Existence is not an existent, from which follows existence belongs to mind alone as a pure conception; existence is given iff there is that mind capable of its deduction, and, that in which such deduction resides. — Mww

Things might exist, unbeknown.

What a surprise, to discover ants under the floorboards. What a mistake, to have believed the tank contained enough fuel. How odd, that we agree on such things. Things tend to be thus-and-so despite our beliefs.

Perhaps existence is known "if there is a mind capable of its deduction, and in which the knowledge might reside". But existence doesn't care what you know, and happens anyway.

What's your view on time? — Corvus

As The Man says, without the “subjective constitution of our senses in general”, time is meaningless. Which translates to, as far as I’m concerned, time is only meaningful should I have occassion to determine some phenomenal duration relating two instances of it, or, some phenomenal coexistence related to a single instance.

Which still leaves the inception of time and space into our subjective constitution….assuming of course there is such a thing to begin with…..for which some pure formal metaphysics is required.

Or so it seems.

As The Man says, without the “subjective constitution of our senses in general”, time is meaningless. — Mww

One needs minds in order to have meaning.

But that does not imply that there is no time without mind, or that time is mind-independent, or that events do not occur in temporal sequences unless measured.

Understanding time requires a mind. That does not imply that time requires a mind. That's a step too far.

Things might exist, unbeknown. — Banno

Of course, but irrelevant.

Understanding time requires a mind. That does not imply that time requires a mind. That's a step too far. — Banno

True enough, insofar as you’re using understanding as a verb denoting a cognitive activity within an intellectual whole, which nevertheless presupposes that which is being understood.

Understanding, as a noun representing a specific cognitive faculty, has its function predicated on the conditions of time alone, at the exclusion of space, which logically cannot be given by that which uses it. Hence, time, in and of itself, as a stand-alone conception, requires something for its validity, even if it not be understanding as such, but still within the human intellect somewhere. So….pure reason.

FYI, in Kant the former here is a metaphysical conception of time, the latter is transcendental exposition of time. The former regards its use, which we empirically verify every time we use a watch, the latter regards its origin, and that in the strict syllogistic method of propositional logic a priori, which we cannot empirically verify at all. With the empirical verification possible on the one hand in conjunction with observation, and the empirical verification impossible on the other in conjunction with the logic of infinite divisibility, arises the ideality of time. And space.

All of which makes explicit, the premises for this particular metaphysics being granted, events cannot be said to occur in temporal sequence, which implies experience thereof, unless the relative times of each are measured. Furthermore, events cannot even be supposed as occuring in temporal sequence, without such a priori condition as ground for how it is possible all of those conceptions relate to each other, regardless of any eventual or subsequent measurement.

For what it’s worth….

Understanding, as a noun representing a specific cognitive faculty, has its function predicated on the conditions of time alone, at the exclusion of space, which logically cannot be given by that which uses it. — Mww

What an appalling sentence.

What could it mean, and why should it be given any credence?

Yesterday, upon the stair...

All of which makes explicit, the premises for this particular metaphysics being granted, events cannot be said to occur in temporal sequence, which implies experience thereof, unless the relative times of each are measured. — Mww

Again, they cannot be said to be in a sequence, but that simply does not imply that they are not in a sequence.

Of course, but irrelevant. — Mww

Not so much. It shows again the step too far, in Kant, in your post and in @Wayfarer's work.

Which still leaves the inception of time and space into our subjective constitution….assuming of course there is such a thing to begin with…..for which some pure formal metaphysics is required. — Mww

Some intelligible scientists and philosophers already have been talking about nonexistence of time.

Hume was also saying time doesn't exist. Could then time be the quality of ideas of objects perceived by mind in Hume?

"The idea of time, being deriv'd from the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which comprehends a still greater variety than that of space, and yet is represented in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and quality.

T 1.2.3.7, SBN 35
As 'tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time, nor is it possible for time alone ever to make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the mind. A man in a sound sleep, or strongly occupy'd with one thought, is insensible of time; and according as his perceptions succeed each other with greater or less rapidity, the same duration appears longer or shorter to his imagination. It has been remark'd by a[8] great philosopher, that our perceptions have certain bounds in this particular, which are fix'd by the original nature and constitution of the mind, and beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought. If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to the senses an image of a circle of fire; nor will there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its revolutions; meerly because 'tis impossible for our perceptions to succeed each other with the same rapidity, that motion may be communicated to external objects. Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho' there be a real succession in the objects. From these phænomena, as well as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover'd by some perceivable succession of changeable objects.

T 1.2.3.8, SBN 35-6
To confirm this we may add the following argument, which to me seems perfectly decisive and convincing. 'Tis evident, that time or duration consists of different parts: For otherwise we cou'd not conceive a longer or shorter duration. 'Tis also evident, that these parts are not co-existent. For that quality of the co-existence of parts belongs to extension, and is what distinguishes it from duration. Now as time is compos'd of parts, that are not co-existent; an unchangeable object, since it produces none but co-existent impressions, produces none that can give us the idea of time; and consequently that idea must be deriv'd from a succession of changeable objects, and time in its first appearance can never be sever'd from such a succession.

T 1.2.3.9, SBN 36
Having therefore found, that time in its first appearance to the mind is always conjoin'd with a succession of changeable objects, and that otherwise it can never fall under our notice, we must now examine whether it can be conceiv'd without our conceiving any succession of objects, and whether it can alone form a distinct idea in the imagination.

T 1.2.3.10, SBN 36-7
In order to know whether any objects, which are join'd in impression, be separable in idea, we need only consider, if they be different from each other; in which case, 'tis plain they may be conceiv'd apart. Every thing, that is different, is distinguishable; and every thing, that is distinguishable, may be separated, according to the maxims above-explain'd. If on the contrary they be not different, they are not distinguishable; and if they be not distinguishable, they cannot be separated. But this is precisely the case with respect to time, compar'd with our successive perceptions. The idea of time is not deriv'd from a particular impression mix'd up with others, and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to the mind, without making one of the number. Five notes play'd on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho' time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by reflection finds in itself. These five sounds making their appearance in this particular manner, excite no emotion in the mind, nor produce an affection of any kind, which being observ'd by it can give rise to a new idea. For that is necessary to produce a new idea of reflection, nor can the mind, by revolving over a thousand times all its ideas of sensation, ever extract from them any new original idea, unless nature has so fram'd its faculties, that it feels some new original impression arise from such a contemplation. But here it only takes notice of the manner, in which the different sounds make their appearance; and that it may afterwards consider without considering these particular sounds, but may conjoin it with any other objects. The ideas of some objects it certainly must have, nor is it possible for it without these ideas ever to arrive at any conception of time; whichsince it appears not as any primary distinct impression, can plainly be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects dispos'd in a certain manner, that is, succeeding each other.

T 1.2.3.11, SBN 37
I know there are some who pretend, that the idea of duration is applicable in a proper sense to objects, which are perfectly unchangeable; and this I take to be the common opinion of philosophers as well as of the vulgar. But to be convinc'd of its falshood we need but reflect on the foregoing conclusion, that the idea of duration is always deriv'd from a succession of changeable objects, and can never be convey'd to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable. For it inevitably follows from thence, that since the idea of duration cannot be deriv'd from such an object, it can never in any propriety or exactness be apply'd to it, nor can any thing unchangeable be ever said to have duration. Ideas always represent the objects or impressions, from which they are deriv'd, and can never without a fiction represent or be apply'd to any other. By what fiction we apply the idea of time, even to what is unchangeable, and suppose, as is common, that duration is a measure of rest as well as of motion, we shall consider[9] afterwards."

ADDENDUM : The bolds are by the OP

Yeah, ol’ Dave’s Treatise is pretty good reading; lot simpler than the German-language counterarguments that came later.

I don’t see a connection between time and the idea of objects, though, when it comes right down to it. Depends on what you mean, I guess. Time and objects as such, real things….that’s different, and we do see a connection therein, via the categories.

Kant's original texts in English seem to have some parts with ambiguous translations dating back 100 years, which can cause ambiguities and difficulties in understanding. But still, they are good classic philosophical texts. I prefer Hume's work, which has no translatory layers.

Well, what Hume seems to be saying is that, some folks, be it philosophers or the vulgars imagine time exists as we see even now. But time is not perceptible. Only objects we see are the objects themselves and durations of the movements. Hence time cannot be objects existing in the world. Simple.
I agree with that idea.

We use time, tell time and measure time thanks to the invention, the solar movements of the earth and the mechanical device called watches and clocks which ticks with regularity and accuracy. But time itself doesn't exist in the universe. If tomorrow the earth stops rotating around the sun, the use of current time system will cease to exist, and the civilization will plunge into chaos.

Hume's expression of the vulgars in his original texts means the ordinary folks who never read any philosophy.

Hume's expression of the vulgars….. — Corvus

HA!! Yeah, Schopenhauer uses the word, too. Not as pejorative as we tend for it these days. Kant was a little more kind, just calling out as common rather than vulgar.

Still, we see changes in meaning for words in our own language, in addition to translation difficulties in others.

Hume was also saying time doesn't exist. Could then time be the quality of ideas of objects perceived by mind in Hume? — Corvus

Hume has a mistaken premise, that sense perception consists of a "succession" of distinct perceptions. This is not consistent with experience, which demonstrates that we actually perceive continuous motion and change with our senses. This renders the quoted argument from Hume as unsound.

Consider, that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the observed continuity of movement and our conceptual representation of it, as demonstrated by Zeno. Hume describes our conceptual representation of motion as a "succession of changeable objects". He negates the Zeno inconsistency by describing sense perception as distinct perceptions. Then the continuity of movement is left out of the representation, as completely unreal. However, this is done by denying the reality that sense perception actually consists of continuous change rather than as a succession of objects. Accordingly, it also rids us of the fundamental Platonic principle of skepticism, that the senses deceive us. But it does this through his false premise, describing sensation as a succession of distinct perceptions. This false premise also produces the conclusion that time is not real, in a way related to how Zeno proved that motion is not real.

Hume has a mistaken premise, that sense perception consists of a "succession" of distinct perceptions. This is not consistent with experience, which demonstrates that we actually perceive continuous motion and change with our senses. This renders the quoted argument from Hume as unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting point.   But think of the old movies shot by 8mm camera with the roll films.  The movement in the film is made of each single still image.  When the single images are run through the projector with the light, it gives us continuous moving motion.  The continuous movement and motion is recreated in our brain by the latent memory.  In actuality, they are just single still images running continuously in fast speed in order to recreate the recorded motions.

Hume is seeing our visual perception in the same way.  His idea of perception is that we have the single impressions and the matching ideas of perceived objects coming into our senses continuously creating the perception just like the old movies made of 8mm films.

At any chance, we can stop the perception, and pick the single impression and ideas to investigate its contents.  In that sense, no ideas and impressions are identical, as they are separate entities to each other.

This false premise also produces the conclusion that time is not real, in a way related to how Zeno proved that motion is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Hume, what is not captured in impressions and ideas are not real. Time has no matching impressions or ideas. The moment you see the time now, it passes into past. It is ineffable, ever evanescent and fleeting illusive part of human mind.

Then the continuity of movement is left out of the representation, as completely unreal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Continuity is another idea which is generated from each single separate impressions and ideas of the movement. It is an idea, which cannot be divided or separated, which is distinct from the actual continuity itself.

Hume has a mistaken premise, that sense perception consists of a "succession" of distinct perceptions. This is not consistent with experience, which demonstrates that we actually perceive continuous motion and change with our senses. This renders the quoted argument from Hume as unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Things cannot be mere perceptions since there are mental phenomena, thoughts for example, which are consistent. This consistency is because any thought resides on other thoughts, etc. This consistency however requires something that thoughts reside within, what we call the brain, therefore saying that things are mere perception is false!

Things cannot be mere perceptions since there are mental phenomena, thoughts for example, which are consistent. This consistency is because any thought resides on other thoughts, etc. This consistency however requires something that thoughts reside within, what we call the brain, therefore saying that things are mere perception is false! — MoK

But if you don't trust your own perception, then where does your knowledge come from? Is your knowledge based on your imagination and blind faith?

nteresting point.   But think of the old movies shot by 8mm camera with the roll films.  The movement in the film is made of each single still image.  When the single images are run through the projector with the light, it gives us continuous moving motion.  The continuous movement and motion is recreated in our brain by the latent memory.  In actuality, they are just single still images running continuously in fast speed in order to recreate the recorded motions.

Hume is seeing our visual perception in the same way.  His idea of perception is that we have the single impressions and the matching ideas of perceived objects coming into our senses continuously creating the perception just like the old movies made of 8mm films. — Corvus

The point though, is that sense perception is as a continuous movement. So, when Hume represents it as a succession of still frames, he already applies the conceptualized version of motion, across this gap of inconsistency, to represent sense perception in a way which is not true. In doing this, the reality of time is lost to him.

If we take your film example, the sense perception is "continuous moving motion". We have good reason to believe that the reality of the situation is a succession of still frames, because the still frames are produced, and run through the machine. We can stop the machine and look at them. Therefore we have all the evidential backing required to support this conceptualization of a succession of frames as true.

In the case of Hume's succession of perceptions, we have not got the required evidence to support this conceptualization. It is conjecture, speculation. Then, he turns this speculative representation back onto sense experience, to describe sensation this way, with only arbitrary separation between distinct still frames.

Now, the true or real passing of time (when actual change occurs) happens between the distinct still frames, with the film moving from one to another. This is what happens when one frame replaces another. But since the distinct frames are arbitrarily assumed by speculative theory in Hume's representation, the reality of this process whereby on frame replaces another, is completely left out. Therefore we lose the reality of time, which would be the true principles whereby the distinct frames (or moments in time) are identified, and the changing of one to another could be represented.

At any chance, we can stop the perception, and pick the single impression and ideas to investigate its contents. — Corvus

We can do this with the "movie". We can take the film out of the projector and show the distinct frames. However, we cannot do this with sense perception. We cannot remove a distinct frame. We produce an arbitrary frame, by applying the conceptual precepts of description onto the active sense perception. So any distinct impression analyzed is an arbitrarily created object, produced for the purpose of analysis. It it is not a true stopping of the perception, nor is it analogous with stopping the projector and looking at the distinct frames, because of that arbitrariness. And it is that arbitrariness which causes us to lose the reality of time. That time is not real, is a conclusion produced by the incorrect thinking, that arbitrarily created still frames are real.

Also, this is a feature of relativity theory. If we take arbitrarily created reference frames, and arbitrary rest frames as "real", we similarly deny the reality of time. So taking relativity theory as "true", rather than simply a useful way of representing motion, is a denial that time is real.

But if you don't trust your own perception, then where does your knowledge come from? — Corvus

I think that Hume did not understand the conscious mind and the subconscious mind. The conscious mind mostly perceives things but it is the main source for the generation of thoughts. These thoughts then are stored in the subconscious mind for further analysis in the future. It is through the constant exchange of thought between the conscious mind and the subconscious mind that we can develop consistent thoughts, whether a thought is true or not is the subject of investigation of the conscious mind.

Is your knowledge based on your imagination and blind faith? — Corvus

It is based on the collaboration between my conscious and subconscious mind. And it is not blind faith!

I think that Hume did not understand the conscious mind and the subconscious mind. — MoK

Conscious or subconscious mind is actually psychological concepts. They are irrelevant to knowledge or reasoning. So Hume was right not to say a lot about them.

It is based on the collaboration between my conscious and subconscious mind. And it is not blind faith! — MoK

Conscious or subconscious mind means the degree of being awake from sleep. They don't provide you with any knowledge at all.

The point though, is that sense perception is as a continuous movement. So, when Hume represents it as a succession of still frames, he already applies the conceptualized version of motion, across this gap of inconsistency, to represent sense perception in a way which is not true. In doing this, the reality of time is lost to him. — Metaphysician Undercover

But are the continuous movements possible without perception? All movements, motions and objects are only meaningful and possible, when perceived via senses.

Conscious or subconscious mind is actually psychological concepts. — Corvus

Yes, they are concepts but these concepts are based on extensive study of the brain. Why do you stick to the idea of perception when I already refute it? Why don't you study a little psychology? It is necessary when it comes to time!

They are irrelevant to knowledge or reasoning. — Corvus

They are very relevant to knowledge and reasoning. People with Alzheimer cannot function well, cannot think, and cannot recall memories because a part of their brain is damaged.

So Hume was right not to say a lot about them. — Corvus

He couldn't possibly say a lot about them since there was no knowledge of them in his time. He was false! Therefore, you are false.

Conscious or subconscious mind means the degree of being awake from sleep. They don't provide you with any knowledge at all. — Corvus

Why don't you study a little bit of psychology so you can back up your thoughts? You deny physics, psychology, and science! All things you know are outdated knowledge which is false.

Why don't you study a little bit of psychology so you can back up your thoughts? You deny physics, psychology, and science! All things you know are outdated knowledge which is false. — MoK

It wasn't denying. It was just a clarification saying , that they are irrelevant to philosophical debates.

Philosopher: I’ll tell you how I think;
Psychologist: I’ll tell you how you think.

(Sigh)

He couldn't possibly say a lot about them since there was no knowledge of them in his time. He was false! Therefore, you are false. — MoK

Because you are mixing psychology and physics in philosophical debates in random and chaotic fashion, it seems to be creating confusion and illusion in your mind. Hume was not false. Hume was intelligible and sensible.

Yes, they are concepts but these concepts are based on extensive study of the brain. Why do you stick to the idea of perception when I already refute it? Why don't you study a little psychology? It is necessary when it comes to time! — MoK

If your knowledge is based on your conscious and subconscious mind just woke up from sleep, no doubt that you are in full of confusion and illusions. You must rely on your perception and reasoning for your knowledge.

Philosophy goes deeper into the roots of the idea trying to capture the arche of the concept. Psychology and physics only talk about what are visible and obvious, and what is given by the measurement and experiment.

It wasn't denying. — Corvus

So do you think that things like electrons, quarks, subconscious minds, conscious minds, etc. are real?

It was just a clarification saying , that they are irrelevant to philosophical debates. — Corvus

Philosophy and science go hand in hand without science you cannot do good philosophy and vice versa.

Because you are mixing psychology and physics in philosophical debates in random and chaotic fashion, it seems to be creating confusion and illusion in your mind. Hume was not false. — Corvus

You cannot do proper philosophy without a good science and vice versa!

Hume was not false. Hume was intelligible and sensible. — Corvus

Hume was false. He was an intelligent philosopher though. I am sure he would deny his philosophy if he was alive now.

If your knowledge is based on your conscious and subconscious mind just woke up from sleep, no doubt that you are in full of confusion and illusions. — Corvus

The subconscious mind does not sleep at all. That is the conscious mind that sleeps.

You must rely on your perception and reasoning for your knowledge. — Corvus

Where is your perception when you are asleep? Why does your perception start to work when you are awake? How could you do reasoning if reasoning per se is a form of perception?

So do you think that things like electrons, quarks, subconscious minds, conscious minds, etc. are real? — MoK

We know them, and use them. But to say they are real can be problem in logical sense. You need to make clear in what sense "real" is real. Philosophy doesn't deny them. But it is trying to make sure in what sense you are using the concepts, and whether they make sense when used in the arguments.
You seem to be emotionally defending them as if they were denied. No. Nothing is denied.

Philosophy and science go hand in hand without science you cannot do good philosophy and vice versa. — MoK

No. They are not in the same level. Philosophy inspects and analyze the misuses of the concepts and imaginary ideas of science, hence philosophy makes science more robust in logic and theory.
They are not friends or lovers. Philosophy is higher level authority in the ladder if you will.

You cannot do proper philosophy without a good science and vice versa! — MoK

Science needs philosophy. Philosophy doesn't need science. No philosophers will go out in the white gown, and conduct experiments and tests and measurements. They just read, think and speculate for analysis and reasoning pursuing truths on the universe.

Hume was false. He was an intelligent philosopher though. I am sure he would deny his philosophy if he was alive now. — MoK

Hume is one of the most important philosophers in western philosophy. To say Hume is false is like saying, philosophy is false and all knowledge is false. Nonsense.

The subconscious mind does not sleep at all. That is the conscious mind that sleeps. — MoK

The conscious mind means that you woke from sleep. Subconscious mind means that you have a part of mind which sleep all the time, but you think it doesn't.

Where is your perception when you are asleep? Why does your perception start to work when you are awake? How could you do reasoning if reasoning per se is a form of perception? — MoK

Perception only happens when you are fully awake and alert. All your knowledge on the universe comes via perception. Perception is also backed by reasoning and logic. Without perception, you don't have knowledge.

We know them, and use them. But to say they are real can be problem in logical sense. You need to make clear in what sense "real" is real. Philosophy doesn't deny them. But it is trying to make sure in what sense you are using the concepts, and whether they make sense when used in the arguments.
You seem to be emotionally defending them as if they were denied. No. Nothing is denied. — Corvus

They exist so in this sense they are real.

No. They are not in the same level. Philosophy inspects and analyze the misuses of the concepts and imaginary ideas of science, hence philosophy makes science more robust in logic and theory.
They are not friends or lovers. Philosophy is higher level authority in the ladder if you will. — Corvus

I didn't say they are on the same level!