A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic. — noAxioms
Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it. — noAxioms
I use it as an example of a real predicate. It can be (and is) independently discovered (and not invented) by anything with rudimentary math skills. It, like Fibonacci numbers is found in nature. A pine cone always has rows and columns that number a pair of adjacent Fibonacci numbers. There are many species of cicadas that come out every X years, and the various species have various cycles, but the cycles are always prime numbers (and for a reason). The 17 year ones are numerous where I live now, but we have some 13 year ones as well. Cicadas rely on a real predicate of some numbers being prime that has nothing to do with human concepts. I actually don't know the purpose served by the Fibonacci thing, but it's found in so many places. It has something to do with being an integer approximation of the golden ratio (another non-human-ideal predicate). — noAxioms
Hard to parse that, but you're apparently claiming that the meaningfulness of arguments is what makes a definition meaningful. — noAxioms
Not sure if I can agree — noAxioms
A "definition" is a statement without a truth-value and therefore cannot be used to "resolve a disagreement"; rather, in a given discursive context, it's either useful to some degree or not at all. Mary's conceptual definition is either more or less coherent consistent & sensible than Joe's. Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements.Joe offers a particular doctrine about existence, Mary offers a different one. Is there anything either can appeal to, in order to determine whether one is correct? Let's just pick "conceptual definition" from your list. Would Joe and Mary be able to consult such a definition in order to resolve a disagreement between them? — J
Re: Meinong's predication (OP), the definition I think is more useful – less ambiguous – in this context is (a) 'exist' indictates a non-fictional, or concrete, object (or fact) and, by extension, (b) 'existence' denotes the (uncountable) set of all non-fictional, or concrete, objects (and all facts). I'm open to any definition more useful than mine. Maybe I should read past this post ...Let's just pick "conceptual definition" from your list.
A "definition" is a statement without a truth-value and therefore cannot be used to "resolve a disagreement"; rather, in a given discursive context, it's either useful to some degree or not at all. Mary's conceptual definition is either more or less coherent consistent & sensible than Joe's. Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements. — 180 Proof
And again, as I've pointed out ...I ask again, if two people disagree about the terms, how can they resolve the disagreement? — J
For example, having greater scientific efficacy (i.e. unfalsified predictive model) "resolves the disagreement" a chemist and an alchemist have about the definition of "heat" or an astronomer and astrologer have about the definition of "planet". In philosophy, however, e.g. a German idealist (i.e. disembodied X) and a French materialist (i.e. embodied X) can only "resolve the disagreement" they have about the term "existence" by either one adopting – becoming convinced via arguments of – the other's metaphysical framework. Competing terms / definitions, in effect, belong to competing vocabularies; one simply learns to speak the other's language (game) in order to use the other term / definition in a way other than one agrees with in one's own language (game).Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements. — 180 Proof
This usage of ( ∃x) (x is in Sydney) is existential quantification (my E6 above, a couple posts back), a form of a relation, stating that x happens to be a member of the set of <stuff that is in Sydney>Let's have a quick look at the sort of reasons we have for not treating existence as a predicate. One example:
From
Circular Quay is in Sydney
we infer
Something is in Sydney
And write
( ∃x) (x is in Sydney) — Banno
Yes, it is valid if we deny EPP, else wrong form, and wrong definition I think.There is no such thing as Pegasus
we do not infer:
( ∃x) (there is no such thing as x)
If we were to treat existence as a predicate, [this] second inference would be valid. — Banno
I'd write (∄x) (x = Pegasus) (same thing?) This seems to reference a predicate of 'being', but the ∄ part is still existential quantification, no? It isn't a relation to Sydney this time, but more of an objective E1 sort of membership. Nothing in reality 'is Pegasus'.So instead of parsing "There is no such thing as Pegasus" as Pegasus not having the property of existence, ~∃!(Pegasus), we pars it as there not being any thing that is Pegasus: ~∃(x)(x is pegasus)
Quite a few, and I'm not pushing any particular view, just running with the denial of the one principle.Could you provide links to the resources you consulted before writing your OP? I'm trying to understand where you are coming from. — Leontiskos
That one I very much did get from one of the articles, but self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox, in this case, any property that references the count of the properties, which is arguably never finite.I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property. — RussellA
News to me, showing how much I actually dove in, so thanks for this since it seems relevant.Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. — RussellA
This presumes EPP.Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. — RussellA
Really? He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. The whole point of this topic was to explore predication to things that lack existence.For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. — RussellA
I have clues and can glean a fairly good picture from incomplete access. Maybe. It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich.But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself? — RussellA
Two ways to parse that:Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? — RussellA
Human math is limited, but yes, very useful. The vast majority of actual real numbers out there (say the distance between the CoM of moon and Earth) is a value that is utterly inexpressible by any means other than the words I just used.I've seen some discussions with regards to whether math is "real" or just subjectively descriptive but extremely precise and so very useful — philosch
Why primes for cicadas? So the different species have as low as possible chance of coming out at the same time as some other species. Non-primes might have common factors, increasing the frequency of the overlap. We just had such an overlap by us a couple years back. Every 221 years, they both come out at once, but we have so few of the 13 year guys that I didn't notice the difference.You've given me something to dig into further, I'm not sure what to think about this just yet. Very good stuff!
'Fictional' already begs an existence state. 'Concrete' leverages E2 (epistemic definition) or E4 (relation to same).Re: Meinong's predication (OP), the definition I think is more useful – less ambiguous – in this context is (a) 'exist' indictates a non-fictional, or concrete, object (or fact) and, by extension, (b) 'existence' denotes the (uncountable) set of all non-fictional, or concrete, objects (and all facts). I'm open to any definition more useful than mine — 180 Proof
Don't see how it could. I defined 'EPP' in my OP. That's a definition since I could not find an official term for the principle. Is 'EPP' the correct term? It might not be what is used elsewhere, but it's not wrong.Why doesn't a definition have a truth-value? — J
I would have thought that "a bachelor is an unmarried male" has a truth-value in L — J
Been too busy to reply quickly again. — noAxioms
Extensionally, Sydney just is the set of stuff that is in Sydney. So as long as there is stuff in Sydney - the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist.Sydney seems not required to exist (E1, almost a platonic definition) for this to be true, just as the number 91 does not require 13 to exist (E1) for it to have the property of not being prime, but it does require 13 to exist (existential quantification) in order to have the property of not being prime. So for one, we seem to be referencing more than one defniition of existence, and E1 seems to be a property. — noAxioms
Yep. Is Pegasus in the domain, or not? If Pegasus is in the domain then we can use existential generalisation to talk about Pegasus - Pegasus sprang from the blood of medusa, therefore something sprang from the blood of Medusa.This presumes a sort of reality with a list of stuff that is part of it, and there not being Pegasus on that list. — noAxioms
Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that...self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox — noAxioms
This presumes EPP. — noAxioms
Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?.................................He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. — noAxioms
It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich. — noAxioms
1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold). — noAxioms
In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property — RussellA
Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms
Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time? — Corvus
Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties. — RussellA
Properties can be assigned to nonexistent objects such as Santa, God and time. — Corvus
Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms
If two people have different definitions of some word they're both using, they will end up talking past each other, but with neither of them being wrong. — noAxioms
So the set of integers necessarily exists because the set isn't empty?Extensionally, Sydney just is the set of stuff that is in Sydney. So as long as there is stuff in Sydney - the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist. — Banno
Sounds circular, since the domain in question here seems to be 'things in the set of things that are members of objective reality', as opposed to say 'in Sydney', something to which we have more empirical access.Is Pegasus in the domain, or not?
I don't expect to meet aliens either, but that doesn't imply (by most definitions) that they don't exist. Pegasus doesn't expect to meet you, so he questions your existence. OK, granted that if there is something that satisfies the description, it probably doesn't share the particular identity of the myth. It's just a flying horsey thing that happens to be named Pegasus.we ought not to expect to meet Pegasus while out shopping.
As I already posted, it seems that there cannot be a finite list of properties of a thing, or at least not a finite list of self-referential properties such as that one. Paradoxes result, just like with the liar paradox. You point this out.Is a lack of properties a property? — RussellA
By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist? I listed several, but E2/E6 seems to be the one being leveraged here, which is a relation. The horse exists because I see it, and thus relates to me. My experience defines existence. Leads to solipsism at worst and anthropocentrism at best. If not that, then what definition?For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses.
Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?Objects that absist such as the round square.
More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance. Hence it not being trivial to test if something is in reality or not.Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.
It originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias. Something to not forget.Everything we know about the "world" comes from our experiences. From these experiences we can make a consistent model of the "world". But this model originates from our experiences, not from what has caused our experiences. — RussellA
Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. So we have to recognize for instance a strong observer bias, which can be very misleading.I agree when you say "I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich" but this is at odds when you say "Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition."
Totally agree. The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it. I am laying no claim that abstraction is not involved in knowing anything.The "brick" is a concept, a mental abstraction.
Not sure how Meinong would classify time. Subsist? I agree that time has properties, as does space (especially since they're arguably the same thing). So non-objects can also have properties. In some universes, there's no meaning to 'object' anyway. His classifications seem very much anthropocentric.Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time? — Corvus
You didn't say that only objects have properties. All your examples are of things with properties, including 'things' that subsist and absist.Objects have properties. — RussellA
Good, We agree on that.Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties.
Under EPP, existence is not a property. If it doesn't exist, it has no properties. EPP is the principle that says this. Meinong denies EPP, and I'm exploring the implications of only that, not necessarily everything else Meinong says, such as his classification into 3 categories.In the case of EPP, could we say, X doesn't exist, could mean it doesn't exist in entity with mass, but it still exists as an EPP with the property of nonexistence. — Corvus
I gave 6 different meanings to the word 3 posts back, E1-E6. More have been suggested. Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location.What does it mean to exist or not? — Harry Hindu
The statement (that he is an imagining) seems to presume his nonexistence. OK, granted that Santa is self-contradictory and so is not likely to logically exist, but some imagined things are. My example was of Pegasus imagining you, without every having any empirical contact with a human. Does that mean you don't exist?Is not one property of Santa is that it is an imagining and it exists as an imagining? Things exist if they have causal power.
It can be argued that only the concept has those causal effects, as intended. It is God for children after all, purpose being to herd sheep, very much cause-effect going on.Just look at the causal power of Santa the imagining around Christmas time
Mary's usage is entirely non-standard, and if she chooses this definition, it needs to be stated up front, else she is indeed just plain wrong. She is not communicating, perhaps deliberately so. The problem occurs more often when words have multiple valid definitions. I have a physics background and often see the lay definitions of words like 'accelerate' and 'event' used instead of the physics definitions, which probably needs to be explicitly stated somewhere to the lay person, even if not necessary in a discussion with those that have a little physics background.Joe defines "bachelor" as "unmarried male", while Mary defines it as "a fir tree". In ordinary usage, we would say that Joe is right and Mary is wrong. — J
Mary's usage is entirely non-standard, and if she chooses this definition, it needs to be stated up front, else she is indeed just plain wrong. . . .
In philosophy, words like 'exist' might have more definitions than you'd find in a dictionary. — noAxioms
And BTW, a bachelor is a device to sort a large collection of laundry into workable batches of like colors that fit in the wash machine.
The term is also used in the old mainframe days, a process to submit batch jobs to the mainframe at a pace that it can handle.
Sheesh, don't you know anything?? :) — noAxioms
So the set of integers necessarily exists because the set isn't empty? — noAxioms
That's not what was said. But also, I adopted "set" only becasue you used the word, and sets are not predicates - treating them as such causes problems.but the existence of x in a set does not make the set exist — noAxioms
to which you replied:So instead of parsing "There is no such thing as Pegasus" as Pegasus not having the property of existence, ~∃!(Pegasus), we pars it as there not being any thing that is Pegasus: ~∃(x)(x is pegasus). — Banno
There is good reason for using ~(∃x). It shows the quantifier and the negation are seperate operations. Pegasus is a mythical horse, is it not? And therefore, we might conclude (by existential generalisation) that there are mythical horses? We can make such a generalisations, hence there is something that is pegasus - the mythical horse. Of course, you will not meet Pegasus at the stables, but in the story of Perseus.This seems to reference a predicate of 'being', but the ∄ part is still existential quantification, no? It isn't a relation to Sydney this time, but more of an objective E1 sort of membership. Nothing in reality 'is Pegasus'. — noAxioms
If Santa can be fat without existing, then it does not follow that Santa exists from the presumption of his girth. — noAxioms
You brought up 'thoughts', a good example. They're not objects, nor are they distinct. They do have properties. — noAxioms
Good, We agree on that. — noAxioms
It originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias. — noAxioms
Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. — noAxioms
The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it. — noAxioms
By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist?......................Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?...............................More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance.....................Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location. — noAxioms
Asking the location of the universe is a silly question, like asking the for the location of reality. You could say that the universe is the set of all locations, or the set of all relations. I still prefer to tie existence to causation with location being just one property of causation.I gave 6 different meanings to the word 3 posts back, E1-E6. More have been suggested. Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location.
Concerning that: What is the location of our visible universe? It's not like it has coordinates. If I was to mail a letter to myself from outside the universe, what could I write that would get it here? Can't be done since there is only one origin (big bang) and that totally lacking in spacial location. There's not a place where it happened, so what becomes of the 'location' property? It too becomes a mere relation. — noAxioms
Well, yeah. An imagining is a concept. Concepts have causal power. Do concepts and imaginings exist? What you are saying is that Santa does not exist as a flesh and blood organism. That is true. It exists as a concept, or a legend, and the legend had to start somewhere.The statement (that he is an imagining) seems to presume his nonexistence. OK, granted that Santa is self-contradictory and so is not likely to logically exist, but some imagined things are. My example was of Pegasus imagining you, without every having any empirical contact with a human. Does that mean you don't exist?
It can be argued that only the concept has those causal effects, as intended. It is God for children after all, purpose being to herd sheep, very much cause-effect going on. — noAxioms
Lacking a clear definition, let's step back from Meinong for a moment and consider the EPP principle. Existence is prior to predication, meaning something nonexistent cannot have a property. Under what definition of existence might that be valid?Yes, I think we're on the same (or closely adjacent) page. The proliferation of definitions/usages of "exist" in philosophy makes it a poor candidate for dispute. Arguments about existence quickly become wrangles over terminology, which is a shame, because I'm convinced there are important things we can understand about metaphysical structure without trying to plug in the "existence" terminology and argue for it, in the hopes that someone will finally agree with us! — J
You said "So as long as [...] the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist.". So conversely, if it isn't an empty set, it must exist. It necessarily exists, because if it didn't, it would violate the assertion above. Perhaps you didn't mean to say exactly that. It made little sense to me. Perhaps you didn't mean any set, but only this 'in Sydney' set. My comment was me trying to understand your comment.Why introduce "necessarily"? — Banno
I was treating membership within sets as predicates. The ontology of the set becomes a predicate if EPP is denied, else I agree that the contradictions you indicate result.... and sets are not predicates - treating them as such causes problems.
That is its relation to humans, sure. That doesn't mean that there isn't one out there in some 'possible world', for lack of better term. If there is such a thing, that still wouldn't change our reference from being a reference to a mythical thing. So in the sense intended, there is indeed no such thing as Pegasus. If the intention (the definition of there being such a thing) is broadened, then we might conclude that there are possibly creatures that match the description of our myths. They wouldn't be mythical at that point.Pegasus is a mythical horse, is it not?
Something went wrong there, since if EPP holds, 'Santa is fat' is not even wrong, but 'something is fat' is true. ∃(x)(x is Santa & x is fat)Santa is fat, hence, there is something that is fat
Santa is fat
∃(x)( x is fat). (Existential generalisation) — Banno
Depends on one's definition of course. Meinong's definition seemed to suggest otherwise, but I didn't like his three categories.That is, not everything that exists is physical.
Seems to contradict the 'physical object' definition I got from another (not particularly reliable) source. The target may or may not be an object (doing arithmetic is not an object target), but the thought itself does not seem to qualify as an object itself, but they sometimes occur in a confined spatial region.For Meinong, the target of a mental act, an intentional act, is an "object" (Wikipedia - Alexius Meinong) — RussellA
Thoughts do have properties, but pyramid thoughts are not often considered to be 'heavy' thoughts, and it would be a different definition of 'heavy' anyway.That the object of thought has a property doesn't mean that my thought has a property.
An object to instantiate the thought. Kind of presumptuous, but I'll accept it. The wording above suggests that the thought itself is an object and is not simply implemented by one.In the context of Meinong, all our mental intentions are of objects, meaning that there cannot be any absence of objects.
Is there a typo in there? Because a mind independent thing being caused by experiences seems to be a contradiction.As an Indirect Realist, I don't know that some mind-independent thing-in-itself caused by experiences, but I believe that they did. — RussellA
Hmm, it does seem to say that. I think I meant 'biased on the knowledge ...", trying to take observer bias into account, something easily omitted.I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. — noAxioms
Are you saying that on the one hand you want a definition of "existence" consistent with your knowledge of what you experience yet on the other hand you want a definition of "existence" not based on your knowledge about your experiences.
OK. I never really got the distinction between direct and indirect realism. Sure, I know what the words mean, but 'direct' makes it sound like there's not a causal chain between the apple and your experience of it.In your mind the "brick" is a mental abstraction, a concept. When you see a brick, you are directly observing an appearance. You are not directly observing the thing-in-itself that caused the appearance. You are directly observing one particular instantiation of your concept of a "brick".
Sorry. I only read parts of it, trying to find definitions mostly.I thought I knew what was happening until I started to read www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm — RussellA
By who? Does Meinong define 'reality'? I'm no realist, so I don't advocate any particular definition. Something being mind-independent doesn't necessarily make it real, more real, or less real. Any of those four cases is possible given the right choice of definition.I assume that "reality" is being used to refer to a mind-independent world
I don't follow this. Something that subsists by definition doesn't exist. It might have properties, but existing isn't one of them (per the definitions given). I don't see a contradiction.Meinong said that existence is a property. However, this leads to a contradiction in sense 2 of subsist. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, an object that subsists doesn't exist, but it still has properties, and if existence is a property, then this means that an object that doesn't exist must exist.
Totally agree, and yet many treat the concept seriously, suggesting say that the universe might be bumping against the nearest neighbor reality or something.Asking the location of the universe is a silly question, like asking the for the location of reality. — Harry Hindu
I like to use the word to refer to our particular bit of spacetime,places where the laws of physics are the same and any location can be given relative to another. That's far less than 'all locations', some of which might be in say a realm with 5 spatial dimensions and has no location relative to 'here'.You could say that the universe is the set of all locations, or the set of all relations.
Now you sound like me, with ontology being defined in a way that only makes sense in a structure with causal relationships.I still prefer to tie existence to causation
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