationship between semantic content and neurophysiological events, as these vary unpredictably within and between different studies of brains (see this article on interpretation of results from fMRI scans.)

Then there's the various forms of the argument from reason, which says that if thoughts and decisions were physically determined, there would be no room for rational inference, because reason involves moving from premises to conclusions because they are true. There is nothing corresponding to that relationship observable in the physical domain.

Memories are lost when brains are damaged from trauma or disease, suggesting memories are encoded in the brain. — Relativist

There is a large body of evidence concerning children who recall previous lives, suggesting memories may be transmitted by some means other than the physical.

For all these reasons and many others, physicalist philosophy of mind fails to come to terms with what it seeks to explain.

Much of our cognitive activity depends on sub- and unconscious processes, which by definition are not experienced (otherwise they'd be conscious). — Wayfarer

I disagree; all the processes are experienced - changes to the brain take place, but these changes are not connected directly to the portions that exhibit consciousness. Of course, there could be indirect connections - where the subconscious triggers emotions that affect conscious thoughts.

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes. — Wayfarer

When an arm is raised, electrochemical signals are passed from brain to nerves that activate muscles that result in the activity. If mind decides to raise the arm, that intent has to somehow connect to the brain to cause it to occur. This suggests that either the mind has some physical properties, or the brain has some non-physical properties. Which is it? Either way, it seems problematic.

Logical relationships exist without being physical (e.g., modus ponens or the law of the excluded middle in logic). Arguably, so-called 'physical laws' are themselves not physical, in that they rely heavily on idealisation (perfect objects and contexts) and abstraction.

Meanings are real, yet they are not physical objects, and furthermore, to arrive at any concept of what physical objects are, requires the use of definitions, rules of inference, and so on, which cannot themselves be regarded as objects. — Wayfarer

Meanings and logic are semantic relations, not ontological (except insofar as we make sense of things using our physical brains).

the experience of "redness" is not itself a property of neural firings, even if those firings correlate with it. You cannot ascertain what it is like to see something red on the basis of the examination of neural data. — Wayfarer

The perception of redness is a representational brain state - it enables discrimination among objects. The "what it's like" seems to me to be imaginary, because the sense of it is not actually real.

A brain state may be correlated with an experience, but it does not contain meaning in the way that a sentence does. — Wayfarer

Meaning implies neural connections, connecting past learnings to current perceptions.

Then there's the various forms of the argument from reason, which says that if thoughts and decisions were physically determined, there would be no room for rational inference — Wayfarer

Rational inference is semantics applied to learnings.

If mind decides to raise the arm, that intent has to somehow connect to the brain to cause it to occur. This suggests that either the mind has some physical properties, or the brain has some non-physical properties. Which is it? Either way, it seems problematic. — Relativist

The problem arises because of abstraction - the division of 'mind' and 'body' as two abstract or idealised entities which supposedly 'interact'. This is the basis of the 'interaction problem' that bedevils Cartesian philosophy, but it only exists because of the idealised abstraction that gave rise to it. The mind and body is actually a body-mind with physical and psychic aspects that are inter-related, not two separate entities (not two=nondual).

Consider what happens when I say something that shocks or annoys - all that has passed between us are symbolic forms, words. Yet these can have immediate physical consequences, raising of heart-rate or adrendal activity. This is because the reality is neither physical nor psychic, but embraces both aspects -hence mind-body medicine, psychosomatic effects, and so on. None of which are endorsed by physicalism.

Meanings and logic are semantic relations, not ontological (except insofar as we make sense of things using our physical brains). — Relativist

But nevertheless, they are constantly deployed to argue for what you consider to be physical. When you say that 'the physical brain' has causal power, you are relying on such semantic relations, which in reality underpin your entire 'thought-world'. Notice the contradictory nature of 'making sense using physical brains' - you deploy the word 'physical' because you think it 'makes sense', but that all depends on what is meant by 'physical'.

the 'interaction problem' that bedevils Cartesian philosophy, but is only exists because of the idealised abstraction that gave rise to it. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

The mind and body is actually a body-mind with physical and psychic aspects that are inter-related.

What you regard as psychic aspects are a product of the abstract framework. It doesn't entail something nonphysical (in the broadest sense).

Notice the contradictory nature of 'making sense using physical brains' - you deploy the word 'physical' because you think it 'makes sense', but that all depends on what is meant by 'physical'. — Wayfarer

I don't see anything contradictory, other than uncareful semantics. "Making sense" of a word means a mental connection to its referent(s). Making sense of a proposition entails applying a learned pattern to the construction. This calls into question the grounding, but I think this can be plausibly accounted for in terms of the connection to the external world through our senses.

This calls into question the grounding, but I think this can be plausibly accounted for in terms of the connection to the external world through our senses. — Relativist

And where is that 'external world' grounded, if not in the mind? Of course it is true that the mind receives information from sensable objects, but then the whole process of apperception and synthesis swings into gear, and that generates whatever you understand 'the world' to be - including the accounts of 'the physical', the theories of which rely on the symbolic order represented by mathematical physics.

And, for that matter, what is the origin of the idea of the physical? In Charles Pinter's 'Mind and the Cosmic Order', it is put like this:

In fact, what we regard as the physical world is “physical” to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be “physical”. On the other hand, since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. It is shown in the final chapter (Mind, Life and Universe) that this is an illusory dichotomy, and any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6)

The whole problem with physicalism, and the reason I'm criticizing it, is because it forget, omits, or excludes the role of the mind in the construction of what we understand 'the physical' to be. And that's a natural consequence of the way in which modern science was originally constructed, with its emphasis on the exclusive reality of the so-called primary qualities of matter and the relegation of the remainder to the subjective domain. It is question-begging all the way down.

Hence, to get back to the OP (which is terribly parsed, by the way) - how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know, but I think agree with Kant: we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience. Physicalism takes causality for granted as a feature of the external world, but it neglects the grounding role of the mind. Without this structuring role, causation as we know it would be unintelligible—mere succession without necessity (per Hume).

The Mind is the uncaused c[aus]e. — MoK

:roll:

An "uncaused cause" is indistinguishable from a random event and "mind" (i.e. what sufficient complex brains do ... contra a reification fallacy of "the mind") is not random, or "uncaused".

Experience is a separate thing. — MoK

This reification fallacy is what's confusing you. Sorry, I can't follow the rest of your post.

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes — Wayfarer

So ... "non-physical" "ability" and "acts" are dis-embodied occurences?

Explain "non-physical cause" (which your statement above implies counterfactually).

that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes

Yet ... ah, but Lord Kelvin speaks again; how dogmatic of you, sir. :smirk:

:up:

:up: :up:

Fair enough but faith isn't meant to be argued... but rather believed because of a complete lack of evidence... and as you have 0 evidence for minds existing outside the body... we will have to unmask this for what it is and leave it at that: faith, not an actual argument.

And where is that 'external world' grounded, if not in the mind? — Wayfarer

It's grounded In the actual world. Don't you agree one exists?

The whole problem with physicalism, and the reason I'm criticizing it, is because it forget, omits, or excludes the role of the mind in the construction of what we understand 'the physical' to be. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. It just doesn't treat mind as the center of attention in metaphysics, like it appears you do. That's not a criticism, it's just an observation.

Physicalism accounts for the world at large first, and after that focuses on whether the mind can fit that paradigm. It can account for the mind, but it's not in the terms we generally apply to mental processes.

how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know, but I think agree with Kant: we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience. — Wayfarer

Naturalism (physicalism or physicalism+) accounts for minds coming to exist as a rare sort of thing in a 14B year old universe of potentially infinite size. That seems a superior account than a mind just happening to exist uncaused. Mind isn't a metaphysical ground. Our minds ground knowledge, but that's because knowledge is an aspect of minds. That our minds would reflect the reality that IS, seems reasonable because we are products of that reality.

:up:

Physicalism accounts for the world at large first, and after that focuses on whether the mind can fit that paradigm. It can account for the mind, but it's not in the terms we generally apply to mental processes. — Relativist

What you think the 'world at large' is, relies on and is dependent on a great many judgements that you will make when considering its nature. You might gesture at it as if it were obviously something completely separate from you, but the very fact of speaking about it reveals the centrality of your judgement as to what the 'world at large' is. Science as a whole is always concerned with judgements as to what is the case in particular applications, but philosophy is different, in that it considers and calls into question the nature of judgement itself, not judgement concerning this or that state of affairs.

And where is that 'external world' grounded, if not in the mind?
— Wayfarer

It's grounded In the actual world. Don't you agree one exists? — Relativist

Of course it exists. It's just that we don't see it as it truly is. Nobody sees it as it truly is. You're starting from the assumption that the appearance, the phenomena, the world as it appears, is real independently of you, when your cognitive faculties provide the very basis for how it appears to you. If you want to refute this argument you need to understand what it is saying. It is not positing 'mind' as some objective, if ethereal, substance or thing.

All of our judgements about the nature of the world, what its constituents are and so on, are themselves intellectual in nature. But then physicalism claims that these are the result of supposedly mind-independent processes. Nothing I’ve said suggests that the mind 'exists uncaused' - what I said was that we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience and so provides the basis on which judgements about causation are intelligible. In that sense, mind is prior to the physical explanations of phenomena, not in the temporal sense of pre-existing those phenomena, but in the ontological sense as being the ground of explanation itself.

That our minds would reflect the reality that IS, seems reasonable because we are products of that reality. — Relativist

I don't think the sense in which the mind is 'the product of reality' is at all well established or understood. We do, of course, have considerable understanding about the course of evolutionary development, but evolutionary biology was not intended as, and doesn't necessarily serve as, a theory of knowledge per se. As far as evolution is concerned, the salient features of any species are those which serve the purpose of species' survival and propagation. I think what drives the whole process is still very much an open question (and by that I'm not appealing to any kind of 'creator God').

I already answered that: — Relativist

You define experience as a set of processes. That is not what experience is. When you experience something, it feels something in a certain way to you. So experience is not a mere process. I am not saying that experience is not due to process in physical but distinguish it from process.

You then asked me to define "perception", which I did, and now you've ignored all that and are reasking the question I already answered. — Relativist

Aren't you happy with my definition of experience? If yes, then great we can move on. If not, you still need to define the experience since we cannot progress without it.

Your definition ASSUMES there is something nonphysical, and then when a physicalist approach cannot account for it, you think you've proven something. — Relativist

Of course, experience is not an physical thing given my definition. And I don't assume its existence. It exists and we cannot deny it. Are you denying that experience does not exist?

Is there some relevant uncontroversial fact that I haven't yet accounted for? — Relativist

You need to define the experience.

They don't have mental experiences. — Relativist

So, a chair is physical to you. What makes you think that the brain is not a physical object?

I read it. Here's a few questions: — Relativist

You have many questions and I try my best to answer them in this post. Some of the questions indicate that you didn't read OP carefully but never mind. The argument as I mentioned in OP is very dense and long so I don't expect that anyone understand it in one shot.

how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? — Relativist

The brain like any other physical object is subject to change. It goes from one state to another state later. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but it is caused when it changes. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP. It also has the ability to experience and cause physical. These abilities as I discussed are necessary since physical as I argued in OP cannot be the cause of its own change. So there must exist a substance so-called the Mind with the ability to cause physical. I then discuss that states of matter are related and that means that the Mind must have the ability to experience physical as well. So the general picture is like this, the Mind experiences physical in state X and then later causes physical in state Y.

Alternatively: does the mind actually have some material properties? If so, which ones? — Relativist

The Mind does not have any physical property like charge, mass, etc. It is only Omnipresent in spacetime though.

Explain the connection between mind an brain: is there one place in the brain that makes this connnection? Multiple places? Does every neuron connect to it? Every synapse? — Relativist

Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so It exists everywhere including in the brain.

If minds occupy a specific location in space (at least in part, so it can interact with the brain) where is this? Does it occupy the same space as the brain? The brain, and it’s components, occupy physical space, so if the mind is to interact with it, there must be some sort of connection – one that connects to your brain, rather than your wife’s. — Relativist

There is only one Mind but different physical objects or persons. We are inside spacetime so we are inside the Mind. We move within the Mind.

How does the brain deliver sights and sounds to the mind? For example, does every neuron connect to the mind, or only certain ones, or combinations? I discussed physical activity associated with vision. Where does the non-physical mind fit in to that? — Relativist

The Mind experiences physical directly. The features of experience however depend on the texture of the physical.

Can a mind exist without a body? Can it become detached? If a mind can become detached from a body (as in an OBE or after death), how is it able to perceive what is happening in the absence of being connected to sense organs? If sense organs aren’t needed when disembodied, why are they needed when paired with the body? — Relativist

The Mind is a substance that exists independently. I think you are talking about the soul here. However, that is a different topic, so let's put it aside. I once had an out-of-body experience. I am currently thinking about it, so I cannot give you a clear answer. Anyhow, if you accept the out-of-body experience then it means that the experience is not due to the brain activity but the activity of another substance that I call it soul.

Do minds pre-exist bodies, or do they come into existence with the body? If the latter, when? At fertilization? Does it develop in parallel with the brain? — Relativist

Yes, the Mind pre-exists bodies. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime.

If my mind causes me to raise my arm, and simultaneously your mind causes you to raise your arm, how do we know it wasn’t my arm causing your arm to raise, and your mind causing my arm to raise? — Relativist

As I mentioned before, there is only one Omnipresent Mind. It causes a change in you because you as a person have a location in spacetime. It causes a change in me as well because I exist in another location.

Memories are lost when brains are damaged from trauma or disease, showing that memories are encoded in the brain. If memories are physical, and destroyed as the brain decomposes at death, but your mind survives, in what sense is that mind still YOU? i.e. what aspects of YOU is your disembodied mind? — Relativist

Correct. Memories are encoded in the brain and they are subject to destruction upon the brain damage. Mind however exists whether you exist or not. You as a person can have certain experiences because you are physical while being alive and healthy. Whether there is a soul that survives death is the subject of another thread.

How do you account for the impact of natural chemicals (such as hormones, seratonin) and artificial chemicals (e.g.hallucinogens, mood altering substances) on thought processes? — Relativist

Well, these chemicals, whether natural or artificial affect the brain's function so we can have different sorts of experiences depending on the substance. The hallucinogenic substance, such as LSD, can cause hallucinations. I have studied this topic but it seems that the nature of hallucination is not yet known to the best of my knowledge.

An "uncaused cause" is indistinguishable from a random event and "mind" (i.e. what sufficient complex brains do ... contra a reification fallacy of "the mind") is not random, or "uncaused". — 180 Proof

I asked you what the mind and physical are to you and you refused to answer. I think we cannot make any progress.

This reification fallacy is what's confusing you. Sorry, I can't follow the rest of your post. — 180 Proof

What is the experience to you? To me, the experience is a conscious event perceived by the Mind that contains information.

Fair enough but faith isn't meant to be argued... — DifferentiatingEgg

I have an argument for the Mind. It is not a matter of my faith.

but rather believed because of a complete lack of evidence... — DifferentiatingEgg

I have an argument for the Mind. I start by experience as a phenomenon that exists and is different from physical. I then establish my argument. Please read my argument and tell me if you have any objections to it.

I asked you what the mind and physical are to you and you refused to answer. — MoK

What you "asked", Mok, is a red herring that lamely avoids addressing my critical objections to both your claims and how you're (mis)using "mind" and "physical" throughout this thread discussion.

What you "asked", Mok, is a red herring that lamely avoids addressing my critical objections to both your claims and how you're (mis)using "mind" and "physical" throughout this thread discussion. — 180 Proof

My request is not a red herring. We have to start an argument from something. How could we possibly proceed and make any progress in a discussion when the terms that are used are not defined well? In your first post in this thread, you only referred to a few articles that I read carefully. A definition of mind and physical is missing in those articles though. Therefore, my request for definitions is legitimate.

That's not an argument for the mind... an argument states something necessarily follows logically... you're just saying something...

The majority of your premises are Observation and Theory sentences... massive nono. Read Quine.

Ok, it seems that you are not interested!

Your premises are theory not yet established.

They have to be just observations not observations and theories in 1 statement...

Conclusions settle theories... you can't be like theory theory proof...

Your premises are theory not yet established. — DifferentiatingEgg

Which premises?

P1, P2, P3, P4

You make observations and theories in every premise. Every theory taken per premise is seen as fundamentally solid logic... when you could just as easily replace the word physical with mental and it would read exactly the same... and make the same assumptions in each line...

Let's discuss P1 in the first section. Are you denying that physical exists and you don't have any experience?

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience — MoK

P1) Mental and experience exist and they are subject to change

P2)Experience is due to existence of mental and the change in the state of the mental is due to existence of experience

C1) Therefore, mental and experience cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)[/quote]

Just saying stuff doesn't make it an argument... see? Your argued concludes multiple ways depending what word you place in it. All youve done is create sentences that connect and lead words to other words you want to emphasize...

Those are not my premises. Could you please answer my question here?

my god were talking about the FORM of your premises

Not the words used ...

The shit form allows for any words to be used.

Cause they don't actually make an argument.

Whennyou have proper form you cannot substitute words.

What do you mean by mental and experience?

To show you can substitute different words for physical and end up with with the same conclusion... thus not an argument...

You can replace mental with Sun... and the same conclusion works out...