We don't ever just perceive the color red..............Judgements involve integrating all percepts into a consistent whole experience of the world. — Harry Hindu

True, both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist are able to successfully drive through the city centre.

It is a philosophical question. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist may perceive the colour red at a traffic light, but what exactly is the nature of the thing-in-itself in the world that is causing them to see the colour red?

This is not something the driver of the car needs to think about. All they need to know when they arrive at the traffic light is whether they perceive red, orange or green.

It may well be that the thing-in-itself is in reality a yellow leprechaun, but as long as the driver consistently perceives the colour red, they will be able to successfully navigate the world.
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What does a direct realist do when they say the chocolate ice cream is delicious but someone else says it is disgusting? Is the direct realist talking about the ice cream or their mental state when eating it? — Harry Hindu

Exactly. Another reason against Direct Realism and for Indirect Realism.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

The EPP
The EPP states that existence is conceptually prior to predication.

1) You say that this means that there must be existence before there are properties.

2) But equally, it could be the case that there must be properties before existence.

Why do you think 1) rather than 2)?

Why do you think that the existence of x is separate to the properties that x has?

Existential Quantification
In the domain of numbers, there is something x that exists that has the properties of being an integer and of being even. This something x exists in the domain of numbers, regardless of whether numbers exist in the world or are non-existent in the world.

In the domain of literature, there is something x that exists and has the properties of being a detective, of having Mrs Hudson as a landlady and of being a pipe-smoker. This something x exists in the domain of literature, regardless of whether literature exists in the world or is non-existent in the world.

Something x that exists in a domain that is non-existent in the world could be called "subsisting".

Strange, that nowhere I could find anyone describing it as principle — Corvus

Perhaps that is so. It isn't a theory since it does not seem testable. Call it a premise maybe.
SEP calls it a principle, top of section 1 of the 'existence' page.

Could you define and list the types of existence?

I linked to exactly that in my prior post. See the (*). I called them E1-E6, with openness for more.

I can only hope that the reader understands what I mean by saying that "thoughts exist". — RussellA

Given so many definitions, the reader probably presumes his own definition instead of yours.

Given anthropocentrism or idealism (E2), existence is mind dependent, a relation of sorts. Yea, thoughts exist.

Given the various relational definitions E4,E5,E6, thoughts relate to something, or are themselves relations, hence they exist.

The number 17 exists under E3 and E6 and under E1 if you're a platonist.

E1 (objective existence) is questionable since existence is reduced to a meaningless tag. There's zero way to distinguish an existing thing from a thing identical in every way except for it not existing. So given E1, there isn't a test for existence, and thus one cannot logically conclude anything either way.

That's a starting point, and it didn't require a book.

I would hope that few would argue with my saying that unicorns are mythical creatures.

I'm not disagreeing with that. They're mythical to us, sure. We're perhaps we're mythical to them.
What I am doing is driving the definition of 'exists = not mythical' to absurdity.


Causation:

The question is, can breaking a leg be said to cause cancelling a ski trip. ... Breaking a leg may contribute to your decision to cancel your ski trip, but it would be wrong to say that breaking your leg caused you to cancel your ski trip.

It seems you use 'cause' as 'necessarily causes', like there needs to be no possibility of the ski trip not being cancelled. In that case, give an example of a cause and effect that satisfies you, and then explain why no other necessary effect can also occur.

For instance: A family is in a house near a hill when an abrupt mudslide crushes the place flat before they are even aware of the danger. Mom dies. Dad dies. Kids die. House destroyed. TV no longer functions. Mud fills the street. The profile of the landscape is changed.

Plenty more on that list of effects, and all of it necessary. Why are most/all of those not effects caused by the mudslide? I'm especially interested in how you justify that there can be no more than one effect.


Also, what relevance does this quibble have to do with the topic of existence?

=========
One of the accepted meanings of "prior" is "at an earlier time".

Yes, it is very much a valid usage, but if you read up on EPP, the word is never being used that way. Context!

Do you have a source that establishes the principle that existence is conceptually prior to predication to help me understand how the terms have been defined?

SEP article on existence, section 1:
"To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties. (This principle—that existence is conceptually prior to predication—is rejected by Meinongians.) Saying it is red and an apple and furthermore exists is to say one thing too many."

What mental constructs are you pointing at when you talk about what you are thinking? — Harry Hindu

Mathematics, logic. Stuff like that. Take the issue of presentism or not. There being no empirical difference between the candidate interpretations, shapes and colors and visual avail you not, but they still can be used to convey language and make charts and such.

That depends on what one means by, "the world is as it appears". If it means that the appearances allows us to get at the actual state-of-affairs, which it does most of the time or else we would be failing at our tasks much more often that we succeed, then what is the issue?

There is no issue with what one means by those words. It may or may not be true, but regardless, we can succeed at our tasks most of the time. That's what I mean by it being a pragmatic stance.
Pragmatically, I'm totally a presentist. I hold that belief an no amount of logic can sway me from it. I (the rational 'I', not the pragmatic 'I') also know it to be wrong, and logic can indeed influence that conclusion, but the empirical evidence just isn't there to make the case. So yes, I hold mutually contradictory beliefs because there is more than one purpose being served in there. I know which one is the boss, and both sides approve of the arrangement.
So I believe that there is no living T-Rex, and I also believe that there is a living T-Rex. Fun, huh? Not a contradiction since it isn't in the same way.

How often have we understood each other's scribbles on this screen as opposed to not understanding them?

With you? More often than with most.

When describing a dragon, you are describing how it appears visually in your mind. Your description is visual in nature.

Yes. The result is an ideal (E2), not a dragon, even if describing something that's in the world (E4).

If ideas can have the same types of properties as physical objects, then what does it mean for lizards to exist but dragons do not exist?

Definition dependent. Under E2 (an anthropocentric definition), there is empirical evidence of lizards but not of dragons. Under E1, what does it mean indeed? That's a question asked in the OP, one that still hasn't been answered. I'm pretty sure Meinong is using definition E1, and for this reason, since the denial makes little sense given the other definitions.

You are talking past me.

I know. I am trying to ask and answer clarifying questions so we stop talking past each other.

That is not what I was saying. Russell was making the point that, from his own position of ignorance, there appears to be multiple possible causes for some effect. He would be projecting multiple causal paths to the same effect when they are merely products of his mind (his ignorance of to the one actual causal path that led to the effect).

Good example of talking past since I cannot in any way figure out how there can be only one actual causal path to a given effect (some subsequent state). It isn't a path, it's a network. I gave four causes of my hip injury which wouldn't have happened given the absence of any of them. But from his post above, Russell seems to require a cause to necessarily (on its own) bring about the effect, and I cannot think of an example of that, so I asked for it.

You could say that the Big Bang is also a cause of your chipped hip.

I would parhaps say that since the hip thing wouldn't have happened sans big bang, but Russell uses the words differently.
On the other hand, the big bang is a state that doesn't uniquely identify this world (except under some specific types of determinism), so the BB does not necessarily cause my hip injury under many quantum interpretations. The thing with the road and the coyote is more of a classical cause.

What is the real dragon? If something looks like a dragon and breathes fire, is it a dragon? — Corvus

Typically more criteria must be met to satisfy a human designation as being a real dragon. Sometimes unreasonably so, falling back to the logic, "there are no dragons, so whatever that is, it isn't a dragon". Not great logic, but frequently employed in other topics.

What does a direct realist do when they say the chocolate ice cream is delicious but someone else says it is disgusting? Is the direct realist talking about the ice cream or their mental state when eating it? — Harry Hindu

Another reason to be a relational stance.

Premise – Metaphysics is An Incomplete Project

... everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. — philosch

Meinong, when he says certain things (a circular triangle) have no regular existence, but nonetheless have some kind of existence, speaks toward the indirection of complexity.

The indirection of complexity, as with the imaginary numbers of the complex number plane, shows us that some real things must be approached in terms of a multi-part complex.

Their existence is no less real than an imaginary number is a real complex number.

The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of <objective> reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms

Existence references the item to the totality. It’s a cataloguing reference to the totality that honors the conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. Existing things all come from the same fund of mass_energy and thus are inter-connected all of the time.

Existence as a property of things makes them complex in the sense of imaginary numbers being complex. Existing things have two parts: a) the local part (collections of attributes); b) the non-local part (inter-connection to all things). The suggestion of QM is that at that scale the non-local part of things becomes detectable.

Existence as a predication, given its non-local part, plays as an acknowledgement of the insuperability of context for presence. Present things are all connected. When I say a red apple exists, I say a red apple is a roadmap to all other existing things. The apple is the Gestault of its generalizable attributes such as red and apple, and existence is the general container, i.e., the inter-connectivity of all Gestaults. Existence of a thing is its approach to the container of containers.

Existence as a catalog reference for a thing and its ecology is useful to the physicist in general and the cosmologist in particular.

So existence is context generalized to insuperability. It is the limit of presence. It is why there is not nothing. The question answers itself by the brute fact of its existence.

The insuperability of context forestalls analysis. Questions of being are insoluble problems of perspective.

The serial solutions to questions of being reside within the hierarchy of upwardly evolving dimensions. The third spatial dimension of depth looks at an infinite series of aerial planes and understands them categorically as algebraic manifolds. The cubic POV affords an overview of aerial manifolds.

What does an infinite series of cubes become categorically? We don’t know the experience of hyper-cubic space. What does its overview of all cubic spaces afford?

If we generalize the hierarchy of upwardly evolving dimensions to an infinite series, then we ask ourselves what is the Gestault of evolution toward infinite presence? Is it scalable presence across upwardly evolving complexity of dimensional extension? Existence as generalized and scalable context upwardly multi-dimensional perplexes vector measurement of location. Might the measurement problem of QM be evidence of strategic cosmic incompleteness? Can we express it locally as perpetual trans-hyper presence?

A big question asks, “What’s the relationship between existence as context insuperable and consciousness as awareness uncontainable?” When the inescapable container engulfs the uncontainable agent, what happens? happens. This is our universe (semi-verse really) as a bi-directional irrational expansion.

The POV problem of Why Existence? that forestalls analysis tells us that metaphysics is necessarily is an incomplete project.

Given so many definitions, the reader probably presumes his own definition instead of yours. — noAxioms

It would be an impossible task for me to persuade everyone that "thoughts exist". All I can do is assert that "thoughts exist".

To cover myself, I could give a definition, such as because "I know about it". But this is no more than a tautology.

Definitions are really no more than unjustified assertions.
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I'm especially interested in how you justify that there can be no more than one effect...Also, what relevance does this quibble have to do with the topic of existence? — noAxioms

Where do apples exist? The Direct Realist says apples exist both in the mind and in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist says apples exist only in the mind.

I don't accept Direct Realism as it depends on one effect having only one possible cause. This is where causation comes into the topic.

Why do I think that one cause has one effect? Imagine a snooker cue hitting a snooker ball. The game of snooker depends on one cause having one effect.

Over-determination is the situation where one effect has been determined by more than one cause. (Wikipedia - Over-determination). PhD's have been written about the problem.
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SEP article on existence, section 1 — noAxioms

:up:
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I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field....................It isn't a path, it's a network. I gave four causes of my hip injury which wouldn't have happened given the absence of any of them. — noAxioms

Scenario one
1) You left the house for a walk.
2) You could have walked on the road or through the field. You walked on a road.
3) You could have walked in the centre of the road or on the unfilled shoulder. You walked on the unfilled shoulder of the road.
4) You could have been looking to houses the left where there was no coyote or to the field on the right where there was a coyote. You looked to the right.

Scenario two
You left the house for a walk, slipped on wet grass and broke your hip. You could have broken your hip even if there had been no coyote.

Scenario three
Even if there had been a coyote in the field to the right, you could have looked to the houses on the left, not seen a coyote, but seen a robbery, and then broken your hip.

Why relevant to existance? Do apples exist only in the mind, as the Indirect Realist says, or both in the mind and mind-independent world, as the Direct Realist says?

Perhaps that is so. It isn't a theory since it does not seem testable. Call it a premise maybe.
SEP calls it a principle, top of section 1 of the 'existence' page. — noAxioms

Kant says, all principles need arguments and proof why they are principles. But I don't see any such thing here.

Could you define and list the types of existence?
I linked to exactly that in my prior post. See the (*). I called them E1-E6, with openness for more. — noAxioms

How about "Existence is perceptible object in space and time"? This must be the defacto definition of existence.

Definitions are really no more than unjustified assertions. — RussellA

That's what premises are. Definitions are descriptions about how certain words and terms are being used. The latter doesn't have a truth value to it. A premise or an assertion does.

Where do apples exist?

That's a different question that 'do apples exist?". Your question already presumes they exist, and in a location at that, thus implying a sort of an E4 definition of exists.

Over-determination is the situation where one effect has been determined by more than one cause.

Overdetermination concerns multiple causes, any of which would have caused the effect. I'm not talking about that. In all my examples, there are multiple causes, each of which is necessary for the effect. Take away any one of the causes and the effect would not have occurred. This is not the case with overdetermination.



I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field....................It isn't a path, it's a network. I gave four causes of my hip injury which wouldn't have happened given the absence of any of them. — noAxioms

Scenario one
2) You could have walked on the road or through the field. You walked on a road.
3) You could have walked in the centre of the road or on the unfilled shoulder. You walked on the unfilled shoulder of the road.
4) You could have been looking to houses the left where there was no coyote or to the field on the right where there was a coyote. You looked to the right.

I think you just listed 2 more causes, since had any of the alterations you described actually taken place, the injury probably would not have occurred.

Scenario two
You left the house for a walk, slipped on wet grass and broke your hip. You could have broken your hip even if there had been no coyote.

Yes, there are multiple paths to that sort of injury. Scenario 3 is another.

What you didn't do is demonstrate that there is but one cause for my injury, something you assert to be the case.

Why relevant to existance? Do apples exist only in the mind, as the Indirect Realist says, or both in the mind and mind-independent world, as the Direct Realist says?

The topic is about denial of EPP, not the distinction between direct and indirect realism. On that note, the whole digress about how many causes there are to my injury seems irrelevant to the topic.
Things existing only in the mind or not is idealism, a valid view but one explicitly not being considered, per the disclaimer in the OP. Still, I did give it a line in the list of definitions of existence.

Kant says, all principles need arguments and proof why they are principles. — Corvus

Fine. For that, we need criteria that must be met for the word 'principle' to apply, and if EPP does not meet this criteria, then we call it a premise or something else.

How about "Existence is perceptible object in space and time"? This must be the defacto definition of existence.

Depends what you mean by perceptible. If it's the anthropocentric definition (perceived by humans), then E2 applies. If it is perceptible by anything, even in the absence of an observer noticing it, then E4 applies. Both definitions are relational, essentially 'is a member of X' where X is human perceptions (E2) or X is 'is somewhere in our universe' (E4) where universe is anything with coordinates relative to say time 0, Greenwich. Dark matter exists despite not being easy to perceive.

Living dinosaurs do have an E4 existence but not an E2 existence. The same is probably true of unicorns. The number 17 does not exist by your definition since it is not in space and time.

So 17 has the property of being prime, which is predication without existence. Is EPP wrong then?

Existence references the item to the totality. It’s a cataloguing reference to the totality that honors the conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. Existing things all come from the same fund of mass_energy and thus are inter-connected all of the time. — ucarr

I made little sense of most of the post, but this seems to reference the E4 definition (is a member of our universe), a relation.

You bring up conservation laws. Mass conservation is a property of Newtonian mechanics. Mass/energy conservation is a property only of inertial frames which do not describe reality. Total energy (meaningful in the right coordinates) is going up, while energy density is going down.

Anyway, I suspect you care little about those nits, but I could not figure out what you were otherwise trying to convey.

Definitions are descriptions about how certain words and terms are being used. The latter doesn't have a truth value to it. — noAxioms

EPP = existence is conceptually prior to predication. What does "exist" mean? The Merriam Webster defines "exist" as "to have real being whether material or spiritual".

I agree that a definition does not have a truth value, in that the definition is not intended to represent the world as it actually is.

But why does "exist" mean "to have real being whether material or spiritual" rather than "a woody perennial plant".

It is not possible to justify why a word means one thing rather than another apart from being asserted by either common usage or government institution.

I still maintain that definitions are unjustified assertions.
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That's a different question that 'do apples exist?". — noAxioms

I agree that "where do apples exist" is a different question to "do apples exist", but they are connected.

The EPP implies that non-existent things cannot have properties. Meinong argued that non-existent things can have properties. But what has causation to do with this question?

For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind. For the Direct Realist, apples exist both in the mind and a mind-independent world

For the Direct Realist, Santa doesn't exist in a mind-independent world, and can therefore be said to be non-existent. For the Indirect Realist, both apples and Santa exist in the mind, and therefore neither can be said to be non-existent.

The Direct and Indirect Realist have different attitudes about non-existence.

My argument is that the Direct Realist position towards non-existence cannot be valid, because Direct Realism itself is not a valid philosophical position, in part because of the problem with causation.

This is why causation is part of the topic about non-existent things.
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I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field......................In all my examples, there are multiple causes, each of which is necessary for the effect. — noAxioms

Both Indirect and Direct Realism have different approaches to non-existence, but I don't believe that the Direct Realist approach is valid, partly because one effect can have more than one possible cause.

Specifically, on seeing the colour red, the Indirect Realist accepts that they may not know the cause because one effect may have more than one possible causes. For example, a migraine, a green tree with the light passing through a stained glass window or a yellow field at sunset. The Direct Realist, however, argues that they know the cause was a red colour on the belief that one effect can only have one cause.

You make my argument for me in saying that one effect, breaking a hip, can have more than one cause, such as taking a walk, a repaved road, a badly repaved road and a coyote.

Once Direct Realism has been set aside, the Indirect Realist approach to non-existence can be further investigated.
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Things existing only in the mind or not is idealism, a valid view but one explicitly not being considered, per the disclaimer in the OP. — noAxioms

The EPP infers that non-existent things cannot have properties. Meinong argued that non-existent things can have properties.

Everything we know about the world is because of what we experience in our senses.

There are two distinct approaches, that of the Indirect and Direct Realist. The Direct Realist believes they can know what exists in a mind-independent world, and the Indirect Realist disagrees.

I believe that the problem of causation shows that Direct Realism is not valid, meaning that there is no alternative to Indirect Realism.

Non-existence can only be investigated from the position of the Indirect Realist.

How about "Existence is perceptible object in space and time"? This must be the defacto definition of existence.

Depends what you mean by perceptible. If it's the anthropocentric definition (perceived by humans), then E2 applies. If it is perceptible by anything, even in the absence of an observer noticing it, then E4 applies. Both definitions are relational, essentially 'is a member of X' where X is human perceptions (E2) or X is 'is somewhere in our universe' (E4) where universe is anything with coordinates relative to say time 0, Greenwich. Dark matter exists despite not being easy to perceive. — noAxioms

None of the definitions of existence mentions on space and time. Are being in space and time not important factors for objects qualifying as existence?

I can think of several definitions of 'exists' that one might use, but some possibilities:
E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality"
E2 "I know about it"
E3 "Has predicates"
E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe"
E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"
E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

There are probably better wordings. — noAxioms

None of the definitions of existence mentions on space and time. — Corvus

Fine, write your own, but also tell me in what way it is distinct from E4. Space and time are contained by the universe, and I see little point in listing the contents in the E4 definition.

The Merriam Webster defines "exist" as "to have real being whether material or spiritual". — RussellA

That is pretty vague since all it does is give a synonym. 'is real' or 'being'. So 'being real' can also be defined 6 ways, which I had called R1-R6, corresponding to E1-E6.
It does say 'material or spiritual', so that kind of eliminates 'mental', so maybe E2 is ruled out by this dictionary definition. I think 'spiritual' was put there so one can say God exists without contradicting the definition.

Don't go to a dictionary to answer definition questions from philosophy or science.
I remember a classic game show "what's my line" where the girl questions three candidates, only one of which is some expert, the other two pretending. The exxpertise in this case was chemistry. She asked each "what is a mole?". End of game. The other two gave the dictionary definition (which, if it's a good dictionary, might include the definition that it's a number).

But why does "exist" mean "to have real being whether material or spiritual" rather than "a woody perennial plant".

Convention (or what you call 'common usage'). If you're going to use the latter definition, it needs to be stated up front because it's unconventional. Likewise, all these philosophers need to do this because your wording doesn't narrow it down to a single one of the possible conventions. This is a philosophical discussion, so a philosophical definition is expected, not a lay definition.

It is not possible to justify why a word means one thing rather than another apart from being asserted by either common usage or government institution.

For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind.

You're describing idealism. The whole point of realism is that there is a real apple independent of mind, the actual nature of which is a matter of interpretation. For instance, absent a mind, there's nothing out there that's going to label it with the symbol 'apple', but absent any minds, said apple would likely have never evolved in the first place, so go figure.

My argument is that the Direct Realist position towards non-existence cannot be valid, because Direct Realism itself is not a valid philosophical position, in part because of the problem with causation.

No argument from me.


It seems that any realist (direct or not) presumes something is real, that it exists. The only justification for that I've seen so far is a statement of relation. The real thing relates to me, which is idealistic and anthropocentric, and since I don't think the universe was created for the purpose of making humans (or that it has a purpose or was created at all), I have little interest in how it relates to me. What does it mean to have mind independent existence? How much is EPP necessary to justify the stance? If it isn't, then why is it needed? If it is needed, how is it justified?

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I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field......................In all my examples, there are multiple causes, each of which is necessary for the effect. — noAxioms

Specifically, on seeing the colour red, the Indirect Realist accepts that they may not know the cause because one effect may have more than one possible causes. For example, a migraine, a green tree with the light passing through a stained glass window or a yellow field at sunset. The Direct Realist, however, argues that they know the cause was a red colour on the belief that one effect can only have one cause.

All this seems irrelevant. My effect is a physical effect, not an experience. You're talking about the experience of red. Get away from experience. For at least the 10th time, per the disclaimer, I am not discussing ideals.

You make my argument for me in saying that one effect, breaking a hip, can have more than one cause, such as taking a walk, a repaved road, a badly repaved road and a coyote.

How so? You assert only one cause is possible. I list four (with there being more), and you don't counter it. My story contradicts your assertion, which is not 'making your argument for you'.

Once Direct Realism has been set aside, the Indirect Realist approach to non-existence can be further investigated.

I am not discussing idealism, and what you call indirect realism is what everybody else calls idealism.

The Direct Realist believes they can know what exists in a mind-independent world, and the Indirect Realist disagrees.

You contradict yourself again, since you claim there is no mind-independent reality under what you call indirect realism, and in so claiming, you claim to know everything about it. "Apples exist only in the mind" you say, so that's a claim that you know everything about mind-independent apples, which is that there aren't any, so there's nothing to know.

Fine, write your own, but also tell me in what way it is distinct from E4. Space and time are contained by the universe, and I see little point in listing the contents in the E4 definition. — noAxioms

Where in the universe, are space and time contained?

1) Don't go to a dictionary to answer definition questions from philosophy or science.2) This is a philosophical discussion, so a philosophical definition is expected, not a lay definition. — noAxioms

How is "exist" defined in philosophy. You refer to the SEP article on Existence. But the article concludes that there is no satisfactory philosophical meaning of "exist"

This entry began by noting that existence raises a number of deep and important problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. The entry has examined some of those problems and surveyed a number of different accounts of existence. None of the theories surveyed is wholly satisfying and without cost.

I referred to the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of "exist" as "to have real being whether material or spiritual", but you say that this is not a philosophical definition.

This leads to an impasse, where a topic is being discussed yet there is no general agreement as to what the words being used mean.
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1) The whole point of realism is that there is a real apple independent of mind, the actual nature of which is a matter of interpretation.2) It seems that any realist (direct or not) presumes something is real, that it exists............What does it mean to have mind independent existence?...............How much is EPP necessary to justify the stance?
3) For at least the 10th time, per the disclaimer, I am not discussing ideals.
4) I am not discussing idealism, and what you call indirect realism is what everybody else calls idealism.
5) You contradict yourself again, since you claim there is no mind-independent reality under what you call indirect realism, and in so claiming, you claim to know everything about it. — noAxioms

Idealism is about what exist in the mind and Realism is about what exists in a mind-independent world. There are Direct Realists and there are Indirect Realists. The Direct Realist, such as John Searle, knows that there is a mind-independent world and the Indirect Realist, such as Kant, believes that there is a mind-independent world. The Idealist, such as Berkeley, knows that there is no mind-independent world.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't claim that there is no mind-independent reality, but I do believe that there is a mind-independent reality.

The Direct Realist knows that there is a real apple independent of mind, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that there is something independent of the mind.

In your Disclaimer you write "I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else". This leads to an impossible situation, in that if we are not allowed to talk about mental abstractions, yet Santa only exists as a mental abstraction, then it becomes impossible to talk about Santa at all.

How does this relate to the EPP? The EPP principle is that something must exist in order for it to have properties. Within Realism, there is the mind and there is the mind-independent world. For the Direct Realist, apples exist in both the mind and a mind-independent world. For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind. If, as I believe, Direct Realism is not valid, then we can only consider existence and non-existence from the position of Indirect Realism. From the position of Indirect Realism, our only knowledge of existence and non-existence is as mental abstractions.
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1) I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field...................You assert only one cause is possible. I list four (with there being more), and you don't counter it. — noAxioms

If there had not been a Big Bang, you wouldn't have broken your hip. It depends whether it is valid to say that the Big Bang was one cause of your breaking your hip?

I would agree that the cause of the snooker ball starting to move was being hit by a snooker cue, but I have more difficulty in saying that one cause of the snooker ball starting to move was the Big Bang.
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E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51. — noAxioms

I think that Existential Quantification E6 points to an important feature of "existing", and that is the domain in which something exists.

Integers exist in the domain of numbers, even if integers don't exist in a mind-independent world. Sherlock Holmes exists in the domain of literature, even if Sherlock Holmes is non-existent in a mind-independent world.

Something can both exist and be non-existent, dependent on which domain is being referred to.

This leads to an impasse, where a topic is being discussed yet there is no general agreement as to what the words being used mean. — RussellA

There does not need to be an agreement as to what a word means. A great deal (perhaps the majority) of words in the dictionary have multiple meanings. Most of the time the intended meaning can be gleaned by context, but where this is not the case, the usage of the word is either ambiguous or is in need of explicit clarification.

Your Webster definition gives a general but very imprecise definition, mostly only a synonym, although it seems to preclude anything existing under idealism since mental is not part of physical or spiritual.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't claim that there is no mind-independent reality"

But you claim exactly that. "For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind.". Do clarify this contradiction then.

If there had not been a Big Bang, you wouldn't have broken your hip. It depends whether it is valid to say that the Big Bang was one cause of your breaking your hip?

Since all the other causes (the coyote say) is also caused by the BB, the phrase "one of" implies a sort of redundancy. The BB caused everything in our world, so it's kind of empty (tautological) to identify it as the cause.
Imagine going to court and saying that I didn't cause the car crash, the big bang did. Or determinism made me do it (an argument frequently made in forums).

I notice that you still have not pointed out why my injury didn't have 4 or more causes, instead deflecting to an example that you think comes down to one clear cause, but pointing to one white swan isn't evidence for lack of a black swan. Tell me why my example is wrong, that nothing on my list caused my injury. I'm not saying you're wrong, but I am saying that you're using a very different definition of 'cause', one that you refuse to clarify, which tells me you lack confidence in it.

I think that Existential Quantification E6 points to an important feature of "existing", and that is the domain in which something exists.

Yes. E2, E4, E5, E6 all have a domain. E1 is the only one that lacks it, and maybe not even then. Not sure how to classify E3, since it seems to be a self-referential domain.

Integers exist in the domain of numbers, even if integers don't exist in a mind-independent world. Sherlock Holmes exists in the domain of literature, even if Sherlock Holmes is non-existent in a mind-independent world.

There you go. All different definitions, all valid, especially since the domain is explcit. It isn't at all explicit in the wording of EPP, which is why that wording of the principle isn't very clear.

Where in the universe, are space and time contained? — Corvus

Space and time are everywhere in the universe, and nowhere not in the universe, at least in the 4D spacetime model that cosmology uses. There are some naive models that have the universe contained by time, in which case things like big bang and black holes go away, to be replace by some other interpretation. There is no valid model of the universe being contained by space, which is akin to suggesting that the big bang occurred at some specific location and has been expanding into some kind of void since then.

I cannot explain it much better than that to somebody not familiar with even the basics of cosmology. To say 'in time and space' is no different than saying 'in the universe' and not in something else, some other domain. Hence E4 being the applicable definition to use.

Space and time are everywhere in the universe, and nowhere not in the universe, at least in the 4D spacetime model that cosmology uses. There are some naive models that have the universe contained by time, in which case things like big bang and black holes go away, to be replace by some other interpretation. There is no valid model of the universe being contained by space, which is akin to suggesting that the big bang occurred at some specific location and has been expanding into some kind of void since then. — noAxioms

It was more to hear about your own view on the point.

I cannot explain it much better than that to somebody not familiar with even the basics of cosmology. — noAxioms

That sounds a daft statement. The basics of cosmology, and the whole the other subjects are on the internet ChatGPT. We are not asking what is the basic cosmology. We are asking where in the universe, space and time contained. It should be a simple few statement explanation with a coupe of examples. We don't expect to hear on the basics of cosmology the lot here.

E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe" — noAxioms

It just sounds vague and empty statement, hence more elaboration with detail wouldn't go amiss. What do you mean by "the objective state", "the universe", and does it include space and time? You said space and time are contained in the universe? So, a simple question was, where in the universe are they contained? In what form and nature?

Existence references the item to the totality. It’s a cataloguing reference to the totality that honors the conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. Existing things all come from the same fund of mass_energy and thus are inter-connected all of the time. — ucarr

I made little sense of most of the post, but this seems to reference the E4 definition (is a member of our universe), a relation. — noAxioms

I'm defending the EPP. My defense stands upon E1 as its premise: "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality"

I catch my clue about the relationship between any material thing and general existence as an all-inclusive category like Star Trek's The Borg: "You will be assimilated resistance is futile."

Do you know how you can't get the last drop of ketchup out of the bottle, or how your birthday party balloons deflate and fall to the ground? Things cooperate with our intentions most of the way, but not all of the way.

Everyone and everything pays involuntary allegiance to the great cosmic trade-off. The impermanence of things is summed up by the conservation laws. If something is gained on one side, something of equal measure is lost on its mirror-image side. Everything in existence has been shifted around from some prior, reciprocal existence. When a guy digs a shovel into the dirt, he's got no choice about simultaneously creating a pile of shifted dirt and a corresponding hole of matching dimensions.

When we say matter is neither created nor destroyed, we're simultaneously saying existence is neither created nor destroyed.

... everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. — philosch

The aforementioned context is the hard, un-analyzable fact of existence. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

You, as a thinking person, have never not existed. Even your thinking about not existing is entirely confined to existing. You can only talk about death as a living person. You've never been dead and you never will be dead. When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way.

Nobody and nothing is alone because our existence is predicated upon an emergence that is configured such that every existing thing, as a fundamental of it existing, emerges as half-symmetry of a pairing across the line of mirror-imaging with the reciprocal partner.

You've never not been known to exist because the cost of your existence has always been a depletion reciprocating your addition.

What does existence-in-general add to the red apple? A notification of orientation to the void the red apple can never transcend, "You will be assimilated resistance is futile." The red apple is the local part; the void is the non-local part. The void seems not to be paired with the red apple because that's the nature of a void. Why death? Because life costs something. What does life cost? It costs the expenditure of energy allowing you to swim above the waves of the void, for a while. Eventually, however, we must be ourselves. We are the void.

The aforementioned context is the hard, un-analyzable fact of existence. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

You, as a thinking person, have never not existed. Even your thinking about not existing is entirely confined to existing. You can only talk about death as a living person. You've never been dead and you never will be dead. When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way — ucarr

I partly agree and disagree. I think you are playing semantic gymnastics. Saying you exist because you exist is definitely just circular reasoning (Self referential). You actually exist because we as beings, capable of language, have defined a word "exist" to mean what ever it's definition is. There is no absolute meaning. There's only the meaning of the word in the context of our human language and shared experience. I could have just as easily said there is no objective reality, only subjective reality, or I could have said everything is relative, or nothing can be understood outside of it's relationship to other things which we have also defined. Those statements are all getting at the same thing. If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. Our personal reality is completely bounded by our own subjective experience. It's locked in that context and cannot escape it. That's what my original statement was getting at.

Saying you can only talk about death as a living person is also obvious and trivial. Of course it's true because a dead person can't talk about anything. You we never dead is true but you were non-existent as a living conscious being before you were conceived and you will be non-existent as a conscious living being after you die because of the definition of "exist" and "death". You might say that your atoms existed in different forms before your being existed and that would be true and the atoms that make up your body may continue to exist after you die but they are not a conscious living human being by definition. Now you can try to alter or impart other meanings onto words or shift contexts mid statement, but that violates the rules of language. I call this semantic gymnastics which arm chair philosophers do all the time to try and prove some profound truth they think they have discovered.

"when death becomes an objective reality for you it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you" is of the form; When A (death) becomes B(an objective reality) of (-) C (you), A won't become a B - C because C no longer exists. That is not quite correct. B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. So A becomes the B-C for an instant and then C and B-C or now non-existent. So what, it's trivial.

What you could reasonable assert in this case is that when A becomes the B-C, C is destroyed so there is no B as it's dependent on C. The fact that C is destroyed by A falls out of the meanings of the words you are using like "death". Death is the ending of life which is what you are really calling existence. This is so because death's meaning is contingent on the meaning of the word "life" by definition. Non-existence is the term you needed to pair with existence. In any case the following is true but still trivial for the given argument here;

A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C.

When you say "our" immersion within existence is weirdly infinite, this depends on the "our" that you are talking about. If you are referring to our conscious living state then you are wrong by definition. If you are referring to some mystical other worldly or spiritual existence of some kind then you may be right but that would fall under the heading of a belief, not a provable fact.

We are asking where in the universe, space and time contained. — Corvus

The question seems to ask "what location is distance?" and "when is duration?", both circular. Perhaps you need an example to clarify the question because I have not. The question as you worded it implies that space and time are objects. They're not. They're properties, but so are objects.

And chatbots are notorious for wrong answers when it comes to cosmology.

E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe" — noAxioms

Poorly worded on my part. "Objectively part of the universe" would be better. 'state' implies a slice of it, a subset of the whole universe. The universe is not a state.

What do you mean by "the objective state", "the universe"

'State' shouldn't be there, especially since a universe does not have a state, but a world at a given moment in time does. One definition is that a thing is present at a moment in time. People exist, dinosaurs don't. That's a reference to state. The universe is all worlds, the entire structure, the initial state of which is what we know as the big bang.
Good question though since there are a lot of other definitions of 'universe', including something like 'all that there is', which renders meaningless the term 'multiverse' since there cannot be other 'everythings'.

Yes, our universe includes spacetime Space and time are different dimensions of the same thing, so it isn't space and time. The form and nature of spacetime is described in relativity theory, which is beyond my ability to describe to you. By 'contained', I mean what I said above. Spacetime is where everything is. There is no spacetime that is not our universe. That means that the universe does not have a location nor was it a thing created. It isn't an object. That would be a category error. Objects are created at a location and endure for some duration. They are thus contained by space and time.


I do include other worlds in 'universe', as well as distant observable universes, despite their states being counterfactuals. Some people define 'universe' to mean the observable parts of it, but that's more E2 than E4.

I'm defending the EPP. My defense stands upon E1 as its premise: "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — ucarr

Well good. Nobody else seems willing to engage with that issue. E1 was the definition (it's not a premise or any kind of assertion) that was problematic with EPP since EPP was difficult to justify. Perhaps you can attempt to do that, but I really have a hard time parsing your posts. Try to be clear.
Nowhere in your post do I see EPP justified given an E1 definition, mostly because you never reference E1 at all.

E1 is objective and mind independent, so talk about intentions doesn't seem relevant.
Talk about conservation laws is irrelevant since they're 1) not objective, but relevant only to our universe (E4), and 2) wrong, as I explained in my prior reply.

You seem to be speaking of some sort of objective conservation law, like there is some external objective time and that the demise of one existing thing leaves 'stuff' for the next. None of this is justified, it's just being asserted.

Everything in existence has been shifted around from some prior, reciprocal existence. When a guy digs a shovel into the dirt, he's got no choice about simultaneously creating a pile of shifted dirt and a corresponding hole of matching dimensions.

You seem to be speaking of material in this universe (E4, not E1). There is classical conservation laws, but our universe has been proven to not be classical.

I think perhaps you are confused and that you are defending EPP using an E4 definition of 'exists'. I actually support that. Denial of EPP using E4 runs into serious troubles.

If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

I agree with all this. It's called observer bias, and it references a relational definition of existence (E2,4,5,6).

You've never been dead and you never will be dead.

Excellent leveraging of EPP. Denial of that statement is a subtle denial of EPP. But you also have to explain why it is still meaningful to say "Isaac Newton is dead".

When death becomes an objective reality for you

This is a contradiction. If it's 'for you', it isn't objective.

it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way.

Nobody and nothing is alone because our existence is predicated upon an emergence that is configured such that every existing thing, as a fundamental of it existing, emerges as half-symmetry of a pairing across the line of mirror-imaging with the reciprocal partner.

You've never not been known to exist because the cost of your existence has always been a depletion reciprocating your addition.

A notification of orientation to the void the red apple can never transcend, "You will be assimilated resistance is futile." The red apple is the local part; the void is the non-local part. The void seems not to be paired with the red apple because that's the nature of a void. Why death? Because life costs something. What does life cost? It costs the expenditure of energy allowing you to swim above the waves of the void, for a while. Eventually, however, we must be ourselves. We are the void.

This is the sort of poetry that I cannot parse.

You actually exist because we as beings, capable of language, have defined a word "exist" to mean what ever it's definition is. — philosch

Not bad... But EPP principle, as typically phrased, uses the word without definition which meaning is being used.

or I could have said everything is relative

Sounds like me

The question seems to ask "what location is distance?" and "when is duration?", both circular. — noAxioms

The OP is about existence prior to predicate, and existence is closely linked to space and time in some of the definitions, hence we were trying to clarify existence in space and time definition.

The question as you worded it implies that space and time are objects. They're not. They're properties, but so are objects. — noAxioms

Some folks seem to think space and time are objects, and exist as real entity. But I am not sure if that is the case. I am more into the idea that space and time is emergent quality from movements of the objects in perception, as in the other thread running at the moment.

And chatbots are notorious for wrong answers when it comes to cosmology. — noAxioms

I went to ChatGPT, and it was actually quite good. It seems to be getting better all the time. It was quite different in response since my last visit a few months ago. For getting the basics of any topics or subjects, ChatGPT seems quite capable in providing good information.

I will do some concentrated reading on the rest of your post, and will return later with my points on it. Many thanks for your reply on the question.

But you claim exactly that. "For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind.". Do clarify this contradiction then. — noAxioms

The Indirect Realist, being a Realist, believes that there is a mind-independent world and all our knowledge about such a mind-independent world arrives as experiences through our senses.

Because of the asymmetric flow of information in a causal chain between a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world and the experiences in our senses, we can never know the true nature of any thing-in-itself.

For example, I could consistently experience in my senses the constant conjunction of a circular shape, a sweet taste, a silky touch, an acrid smell and an absence of sound. For convenience, this consistent set of properties could be named "apple".

My only knowledge of the concept "apple" has come from experiences in my senses, not from knowledge of things-in-themselves in a mind-independent world. I can say that the thing-in-itself is an apple, but that is not to say that in reality the thing-in-itself is an apple.
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Tell me why

Tell me why my example is wrong, that nothing on my list caused my injury. — noAxioms

My argument against Direct Realism is that one effect, such as a broken window, can have more than one possible causes, such as a rock, bird or window cleaner. Knowing the window is broken doesn't of itself give us knowledge as to what caused the window to break.

There is a temporal direction of flow of information in a causal chain.

In a deterministic world, there is a direct flow of information in a causal chain forwards in time. I agree that choosing to walk, a recently repaved road, a shoulder not properly filled and a coyote in a distant field all inexorably lead to your breaking your hip.

There is no direct flow of information in a causal chain backwards in time. Knowing you broke your hip doesn't of itself give us knowledge as to what caused your hip to break. There could have been more than one possible cause, such as being hit by a car, slipping on wet grass, being distracted by a coyote, etc.

In a deterministic world, there is a causal chain from your choosing to take a walk to your breaking a hip, but it is also true that there is a causal chain from the Big Bang to your breaking a hip.

In that sense, the Big Bang is as much a cause of your breaking a hip as choosing to take a walk. If it is true as you say that it is empty and tautological to identify the Big Bang as the cause, then it must also be empty and tautological to identify your choosing to walk as the cause.

However, my argument against Direct Realism is that it relies on a symmetric flow of information in a causal chain. For example, Direct Realism relies on a stranger hearing that you have broken your hip and for the stranger to thereby know that the cause of your breaking your hip was your choosing to take a walk.

Direct Realism, being invalid, means that all our knowledge comes from experiences in our senses. We can then reason about the possible causes of such experiences. As all our knowledge about existence and properties are mental abstractions, this makes it difficult to discuss existence and properties when your disclaimer prohibits discussion about mental abstractions.
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Yes. E2, E4, E5, E6 all have a domain. E1 is the only one that lacks it, and maybe not even then. Not sure how to classify E3, since it seems to be a self-referential domain. — noAxioms

E1 - "exists" may be defined as "is a member of all that is part of objective reality"
There is the domain of being within the mind and there is the domain of being within a mind-independent world.

E3 - "exists" may be defined as "has predicates"
A horse exists because it has the property of being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc. In Meinong's term "exist"
Sherlock Holmes exists because he has the properties of being a detective, being a pipe-smoker, being housed in 221B Baker Street, etc. In Meinong's term "subsists"
A round square exists because it has the property of being round and being square. In Meinong's term "absists".
There are the domains of exist, subsist and absist.

'State' shouldn't be there, especially since a universe does not have a state, but a world at a given moment in time does. One definition is that a thing is present at a moment in time. People exist, dinosaurs don't. That's a reference to state. The universe is all worlds, the entire structure, the initial state of which is what we know as the big bang. — noAxioms

If you mean by universe as some physical entity, then I am not sure where you can find space and time. You see the objects and objects in movements, changes and motions, but where is time? Isn't what you call time the durations and intervals observed and measured with the clocks and watches in some variables? Is that case, is time real? If you use some other measuring device other than the standard watches, clocks and calendar systems, you will get totally different measured time variables. In that case what is the real time? What are the nature of real space and time then?

Space and time is contained in the universe only makes sense, if you mean the universe as an entity created in your mind, not something out there in material entity. But in this case, is it correct to say space and time exist or contained in the universe? There are some physicists saying that spacetime doesn't exist. It is just an illusion derived from our imagination.

E1 was the definition (it's not a premise or any kind of assertion) that was problematic with EPP since EPP was difficult to justify. — noAxioms

Do you believe a definition cannot be used as a premise? If not, why not? Consider: I will use E1 to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to a conclusion negating the possibility of predication standing independent from existence.

This is the upshot of what I'm declaring to you.

Perhaps you can attempt to do that, but I really have a hard time parsing your posts. Try to be clear. Nowhere in your post do I see EPP justified given an E1 definition, mostly because you never reference E1 at all. — noAxioms

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. I equate it with existence. I equate existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable). There is an oscillation between "to experience (subject)" and "to measure (object)."

Eternal universe is the “bank account” that funds the reality chiefly characterized by mass, matter, energy, space, and time. So, the currency of phenomena and the science that observes and measures it is the aforementioned quintet. The “bank account,” being conserved, proceeds by way of a zero-sum structure. All transactions of the physics of reality balance to zero.

I think E1 is a distillation of my two above paragraphs. I read E1 as, "Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality." I see it as being distinct from E4, which I read as, "Existence is a part of objective reality."

All of the apparently distinct physical things of the phenomenal world are temporarily emergent from the "bank account" that funds the quintet of essentials part and parcel of the dynamism of material things emerging into and subsuming out of the physics of reality.

The zero sum structure -- powered by the symmetries and their laws of conservation -- of emergence and subsumption of the dynamism of physics is what I refer to when I say a physical_material thing has two parts: a) local part; b) non-local part. Example: the red apple: a) the local part is the piece of fruit in the bowl on your breakfast table; b) the non-local part is the "bank account" funding the quintet of essentials out of which the piece of fruit on your table is emergent.

If eternal universe lies at the heart of objective reality, and if it functions as the "bank account" funding an alternately emergent/subsumed change of forms eternal, then nothing can precede it, it being without a beginning.

The aforementioned context is the hard, un-analyzable fact of existence. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

You, as a thinking person, have never not existed. Even your thinking about not existing is entirely confined to existing. You can only talk about death as a living person. You've never been dead and you never will be dead. When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way — ucarr

I partly agree and disagree. I think you are playing semantic gymnastics. Saying you exist because you exist is definitely just circular reasoning (Self referential). You actually exist because we as beings, capable of language, have defined a word "exist" to mean what ever it's definition is. There is no absolute meaning. There's only the meaning of the word in the context of our human language and shared experience. I could have just as easily said there is no objective reality, only subjective reality, or I could have said everything is relative, or nothing can be understood outside of it's relationship to other things which we have also defined. Those statements are all getting at the same thing. If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. Our personal reality is completely bounded by our own subjective experience. It's locked in that context and cannot escape it. That's what my original statement was getting at. — philosch

Are you viewing my quotes through a Wittgenstein-inspired lens of analytic philosophy?

Language is a voice emergent from the effects of expression constrained by the parameters enforced by the signification rules of grammar. If you believe the referents for the signs you express as language are just more signs of that same language, then you are: a) practicing the gymnastics of higher-order signification, an engulfing, upward spiral, all of it derivative; b) fraternization with solipsism.

... everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. — philosch

You are not your context. This is a way of saying you did not generate yourself through you own language acts. If you're total existence is distinct from your language capacity, then you are not trapped within that language capacity. You are, however, trapped within the totality of your existence.

Let's try to examine the difference between the derivative language context and the insuperable existence context.

Russell's Paradox helps us see that existence is authentically insuperable: The unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory states that to every condition there corresponds a set of things meeting the condition: (∃y) (y={x : Fx}). The axiom needs restriction, since Russell's paradox shows that in this form it will lead to contradiction.

Without comprehension restriction we get: Let R = (x | {x⊂x}), then R∈R ⟺R∉R. This tells us that a set cannot be a proper subset of itself. If we translate this rule into conversational speech, we get, "My statements are equal to their referents." This translates to, "My statements, being equal to their sources, are proper subsets of themselves." Your language capacity can't be equal to its sources in your experience of phenomena because that expresses phenomenal experience mapped to grammatical signs one-to-one. When you see two vehicles collide at an intersection, then later that day recount the event in words to your brother at the dinner table, your words do not equal the phenomena observed by you earlier. They sign for it. If the signs equal the phenomena, then one thing simultaneously possesses two different values. That’s the upshot of your subjective (cognitive_linguistic) reality equals your objective (dynamics of physics) reality. You might say, in push back, at the scene of the collision, I was immersed in language. Here we see why total existence cannot be analyzed. The totality which general existence embodies cannot be subsumed by anything outside itself for observation, measurement and analysis because that leads to Russell’s Paradox. In the case of totality, there can be nothing beyond it because that would mean a thing being greater than itself, a paradox. This limit expresses the insoluble POV problem lying at the heart of cosmology.

Saying you can only talk about death as a living person is also obvious and trivial. Of course it's true because a dead person can't talk about anything. You we never dead is true but you were non-existent as a living conscious being before you were conceived and you will be non-existent as a conscious living being after you die because of the definition of "exist" and "death". You might say that your atoms existed in different forms before your being existed and that would be true and the atoms that make up your body may continue to exist after you die but they are not a conscious living human being by definition. Now you can try to alter or impart other meanings onto words or shift contexts mid statement, but that violates the rules of language. I call this semantic gymnastics which arm chair philosophers do all the time to try and prove some profound truth they think they have discovered. — philosch

All of this supports the interpretation that language and the thought supporting it are emergent properties, not the fundamentals of the dynamism of physics. Absent mass, matter, energy, space, and time, no thought and no language to make assertions about the presumed priority of thought and language vis-á-vis physics.

Supervenience shows that emergent properties are downwardly causal, but not to the extent that thought and language conjure the physics from which they emerge. Were that the case, thought and utterance of the type depicted within Genesis would have precluded science. Few to no deathbed scenarios if thought and utterance could abolish the degeneration of the body.

"when death becomes an objective reality for you it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you" is of the form; When A (death) becomes B(an objective reality) of (-) C (you), A won't become a B - C because C no longer exists. That is not quite correct. B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. So A becomes the B-C for an instant and then C and B-C or now non-existent. So what, it's trivial. — philosch

The crux of your argument is the equation of B: objective reality with C: human cognition rendered through language. If, as you've been arguing:

If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. — philosch

then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:

B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. — philosch

A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C. — philosch

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things.

Death is the ending of life which is what you are really calling existence. — philosch

There is neither beginning nor ending of existence. For this reason, no life ever knows death. Why do we not fully know either the world or ourselves; eternity cannot be analyzed whole.

When you say "our" immersion within existence is weirdly infinite, this depends on the "our" that you are talking about.If you are referring to our conscious living state then you are wrong by definition.
— philosch

If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. Our personal reality is completely bounded by our own subjective experience. — philosch

How is it that your two above quotes are not contradictory?

If you are referring to our conscious living state then you are wrong by definition. — philosch

Supervenience and subvenience, I think, mirror-image each other as a symmetry essential to emergence. Given this, "No mind, no logical thinking/No brain, no mind," stand as evidence, facts and measurable truths.

I am more into the idea that space and time is emergent quality from movements of the objects in perception, as in the other thread running at the moment. — Corvus

You mean the "ontology of time" topic. I didn't post to that since time was not defined clearly. I can think of three obvious definitions and yea, some of them exist (depends on definition of 'exists' of course), and some don't. Two of the three can be perceived, including the one I consider nonexistent.

I read not too many posts before it became clear that definitions were not a priority.

Because of the asymmetric flow of information in a causal chain between a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world and the experiences in our senses, we can never know the true nature of any thing-in-itself. — RussellA

That doesn't mean there's no apple. It just means that we don't know the true nature of the apple. Common referent (the fact that more than one mind can experience the object) is solid evidence that it is there in some form. You can deny the common referent, but that becomes solipsism.

I can say that the thing-in-itself is an apple, but that is not to say that in reality the thing-in-itself is an apple.

Sure you can. You just don't know the full nature of it. That doesn't stop anybody from applying the label or otherwise discussing the thing and not discussing only our concept of it. If you cannot do that, then your idealistic inclinations prevent communication on topics like this.

I agree that choosing to walk, a recently repaved road, a shoulder not properly filled and a coyote in a distant field all inexorably lead to your breaking your hip. — RussellA

So you agree that there are at least four causes to my injury? If not, which ones are not? If you cannot, then your single-cause assertion is falsified by counterexample.

You talk endlessly about indirect realism and information flow, but not how any of that leads to a conclusion of the necessity of a single cause for any effect.

E1 - "exists" may be defined as "is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — RussellA

Yes. The domain is objective in that one.

There is the domain of being within the mind

E2

and there is the domain of being within a mind-independent world.

E4

A horse exists because it has the property of being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc. In Meinong's term "exist"

Unicorn then as well, and even square circle, all existent by E3. Meinong certainly does not use E3 as his existence definition.


The question never gets answered. If EPP holds, how is EPP justified? If it doesn't hold, how do we know the horse exists? How does Meinong (somebody known to deny EPP) justify the horse as being in a different domain than the unicorn?

You see the objects and objects in movements, changes and motions, but where is time? — Corvus

If you consider time to be an object, then it is up to you to point to where it might be. I don't, so the question makes no sense. Start off by defining time, something you didn't do in your own topic about it.
My three I think of first are
1) proper time, that which clocks measure
2) Coordinate time, that which dilates
3) Progression of the present, one's intuitive sense of the flow of events.

None of those are objects with a location.

Do you believe a definition cannot be used as a premise? If not, why not? — ucarr

A definition takes the form "I am using the word 'X' to mean such and such in some context". A premise takes the form "X is being presumed here to be the case".

I suppose with some careful wording, a statement can be used as either. The closest example I could think of was the fallacy of using a definition as a premise (actually as a conclusion), resulting in Anselm's ontological argument.
Give me an example of a definition being used as a premise.

Consider: I will use E1 to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to a conclusion negating the possibility of predication standing independent from existence. — ucarr

That would be great. Nobody else has tried. You're saying that if definition E1 is used (I think Meinong is using it), then EPP must be the case, something Meinong denies.

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

By 'eternal', do you mean unbounded time (everlasting), or do you mean that time is part of the universe (eternalism)? Either way, it is uncaused. If it's caused, we're not including the entire universe, just part of it.

I equate it with existence.

That's begging your conclusion. You need to justify it, not just assert it.

I equate existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable).

It isn't objective if it is confined to being public, repeatable, measureable. That's an empirical definition (E2). It exists relative to an observer. Putting the word 'objective' into a subjective description does not make it objective.

I read E1 as, "Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality."

But then you go and describe a subjective reality. As far as I can tell, there is no test for something objectively existing or not objectively existing. Any test would be a relational test, a subjective one.

There is neither beginning nor ending of existence. For this reason, no life ever knows death. Why do we not fully know either the world or ourselves; eternity cannot be analyzed whole. — ucarr

The above quote is wrong (logically invalid) if you stick with the generally accepted meanings of words. You are by syllogism, inferring that "existence" and "life" are interchangeable and that "death" and "non-existence" are also interchangeable, and they are not synonymous. Your first premise, "there is no beginning nor ending of existence" is actually interesting and worthy of the philosophical debate. I'm not sure what my position is on that premise but it's certainly interesting. Your conclusion is "for this reason, no life ever knows death", simply does not follow from the first premise unless you hold "being alive" as equal to "existing". They are not the same thing without bending the rules of language. Your above argument or assertion is of the form;

Premise 1. "A" has no beginning and no end
Conclusion: From premise 1 (for that reason) "B" never knows "C".

Where;
A = existence
B = Life or being alive (either definition works)
C = Death or the end of A, (either definition works)

It's not valid logic period. The conclusion clearly does not follow from the premise.

You had to have added the following second premise; A = B and C = end of A

You now get:
P1 - A has no beginning or end
P2 - A = B
Conclusion : B has no end (C)

The second premise makes the logic valid but that just render's the conclusion as a partial restatement of the first premise using different labels and it is trivial. However without the second premise the logic is invalid so the conclusion is false. A does not equal B without altering standard, accepted meanings.

Existence is defined as the quality of being real. Life or living things exist, but so do things that are not alive. Now you might get cute and start question whether or not a rock is alive or real but that's just playing with generally accepted meanings. Also by definition, life is a distinct quality of organic matter and the organic "things" that possess that quality, clearly lose that quality upon death, so "a" life has an end. Take a human being as something that exists. It's aliveness had a beginning and it has an end. The body still exists after the quality of life has ended, as long as standard definitions are being adhered to. Your above quote is in error.

This is the essence of my objection to your arguments. Words matter and the rules of logic matter. If we start letting the accepted meanings of words become malleable or squishy then we get malleable or squishy philosophy.

As far as being a solipsist, I am not. The assertion that the only thing we can be certain exists is our own consciousness has not been proven. I don't support that position even theoretically. IMO, everything you perceive through your senses is real by definition, including your consciousness meaning everything your perceive exists. I simply stated in so many words that you can only experience a subjective reality, your perspective or context limits you from experiencing (absolute) objective reality. I'm not stating whether objective reality exists or not, only that you cannot experience it if it does, because your conscious experience is filtered through your senses. I can say unequivocally that a rock exists but I cannot "know" the object state of the rock's reality, I can only know the subjective reality of the rock that I experience.

then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:

B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well.
— philosch

A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C.
— philosch

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things. — ucarr

I wasn't making any argument. I only formalized your argument. I don't support it. I stand by the fact you can't know any objective reality. If you have one that was yours it would clearly cease if you did, that is obvious and trivial.

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. — ucarr

I didn't over generalize anything. I specifically stated if the existence of a thing is dependent on the existence of something else and the first thing ceases to exist, then by the rules of logic so des the existence of the dependent thing. In this context of the argument you setup, the dependence is absolute. The dependence of a child's life on it's parent's life is a non sequitur as existence and being alive are not the same thing as I previously argued and a child's existence is not absolutely dependent on the parents continued existence. It's a different argument altogether.

You mean the "ontology of time" topic. I didn't post to that since time was not defined clearly. — noAxioms

The OP started with little assumption and open mindedness on the definitions, because it is known to be historically abstract and contentious topic. It was looking for good arguments from different angles for exploration, which could offer us better understanding on the concept of time, and possible solid definitions and conclusions.

That doesn't mean there's no apple. It just means that we don't know the true nature of the apple. Common referent (the fact that more than one mind can experience the object) is solid evidence that it is there in some form. You can deny the common referent, but that becomes solipsism. — noAxioms

I assume you are referring to apples in a mind-independent world rather than "apples" in the mind.

It is a logical contradiction to say that we don't know the true nature of the apple, but we do we know that the true nature of the thing-in-itself is an apple.

We perceive an "apple" in our minds. Both the Direct and Indirect Realist agree that there is a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world that has caused us to perceive an "apple" (ignoring dreams and hallucinations).

The Direct Realist says that there is a one to one correspondence between what they perceive and the thing-in-itself, meaning that the true nature of the thing-in-itself is an apple. The Indirect Realist doesn't know the true nature of the thing-in-itself.

Regardless of the true nature of the thing-in-itself, it can be labelled as an apple, which means that the label is the common referent, not the thing-in-itself.

For example, suppose the true nature of a thing-in-itself is being green, but this thing-in-itself has been labelled pink. Suppose person A perceives the thing-in-itself as purple and person B perceives the thing-in-itself as red. Person A and person B can have a conversation about the pink object because that is its label, even if the true nature of the thing-in-itself is not pink and neither person perceives the thing-in-itself as pink.

That there is a common referent, the label pink, is not evidence about the true nature of the thing-in-itself.
===============================================================================

So you agree that there are at least four causes to my injury? — noAxioms

When walking on wet gravel looking at a coyote, you slip. Simplifying the situation, you walk on gravel and slip. What is the cause of your slipping?

Walking and not gravel - don't slip
Walking and gravel - slip
Not walking and not gravel - don't slip
Not walking and gravel - don't slip

How many causes are there to your slipping? Walking is not a cause of your slipping, as you could have been walking on asphalt. Gravel is not a cause of your slipping as you may not have been walking. Walking on gravel is the cause of your slipping.

Walking on gravel is the single cause of your slipping
===============================================================================

You talk endlessly about indirect realism and information flow, but not how any of that leads to a conclusion of the necessity of a single cause for any effect. — noAxioms

Forwards in time, a single cause has a single effect. For example, a snooker ball moves in a pre-determined way when hit by a snooker cue.

Backwards in time, a single effect has more than one possible cause. For example, knowing the positions of the snooker balls on a snooker table gives no knowledge about the positions of the snooker balls on the snooker table at a prior time.

An effect is overdetermined if it has two or more distinct, sufficient causes (Wikipedia - Overdetermination). As the Wikipedia article notes, there are many problems with
overdetermination, and PhD's have been written about the topic.

The question never gets answered. If EPP holds, how is EPP justified? If it doesn't hold, how do we know the horse exists? How does Meinong (somebody known to deny EPP) justify the horse as being in a different domain than the unicorn? — noAxioms

As I believe that neither Idealism nor Direct Realism are valid, the question can only be looked at from the perspective of Indirect Realism.

Q1 The EPP principle is that there cannot be properties without being attached to something existing. How is this principle justified

The Indirect Realist perceives a set of properties in the mind, such as being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc. The Indirect Realist believes that there is a thing-in-itself existing in a mind-independent world that has caused them to perceive this set of properties in their mind, but they know nothing about any thing-in-itself.

The Indirect Realist cannot justify the EPP principle, as although they do know that there are properties in their mind, they don't know if these properties are attached to something existing in a mind-independent world. There may be, or there may not be.

Q2 If there can be properties in the absence of something existing, how do we know that horses exist

The Indirect Realist may consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc.

They can then attach the mental concept "horse" to this set of properties.

When the Indirect Realist is thinking about a "horse", they are thinking about a set of properties. They are not thinking about an unknown thing-in-itself that may or may not be existing in a mind independent world.

Q3 If there can be properties in the absence of something existing, how do we know that horses are in a different domain to unicorns

The Indirect Realist may consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, not being horned, not only being in a book, etc. They can then attach the mental concept "horse" to this set of properties.

They may also consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, being horned, only being in a book, etc. They can then attach the mental concept "unicorn" to this set of properties.

The domains of horse and unicorn are different. One domain can include the property "not only being in a book", whilst another domain can include the property "only being in a book".