A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic. — noAxioms

But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself?

Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it. — noAxioms

Our only knowledge comes from mental abstractions.

Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? If metaphysically impossible, the disclaimer in the OP makes the OP unanswerable.

I use it as an example of a real predicate. It can be (and is) independently discovered (and not invented) by anything with rudimentary math skills. It, like Fibonacci numbers is found in nature. A pine cone always has rows and columns that number a pair of adjacent Fibonacci numbers. There are many species of cicadas that come out every X years, and the various species have various cycles, but the cycles are always prime numbers (and for a reason). The 17 year ones are numerous where I live now, but we have some 13 year ones as well. Cicadas rely on a real predicate of some numbers being prime that has nothing to do with human concepts. I actually don't know the purpose served by the Fibonacci thing, but it's found in so many places. It has something to do with being an integer approximation of the golden ratio (another non-human-ideal predicate). — noAxioms

Okay now this is interesting and although I knew Cicadas had a 17yr cycle, I didn't realize there was a `13 yr version nor the Fibonacci sequence being found in nature with such frequency. But I still wonder. There are lots of other mathematical concepts found in nature and just exactly what to think about their predicates now becomes more interesting and tougher to discuss or argue for or against. I've seen some discussions with regards to whether math is "real" or just subjectively descriptive but extremely precise and so very useful. You've given me something to dig into further, I'm not sure what to think about this just yet. Very good stuff!

Hard to parse that, but you're apparently claiming that the meaningfulness of arguments is what makes a definition meaningful. — noAxioms

So in the first place it's a straightforward biconditional, and should be parsed as such:

"The term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful."

And how does one oppose a biconditional? The same basic way they oppose a conditional: by providing a counterexample of one side obtaining without the other.

Not sure if I can agree — noAxioms

And so if you want to disagree you have to provide that counterexample. You can either show how the term could be meaningful even if arguments over the meaning of existence are not meaningful, or you could show how arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful even if the term is not meaningful.

This is also what @J is required to do if he wishes to answer objections to his claims.

Joe offers a particular doctrine about existence, Mary offers a different one. Is there anything either can appeal to, in order to determine whether one is correct? Let's just pick "conceptual definition" from your list. Would Joe and Mary be able to consult such a definition in order to resolve a disagreement between them? — J

A "definition" is a statement without a truth-value and therefore cannot be used to "resolve a disagreement"; rather, in a given discursive context, it's either useful to some degree or not at all. Mary's conceptual definition is either more or less coherent consistent & sensible than Joe's. Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements.

Let's just pick "conceptual definition" from your list.

Re: Meinong's predication (OP), the definition I think is more useful – less ambiguous – in this context is (a) 'exist' indictates a non-fictional, or concrete, object (or fact) and, by extension, (b) 'existence' denotes the (uncountable) set of all non-fictional, or concrete, objects (and all facts). I'm open to any definition more useful than mine. Maybe I should read past this post ...

A "definition" is a statement without a truth-value and therefore cannot be used to "resolve a disagreement"; rather, in a given discursive context, it's either useful to some degree or not at all. Mary's conceptual definition is either more or less coherent consistent & sensible than Joe's. Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements. — 180 Proof

Why doesn't a definition have a truth-value? You probably mean something simple that I'm overlooking, but I would have thought that "a bachelor is an unmarried male" has a truth-value in L. It's a truth about language, not the world, if that's what you mean -- and that's part of my point about the difficulties Joe and Mary will have using a definition to resolve their disagreement.

As to "coherent, consistent and sensible": Joe's doctrine about existence can be all of those things, while still being false -- if there is a truth of the matter. That's the question I'm trying to highlight.

I agree about better, sounder arguments. I just believe it's difficult to find a non-stipulative terminological place to stand, when it comes to arguments about "what existence is." I ask again, if two people disagree about the terms, how can they resolve the disagreement? Wouldn't they be better off noticing how "existence" is used in philosophical (and ordinary) discourse, and then coming up with sharper, more specific terms to cover the various cases? Indeed, isn't this what Meinong tried to do, in part?

I ask again, if two people disagree about the terms, how can they resolve the disagreement? — J

And again, as I've pointed out ...

Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements. — 180 Proof

For example, having greater scientific efficacy (i.e. unfalsified predictive model) "resolves the disagreement" a chemist and an alchemist have about the definition of "heat" or an astronomer and astrologer have about the definition of "planet". In philosophy, however, e.g. a German idealist (i.e. disembodied X) and a French materialist (i.e. embodied X) can only "resolve the disagreement" they have about the term "existence" by either one adopting – becoming convinced via arguments of – the other's metaphysical framework. Competing terms / definitions, in effect, belong to competing vocabularies; one simply learns to speak the other's language (game) in order to use the other term / definition in a way other than one agrees with in one's own language (game).

Been too busy to reply quickly again.

Let's have a quick look at the sort of reasons we have for not treating existence as a predicate. One example:

From

Circular Quay is in Sydney

we infer

Something is in Sydney

And write
( ∃x) (x is in Sydney) — Banno

This usage of ( ∃x) (x is in Sydney) is existential quantification (my E6 above, a couple posts back), a form of a relation, stating that x happens to be a member of the set of <stuff that is in Sydney>

Sydney seems not required to exist (E1, almost a platonic definition) for this to be true, just as the number 91 does not require 13 to exist (E1) for it to have the property of not being prime, but it does require 13 to exist (existential quantification) in order to have the property of not being prime. So for one, we seem to be referencing more than one defniition of existence, and E1 seems to be a property.

There is no such thing as Pegasus

we do not infer:
( ∃x) (there is no such thing as x)

If we were to treat existence as a predicate, [this] second inference would be valid. — Banno

Yes, it is valid if we deny EPP, else wrong form, and wrong definition I think.

So instead of parsing "There is no such thing as Pegasus" as Pegasus not having the property of existence, ~∃!(Pegasus), we pars it as there not being any thing that is Pegasus: ~∃(x)(x is pegasus)

I'd write (∄x) (x = Pegasus) (same thing?) This seems to reference a predicate of 'being', but the ∄ part is still existential quantification, no? It isn't a relation to Sydney this time, but more of an objective E1 sort of membership. Nothing in reality 'is Pegasus'.
This presumes a sort of reality with a list of stuff that is part of it, and there not being Pegasus on that list. Meinong might say that Pegasus has a property of not being on that list, and somebody more like me might deny the meaningfulness of that list altogether since there is no way to test for it. e.g. How would Pegasus conclude his own nonexistence? We are letting Pegasus ponder this because we're considering the case where predication does not require existence.

Could you provide links to the resources you consulted before writing your OP? I'm trying to understand where you are coming from. — Leontiskos

Quite a few, and I'm not pushing any particular view, just running with the denial of the one principle.
I looked at parts of SEP on existence, and more recently the 'object' section at https://www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm

I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property. — RussellA

That one I very much did get from one of the articles, but self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox, in this case, any property that references the count of the properties, which is arguably never finite.

Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. — RussellA

News to me, showing how much I actually dove in, so thanks for this since it seems relevant.
Exist: Is a physical object, contained by both space & time, a relation to our universe, or more in particular, a relation to a collapsed state of our universe. Meinong would never have used those words since the universe was still considered classical back in his day.
The universe is not something that exists by this definition, but it might not be how Meinong would qualify it. People (especially those embracing classical notions) don't like saying the universe doesn't exist.
I might be getting this wrong, but this definition seems to be a relation, not anything objective. A thing not part of our physical reality might be part of a very different physical reality.

Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?

Absist: Imaginations: Santa for instance, not requiring logical consistency. For reasons of my OP disclaimer, I am not worried much about this one.

Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. — RussellA

This presumes EPP.

For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. — RussellA

Really? He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. The whole point of this topic was to explore predication to things that lack existence.

But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself? — RussellA

I have clues and can glean a fairly good picture from incomplete access. Maybe. It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich.

Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? — RussellA

Two ways to parse that:
1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
2) How can we know that something doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? This is the idealism vs physical-reality debate: Answer, we can't know since neither view can be falsified, even if there's significant evidence. Evidence and proof are different things.

I've seen some discussions with regards to whether math is "real" or just subjectively descriptive but extremely precise and so very useful — philosch

Human math is limited, but yes, very useful. The vast majority of actual real numbers out there (say the distance between the CoM of moon and Earth) is a value that is utterly inexpressible by any means other than the words I just used.

I can do 6th order differential calculus in my head, real time. Thing is, I do it with the fast efficient part of me, not the slow digital part that got educated by the schools. The hard math is done analog (sort of), not digital (again, sort of).

You've given me something to dig into further, I'm not sure what to think about this just yet. Very good stuff!

Why primes for cicadas? So the different species have as low as possible chance of coming out at the same time as some other species. Non-primes might have common factors, increasing the frequency of the overlap. We just had such an overlap by us a couple years back. Every 221 years, they both come out at once, but we have so few of the 13 year guys that I didn't notice the difference.

Re: Meinong's predication (OP), the definition I think is more useful – less ambiguous – in this context is (a) 'exist' indictates a non-fictional, or concrete, object (or fact) and, by extension, (b) 'existence' denotes the (uncountable) set of all non-fictional, or concrete, objects (and all facts). I'm open to any definition more useful than mine — 180 Proof

'Fictional' already begs an existence state. 'Concrete' leverages E2 (epistemic definition) or E4 (relation to same).

Meinong seems to allow predication of nonexistent things, but he still sorts stuff into existing and not existing (fictional for instance). Per the argument in my OP, I'm unconvinced that such sorting is a valid thing to do. I guess it is since 'existence' seems defined as a mere relation, but what if we're the fiction of something that actually exists? How would we know that?

Why doesn't a definition have a truth-value? — J

Don't see how it could. I defined 'EPP' in my OP. That's a definition since I could not find an official term for the principle. Is 'EPP' the correct term? It might not be what is used elsewhere, but it's not wrong.

If two people have different definitions of some word they're both using, they will end up talking past each other, but with neither of them being wrong.

- :up:

---

I would have thought that "a bachelor is an unmarried male" has a truth-value in L — J

Because you are thinking of it as a proposition, not as the definition of a term. If you make it a definition like so then it has no truth value: "A bachelor is_df an unmarried male."

The difficulty here is that "definition" is equivocal. Lexicographers can err, and in that sense the definitions provided by a dictionary can be true or false. And in the Aristotelian sense a nominal definition can be a better or lesser approximation of the real definition, i.e. the accurate abstraction of the essence. But "definition" in analytic philosophy tends to mean stipulative definition, and stipulative definitions are not true or false. More generally, in a linguistic sense the meaning of a term is not true or false; what is true or false is a proposition that involves multiple terms with a copula.

---



Okay, thanks. :up:

Been too busy to reply quickly again. — noAxioms

Same. I was going to follow that with a series of posts on each of the approaches in the article, but travel intervened.

Sydney seems not required to exist (E1, almost a platonic definition) for this to be true, just as the number 91 does not require 13 to exist (E1) for it to have the property of not being prime, but it does require 13 to exist (existential quantification) in order to have the property of not being prime. So for one, we seem to be referencing more than one defniition of existence, and E1 seems to be a property. — noAxioms

Extensionally, Sydney just is the set of stuff that is in Sydney. So as long as there is stuff in Sydney - the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist.

So the quantification would work as follows: We note that Circular Quay is in Sydney, and so we can invoke the definition of existential quantification, that we list all the individuals in the domain, and say of them that at least one is in Sydney.

This avoids the messy "is a part of objective reality", or knowing about stuff, or being objective, or causal histories. And avoids Platonism.

This presumes a sort of reality with a list of stuff that is part of it, and there not being Pegasus on that list. — noAxioms

Yep. Is Pegasus in the domain, or not? If Pegasus is in the domain then we can use existential generalisation to talk about Pegasus - Pegasus sprang from the blood of medusa, therefore something sprang from the blood of Medusa.

I'll advocate for the "Anti-Meinongian First-Order View", such that "Pegasus" rigidly designates Pegasus, without the need for an intervening description. Pegasus is a myth, so we ought not to expect to meet Pegasus while out shopping.

Is a lack of properties a property?

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that...self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox — noAxioms

The statement "a lack of properties is itself a property" breaks the Law of Non-contradiction. From the Law of Non-contradiction, A cannot be not A. Let A be the presence of a property.

Then the absence of a property cannot be the presence of a property.

This presumes EPP. — noAxioms

For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses. Objects that subsist such as numbers. Objects that absist such as the round square.

Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.

Therefore, for Meinong, in reality there cannot be an absence of properties.

Does Meinong's "being" mean anything?

Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?.................................He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. — noAxioms

For Meinong there are three kinds of objects. Those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. All these objects have properties.

Those objects that subsist, such as numbers and Santa have non-existence and being.

There is a problem with Meinong's meaning of "existence". Presumably the word "existence" is being used to describe things in a world independent of the mind rather than being used to describe things in the mind. However, I would say that "thoughts exist", and I have always used the word" exist" to refer to things that exist not only in the mind but also in the world. However, it seems that in any discussion about Meinong, the word "exist" is being restricted to things in the world.

For me, it seems clear that Santa exists in the mind and doesn't exist in the world. But Meinong says that although Santa doesn't exist in the world, has a non-existence in the world, Santa has "being" in the world. This makes no sense to me. Just because I say "the moon is made of blue cheese" doesn't mean that the moon is made of blue cheese. Just because Meinong might say "Santa has being in the world" doesn't mean that Santa has being in the world.

Anyone can say anything, Sometimes they say true things and sometimes they say false things. Perhaps this is the case for Santa's being in the world.

The impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself

It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich. — noAxioms

Everything we know about the "world" comes from our experiences. From these experiences we can make a consistent model of the "world". But this model originates from our experiences, not from what has caused our experiences.

I agree when you say "I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich" but this is at odds when you say "Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition."

We can only ever know our experiences, never the thing-in-itself independent of our experiences.

As the consistent model exists in our minds, any understanding we have of existence must also exist in our minds. This makes it impossible to be able to understand the nature of existence independently of how we understand the nature of existence in our minds.

1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold). — noAxioms

Through your visual experiences you experience on a number of different occasions a rectangular shape that is red. Because of the consistency in your visual observations, a rectangular shape that is red has the name "a brick".

On one particular occasion you see one particular instantiation of "a brick" and feel a pain in your head. You know the concept "a brick" and you know the relation between a pain in your head and seeing one particular instantiation of "a brick".

All these exist in your mind. The "brick" is a concept, a mental abstraction.

In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property — RussellA

Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time?

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms

Haven't read Meinong, but if it is his idea, then I agree. Properties can be assigned to nonexistent objects such as Santa, God and time.

Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time? — Corvus

For Meinong, in the world an object may exist, such as a horse, may subsist, such as a number or absist, such as a round square. Objects have properties. Therefore, there is no instance in the world where there is not an object, where there is an absence of objects, an absence of properties.

Otherwise, one can imagine a space empty of objects, where this space passes through time. Space has the property of being extended. Time has the property of duration. Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties.

Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties. — RussellA

I agree with this idea. So, is existence a property of object, or entity with mass? Or both?

If we agree that existence implies the both, then in the case of EPP, could we say, X doesn't exist, could mean it doesn't exist in entity with mass, but it still exists as an EPP with the property of nonexistence.

IOW, when you say X doesn't exist, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. It exists as an EPP with the property of nonexistence. Would appreciate your comment if you see any inconsistency or fallacy in this.

Properties can be assigned to nonexistent objects such as Santa, God and time. — Corvus

It seems to me that, when discussing Meinong, the word "exist" is only used when referring to the world, not the mind. I would say that thoughts exist, but this doesn't seem how the word "exist" is being used.

Therefore, for Meinong, as regards the world, although Santa is non-existent, Santa does have "being". Properties can be assigned to objects that have being, such as Santa.

:ok: Interesting. Need to read some Meinong for me to be able to further comment on the point. Many thanks for your replies.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms

What does it mean to exist or not? Is not one property of Santa is that it is an imagining and it exists as an imagining? Things exist if they have causal power. Just look at the causal power of Santa the imagining around Christmas time. So it is not a question of whether Santa exists, but how it exists. What is the nature of Santa Claus if not an imagining? Things that do not exist we can never talk about.

If two people have different definitions of some word they're both using, they will end up talking past each other, but with neither of them being wrong. — noAxioms

I take the point about definitions being sometimes non-truth-apt, but in the case you cite: Joe defines "bachelor" as "unmarried male", while Mary defines it as "a fir tree". In ordinary usage, we would say that Joe is right and Mary is wrong. Granted, either can simply stipulate a definition, but we would say that Joe is stipulating the dictionary definition and Mary is not, so there is some kind of wrongness attached to what Mary is doing. But what kind? What allows us to go from "Mary is using an unconventional definition" to "Mary is wrong about what a bachelor is"? I don't have a ready answer, but the question underlies why I think "resolution of a dispute by definition" is more problematic than you do.

Being is prior to predication in thought. In the flesh they are one. Noumena IS phenomenon seen in truth. "And this will be a sign to you, you will find a child in a manger". The child was not a sign, pointing to something else. This "sign" pointed to itself at the moment they knew the child as God-flesh. And the Indian snake is phenomena only so long as it's not seen as a rope. The world is misunderstood by the mind. To go deeper is to find pure being, what matter as extention truly is. What the brain and nervous system. Man is psycho-organic, spiritual enfleshed. Spiritual means "being"

Thanks to all for the active discussion. Plenty to digest here.

Extensionally, Sydney just is the set of stuff that is in Sydney. So as long as there is stuff in Sydney - the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist. — Banno

So the set of integers necessarily exists because the set isn't empty?
Pegasus then also necessarily exists because of his list of parts isn't empty. Maybe I'm just not reading you right, but the existence of x in a set does not make the set exist, no? It seems a funny criteria.

Is Pegasus in the domain, or not?

Sounds circular, since the domain in question here seems to be 'things in the set of things that are members of objective reality', as opposed to say 'in Sydney', something to which we have more empirical access.

we ought not to expect to meet Pegasus while out shopping.

I don't expect to meet aliens either, but that doesn't imply (by most definitions) that they don't exist. Pegasus doesn't expect to meet you, so he questions your existence. OK, granted that if there is something that satisfies the description, it probably doesn't share the particular identity of the myth. It's just a flying horsey thing that happens to be named Pegasus.

Is a lack of properties a property? — RussellA

As I already posted, it seems that there cannot be a finite list of properties of a thing, or at least not a finite list of self-referential properties such as that one. Paradoxes result, just like with the liar paradox. You point this out.

For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses.

By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist? I listed several, but E2/E6 seems to be the one being leveraged here, which is a relation. The horse exists because I see it, and thus relates to me. My experience defines existence. Leads to solipsism at worst and anthropocentrism at best. If not that, then what definition?

Objects that absist such as the round square.

Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?

Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.

More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance. Hence it not being trivial to test if something is in reality or not.
I can make a square circle BTW. 4 equal nonzero length straight sides, 4 equal angles where the sides meet, and it's also a circle. Just got to think a little outside the box.

Everything we know about the "world" comes from our experiences. From these experiences we can make a consistent model of the "world". But this model originates from our experiences, not from what has caused our experiences. — RussellA

It originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias. Something to not forget.

I agree when you say "I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich" but this is at odds when you say "Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition."

Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. So we have to recognize for instance a strong observer bias, which can be very misleading.

The "brick" is a concept, a mental abstraction.

Totally agree. The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it. I am laying no claim that abstraction is not involved in knowing anything.

Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time? — Corvus

Not sure how Meinong would classify time. Subsist? I agree that time has properties, as does space (especially since they're arguably the same thing). So non-objects can also have properties. In some universes, there's no meaning to 'object' anyway. His classifications seem very much anthropocentric.

Objects have properties. — RussellA

You didn't say that only objects have properties. All your examples are of things with properties, including 'things' that subsist and absist.
You brought up 'thoughts', a good example. They're not objects, nor are they distinct. They do have properties. How would they be classified? Imagnation? I don't imagine my thoughts, I utilize thoughts to do the imagining.

Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties.

Good, We agree on that.


Sorry to butt into a conversation, but...

In the case of EPP, could we say, X doesn't exist, could mean it doesn't exist in entity with mass, but it still exists as an EPP with the property of nonexistence. — Corvus

Under EPP, existence is not a property. If it doesn't exist, it has no properties. EPP is the principle that says this. Meinong denies EPP, and I'm exploring the implications of only that, not necessarily everything else Meinong says, such as his classification into 3 categories.

What does it mean to exist or not? — Harry Hindu

I gave 6 different meanings to the word 3 posts back, E1-E6. More have been suggested. Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location.

Concerning that: What is the location of our visible universe? It's not like it has coordinates. If I was to mail a letter to myself from outside the universe, what could I write that would get it here? Can't be done since there is only one origin (big bang) and that totally lacking in spacial location. There's not a place where it happened, so what becomes of the 'location' property? It too becomes a mere relation.

Is not one property of Santa is that it is an imagining and it exists as an imagining? Things exist if they have causal power.

The statement (that he is an imagining) seems to presume his nonexistence. OK, granted that Santa is self-contradictory and so is not likely to logically exist, but some imagined things are. My example was of Pegasus imagining you, without every having any empirical contact with a human. Does that mean you don't exist?

Just look at the causal power of Santa the imagining around Christmas time

It can be argued that only the concept has those causal effects, as intended. It is God for children after all, purpose being to herd sheep, very much cause-effect going on.

Joe defines "bachelor" as "unmarried male", while Mary defines it as "a fir tree". In ordinary usage, we would say that Joe is right and Mary is wrong. — J

Mary's usage is entirely non-standard, and if she chooses this definition, it needs to be stated up front, else she is indeed just plain wrong. She is not communicating, perhaps deliberately so. The problem occurs more often when words have multiple valid definitions. I have a physics background and often see the lay definitions of words like 'accelerate' and 'event' used instead of the physics definitions, which probably needs to be explicitly stated somewhere to the lay person, even if not necessary in a discussion with those that have a little physics background.

In philosophy, words like 'exist' might have more definitions than you'd find in a dictionary. I listed several relevant ones, and explicitly reference different ones when I mix their usages in the same post.


And BTW, a bachelor is a device to sort a large collection of laundry into workable batches of like colors that fit in the wash machine.
The term is also used in the old mainframe days, a process to submit batch jobs to the mainframe at a pace that it can handle.
Sheesh, don't you know anything?? :)

Mary's usage is entirely non-standard, and if she chooses this definition, it needs to be stated up front, else she is indeed just plain wrong. . . .

In philosophy, words like 'exist' might have more definitions than you'd find in a dictionary. — noAxioms

Yes, I think we're on the same (or closely adjacent) page. The proliferation of definitions/usages of "exist" in philosophy makes it a poor candidate for dispute. Arguments about existence quickly become wrangles over terminology, which is a shame, because I'm convinced there are important things we can understand about metaphysical structure without trying to plug in the "existence" terminology and argue for it, in the hopes that someone will finally agree with us! Theodore Sider's Writing the Book of the World is in that spirit, I believe

And BTW, a bachelor is a device to sort a large collection of laundry into workable batches of like colors that fit in the wash machine.
The term is also used in the old mainframe days, a process to submit batch jobs to the mainframe at a pace that it can handle.
Sheesh, don't you know anything?? :) — noAxioms

:lol:

I'll get out my heidigger and see if I can get to the bottom of it . . .

So the set of integers necessarily exists because the set isn't empty? — noAxioms

Why introduce "necessarily"? What does that mean in this context? "In every possible world?

Extensionally, the predicate 'p' is <a,b,c> - just those individuals...

So the integers just are <1,2,3...>. hence the integers exist if <1,2,3...> exist.

And Pegasus does not exist in every possible world, so Pegasus does not exist necessarily.

but the existence of x in a set does not make the set exist — noAxioms

That's not what was said. But also, I adopted "set" only becasue you used the word, and sets are not predicates - treating them as such causes problems.

So I've not been able to follow your comments here. Too fast. Maybe go back to this:

So instead of parsing "There is no such thing as Pegasus" as Pegasus not having the property of existence, ~∃!(Pegasus), we pars it as there not being any thing that is Pegasus: ~∃(x)(x is pegasus). — Banno

to which you replied:

This seems to reference a predicate of 'being', but the ∄ part is still existential quantification, no? It isn't a relation to Sydney this time, but more of an objective E1 sort of membership. Nothing in reality 'is Pegasus'. — noAxioms

There is good reason for using ~(∃x). It shows the quantifier and the negation are seperate operations. Pegasus is a mythical horse, is it not? And therefore, we might conclude (by existential generalisation) that there are mythical horses? We can make such a generalisations, hence there is something that is pegasus - the mythical horse. Of course, you will not meet Pegasus at the stables, but in the story of Perseus.

If Santa can be fat without existing, then it does not follow that Santa exists from the presumption of his girth. — noAxioms

Santa is fat, hence, there is something that is fat

Santa is fat
∃(x)( x is fat). (Existential generalisation)

It might be worth considering the suggestion that Santa exists, as a fictive individual, and is indeed fat, but that you will not find him by heading north.

That is, not everything that exists is physical.

Properties

You brought up 'thoughts', a good example. They're not objects, nor are they distinct. They do have properties. — noAxioms

For Meinong, the target of a mental act, an intentional act, is an "object" (Wikipedia - Alexius Meinong)

Suppose I thought about the object the Giza Pyramid. The Giza Pyramid has the property of being heavy. Does that mean my thought about the Giza Pyramid must also be heavy?

That the object of thought has a property doesn't mean that my thought has a property.

Good, We agree on that. — noAxioms

It depends on whether we are talking about Meinong or everyday life.

In the context of Meinong, all our mental intentions are of objects, meaning that there cannot be any absence of objects.

In the context of everyday life, one can imagine a space in which there are no objects. It seems to me that space has the property of extension and time has the property of duration, meaning that even in the absence of objects there will still be properties

It depends on the definition of "object"

Knowledge

It originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias. — noAxioms

As an Indirect Realist, I don't know that some mind-independent thing-in-itself caused my (EDIT) experiences, but I believe that they did. This is my working hypothesis until proved wrong.

Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. — noAxioms

Are you saying that on the one hand you want a definition of "existence" consistent with your knowledge of what you experience yet on the other hand you want a definition of "existence" not based on your knowledge about your experiences.

This breaks the Law of Non Contradiction.

The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it. — noAxioms

In your mind the "brick" is a mental abstraction, a concept. When you see a brick, you are directly observing an appearance. You are not directly observing the thing-in-itself that caused the appearance. You are directly observing one particular instantiation of your concept of a "brick".

Existence

By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist?......................Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?...............................More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance.....................Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location. — noAxioms

I thought I knew what was happening until I started to read www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm

For Meinong, Tom Sawyer would be an example of "subsist".

I assume that "reality" is being used to refer to a mind-independent world, even though thoughts can be described as real and take place only in the mind.

As I see it, for Meinong, an object either exists, subsist or absists. All objects have properties.

This division seems sensible to me, yet generally attacked, which makes me think I don't understand Meinong's Theory. For example, Bertrand Russell attacked Meinong's Theory by saying that an object being both round and square would break the law of Non-contradiction. Yet Meinong never said that a round square exists, he said that a round square absists, and there is no reason why a round square cannot absist. It all depends on what "absists" means.

Sense 1 - exist.
i) such as a horse, ii) has a negation, iii) temporal and spatial, iv) Meinong must be using the word "exist" to refer to objects in the world. I would say that "thoughts exist", but Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way.

Sense 2 - subsist
i) aka as being, ii) such as Sherlock Holmes, numbers, iii) non-existent, iv) has a negation, v) non-temporal and non-spatial, vi) "subsist" must refer to objects in the mind, such as Sherlock Holmes. Objects that don't exist in the world, but objects that are logically possible in the world.

Sense 3 - absist
i) such as the round square, ii) non-existent, iii) as every possible object absists, there can be no negation, iv) non-temporal and non-spatial, v) "absist" must also refer to objects in the mind, such as the round square. Objects that don't exist in the world, because logically impossible in the world.

Meinong said that existence is a property. However, this leads to a contradiction in sense 2 of subsist. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, an object that subsists doesn't exist, but it still has properties, and if existence is a property, then this means that an object that doesn't exist must exist.

Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way, as something that obtains in the world rather than mind.

I gave 6 different meanings to the word 3 posts back, E1-E6. More have been suggested. Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location.

Concerning that: What is the location of our visible universe? It's not like it has coordinates. If I was to mail a letter to myself from outside the universe, what could I write that would get it here? Can't be done since there is only one origin (big bang) and that totally lacking in spacial location. There's not a place where it happened, so what becomes of the 'location' property? It too becomes a mere relation. — noAxioms

Asking the location of the universe is a silly question, like asking the for the location of reality. You could say that the universe is the set of all locations, or the set of all relations. I still prefer to tie existence to causation with location being just one property of causation.

The statement (that he is an imagining) seems to presume his nonexistence. OK, granted that Santa is self-contradictory and so is not likely to logically exist, but some imagined things are. My example was of Pegasus imagining you, without every having any empirical contact with a human. Does that mean you don't exist?

It can be argued that only the concept has those causal effects, as intended. It is God for children after all, purpose being to herd sheep, very much cause-effect going on. — noAxioms

Well, yeah. An imagining is a concept. Concepts have causal power. Do concepts and imaginings exist? What you are saying is that Santa does not exist as a flesh and blood organism. That is true. It exists as a concept, or a legend, and the legend had to start somewhere.

There might have been a person that existed long ago from which the concept Santa started, but has evolved over time to only vaguely represents the original.

Yes, I think we're on the same (or closely adjacent) page. The proliferation of definitions/usages of "exist" in philosophy makes it a poor candidate for dispute. Arguments about existence quickly become wrangles over terminology, which is a shame, because I'm convinced there are important things we can understand about metaphysical structure without trying to plug in the "existence" terminology and argue for it, in the hopes that someone will finally agree with us! — J

Lacking a clear definition, let's step back from Meinong for a moment and consider the EPP principle. Existence is prior to predication, meaning something nonexistent cannot have a property. Under what definition of existence might that be valid?
Idealism: Santa, like the apple, is an ideal, and thus both exist and can have properties. The principle is meaningless since if it doesn't exist, it means it is not thought of at all, and so neither has its properties.

Existence only of 'objects', which doesn't work because 17 has the property of being prime despite not existing by this definition.
So it works for some definitions and not for others. But what I think was intended by the principle is more along the lines of Santa not being fat because there's no Santa to be fat. The concept of santa is of someone fat, but that's just a concept, not Santa. The concept is not fat, but rather of a fat Santa.
It works, but the exact definition of 'exists' is left unspecified, perhaps.referring only to what's on Earth (a relation again).

Why introduce "necessarily"? — Banno

You said "So as long as [...] the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist.". So conversely, if it isn't an empty set, it must exist. It necessarily exists, because if it didn't, it would violate the assertion above. Perhaps you didn't mean to say exactly that. It made little sense to me. Perhaps you didn't mean any set, but only this 'in Sydney' set. My comment was me trying to understand your comment.
Yes, I introduced the word 'set', which seemed fitting with your introduction of 'domain'. Also, 'set' as opposed to 'that which is in Sydney'.

... and sets are not predicates - treating them as such causes problems.

I was treating membership within sets as predicates. The ontology of the set becomes a predicate if EPP is denied, else I agree that the contradictions you indicate result.

I accept your notational differences as being more clear than my ∄(x)(x is pegasus) since your notation allowed distinction between two different interpretations of the statement.

Pegasus is a mythical horse, is it not?

That is its relation to humans, sure. That doesn't mean that there isn't one out there in some 'possible world', for lack of better term. If there is such a thing, that still wouldn't change our reference from being a reference to a mythical thing. So in the sense intended, there is indeed no such thing as Pegasus. If the intention (the definition of there being such a thing) is broadened, then we might conclude that there are possibly creatures that match the description of our myths. They wouldn't be mythical at that point.

Santa is fat, hence, there is something that is fat

Santa is fat
∃(x)( x is fat). (Existential generalisation) — Banno

Something went wrong there, since if EPP holds, 'Santa is fat' is not even wrong, but 'something is fat' is true. ∃(x)(x is Santa & x is fat)

That is, not everything that exists is physical.

Depends on one's definition of course. Meinong's definition seemed to suggest otherwise, but I didn't like his three categories.

For Meinong, the target of a mental act, an intentional act, is an "object" (Wikipedia - Alexius Meinong) — RussellA

Seems to contradict the 'physical object' definition I got from another (not particularly reliable) source. The target may or may not be an object (doing arithmetic is not an object target), but the thought itself does not seem to qualify as an object itself, but they sometimes occur in a confined spatial region.

That the object of thought has a property doesn't mean that my thought has a property.

Thoughts do have properties, but pyramid thoughts are not often considered to be 'heavy' thoughts, and it would be a different definition of 'heavy' anyway.

In the context of Meinong, all our mental intentions are of objects, meaning that there cannot be any absence of objects.

An object to instantiate the thought. Kind of presumptuous, but I'll accept it. The wording above suggests that the thought itself is an object and is not simply implemented by one.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't know that some mind-independent thing-in-itself caused by experiences, but I believe that they did. — RussellA

Is there a typo in there? Because a mind independent thing being caused by experiences seems to be a contradiction.

I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. — noAxioms

Are you saying that on the one hand you want a definition of "existence" consistent with your knowledge of what you experience yet on the other hand you want a definition of "existence" not based on your knowledge about your experiences.

Hmm, it does seem to say that. I think I meant 'biased on the knowledge ...", trying to take observer bias into account, something easily omitted.

In your mind the "brick" is a mental abstraction, a concept. When you see a brick, you are directly observing an appearance. You are not directly observing the thing-in-itself that caused the appearance. You are directly observing one particular instantiation of your concept of a "brick".

OK. I never really got the distinction between direct and indirect realism. Sure, I know what the words mean, but 'direct' makes it sound like there's not a causal chain between the apple and your experience of it.

I thought I knew what was happening until I started to read www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm — RussellA

Sorry. I only read parts of it, trying to find definitions mostly.

I assume that "reality" is being used to refer to a mind-independent world

By who? Does Meinong define 'reality'? I'm no realist, so I don't advocate any particular definition. Something being mind-independent doesn't necessarily make it real, more real, or less real. Any of those four cases is possible given the right choice of definition.

As for the three classifications, subsist and absist seem identical except for the whole 'logically possible' distinction. Two words, both to describe ideals, and only one for everything else. Hmm....

What is "has a negation"? I don't see that on the site I linked.

Where does combustion fit in? Not the idea of it, but the physical process. It has a location, but being a process, it isn't really an object. It does obtain in this world.

Meinong said that existence is a property. However, this leads to a contradiction in sense 2 of subsist. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, an object that subsists doesn't exist, but it still has properties, and if existence is a property, then this means that an object that doesn't exist must exist.

I don't follow this. Something that subsists by definition doesn't exist. It might have properties, but existing isn't one of them (per the definitions given). I don't see a contradiction.

Asking the location of the universe is a silly question, like asking the for the location of reality. — Harry Hindu

Totally agree, and yet many treat the concept seriously, suggesting say that the universe might be bumping against the nearest neighbor reality or something.

You could say that the universe is the set of all locations, or the set of all relations.

I like to use the word to refer to our particular bit of spacetime,places where the laws of physics are the same and any location can be given relative to another. That's far less than 'all locations', some of which might be in say a realm with 5 spatial dimensions and has no location relative to 'here'.

I still prefer to tie existence to causation

Now you sound like me, with ontology being defined in a way that only makes sense in a structure with causal relationships.