I never really got the distinction between direct and indirect realism. Sure, I know what the words mean, but 'direct' makes it sound like there's not a causal chain between the apple and your experience of it. — noAxioms

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that there is a direct causal chain between the thing-in-itself in the world and the experience of it in your mind.

You see the colour red. Assume that this is not a dream or hallucination, but that there is a thing-in-itself in the world that directly caused you to experience the colour red. Would you say that because you experience the colour red, the colour red must exist in the world?

Similarly, because you experience pain, would you also say that pain exists in the world?

Similarly, because you experience the appearance of a brick, would you say that bricks exist in the world?

Meinong's Theory

As for the three classifications, subsist and absist seem identical except for the whole 'logically possible' distinction — noAxioms

That objects that subsist, such as numbers and Sherlock Holmes, are logically possible and objects that absist, such as a square circle or A being not-A, are not logically possible, makes subsist and absist very different.
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What is "has a negation"? — noAxioms

See Russell's Theory of Descriptions 2 - Frege & Meinong

For "exist", a horse may exist or not exist in the field.
For "subsist", Sherlock Holmes may subsist or not subsist at 221B Baker Street
For "absist", as everything absists, there can be no negation.
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Where does combustion fit in? — noAxioms

See Mehrdad Jazayeri

A thought can be a physical process or a physical part. A car can be a physical process, such as turning the wheel, going from A to B, and doesn't have mass. A car can be a physical part, such as wheels and an engine, which does have mass.

Then combustion as a physical part would "exist" and combustion as a physical process would "subsist"
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The target may or may not be an object (doing arithmetic is not an object target) — noAxioms

For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist. This is just how Meinong is defining the meaning of "object"
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An object to instantiate the thought. Kind of presumptuous, but I'll accept it. The wording above suggests that the thought itself is an object and is not simply implemented by one. — noAxioms

For Meinong, the target of a mental act, such as a thought, is an object, even if that object is a number. This is how Meinong is using the term "object".

From SEP - Alexius Meinong

Whatever can be experienced in some way, i.e., be the target of a mental act, Meinong calls an object [Gegenstand or Objekt].

The target of a mental act is an object. As the target of a mental act cannot be itself, a mental act cannot be an object.

Now you sound like me, with ontology being defined in a way that only makes sense in a structure with causal relationships. — noAxioms

:100:

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that there is a direct causal chain between the thing-in-itself in the world and the experience of it in your mind.

You see the colour red. Assume that this is not a dream or hallucination, but that there is a thing-in-itself in the world that directly caused you to experience the colour red. Would you say that because you experience the colour red, the colour red must exist in the world?

Similarly, because you experience pain, would you also say that pain exists in the world?

Similarly, because you experience the appearance of a brick, would you say that bricks exist in the world? — RussellA

Yes to all those questions as minds exist in the world. When I see someone in pain, are they and their pain not in this same shared world my mind exists in? If both direct and indirect realists answer, "yes", to this question, then I don't see how this establishes a distinction between direct and indirect realists.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication......................Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa — noAxioms

For Meinong, existence is a property. For the EPP, existence is prior to properties. It seems that two senses of "exist" are being used.

Meining seems to be naming something "exist", "subsist" and "absist" rather than describing something that is "existing", "subsisting" or "absisting".

For Meinong, within the mind are intentional acts towards objects.

Sense one of exist
The name "horse" can be given to objects having the properties hoofed, a mammal and long mane. "A horse" may be defined as "hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane".

Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse. Therefore, an object of intention such as a horse may be defined as "existing" as well as having the property existing.

He also gives the name "subsist" to those objects such as Sherlock Holmes, and the name "absist" to those objects such as the round square.

Because Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse, it becomes both a property of and a definition of objects of intention such as a horse.

In this sense of "exist", exist is a property.

Sense two of exist
However, there is another sense of exist, that of the Existential Generalization, whereby Fa → ∃x (Fx). If a is F then there exists something that is F.

For example, if something is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane, then there exists something that is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane.

Similarly, if something is existing (sense one), then there exists (sense two) something that is existing (sense one)

In conclusion, it seems that two senses of existing are being used.

When I see someone in pain, are they and their pain not in this same shared world my mind exists in? — Harry Hindu

We directly see the consequence of pain, such as someone grimacing. We don't directly see the pain.

Suppose I see the colour red. If I were a Direct Realist, I think that I would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. As an Indirect Realist, I say that something in the world caused me to see the colour red, but whatever that something is, there is no reason to believe that it was the colour red.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that there is a direct causal chain between the thing-in-itself in the world and the experience of it in your mind.

You see the colour red. Assume that this is not a dream or hallucination, but that there is a thing-in-itself in the world that directly caused you to experience the colour red. — RussellA

None of that would read different if the word 'direct' was omitted. None of it explains the difference between direct and indirect, which is what I expressed confusion about.

Would you say that because you experience the colour red, the colour red must exist in the world?
Similarly, because you experience pain, would you also say that pain exists in the world?

Heavily dependent on definition of 'exist'. On the surface, it seems to ask if I am a realist about mind dependent experiences.

Similarly, because you experience the appearance of a brick, would you say that bricks exist in the world?

Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal. So not so similarly.

I still don't know the difference between a direct realist and an indirect realist.

For "exist", a horse may exist or not exist in the field.
For "subsist", Sherlock Holmes may subsist or not subsist at 221B Baker Street — RussellA

Here, 'exist' is being used as a relation.

For "absist", as everything absists, there can be no negation.

Oh, I thought it was one of the three things, and not a heirarchy where 'exist' is just a special case of the other two. This contradicts your statement just below

For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist.

Sounds like numbers don't absist, even though everything absists. Sounds like numbers are objects, despite not having a location.

Just picking apart what seems to be inconsistencies. Actually, I care little about Meinong's actual views since for one he presumes a classical 'reality'. I was just interested in the implications of the denial of EPP, and all these classification details seem irrelevant to that, a derailment.

What is very relevant to my question is the defniition of 'existence' since the word is directly referenced in EPP. It's important, and seemingly unspecified. A horse isn't in the field, so a horse cannot have a tail? That makes no sense. Clearly a different definition of 'exist' is being referenced when asserting that a nonexistent horse cannot have a tail. It doesn't just mean that the horse is elsewhere.

For Meinong, existence is a property. For the EPP, existence is prior to properties. It seems that two senses of "exist" being used. — RussellA

Can't be different senses of the word, else it wouldn't be a denial of anything that some other view held true.

Meining seems to be naming something "exist", "subsist" and "absist" rather than describing something as "existing", "subsisting" or "absisting".

That's kind of cheating, a view that is functionally no different except the meaning of certain words. So the EPP guy says the unicorn cannot have a property of being horny, but one can think of such a thing, so the abstraction exists, and is abstracted to be horny. Meinong comes along and says 'no, that's subsist', and yes, it's horny, so that's predication without existence, but only because he refused to classify it as existence.

I don't think he would have gained any recognition for such a lame argument, so I don't think that's the argument. I don't think it's just a case of renaming the 'exists' label of something with a predicate to demonstrate EPP to be false.

Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse.

Sorry, but what is 'objects of intention' here? I looked it up and got morals: Intended results of an action, whether or not those results actually follow.
Anyway, I cannot follow your description of first sense of 'exist' without that.

Sense two of exist
However, there is another sense of exist, that of the Existential Generalization, whereby Fa → ∃x (Fx). If a is F then there exists something that is F.

So a is a round square, so there exists a round square. OK, a is also supposedly (I claimed the possibility above) a contradiction, so a is arguably not F.
What is F? A property? If a has the property of being F, then there exists something with that property, which seems to require EPP in order to follow. A creature is a unicorn, so there exists something that is a unicorn. Yes, that follows under existential generalization (my E6 way above), there is no predication without existence, not what Meinong says, so he probably is not using this sense.


You're numbering your senses of existence the same way I did, but I don't get your sense 1.

When I see someone in pain, are they and their pain not in this same shared world my mind exists in? — Harry Hindu

We directly see the consequence of pain, such as someone grimacing. We don't directly see the pain. — RussellA

What we see seems irrelevant to the question, which was whether the pain of another is in the same world as you (or your pain). I suppose that depends on where you delimit 'the world'.

Suppose I see the colour red. If I were a Direct Realist, I think that I would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. As an Indirect Realist, I say that something in the world caused me to see the colour red, but whatever that something is, there is no reason to believe that it was the colour red.

Hey, that's sort of the distinction I was requesting. To say something (apple) is red is seemingly to say that the apple (ding an sich) is experience, quite the idealistic assertion, and realism only of experience, not of actual apples. Just my take from that brief description.

None of it explains the difference between direct and indirect, which is what I expressed confusion about..On the surface, it seems to ask if I am a realist about mind dependent experiences..................Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal. So not so similarly.................... whether the pain of another is in the same world as you...........................To say something (apple) is red is seemingly to say that the apple (ding an sich) is experience, quite the idealistic assertion, and realism only of experience, not of actual apples. — noAxioms

From Wikipedia - Direct and indirect realism

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Conversely, direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.

Suppose someone sees a red, rectangular brick. Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist would agree that there is a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world that is causing that person to see a red, rectangular brick (ignoring the special cases of dreams and hallucinations).

However, the Direct Realist would say that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick, as the colour red, the shape rectangular and the object brick exist in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist would say that they don't know the true nature of the thing-in-itself, as all they know are their subjective experiences.

I put my hand in a fire and feel pain. As an Indirect Realist, I say that the pain only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself. I look at a brick and see the colour red. As an Indirect Realist, I also say that the colour red only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself.

Suppose you have the subjective experiences of pain and the colour red. Presumably you believe that pain only exists in a mind and not a mind-independent world.

What argument would a Direct Realist make to justify that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world, when their only experience of the colour red is in their mind as a subjective experience?

We directly see the consequence of pain, such as someone grimacing. We don't directly see the pain. — RussellA

We directly experience some things but not others seems to show that the distinction between direct and indirect is simply one of causal complexity - how far removed the effect is from its causes, not a difference in the ontology of perception as we can experience things directly and indirectly.

Suppose I see the colour red. If I were a Direct Realist, I think that I would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. As an Indirect Realist, I say that something in the world caused me to see the colour red, but whatever that something is, there is no reason to believe that it was the colour red. — RussellA

This is non-sensical. Red is a property of minds. Ripeness is a property of apples, or fruit in general. Do we concern ourselves that the apple's ripeness can exist independently of fruit, or that it's ripeness is caused by things that are not ripe, like water, sunlight, the seed, the apple tree, etc.? No. So why do this with the color red? In which natural causal process is the cause and the effect the exact same thing? Ripeness does not cause ripeness. Red does not cause red. Information is the relationship between cause and effect. The cause or effect alone is not interesting. The relationship is, and that is what we are getting at when we perceive anything.

For Meinong, existence is a property. For the EPP, existence is prior to properties. It seems that two senses of "exist" are being used. — RussellA

What does it even mean to say something is prior to properties? If something exists, how does it exist? In what way does it interact with other things? Does one's existence interact with another existence, or does one's properties interact with other properties and the type of properties interacting is what produces novel effects? Do properties exist?

We directly experience some things but not others seems to show that the distinction between direct and indirect is simply one of causal complexity - how far removed the effect is from its causes, not a difference in the ontology of perception as we can experience things directly and indirectly. — Harry Hindu

There is another aspect that is critical to the difference between Indirect and Direct Realism, and that is the direction of flow of information in a causal chain.

One cause can only have one effect, in that if one knows the cause then the effect has been determined by the cause. For example, if a stone hitting a glass window causes the glass to shatter, the same stone under he same conditions hitting the same glass window will always cause the glass to shatter.

However one effect can have more than one cause, in that even if one knew the effect, it doesn't follow that that one will necessarily know the cause. For example, knowing that has a glass window has shattered is no reason why one will know what caused the glass to shatter. It could have been a bird, a stone, a window cleaner etc.

There is a temporal direction of information flow in a causal chain. The Indirect Realist accepts this fact, and accepts the fact that one effect may have several different causes. This makes it impossible to follow a causal chain backwards in time. The Direct Realist doesn't accept this fact, and believes that even though one effect may have several causes, it is possible to follow a causal chain backwards in time.

The Indirect Realist accepts that they may never know what broke the window. The Direct Realist has the position that they will always know what broke the window.
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Red is a property of minds. Ripeness is a property of apples — Harry Hindu

You can only know whether an apple is ripe from experiences through your senses. It may be soft to the touch, it may have a sweet smell, it may have a speckled colour, it may taste bitter and there may be a dull sound when you hit it.

There is no escaping the fact that you can only know the ripeness of an apple through your senses.

Take one of these as an example. You experience a sweet smell through your sense of smell. This is no different in kind to experiencing the colour red through your sense of vision. As red is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself, a sweet smell is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself.

Ripeness is a set of properties in the mind, not a set of properties of a thing-in-itself.
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What does it even mean to say something is prior to properties? — Harry Hindu

These are the questions @noAxiom wants answering.

Oh, I thought it was one of the three things, and not a heirarchy where 'exist' is just a special case of the other two. This contradicts your statement just below.................. For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist. — noAxioms

For Meinong, exist, subsist and absist are part of a hierarchy. Round squares absist but cannot subsist or exist. Sherlock Holmes can absist but not exist. Horses can exist, subsist and absist.

In Meinong's domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist. In my domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes exists. The question is then raised, how can something that doesn't exist exist. But this question is conflating two different domains, understandably leading to contradiction

For Meinong to separate thoughts into exist, such as horse, subsist, such as Sherlock Holmes, and absist, such as a round square, seems quite sensible. But the fact that many attack his views makes me believe that I may not really understand what he is saying.

I was just interested in the implications of the denial of EPP — noAxioms

Properties are predicated of something. From SEP - Properties

For example, if we say that this is a leaf and is green, we are attributing the properties leaf and green to it, and, if the predication is veridical, the thing in question exemplifies these properties.

Our only belief about things-in-themselves comes from experiences in our five senses. For example, the colour red in our vision, a silky feel to the touch, an acrid smell, a sweet taste or a grating noise. All these are properties. We can never know about the thing-in-itself that we believe has caused such experiences.

The EPP states that existence is prior to predication. However, all we can ever know are predications of the supposed thing-in-itself. We can never know about the the existence of any thing-in-itself. Therefore, it is a logical impossibility to say whether existence is prior to predication or not.

As David Hume argued, existence means no more than the bundle of properties an object has. From Wikipedia - Bundle theory

Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes.

We experience properties in our mind, such as the colour red, but we can never know about the existence of the supposed thing-in-itself that may have caused these experiences. Therefore, the EPP is unknowable.

We experience properties in our mind, such as the colour red, but we can never know about the existence of the supposed thing-in-itself that may have caused these experiences. Therefore, the EPP is unknowable. — RussellA

Can any objects be EPP, or only certain category or types of objects can be EPP? What objects belong to the EPP?

What objects belong to the EPP? — Corvus

The EPP (existence is prior to predication) may refer to things other than objects.

Thoughts exist in the mind. Are thoughts objects?

Rain exists in the world. Is rain an object?

Thoughts exist in the mind. Are thoughts objects? — RussellA

Thoughts appear and disappear in the mind. Thoughts also causes actions to perform.
Thoughts are not visible. but they are the most intimate form of mental events.
In that regard, yes thoughts exist.

Rain exists in the world. Is rain an object? — RussellA

Whatever visible, touchable, perceptible, thinkable and knowable are objects.

From Wikipedia — RussellA

I've read wiki, which apparently didn't help.

However, the Direct Realist would say that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick

Quite the naive view. Does it have significant support?

I put my hand in a fire and feel pain.

How does the direct realist explain that? Is there actual pain in his hand? Injury and pain are quite different, and there's not always injury at all.

We directly experience some things but not others seems to show that the distinction between direct and indirect is simply one of causal complexity - how far removed the effect is from its causes, not a difference in the ontology of perception as we can experience things directly and indirectly. — Harry Hindu

Excellent point. Way too much weight is given to sight for instance, to the point that things arguably don't exist to a blind person.
Do pictures count? What if it's a picture taken at XRay frequencies? Is the resulting false color image what it looks like?

What does it even mean to say something is prior to properties? — Harry Hindu

That something 'nonexistent' (whatever that means) cannot have properties.

If something exists, how does it exist?

Hence the 'whatever that means'. I gave at least 6 definitions, and there are more.

Do properties exist?

Again, definition (of both words) dependent. It seems that everybody keeps saying 'definition dependent, but nobody every tries to make clear how the word is being used before using it.

One cause can only have one effect, in that if one knows the cause then the effect has been determined by the cause. — RussellA

This seems totally wrong. A cause typically has many effects, and each effect has many causes. It's a complex network, not a linear chain as that comment seems to suggest.
It's the old butterfly effect ,that some hurricane would not have happened had butterfly X not wafted its wings months prior. True, but had that butterfly done the alternate thing, different hurricanes would have happened. The butterfly was not the sole cause of the hurricane, nor was the hurricane the sole effect of the wing wiggle.

The Direct Realist doesn't accept this fact, and believes that even though one effect may have several causes, it is possible to follow a causal chain backwards in time.
...
The Direct Realist has the position that they will always know what broke the window. — RussellA

Really? Is this an epistemological assertion? Why then does he not know who shot Kennedy?
Why are not the direct realists in charge of the court system? Why are juries necessary? The phrase 'probable cause' becomes meaningless.

For Meinong, exist, subsist and absist are part of a hierarchy. Round squares absist but cannot subsist or exist. Sherlock Holmes can absist but not exist. Horses can exist, subsist and absist. — RussellA

OK, the crux of it all then: How do we know that horses exist and not just subsist? Both kinds of subsisting things have properties (the same properties, except for existence property), so appealing to their properties does not distinguish the two cases.

From Wikipedia - Bundle theory
Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes. — RussellA

This is interesting. I've been saying that objecthood is no more than a mental abstraction, but this bundle theory may be an attempt to refute that. Seems kind of off-topic here, but relevant to some other threads I've done. Something to look into.

Can any objects be EPP, — Corvus

This does not parse. EPP is a principle, and I don't know what it means for an object to be (or not) a principle.

You can ask what sort of objects are inapplicable to EPP for instance. My typical example is that 17 has the property of being prime, yet no conclusion of 17's existence follows from that. EPP seems not to apply there.

Can any objects be EPP,
— Corvus
This does not parse. EPP is a principle, and I don't know what it means for an object to be (or not) a principle. — noAxioms

Isn't EPP, Existence Prior to Predication? Hence it is a type of existence such as unicorn or dragon. We can describe how they might look, and they have properties such as has horn, breathes fire, being mythical etc. It is not possible to say they exist, but they exist prior to predication as concepts.
So is it a principle? Principle is the way something works with consistency and coherence mostly in physical objects and movements, and sometimes in the law and logic too. Nothing to do with existence.

You can ask what sort of objects are inapplicable to EPP for instance. My typical example is that 17 has the property of being prime, yet no conclusion of 17's existence follows from that. EPP seems not to apply there. — noAxioms

17 is a number. Numbers don't exist in real world. Numbers are concept. 17 has property being odd number, as well as being prime etc. Therefore it is EPP. Let me know if you don't agree or think not correct. Must admit EPP is a new concept for me.

yes thoughts exist. — Corvus

:up:

Meinong

How do we know that horses exist and not just subsist? — noAxioms

For Meinong, the unicorn, being mythical, makes it subsist, rather than the horse, which exists.

From the Merriam Webster

Horse = a large solid-hoofed herbivorous ungulate mammal (Equus caballus, family Equidae, the horse family) domesticated since prehistoric times and used as a beast of burden, a draft animal, or for riding
Unicorn = a mythical, usually white animal generally depicted with the body and head of a horse with long flowing mane and tail and a single often spiralled horn in the middle of the forehead

Both the horse and unicorn have similar properties, apart from the unicorn having the property of being mythical.

The unicorn is mythical because no one has seen one in the world, whereas many people have seen horses in the world.

However, the fact that no one has seen a unicorn in the world does not mean that they don't exist in the world. After all, the Coelacanth had been thought extinct for 70 million years until one was found in 1938.

Meinong's terms exist, subsist and absist are useful guidelines, though particular examples can be argued over.

Direct Realism

Quite the naive view. Does it have significant support? — noAxioms

I would guess that half of everyone on the Forum are Direct Realists.

Some of your comments suggest that you are a Direct Realist

page 2 - 1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
page 2 - The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it.
page 3 - Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal.

But other of your comments suggest that you an Indirect Realist

page 3 - I've been saying that objecthood is no more than a mental abstraction
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Why are not the direct realists in charge of the court system? — noAxioms

The Direct Realist knows that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick.

But this is only possible if there can be a direct flow of information from the present to the past. From the present experiences in the senses to the past causes of such experiences. But this is logically impossible.

This is one reason what I am not a Direct Realist, but rather an Indirect Realist.

One consequence of Direct Realism would be that the Detective would know who had carried out the crime, which is clearly not the case.
===============================================================================

A cause typically has many effects — noAxioms

If a "cause" has many effects, then by definition it is not a cause. A butterfly flapping its wings in Goa is not the cause of a tornado in Florida.

Assuming we live in a Deterministic world, then everything that happens in the world is determined completely by previously existing causes. From Wikipedia - Determinism

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.

In a Deterministic world, which I believe we live in, by defintion, one cause only has one effect.

Excellent point. Way too much weight is given to sight for instance, to the point that things arguably don't exist to a blind person.
Do pictures count? What if it's a picture taken at XRay frequencies? Is the resulting false color image what it looks like? — noAxioms

Well, most of our information about our environment comes in the form of visuals, so it seems logical that we would think the world is at it appears. A dog may think the world is as it smells, to a bat the world is as it sounds.

I think the wording is incorrect when we say that the world is as it appears. How it appears allows us to get at the way it is thanks to determinism (same causes lead to the same effects) and reasoning (incorporating multiple observations using all five senses over time).

That something 'nonexistent' (whatever that means) cannot have properties. — noAxioms

Seems like a misuse of language to me. How can we ever hope to talk about such things? Why bother?

Hence the 'whatever that means'. I gave at least 6 definitions, and there are more. — noAxioms

It seems to me that in describing how something exists you would be inherently describing it's properties.

One cause can only have one effect, in that if one knows the cause then the effect has been determined by the cause. For example, if a stone hitting a glass window causes the glass to shatter, the same stone under he same conditions hitting the same glass window will always cause the glass to shatter.

However one effect can have more than one cause, in that even if one knew the effect, it doesn't follow that that one will necessarily know the cause. For example, knowing that has a glass window has shattered is no reason why one will know what caused the glass to shatter. It could have been a bird, a stone, a window cleaner etc. — RussellA

You're confusing your ignorance of the cause with there being more than one cause. There is only one cause and because you do not know the cause you might come up with some options but those options are mental constructs (possibilities), not actual causes. Only by doing an investigation can you eliminate those possibilities, thereby finding that those causes didn't really "exist", or at least don't exist apart from your mind.

You're also focusing only on the broken window as the effect. Breaking a window (any effect) is an interaction between at least two things (a rock and a window). If a rock broke the window, the effect is not only that the window is broken but also the location of the object that broke the window. There is a rock on the floor just inside the broken window, not outside in the rock garden where it was before the window was broken. Often there is more evidence (effects) than just a broken window. You have to use your senses and powers of reason to find it.

I think that this is part of the problem - that we arbitrarily "box in" effects and causes as discrete events when causation is a constant flow and any boundaries we impose on this process may be of our own mental makings.

There is a temporal direction of information flow in a causal chain. The Indirect Realist accepts this fact, and accepts the fact that one effect may have several different causes. This makes it impossible to follow a causal chain backwards in time. The Direct Realist doesn't accept this fact, and believes that even though one effect may have several causes, it is possible to follow a causal chain backwards in time.

The Indirect Realist accepts that they may never know what broke the window. The Direct Realist has the position that they will always know what broke the window. — RussellA

Actually, for a direct realist there is no causal process. The red apple on the table is the same red apple they perceive - the cause and effect are one and the same with no intervening process in between.

For a direct realist, the apple is not ripe as they never directly experience ripeness. They experience red. When a direct realist hears someone say, "That apple is ripe", what they interpret them to really mean is the apple is red. There is no such thing as ripeness for a direct realist. A direct realist would have problems explaining causation. Or they would be separating their minds from the causal interactions of the rest of the world - as if their minds are not subject to the same laws that govern the rest of the universe. As such, I find that most direct realists seem to be religious in some way or another as their God created them in a way (with a soul) that allows them to perceive the world as it is.

It is not the case that the indirect realist may never know the cause because we actually do get at the cause on a great many things. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to accomplish tasks with the degree of success that we do.

The issue for direct vs. indirect realism is that they are really just the extreme positions on the spectrum of explaining perception. The best explanation will lie somewhere in the middle and incorporate the best, non-contradictory parts of both extremes.

Incorporating determinism (same causes lead to the same effects) and the idea that we have multiple senses AND reasoning capable of getting at the same property in different ways for fault-tolerance gives us more confidence in our understanding of the causes of some effects. I don't ever hear indirect realist take into account determinism and reasoning - as if all the indirect realist has in their toolkit is their senses and not reasoning.

You can only know whether an apple is ripe from experiences through your senses. It may be soft to the touch, it may have a sweet smell, it may have a speckled colour, it may taste bitter and there may be a dull sound when you hit it.

There is no escaping the fact that you can only know the ripeness of an apple through your senses.

Take one of these as an example. You experience a sweet smell through your sense of smell. This is no different in kind to experiencing the colour red through your sense of vision. As red is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself, a sweet smell is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself.

Ripeness is a set of properties in the mind, not a set of properties of a thing-in-itself. — RussellA

Is it? I though ripeness is a property of the apple and all those sensory impressions you spoke of are mental representation (effects of our senses and brain interacting with light reflected off the apple) of that property. How can all those very different sensory impressions be the same property? Aren't they really just the many ways one can represent the ripeness of the apple, in the same way that we can use many different scribbles (languages) to refer to the same thing in the world (apple in English or manzana in Spanish)?

And doesn't this mean that our multiple senses provides a level of fault tolerance in getting at the actual properties of the apple? Those objects look like apples in the basket at the center of Grandma's dinner table but when you try to grab one and eat it you find that they are all ceramic apples in a ceramic basket that is the centerpiece on Grandma's dinner table. So your multiple senses and reasoning allow you to get at the true nature of the objects on the table, just as it would allow you to get at the cause of the broken window. If you only had the broken window as the effect, sure I can see your issue, but that is not the case. We often have more evidence available if we just use ALL of our senses AND reasoning to get at them.

For Meinong, exist, subsist and absist are part of a hierarchy. Round squares absist but cannot subsist or exist. Sherlock Holmes can absist but not exist. Horses can exist, subsist and absist.

In Meinong's domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist. In my domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes exists. The question is then raised, how can something that doesn't exist exist. But this question is conflating two different domains, understandably leading to contradiction

For Meinong to separate thoughts into exist, such as horse, subsist, such as Sherlock Holmes, and absist, such as a round square, seems quite sensible. But the fact that many attack his views makes me believe that I may not really understand what he is saying. — RussellA

It seems to me that Meinong is simply conflating properties with different kinds of existence. Absisting an subsisting are different kinds of existence, or the nature of their existence, for what are they really saying when using these terms if not different modes of existing? What distinction are they trying to make in using these terms, if not how they interact with the world causally? Sherlock Holmes does not exist as a biological entity. It is a mental construct - an idea, but it has the same causal power as biological entities. The idea of Sherlock Holmes can cause you to do things in the world, so what exactly is the distinction they are trying to make if not the nature of their existence?

If a rock broke the window, the effect is not only that the window is broken but also the location of the object that broke the window. — Harry Hindu

Yes I agree. Whoever sees a broken window can use all their senses, reasoning and available evidence, such as a rock lying on the floor inside the room, to make a judgement as to what actually broke the window. Their judgement might be right or wrong. This would be the same approach for both the Direct and Indirect Realist.

You are right when you say that we do know the cause of many things

It is not the case that the indirect realist may never know the cause because we actually do get at the cause on a great many things. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to accomplish tasks with the degree of success that we do. — Harry Hindu

But this doesn't get to the difference between Direct and Indirect Realism.

Your statement that for the Direct Realist the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table gets to the difference between Direct and Indirect Realists.

Actually, for a direct realist there is no causal process. The red apple on the table is the same red apple they perceive - the cause and effect are one and the same with no intervening process in between. — Harry Hindu

I cannot argue with your claim that God allows us to perceive the world as it really is, and if God exists then this would be a perfectly valid explanation.

As such, I find that most direct realists seem to be religious in some way or another as their God created them in a way (with a soul) that allows them to perceive the world as it is. — Harry Hindu

However, I am looking at the problem in a secular way, and for me, it is a fact that there is a causal chain from a thing-in-itself in the world to our perception of it in the mind. It is this causal chain that makes the claims of Direct Realism invalid, that the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table.

It is not the case that when perceiving a colour we use all our senses, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgement as to what colour we are seeing. We don't make the judgment that we are in fact seeing the colour red.

When we perceive the colour red, no judgment is involved. We perceive the colour red.

It is true that once perceiving the colour red, we can then use all our sense, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgment as to what has led up to our seeing the colour red. We can reason that there has been a flow of information from a thing-in-itself in the world to our perception of it in our mind involving a long and complex causal series of events. We can determine that there is a temporal direction to this flow of information, in that in a deterministic world one cause has one effect whilst one effect may have more than one possible causes.

We may perceive a red apple on a table, but for whatever reason, a medical problem with our eyes, the light having passed through a stained glass window or there being a sunset, the apple on the table may in fact have been green.

The Indirect Realist accepts that information may change along any causal series of events, and would not explicitly say that because they perceive a red apple the apple in the world was red.

However, as you say, for the Direct Realist there is no causal intervening process, and the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table.

Both the Direct and Indirect Realist are the same in using all their senses, reasoning and evidence to try to understand the original cause of their perceptions. But they differ in that for the Direct Realist there is a one to one correspondence between what they perceive and the thing-in-itself but for the Indirect Realist, what they perceive is a representation of any thing-in-itself.

The asymmetric temporal flow along a causal series of events is an important reason why the Direct Realist's position is incorrect.

Actually, I care little about Meinong's actual views since for one he presumes a classical 'reality'. I was just interested in the implications of the denial of EPP, and all these classification details seem irrelevant to that, a derailment. — noAxioms

EPP = existence is prioir to predication.

It depends whether existence is referring to 1) the existence of the Universe prior to the predication of an apple, or 2) is referring to the existence of the apple prior to the predication of the apple.

The Universe

If 1), then the EPP is accepted, and existence is prior to the predication of an apple.

The apple

If 2), then something exists, and that something has the properties of being circular, being sweet and being green.

It cannot be that case that something exists for a period of time before its properties are attached.

It cannot be the case that there are properties not attached to something.

It must be the case that the something that exists must be contemporaneous with its properties.

Then the EPP is denied, and existence is contemporaneous with predication.

Existential Quantification

1) There is something x that exists.
2) X has the properties of being circular, being sweet, being green.

The set {being circular, being sweet, being green} may be named "being an apple"

Therefore, ∃x A (x)

There is something x that exists and x has the property A of being an apple

The property of being an apple cannot be prior to x

X cannot be prior to the property being an apple

X has the property being an apple

There is something that exists that has the property of being an apple.

Therefore, the EPP and Existential Quantification are contradictory

yes thoughts exist. — Corvus
:up: — RussellA

How very well argued. A raw assertion without even a definition of what sort of 'exists' is being presumed.
I am looking for justified statements, not opinions.

I might agree given some definitions, and not agree given others.
E2-E6*, probably yes, I'd agree, some of these by definition. E1 is the problem case, and it seems it cannot be justified without leveraging (and consequently justifying) the EPP principle, something nobody has done.


* Defined here if you missed it

Isn't EPP, Existence Prior to Predication?
...
So is it a principle? Principle is the way something works. Nothing to do with existence. — Corvus

Yes, yes, and no. It's a principle, yes. It does have something to do with existence since it explicitly mentions 'existence', but without specification of what type is meant.

In short, the principle says that nonexistent things cannot have properties, but the wording of the principle leaves 'existence' undefined, so the principle might hold with some definitions and not with others. Without a clear definition, assertions like the one quoted just above are pretty meaningless.
You seem to switch definitions on the fly, not using any one definition consistently.

Hence it is a type of existence such as unicorn or dragon.

No, a principle is a sort of rule, not a type of existence.

We can describe how [dragons] might look

Yes. That would be definition E2: thoughts, and it is hard to think of the properties of a dragon without thinking of a dragon, so EPP sees to be true given E2 definition. However, per the disclaimer in the OP, I am not talking about the existence of thoughts/ideals OF a thing, I'm talking about the thing itself. The principle says that dragons cannot breathe fire if dragons are not real. Thoughts of dragon fire are fine since thoughts of dragons seem to be a necessary part of doing so.

17 is a number. Numbers don't exist in real world. Numbers are concept.

Concepts don't exist in real world? Your assertions are loaded with problems. 17 is indeed a number (E6), but then you call it a concept (E2), and a concept is not a number. That's a contradiction. You reference 'real world' like only one world is real (E1) and all others are not, which is not justified in any way, at least not without leveraging the EPP principle, which would then itself need justification, which is one of the things I'm trying to do in this topic.

Number are thoughts. Thoughts exist. Numbers don't exist. Ouch... I certainly deny the bold part. The other two are definition dependent.

How do we know that horses exist and not just subsist? — noAxioms
For Meinong, the unicorn, being mythical, makes it subsist, rather than the horse, which exists. — RussellA

So things that are non-mythical determines what exists?
E8: Isn't mythical
What if I become a myth? What about something nobody has thought of? That exists because it isn't mythical?

I don't think you meant that, and therefore the question wasn't answered.

More concise wording of the question: Given a denial of EPP, how can the existence of anything be known? First step in answering that is to define existence. Only then can a coherent justified answer be attempted. The answer may very well be different from one definition to the next.

The unicorn is mythical because no one has seen one in the world

This uses an anthropocentric definition of 'mythical'. Is the core of the Earth then mythical because no one has seen it? I'm not even going to list this one, but it seems related to the anthropocentric definition E2.

Yet again, per the OP disclaimer, I am not considering idealistic/anthropocentric arguments for reality.

After all, the Coelacanth had been thought extinct for 70 million years until one was found in 1938.

Being nonexistent and being currently extinct are very different things.

I would guess that half of everyone on the Forum are Direct Realists. — RussellA

Maybe we should let them (in their copious numbers) defend the position then. The description above got pretty implausible.

Some of your comments suggest that you are a Direct Realist

page 2 - 1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
page 2 - The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it.
page 3 - Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal.[/quote]I think the middle comment clearly says otherwise, that my concept of the brick does not reflect its actual nature. Secondly, nothing in those three statements indicates that I'm a realist.

But other of your comments suggest that you an Indirect Realist

Indirect, sure. Realist is, like everything else, definition dependent, but I can write an R1-R6 that directly correspond to E1-E6.

If a "cause" has many effects, then by definition it is not a cause.

Perhaps we are speaking past each other. I break my leg. That causes 1) pain, 2) doctor work 3) financial troubles 4) missed days at work 5) cancelled ski trip.

Plenty more, but that sounds like multiple effects to me, so why didn't my leg breakage cause any of those effects?

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.

And this is relevant to the point above how, especially since both our comments (causes have more than one effect or not) seem to be relevant regardless of one's opinion on determinism.

In a Deterministic world, which I believe we live in, by defintion, one cause only has one effect.

Not by the definition you gave (I can think of at least 5 kinds of determinism), plus we do not know if the world is deterministic. As I said, we seem to be talking past each other.

Well, most of our information about our environment comes in the form of visuals — Harry Hindu

The naive classical stuff maybe, but not the deep stuff that gets important when exploring the gray areas.

it seems logical that we would think the world is at it appears.

Very pragmatic at least, and given that pragmatic utility, it may even be logical that we think the world is as it appears, but it isn't logical that the world is actually as it appears, for reasons you spelled out earlier.

Seems like a misuse of language to me. How can we ever hope to talk about such things? Why bother?

What? Talking about dragons having properties? That's fine. All of those are ideals, valid things to talk about. The EPP concerns actual dragons having wings, not possible if there are not actual ones. The problem with that reasoning is that it presumes a division into actual and not actual before applying the logic, which is circular logic. Dispensing with EPP fixes that problem, but leaves us with no way to test for the existence (E1) (actuality) of anything, leaving the term without a distinction.

It seems to me that in describing how something exists you would be inherently describing it's properties.

OK. Dragons breathe fire. Therefore, per EPP, dragons exist. That leverages definition E3.

There is only one cause — Harry Hindu

I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field
That's four causes (there are more) of the hip break (true story). Coyote distracts attention from foot placement. Step off road and fall, instinctively to the side into a roll.

Once again, perhaps we are talking past each other when you say there can be but one cause and I disagree. If I say that each of those things is a cause, I mean the state of my broken (chipped actually) hip is a function of all those things and many others. Had any one of them not been the case, the hip thing would not have happened. Cause C (a system state) is a cause of effect E (another system state) if state E is in any way a function of state C. A state is a system state, however local, like say the coyote.

[EPP] depends whether existence is referring to 1) the existence of the Universe prior to the predication of an apple, or 2) is referring to the existence of the apple prior to the predication of the apple. — RussellA

You seem to be interpreting the word 'prior' to mean 'at an earlier time', which is not at all what the principle is saying. It says that existence is required for predication, and conversely a nonexistent thing cannot have predicates, not even be the nonexistent thing. It is not making any reference to time.

We still can apply several definitions of 'exists' to that principle, some of which make sense and some not. I care, because in denying EPP, I want to know exactly what is being denied.

Existential Quantification

1) There is something x that exists.

No, there exists some integer x that satisfies some condition (being odd). (∃x) (Int(x) ∧ x is odd), where your statement comes down to ∃x which is empty.

So you want to say there an exists an object that is round, sweet and green. (∃x) (x is round ∧ x is sweet ∧ x is green)
Hey, the green ones are tart!

Anyway, that's leveraging E6, a relation. One can say that there isn't an integer that breathes fire.
~∃(x)(Int(x) ∧ x breathes fire).

EPP seems to hold here. There isn't anything that satisfies those predicates, so there's nothing on which those predicates are being hung. Under Meinong, a fire breathing integer has those predicates, and it absists, without contradiction.

Therefore, ∃x A (x)

Works for me.

Therefore, the EPP and Existential Quantification are contradictory

No. You seem to be using the temporal definition of 'prior' to conclude this.

It's a principle, yes. It does have something to do with existence since it explicitly mentions 'existence', but without specification of what type is meant. — noAxioms

Strange, that nowhere I could find anyone describing it as principle, but there are many explications on EPP. It sounds like a theory or idea too.

but without specification of what type is meant. — noAxioms

Could it mean that it covers all existence? Could you define and list the types of existence?
What is existence?

A raw assertion without even a definition of what sort of 'exists' is being presumed. I am looking for justified statements, not opinions. — noAxioms

True. My saying that "thoughts exist" is a raw assertion without any definition of either "thoughts" or "exist".

But considering books have been written about the nature of thoughts and existence, I think my trying to define these terms would make my post far too long.

I can only hope that the reader understands what I mean by saying that "thoughts exist".
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So things that are non-mythical determines what exists?............This uses an anthropocentric definition of 'mythical'....................Being nonexistent and being currently extinct are very different things. — noAxioms

I would hope that few would argue with my saying that unicorns are mythical creatures.

For Meinong, something being mythical makes it subsist.
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Maybe we should let them (in their copious numbers) defend the position then. — noAxioms

Yes, Direct Realists should defend their position on the Forum.
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Perhaps we are speaking past each other. I break my leg. That causes 1) pain, 2) doctor work 3) financial troubles 4) missed days at work 5) cancelled ski trip. — noAxioms

My assumption is that in a deterministic world one cause has one effect and one effect can have more than one possible causes.

This is the core of my argument against Direct Realism.

Your example is about one event having more than one effect, which I agree with, as it supports my argument against Direct Realism.

The question is, can breaking a leg be said to cause cancelling a ski trip. After all, there is no necessary reason to cancel a ski trip just because you broke your leg. Breaking a leg may contribute to your decision to cancel your ski trip, but it would be wrong to say that breaking your leg caused you to cancel your ski trip.

Books have been written about the meaning of "causation", including the SEP article The Metaphysics of Causation
===============================================================================

You seem to be interpreting the word 'prior' to mean 'at an earlier time', which is not at all what the principle is saying — noAxioms

You say "There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all."

One of the accepted meanings of "prior" is "at an earlier time".

Do you have a source that establishes the principle that existence is conceptually prior to predication to help me understand how the terms have been defined?

Well, most of our information about our environment comes in the form of visuals
— Harry Hindu
The naive classical stuff maybe, but not the deep stuff that gets important when exploring the gray areas. — noAxioms

I don't know what you mean by the "deep stuff that gets important". What form does the deep stuff that gets important take in the mind if not colors and shapes? Because we get most of our information about the world via vision, we tend to think in visuals as well. How do you know when you are thinking about the deep stuff that gets important? What is it like? What form do your thoughts take when thinking these things? What mental constructs are you pointing at when you talk about what you are thinking? And what form does the gray areas take when exploring them. You even used the color, "grey" (a visual) in your description.

Very pragmatic at least, and given that pragmatic utility, it may even be logical that we think the world is as it appears, but it isn't logical that the world is actually as it appears, for reasons you spelled out earlier. — noAxioms

That depends on what one means by, "the world is as it appears". If it means that the appearances allows us to get at the actual state-of-affairs, which it does most of the time or else we would be failing at our tasks much more often that we succeed, then what is the issue? What is missing from our knowledge when we successfully use appearances (representations) to accomplish a vast majority of our tasks that we set out to do? I don't know about you, but when I interact with the world, I interact with the actual state-of-affairs via its appearance in my mind. I don't interact with appearances.

I find that many indirect realists like to whine about how we might be mistaken, or that we end up not knowing anything, when we are not mistaken and we succeed in our goals most of the time. How often have we understood each other's scribbles on this screen as opposed to not understanding them?

That something 'nonexistent' (whatever that means) cannot have properties. — noAxioms

Seems like a misuse of language to me. How can we ever hope to talk about such things? Why bother? — Harry Hindu

What? Talking about dragons having properties? That's fine. All of those are ideals, valid things to talk about. The EPP concerns actual dragons having wings, not possible if there are not actual ones. The problem with that reasoning is that it presumes a division into actual and not actual before applying the logic, which is circular logic. Dispensing with EPP fixes that problem, but leaves us with no way to test for the existence (E1) (actuality) of anything, leaving the term without a distinction.
— noAxioms

It seems to me that in describing how something exists you would be inherently describing it's properties. — Harry Hindu

OK. Dragons breathe fire. Therefore, per EPP, dragons exist. That leverages definition E3. — noAxioms

Sure, this goes back to what I was saying about thinking in visuals. When describing a dragon, you are describing how it appears visually in your mind. Your description is visual in nature. You do the same thing for objects that exist in other locations in the world, like outside of your head. If ideas can have the same types of properties as physical objects, then what does it mean for lizards to exist but dragons do not exist? It seems to me that people are trying to make a special case for ideas (as having the property of non-existence) as opposed to everything else, when they possess the same types of properties and have as much causal power as everything else? The only difference is the location of the things we are talking about - either in your head or outside of it, and you head exists, but the things within it do not?

There is only one cause
— Harry Hindu
I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field
That's four causes (there are more) of the hip break (true story). Coyote distracts attention from foot placement. Step off road and fall, instinctively to the side into a roll.

Once again, perhaps we are talking past each other when you say there can be but one cause and I disagree. If I say that each of those things is a cause, I mean the state of my broken (chipped actually) hip is a function of all those things and many others. Had any one of them not been the case, the hip thing would not have happened. Cause C (a system state) is a cause of effect E (another system state) if state E is in any way a function of state C. A state is a system state, however local, like say the coyote. — noAxioms

You are talking past me. That is not what I was saying. Russell was making the point that, from his own position of ignorance, there appears to be multiple possible causes for some effect. He would be projecting multiple causal paths to the same effect when they are merely products of his mind (his ignorance of the one actual causal path that led to the effect).

If you read the rest of that post you would see that I go on to say that a cause is an interaction between two or more things. So depending on if you point at the interaction ( a single thing), or the two or more things interacting, one could say that the cause is a single thing, or multiple things. It depends on what our goal is in the moment.

You could say that the Big Bang is also a cause of your chipped hip.

It is not the case that when perceiving a colour we use all our senses, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgement as to what colour we are seeing. We don't make the judgment that we are in fact seeing the colour red.

When we perceive the colour red, no judgment is involved. We perceive the colour red. — RussellA

We don't ever just perceive the color red. What is the purpose of experiencing red if we are just suppose to perceive it? Judgements involve integrating all percepts into a consistent whole experience of the world. It is not just using all of your senses, but using them over time that allows you to make valid judgements about the world. It also depends on the context. Red on an apple means something different than red on a street sign.

However, as you say, for the Direct Realist there is no causal intervening process, and the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table. — RussellA

What does a direct realist do when they say the chocolate ice cream is delicious but someone else says it is disgusting? Is the direct realist talking about the ice cream or their mental state when eating it?

Both the Direct and Indirect Realist are the same in using all their senses, reasoning and evidence to try to understand the original cause of their perceptions. But they differ in that for the Direct Realist there is a one to one correspondence between what they perceive and the thing-in-itself but for the Indirect Realist, what they perceive is a representation of any thing-in-itself. — RussellA

Yet both of them succeed in accomplishing their goals with the same rate of success.

I'm talking about the thing itself. The principle says that dragons cannot breathe fire if dragons are not real. — noAxioms

What is the real dragon? If something looks like a dragon and breathes fire, is it a dragon? I saw the fake dragons made to breathe fire.