You said you agreed that

"The brain at t0 is composed of a set of matter arranged in a particular way. Nearly everyone would agree that this material continues to exist at t1, possibly in a different arrangement, and this constitutes the brain at t1."

Did you change your mind?

Within physicalism, the physical is believed to change on its own based on the laws of physics without any need for experience. Given this, I think we can agree that the experience is not physical since physicalism cannot accommodate experience as a physical thing. The existence of experience and mental phenomena challenged physicalists for a long time. Some physicalists even deny the existence of experience and mental phenomena! — MoK

I understand the usual monopoly on the term "physical", that's Dennett and the Churchlands. But there are others, like Galen Strawson (without panpsychism which I don't subscribe to) or even going further back Joseph Priestley, developing Locke's thought, that says that matter has powers inconceivable to me - like motion without contact. We cannot conceive it, but it must be true, because that's what theories show (Newton's theories, which he himself was in utter disbelief in).

If matter can produce effect like motion we cannot understand, why would we limit nature in supposing that it cannot combine matter such that it can be conscious?

Incidentally, Schopenhauer (a Kantian) says the very same thing.

If you take physical to mean whatever physics says, the point needs no discussion, for it is silly to argue.

But if you take physical to mean natural, then the physical is everything there is. The mental is the domain of the physical we know the best.

He didn't say it was. In fact, the paper is called 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness'. It only came to be called THE hard problem later. — Wayfarer

He doesn't say it's a really hard problem? That leads to the natural reading that it is an especially hard problem. I would grant it with one crucial caveat. If mind coming from matter is incomprehensible, why is that harder than not intuitively understanding how gravity could possibly work absent direct contact between bodies?

At bottom most of these things are very hard, incomprehensibly so. Why is consciousness specifically harder than motion without contact? I sympathize with you in disdaining many aspects of Dennett and others, but I don't see why they should be engaged with in this topic. It's not worth refuting, because it is so silly.

Chalmers was contrasting his "hard problem of consciousness" with what he called "the easy problem of consciousness": finding the places in the brain that correspond to various subjective experiences. This, as we know, is indeed getting easier. — J

Some problems fit into science. Others are much harder. When it comes to the study of the will, we know almost nothing, no clue how the "strings are pulled".

The more complex a phenomenon is, the harder is to study in great depth. And the insights gained are arguably less surprising than what we compared to the consequences of the simpler sciences, like physics.

He doesn't say it's a really hard problem? That leads to the natural reading that it is an especially hard problem. — Manuel

It's an especially hard problem for the generally-accepted forms of scientific naturalism, as they assume at the outset that whatever is real must be tractable in objective terms. The whole essay is a rhetorical argument against those assumptions.

Interestingly, in another thread, we're discussing Husserl's critique of naturalism, which actually says something rather similar.

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology

As I mentioned, "Yes, the brain continues to exist but this is due to a vertical causation rather than a horizontal one."

If matter can produce effect like motion we cannot understand, — Manuel

What is in motion that you cannot understand?

why would we limit nature in supposing that it cannot combine matter such that it can be conscious? — Manuel

I think the main problem is that something cannot be object and subject at the same time. That is why I distinguish between experience and physical as separate things. Whether the Hard Problem of consciousness can be resolved is another issue.

Anyhow, even if we agree that consciousness results from the arrangement of matter in a specific form, such as the brain, we still have difficulty explaining how conscious phenomena, such as thoughts, feelings, etc., could have causal power. This difficulty is because the physical move is based on the laws of physics so there is no room left for the mental to contribute.

If you take physical to mean whatever physics says, the point needs no discussion, for it is silly to argue. — Manuel

Why is it silly? We know that physics is true.

But if you take physical to mean natural, then the physical is everything there is. The mental is the domain of the physical we know the best. — Manuel

What is mental to you?

Your so-called "vertical causation" is an "efficient cause", not a material cause, is it not?

Your so-called "vertical causation" is an "efficient cause", not a material cause, is it not? — Relativist

I am not happy to use "efficient cause" here since it requires the existence of a material cause. The Mind causes/creates physical. The Mind however needs the experience of the physical in the former time since it does not have direct access to the physical.

The Mind causes/creates physical. — MoK

The explain what this means:

Yes, the brain continues — MoK

I already mentioned it several times. The brain exists at time t0 and it is experienced by the Mind. The Mind then causes the brain at time t1. So by "the brain continues" I mean that the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1.

It's an especially hard problem for the generally-accepted forms of scientific naturalism, as they assume at the outset that whatever is real must be tractable in objective terms. The whole essay is a rhetorical argument against those assumptions. — Wayfarer

Some may assume that. It need not be accepted in these very terms. Naturalism can be taken as the view that all that exists is natural and no more.

The issue then, if such naturalism is not convincing, is to say why consciousness is either not natural or supernatural. The latter option is very questionable.

I don't see why one should take a view that consciousness is not a phenomenon of nature. Unless there are theological or metaphysical issues that must necessarily arise.

What is in motion that you cannot understand? — MoK

Not me, anybody - including Newton. How can there be motion without direct contact? We don't have this intuition at all. We assume that the only way a body can move is if another body contacts it.

we still have difficulty explaining how conscious phenomena, such as thoughts, feelings, etc., could have causal power. This difficulty is because the physical move is based on the laws of physics so there is no room left for the mental to contribute. — MoK

Ah yes. That's a good problem. It's utterly mystifying, way beyond theoretical understanding. Interestingly, according to quantum physics the universe is probabilistic, not deterministic. But classical physics is not deterministic either, as is proved by Norton's dome.

But probabilistic is not the same as willing at all.

The mental merely contributes the evidence for the theories that are used to supposedly prove that we have no free will, or that there is nothing but particles. It's a very poor approach to thinking about nature.

Why is it silly? We know that physics is true. — MoK

To deny consciousness, as Dennett does. If accepted, we have no reasons to suppose physics is true, as our evidence comes through experience of empirical phenomena.

What is mental to you? — MoK

Personal experience or "occurrent experiential episodes", as Strawson puts the issue.

the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1 — MoK

.

In this statement:
"The brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"
"The brain" is a particular that exists at both t0 and t1, but in a different state.

But this statement:
"the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1"
suggests the brain at t0 is a different particular than the brain at t1.

Which is it? Is it a different particular or the same particular?

If it's the same one, what makes it the same, given that it is made of different matter?

Not me, anybody - including Newton. How can there be motion without direct contact? We don't have this intuition at all. We assume that the only way a body can move is if another body contacts it. — Manuel

An object whose motion is subject to change does so because it experiences a force. This force is due to the existence of a field, a gravitational field for example.

Ah yes. That's a good problem. It's utterly mystifying, way beyond theoretical understanding. Interestingly, according to quantum physics the universe is probabilistic, not deterministic. — Manuel

To me, the De Broglie–Bohm interpretation is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics since it is paradox-free. The universe evolves deterministically in this interpretation though.

But classical physics is not deterministic either, as is proved by Norton's dome. — Manuel

That is just a thought experiment. It seems paradoxical because it assumes that one can put a particle exactly at the top of the dome. This is however not possible since one in reality cannot put a particle on the exact point at the top of the dome.

But probabilistic is not the same as willing at all. — Manuel

Correct.

The mental merely contributes the evidence for the theories that are used to supposedly prove that we have no free will, or that there is nothing but particles. It's a very poor approach to thinking about nature. — Manuel

Correct.

To deny consciousness, as Dennett does. If accepted, we have no reasons to suppose physics is true, as our evidence comes through experience of empirical phenomena. — Manuel

Physics is true in the sense that explains the changes in the physical world. It is however incorrect when it assumes that the only things that exist are physical. That is why I endorse a new version of substance dualism in which not only physical changes are explained but also mental phenomena are considered as well.

Personal experience or "occurrent experiential episodes", as Strawson puts the issue. — Manuel

Correct.

"The brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"
"The brain" is a particular that exists at both t0 and t1, but in a different state. — Relativist

By this, I don't mean that the brain is the same thing as I stressed later "The brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1". By going from one state to another state I mean there is a brain in one state and there is another brain in another state later.

But this statement:
"the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1"
suggests the brain at t0 is a different particular than the brain at t1. — Relativist

See above.

Which is it? Is it a different particular or the same particular? — Relativist

Different particular.

If it's the same one, what makes it the same, given that it is made of different matter? — Relativist

It is not the same matter. The states of the brain are however related.

Then this statement is worded incorrectly:

the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1 — MoK

Nothing goes from one state to another, because that entails existing in both states.

You often word your statements in ways that are contrary to your paradigm, as you did here. This creates contradictions, that you never acknowledge. Instead, you criticize me for misunderstanding, misinterpreting, or ignoring something else.

Are we on the same page? :-)

Do you agree that you've made contradictory statements?

Do you agree that you've made contradictory statements? — Relativist

I already elaborated on what I mean by the motion of the brain from one point to another point. That is all that matters. Haven't you ever elaborated on something which is the subject of discussion?

I already elaborated on what I mean by the motion of the brain from one point to another point. That is all that matters. — MoK

It matters that you make contradictory statements. I've been questioning whether or not you have a coherent account at all. Since you justify it with contradictory statements, it appears that you do not. If you want to rescue your theory, you need to present it with a coherent account (i.e. without contradicting yourself).

What is the thing that you do not understand? Did you understand everything I said? My theory as it is represented in the OP is valid.

What is the thing that you do not understand? — MoK

What is it that YOU don't understand about what I said previously?:

this statement is worded incorrectly:

the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1 — MoK


Nothing goes from one state to another, because that entails existing in both states. — Relativist

Your statement "the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1" contradicts your view of identity.

How do you word it considering that you understand what I said so far?

How do you word it considering that you understand what I said so far? — MoK

You should word all your statements in a way that doesn't entail contradictions.

So you cannot? Can you?

I cannot make sense of your contradictions, because contradictions make no sense.

Illustration: Consider a married bachelor. If he divorces and marries, is he married or a bachelor? He can't be both.

All I am saying is that the Mind experiences the physical, let's call it P1, at time t1, and creates another physical, let's call it P2, at time t2 later! Do you have any problem understanding this?

No, because it leaves too much to the imagination. You need to describe:
- how you account for identity over time: what makes you the same person your were yesterday.
- what are particulars/existents/objects, in terms consistent with the above.
- how you account for causation, in general.
- how the mind fits into your general account of causation.
- the ontological nature of time.

Your descriptions of all these should not entail any contradictions.

No, because it leaves too much to the imagination. You need to describe: — Relativist

No, I don't need to describe all these items since a few of them are off-topic. We need to first agree on the OP.

- how you account for identity over time: what makes you the same person your were yesterday. — Relativist

Off-topic. I will however answer that later when we agree on the OP.

- what are particulars/existents/objects, in terms consistent with the above. — Relativist

The object/physical is the substance which is the object of experience and causation. The Mind is a substance that experiences and causes the physical. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime therefore it does not change so it is the same particular. The physical however is caused so it is different particular at different points in time.

- how you account for causation, in general. — Relativist

There is only vertical causation. If you are asking how a person can cause something then I am not going to answer that in this thread since it is off-topic.

- how the mind fits into your general account of causation. — Relativist

I already explained that in the case of the Mind. The rest, see above, is off-topic hence I am not going to answer that in this thread.

- the ontological nature of time. — Relativist

Please read the OP, the second and third arguments.

- how you account for identity over time: what makes you the same person your were yesterday. — Relativist

Off-topic. I will however answer that later when we agree on the OP. — MoK

It's relevant to the contradiction you demonstrated in this thread and the other:" the brain (or electron) goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"

You treated the brain/electron as a persisting object, but you also indicate it's not the same brain/electron. If an electron and brain lacks a persistent identity, then how can YOU have one? I presume you believe yourself to continue existing day to day, but I doubt you can make sense of that. If you can, it seems that it should apply to electrons and brains.

- how the mind fits into your general account of causation. — Relativist

I already explained that in the case of the Mind. — MoK

You seem to be suggesting that all causation is accounted for by the mind. There are no laws of nature, just the action of an unchanging mind. I wonder how an unchanging (inert) entity experiences anything - it can't learn, it can't react. This is more consistent with a B-theory of time (block time), but you say you're a presentist.

These are the reasons I brought up those "off-topic" issues. If you have these big-picture issues in mind when making your statements, you could avoid contradicting yourself.

In regards to the OP, I don't need to discuss how the intrinsic properties of the physical are preserved. I also don't need to discuss the laws of nature here. Regarding time, I think that there are three types of time: 1) Objective time (B-theory of time or block universe), 2) Subjective time (growing block universe), and 3) Psychological time (what we experience which is the byproduct of the processes in the brain). I will address how the intrinsic properties of the physical are preserved once we agree on the OP. Do you agree with the OP?