Aristotle demonstrated that "knowledge", claimed by Parmenides as "being", is inconsistent with the reality of "becoming" which was asserted by Heraclitus. These two aspects of reality, being and becoming are simply incompatible. The solution to this problem is dualism.

Plato demonstrated in The Theaetetus, that "knowledge" as we know it cannot be described as JTB. This is because the possibility of falsity cannot be excluded, therefore we cannot hold truth as a criterion. In other words, the requirement of truth cannot be justified, therefore the idea that knowledge is JTB cannot itself be knowledge.

And if we remove the requirement of truth, we are left with justified belief, and this does not properly represent what we request from knowledge. So Plato concludes The Theaetetus with the proposal that trying to understand knowledge with the preconceived notion that it is some form of JTB is actually misleading.

Plato demonstrated in The Theaetetus, that "knowledge" as we know it cannot be described as JTB. This is because the possibility of falsity cannot be excluded, therefore we cannot hold truth as a criterion. In other words, the requirement of truth cannot be justified, therefore the idea that knowledge is JTB cannot itself be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

I always thought the T in JTB was weird. I mean it makes sense, but then it makes Knowledge just as inaccessible as Truth itself. We only have access to justifications about our beliefs, there's no oracle who can tell us if that belief satisfies the T or not.

So we can only really appeal to our justifications when calling a certain belief "knowledge", we can't ever appeal to the raw T.

So are we just supposed to be agnostic about if any belief is knowledge? Because... well, of course if we think it's J then we think it's T, but we can't really distinguish between the beliefs we think are justified and are actually true vs the beliefs we think are justified but aren't true. I mean, if we could - if we could know, "I'm justified in this belief but it isn't really true", then we wouldn't believe it anymore.

It just feels like the J is doing all the work and the T is coming along for the ride.

I've read about half in seriousness and about half skimming because of time this morning. What I can say so far: Well done. This is a serious paper that a LOT of work went into and there's no way I could answer such a piece without really looking into it in depth. I'll comment more later.

Welcome to the forum.

However, we typically regard knowledge as stable and reliable, a foundation we can trust. Gettier problems like this challenge the traditional JTB definition by revealing cases of accidental knowledge, suggesting that justification, truth, and belief alone are insufficient for genuine knowledge. — DasGegenmittel

Of course what we call knowledge isn't, never will be, and never can be "stable and reliable." This demonstrates that justified true belief definition of truth is fundamentally flawed. JTB does not describe knowledge as we normally think of it, use it, or act based on it. The unnecessary and convoluted Gettier "problem" just highlights that fact.

My approach? Focus on the practical justification needed before we act on specific knowledge rather than on it's truth.

I very much like the general thrust of your thesis and find much agreement with it, but as a minor quibble:

Knowledge is treated today as if it were static and timeless, as Plato might have suggested, [...] — DasGegenmittel

Knowledge so construed would be lacking in any possibility of being wrong - and so would be infallible by entailment. Such that the notion of infallible knowledge to me corresponds what you’ve termed “static knowledge”.

Plato, via Socrates’s voice, however, is almost always understood to present the case for what is called - not Cartesian Skepticism, which is about doubting everything till some infallible knowledge is supposedly obtained - but Ancient Skepticism, whose aim can well be argued via today’s terminology to present the case that there can be no such thing as infallible knowledge, else what you’ve termed static knowledge. Such that the very knowledge that “there can be no infallible knowledge” will of itself be fallible knowledge - else what you term “dynamic knowledge” - this rather than infallible or else static.

@Metaphysician Undercover
You pointed out the tension between Parmenides’ being and Heraclitus’ becoming, referencing Aristotle, who saw these opposites as irreconcilable. Your proposed solution is a dualism that separates both aspects. This is precisely where my distinction between Static Knowledge and Dynamic Knowledge comes in:
• SK refers to timeless, secure knowledge (e.g., mathematics).
• DK is tied to changing conditions (e.g., the fastest route to work today).

Immutable and timeless elements (see deduction) are often conflated with mutable and temporal ones (see induction), as is the case in many Gettier examples. The expectation that knowledge should work the same way in inductive contexts as it does in deductive reasoning is, as you imply, unfounded. The epistemic monism currently dominant in the field is therefore deeply problematic. That’s why I wrote my paper Justified True Crisis—because this issue often goes unrecognized. It’s reassuring to know there are people out there who think along similar lines.

In relation to Plato’s Theaetetus, you argue that knowledge cannot be understood as “Justified True Belief” (JTB) because we can never completely rule out the possibility of falsehood. Therefore, “truth” cannot serve as a sufficient criterion, and JTB itself cannot be equated with knowledge. This interpretation reflects a typical post-Gettier skepticism, namely that the concept of truth itself remains “inaccessible.”

In my model, this doesn’t mean we discard truth altogether. Rather, the discussion around Gettier cases (e.g., the stopped clock) highlights the need to distinguish between static and dynamic knowledge. We still need “truth” as a goal and standard for knowledge, but we must accept that in DK-domains, our beliefs are constantly subject to revision, and we can never claim absolute certainty in changing environments.

@flannel jesus
You find the “T” in JTB problematic because we can never know with final certainty whether something is truly true. Ultimately, we only rely on our justifications (J) and beliefs (B). That’s exactly what we see in everyday dynamic contexts: we live in a world where everything flows and changes, and we can only partially verify whether a belief is really true.

This is where the idea of Justified True Crisis (JTC) comes in. In dynamic contexts, we may hold an assumption about what is true, but it must always remain open to potential correction. You could say we operate in a constant crisis mode: we have to act, even though we don’t have ultimate certainty about the “T” in JTB. That’s precisely why justification (J) does most of the work in practice, while truth (T) in a dynamic setting is only attributed hypothetically.

@Philosophim
Thanks so much for the kind feedback. I’m looking forward to any further questions you might have as you dig deeper into the text. And yes, a lot of work went into it ;D… I really hope it reads well, makes sense, and is useful. It’s tough to get feedback when you’re no longer in university. I wrote the essay after finishing my Master’s because I wanted to explore this idea further. The essay is like a bottle thrown into the sea, hoping to be found.

@T Clark
Thanks, it’s a pleasure to be able to talk with you all. You mention that knowledge in everyday life isn’t really “stable and reliable” the way we often wish it were—or the way the JTB definition implies. The Gettier case is really just an elegant illustration of this. You suggest instead focusing on practical justification before taking action.

This aligns very well with my introduction of Dynamic Knowledge: we might try to treat knowledge as a solid foundation, but in reality, there are always gaps and uncertainties. That’s exactly why I propose that in dynamic contexts, we shouldn’t rely on the illusion of “eternal validity,” but rather see knowledge as an ongoing process that must handle uncertainty and revision (JTC).

@javra
You find the idea of distinguishing between “static” and “dynamic” knowledge interesting and connect it with Plato’s (or rather Socrates’) skepticism in the Theaetetus. I think this connection is spot on and can be deepened by taking a more nuanced look at Platonic epistemology:
• Static Knowledge can be understood as an aspirational ideal, most clearly expressed in Plato’s treatment of mathematics, logic, or the theory of Forms—domains in which knowledge appears “unchanging and timeless.” While these ideals may seem to offer infallibility, they remain, for Plato, somewhat out of reach in the sensible world.
• Dynamic Knowledge, by contrast, aligns more closely with the core of Ancient Skepticism, as voiced through Socrates in the Theaetetus: the view that no claim to infallible knowledge can ultimately hold. Even the assertion that “there is no infallible knowledge must itself be fallible—thus placing it within the realm of DK; It’s important to emphasize that knowledge here is usually understood monistically, not dually—and that’s precisely the problem. In areas like everyday experience, empirical science, or historical understanding, knowledge is inherently provisional and context-dependent. Here, skeptical questions like “Can I be sure I have hands?” (cf. JTC) remain meaningful, even as practical certainties like “I have hands” are asserted. But depending on the epistemic standards at play, such claims are always vulnerable to what I call a crisis: "To differentiate dynamic knowledge with its crisis-like nature at this point, the Platonic conviction, δόξα (doxa), can be substituted with the ancient Greek κρίσις (krisis). κρίσις also means an opinion but more importantly, it conveys assertion and judgment, implying a crossroads. Thus, the structure and effectiveness of the JTB definition are preserved, with the difference that it is adapted to the reality and limits of concept knowledge." (see JTC, p. 25)

In this light, Plato doesn’t simply reject knowledge, but dramatizes the limits and tensions between the ideal of certainty and the reality of fallibility—between SK and DK. The aporia in dialogues like the Theaetetus reveals not a collapse of knowledge, but a shift toward understanding it as dynamic, contextual, and always open to revision.

In other words: Plato’s JTB framework implicitly aims at fixing knowledge in timeless validity, yet remains in a paradoxical or aporetic state due to the underlying “either/or” between change/unchange and temporal/timeless (see the Ship of Theseus).
JTC, by contrast, makes visible that in many contexts, knowledge must be continually justified, challenged, or defended anew. The duality opens up a “both/and” perspective, depending on the nature of the object under investigation. The two perspectives don’t contradict each other—they complement one another. That, in my view, is what makes the distinction between SK and DK fruitful.

I'm very glad we agree.

You mention that knowledge in everyday life isn’t really “stable and reliable” the way we often wish it were—or the way the JTB definition implies. The Gettier case is really just an elegant illustration of this. You suggest instead focusing on practical justification before taking action.

This aligns very well with my introduction of Dynamic Knowledge: we might try to treat knowledge as a solid foundation, but in reality, there are always gaps and uncertainties. That’s exactly why I propose that in dynamic contexts, we shouldn’t rely on the illusion of “eternal validity,” but rather see knowledge as an ongoing process that must handle uncertainty and revision (JTC). — DasGegenmittel

Your formulation seems unnecessarily complicated to me. As I see it, the purpose of knowledge is to allow us to make decisions, to act, effectively and safely. Recognizing there will always be uncertainties in that knowledge, we need to decide how much risk of failure we can tolerate and how much justification we need to limit that risk. In order to provide that level of uncertainty, we need to determine what the consequences of failure are. If I risk losing $10 in a bet, the consequences and required justification are small. If the risks include endangering human life, much more justification is needed.

So, in this context, knowledge is adequately justified belief based on the consequences of failure.

Hmmm, remind me why Gettier is even a problem.

The businessman believed himself to be justified that the time was correct. However, in retrospect, after learning that the clock was broken, he would realize that his belief wasn't justified. The clock was right only twice a day, and just by chance he picked one of those. His belief wasn't justified, it was only apparently justified, and it was true merely by luck.

Truth, as @flannel jesus points out, is always uncertain. Perhaps the same holds for justification as well. What counts as justification is always subject to revision in the light of new information. We only ever think something is true, and we only ever think its truth is justified. Therefore, we only ever think we know something, and that belief needs to always be held in proper suspicion. At least for what @DasGegenmittel calls dynamic knowledge.

Could that be all there is to it?

@T Clark

TL;DR: Your proposal works well as a practical heuristic. But without a clearer framework, many of the beliefs we treat as “knowledge” wouldn’t actually qualify — not because they’re false, but because their justification dissolves over time. Justified True Crisis (JTC) formalizes that pragmatism by asking why we treat something as “justified enough,” when we take the Weiji-Jump, and how we manage that risk epistemically.
Not to complicate knowledge, but to take its fragility seriously — and to ground it in conceptual knowledge: not claims about reality itself, but about the best models we have at a given time. Without that, we risk treating coincidence as certainty. And once the world changes, we confabulate continuity — while JTB keeps calling it knowledge, even if the bottle has already shattered.

In more Detail:
I see your point. You’re offering a pragmatic perspective that I broadly agree with: knowledge must enable action despite uncertainty. In my work on Dynamic Knowledge (DK) and Justified True Crisis (JTC), the goal isn’t to complicate things unnecessarily, but rather to methodically account for that uncertainty — without falling into dogmatic pseudo-certainty.

You write: “Knowledge is adequately justified belief based on the consequences of failure.” That’s very close to what I argue with JTC. The key difference is that JTC doesn’t just focus on the immediate utility of a belief for action. It also emphasizes the awareness of epistemic crisis — the recognition that our justification may be context-sensitive, fragile, or even coincidental. The Weiji-Jump (危机; meaning crisis, precisely combines this with the risk (危: wei) associated with uncertainty and the opportunity (机: ji) into one term.; Inspired by Kierkegaard’s concept of the "leap of faith") refers to precisely that moment: a decision is made despite uncertainty, but with a reflective grasp of the risks involved. I’m not just proposing a new definition, but outlining a form of epistemic responsibility — especially important in complex, dynamic environments.

Now, why does this need to be more than JTB or a pragmatic cost-benefit approach? Because those models collapse when confronted with time-sensitive or shifting contexts. Let me illustrate this with a simple case:

Imagine you see a bottle sitting on a table at 12:00. You say, “The bottle is intact.” At 12:02, you hear a crash — it has fallen and shattered.
Did you know the bottle was intact?

Under JTB: ✔ justified (you saw it), ✔ true (at the time), ✔ believed — so: knowledge.

But epistemically, your statement is unstable. What you actually knew was: “The bottle was intact at 12:00.” Without temporal indexing, your statement becomes retroactively misleading — even though it was “true” in a narrow JTB sense. The JTB model implicitly assumes that once a belief qualifies as knowledge, it remains so — even if the real-world referent (like an intact bottle) changes moments later, unless we explicitly update or retract the claim. But if we continue to treat the original statement as knowledge after the bottle breaks, we’re no longer tracking reality — we’re confabulating coherence where none exists. Consider as well Gettier’s job application case: at t₁, Smith believes he knows that “Jones will get the job” (definiendum) and “has ten coins in his pocket” (definiens). However, at t₂, it turns out that Smith himself gets the job and — unknowingly — also has ten coins in his pocket (similar to the broken bottle; new information).

This is where DK becomes essential (and more detailed):
• DKa addresses how a concept (e.g., “intact”) adjusts to the context and change.
• DKh tracks whether that concept remains coherent across time.

These two components are complementary; both necessary and jointly sufficient to describe knowledge in dynamic settings. JTC operationalizes this into a model for decision-making: not just whether you’re justified, but when, how, and under what conditions of risk you’re willing to treat a belief as knowledge.


@hypericin Great summary — yes, that’s exactly the core of dynamic knowledge. But the reason Gettier still matters is that it shows how easily we confuse fragile, coincidental beliefs for solid knowledge. It’s not just a theoretical issue — it’s a practical warning: we often act on what only seems justified in retrospect.

The Ship of Theseus illustrates how both identity and knowledge can shift over time — subtly, gradually — without us noticing. That’s the danger of dogmatic knowledge: it assumes timeless certainty and ignores change. In dynamic contexts, this isn’t just naïve — it’s a failure of risk management.

That’s where Justified True Crisis (JTC) comes in: it reframes knowledge not as a fixed state, but as a responsible, time-bound assertion made in awareness of uncertainty.

Here, conceptual knowledge plays a key role. It’s not knowledge of reality itself, but of our best available concepts — abstracted, structured, and always partial. We don’t access the world directly; we model it. As Popper argued, our theories are nets we cast to catch the world — but we must never forget they are nets.

JTC takes that seriously: it treats knowledge as something we claim through concepts, knowing they’re fallible — but also knowing they’re the most reliable tools we have to navigate a changing world.

dynamic knowledge aka "we're doing the best we can, and according to the best we can, this seems right right now".

Honestly yeah, I don't think there's all that much to it. We have degrees of confidence, things we're almost certain of and things that are a bit more speculative.

As long as you're self aware enough to tell when you should be certain, when you should be very confident, and when you should have a belief that's easily shaken by new evidence, you should be okay.

The point is that truth as representation or correspondence has many failures to keep pace with reality. In any case we are still restricted to the subject-object division. That is why I advocate the construction of knowledge as working with reality. A truth is not something you discover or think about or believe in. But in a very different way it is something that is constructed. The subjective part should not be taken as the epicenter from which knowledge is constructed. If we take scientific work as an example we are actually working with reality constructing synthetic identities in which theories, phenomena, operations and relations converge in the same flow of human action in a harmonic way so to speak.

I agree with pretty much every thing you say. The one part we may differ is that I question the validity of the Gettier problem. In the sense that it attacks JTB. If the businessman was not justified in his belief, then it is not a counterexample of JTB. It's just that, to truly know whether something is a JTB, we need to adopt the omniscient perspective implicitly taken in the thought experiment. In the real world, empirical knowledge is always provisional.

@hypericin Yes, absolutely—we share similar perspectives. Still, Gettier remains important because he challenges us to explain the lack of supposed knowledge in a way that the current debate around Gettier cases fails to grasp. Highlighting the problems that arise from this and offering a way out of the conceptual fly-bottle is precisely what I aim to do.

Plato and Aristotle both knew—as I believe you do as well—that JTB alone is insufficient in dynamic contexts (though it may suffice in static ones), contrary to the dominant interpretation today. Consider, for example, Plato’s aporia at the end of the Theaetetus, or Aristotle’s view that statements about the future are contingent. If one were to claim that Plato believed JTB applies meaningfully in dynamic contexts, his entire theory of Forms—and the idea of the fleeting shadows of the sensible world—would be rendered meaningless.

Gettier appeals to our modern intuition that we can have knowledge of the temporal and changeable world, as @JuanZu also illustrates. Unfortunately, this assumption is flawed. Every perception—even when enhanced by technological means—is only an approximation of reality, because reality itself is temporal and mutable. What appears whole in one moment can be altered in the next. We cannot see when atoms are missing, nor can we perceive the flow of electrons. Our perception saturates reality in such a way that we experience things as unified objects or quantities, though they are fundamentally individual—take the example of the original kilogram (which wasn't a kilogram anymore because of radiation of itself), which has been replaced by definitions grounded in natural constants (which, at least for now, are considered invariant).

Subjective human perception cannot be eliminated by supposedly objective, yet still technologically mediated, perception. Technology may offer finer resolution than our senses, but it too is bound by the limits of perception. It is a substitutive tool—not a replacement. That’s why epistemic humility is crucial, and, where possible, the use of tools—as @JuanZu implied—is helpful.

But knowledge is only possible of concepts that attempt to capture this mutable and temporal world. And since, as @hypericin rightly noted, true knowledge in a changing world would require an omniscient perspective—which we cannot attain—we ultimately cannot possess absolute knowledge. Many resist this idea, which is why they cling to a kind of dogmatic pseudo-knowledge.

Plato and Aristotle both knew—as I believe you do as well—that JTB alone is insufficient in dynamic contexts (though it may suffice in static ones), contrary to the dominant interpretation today. — DasGegenmittel

I was going to ask you if Gettier problems are really all that much different from the Allegory of the Cave, but I bounced it off ChatGpt first, and it didn't seem like I was making much of a point, but I don't know. They say all philosophy is a footnote to Plato. Is there some truth to that here?

That’s an interesting question @RogueAI – one I’ve actually never thought about this way before, since Gettier cases and Plato’s Allegory of the Cave usually aren’t connected in academic philosophy, at least not explicitly. So thank you for that. And yes, there’s definitely something to it: both deal with the question of what real knowledge is, and both expose forms of false or illusory knowledge. In Gettier cases, we have a “justified true belief” that, on closer inspection, turns out to be a mere coincidence. Similarly, the prisoners in the cave take shadows on the wall for reality, simply because they lack access to the bigger picture. Both scenarios reveal that knowledge requires more than justification and truth – it also needs context, perspective, and an awareness of epistemic change. In that sense, the Cave even anticipates aspects of the so-called (atypical) Fake Barn Gettier case: the illusion seems real because it occurs under epistemically unreliable conditions.

Plato covered an astonishing range of topics and shaped them in a way that still resonates – that’s part of why he holds such a foundational status. But that doesn’t mean everything else is just derivative. I think the idea that “all philosophy is a footnote to Plato” can be misleading. There are independent contributions. But maybe that’s not the point. We all stand in relation to what came before us – and that’s a good thing. The key is to stay aware of those connections so we can recognize what we might want to do differently.

:up:

Welcome to the forum!

Just as a side note, this is the intro to Flowers for Algernon, and it's always made me tear up:

Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind’s eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

Every perception—even when enhanced by technological means—is only an approximation of reality — DasGegenmittel

This is precisely the idea that I criticize. If we abandon the idea that we are trying to represent reality faithfully, the matter becomes something very different. Science can no longer be conceived as knowledge but as technique. A human technique that, as I have said, constitutes synthetic identities. That is, as a device of reality that can function or not. Here to function means to be in continuity with reality but no longer in a representative sense of our beliefs but in a sense of fitting or adjustment. So a truth is not something that is discovered but that is produced, truth is the synthetic identity where different courses of action converge and resonate with each other, as a well-adjusted device.

You put a lot of emphasis on change. I'm wondering if you are under emphasizing a more fundamental epistemic problem.

As I see it, the core problem of knowledge is that we don't perceive reality itself, but rather we experience sensations which are something like signals emanating from reality, much like Plato's shadows. Based on these signals, we construct models of the reality that produced them. The problem is, there are always multiple models that fit the signals we receive. Some seem more likely, some less, some seem absurd, yet for any set of observations there is never just one possible model. This is true both of everyday life and of science.

This directly leads to the Gettier problem. The businessman saw the clock , and saw the train arrive at the proper time. Naturally he assumed that the clock was functioning, and had told him the correct time. He probably never considered the alternate model which also equally fit his observations: that the clock was broken, but by chance was stopped at the correct time. With imagination you can construct still less likely, yet consistent, models (i.e. the clock was painted on the wall, or a hallucination sent to him by a benevolent train spirit).

Notably, this problem would obtain even in a static, unchanging universe.

What do you think? How does this jibe with JTC?

Your proposal works well as a practical heuristic. But without a clearer framework, many of the beliefs we treat as “knowledge” wouldn’t actually qualify — not because they’re false, but because their justification dissolves over time. — DasGegenmittel

The required justification applies at the time when a decision is required, not at some time in the future when previous justifications have "dissolved." If things change, additional justification may be needed, again, depending on the consequences of failure.

In my work on Dynamic Knowledge (DK) and Justified True Crisis (JTC), the goal isn’t to complicate things unnecessarily, but rather to methodically account for that uncertainty — without falling into dogmatic pseudo-certainty...

...JTC doesn’t just focus on the immediate utility of a belief for action. It also emphasizes the awareness of epistemic crisis — the recognition that our justification may be context-sensitive, fragile, or even coincidental. — DasGegenmittel

In my experience as an engineer, accounting for uncertainty is the decider's job, it's part of the engineering process and there are specific standards of practice. Strikes me that is true for other fields also. It's the deciders responsibility to evaluate the uncertainty, acceptable risk, and level of justification available and make their decisions on that basis.

Imagine you see a bottle sitting on a table at 12:00. You say, “The bottle is intact.” At 12:02, you hear a crash — it has fallen and shattered.
Did you know the bottle was intact?

Under JTB: ✔ justified (you saw it), ✔ true (at the time), ✔ believed — so: knowledge.

But epistemically, your statement is unstable. What you actually knew was: “The bottle was intact at 12:00.” Without temporal indexing, your statement becomes retroactively misleading — even though it was “true” in a narrow JTB sense. The JTB model implicitly assumes that once a belief qualifies as knowledge, it remains so — even if the real-world referent (like an intact bottle) changes moments later, unless we explicitly update or retract the claim. — DasGegenmittel

I've already stated that JTB is not a good definition of knowledge. My definition - adequately justified belief - addresses the issue you identify, without unnecessary complication.

@RogueAI beautifully written passage! :)

@JuanZu I find it exciting to think about it from a different angle. What I still struggle with is that knowledge seems so difficult to perceive. So, we’re working with reality, which is a good thing. And that’s what we do every day in our private lives and, let’s say, in science as well. Things happen—some we perceive, some we don’t—some we understand, some we don’t, and some we can justify, others not. That’s roughly the state you describe as harmonious, when thought of prior to any kind of language. But once we begin forming concepts, things become imprecise—and I agree with that. However, I don’t think it’s enough to rely solely on experience, because it doesn’t allow us to sufficiently anticipate how the world is to be understood. Only by digitizing the world into concepts can we make predictions about things not yet encountered. We can’t think the world 1:1 in all its atoms, nor perceive it that way in everyday or scientific practice. I hope I’ve captured the core of your thought.

@hypericin You point out two major problems that I also recognize:

1. Digitalization: Reality is digitalized through perception into something we can process. Things appear black or white … perception draws the line. But after many layers of complexity, things that are fundamentally different may appear the same—for example, a clock that’s broken yet shows the correct time, or more starkly, the man with ten coins who was thought to be Jones but turns out to be Smith. In a reality unshaped by linguistic digitalization, such a case wouldn’t pose a problem—we’d simply be surprised that Smith also has ten coins. Our expectation just wouldn’t have matched what turned out to be the case.

2. Alternatives: You bring up alternatives. That’s discussed in science
under the terms “relevant alternatives” and “possible worlds.” It’s a popular line of thought—and yes, there’s something to it, because the world can indeed be different from what we expect: see the lottery problem. Our expectations can be wrong, which is why Popper sees them as nets—something can always slip through. That’s why, in my view, we only ever have knowledge of concepts, but never of reality itself, since it could always turn out to be wrong. It’s a knowledge process that can never be fully completed, only made more precise.

Discussing these alternatives and finding the best concept we currently have is a collective process of weighing and refining: see Rashomon effect. After all, perceptions and assessments differ. Some people believe they’ll win the lottery, others think that’s very unlikely. These processes—especially when they’re self-reflective—I view, at a higher level of complexity, as DKorg: a kind of knowledge that’s aware of itself, like in societies or in individuals who think about their own knowledge and thus become aware of what they’ve learned. It’s like a knowledge about one’s own knowledge. Coming back to your point: JTC makes it explicit that our assessment can be wrong, precisely because we can be wrong. We’re not omniscient, as you once put it.

Viewing the universe as static only presents this problem if the observer is temporal and subject to change: I love the idea of the Trainspirit. xD
He himself is part of the knowledge question, because, as hinted in DKorg, he seeks knowledge of himself. Even the one who strives for this only has a concept of himself—and will have to adjust that over time. But stepping back a bit: when we freeze things—make them static and “unbecoming”—we can make absolute statements about them, at least insofar as we only refer to what can be logically derived. The same holds for mathematical, truly static knowledge. But this gets very complicated here, because the dimensions we have to consider when it comes to real things are far more diverse. It’s harder to calculate atoms, molecules, electrons, and quarks than just 2+2=4. Humans make mistakes because they are temporal and changeable. But we learn and adapt. So the JTC model has a basic assumption: the reasonable or rational believer.

There are some other problems tied to this, but I haven’t had the time to work them in or fully think them through. The published essay is also only half the story. It’s really important to also address perception, because there are various effects that need explaining. I’ve split it up because I don’t want people to get discouraged by a wall of text—36 pages is already too much. The JTC essay is the highest level I could reach on my own without the supervision of a professor. I work as a philosophy teacher, but not as an academic. And I’ve already put way too much work into it, not knowing whether it’ll ever pay off. But I still believe in it (for now) and feel responsible for the idea—and it’s a joy to talk about it with you all. :)

@T Clark If knowledge is to be defined, it must have necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions indicate that whenever they are fulfilled, what is defined—here, knowledge—must always be present. That’s the point of a definition. JTB fails here because, as shown with the broken bottle, this knowledge state is subject to change. If time is a factor in the definition—because knowledge doesn’t work without it—then time must be included in the definition. It’s not enough to adjust belief or the concept retroactively, or to simply cancel out previous knowledge. It’s clear here that something wasn’t known, and that the definition fails. And yes, knowledge is proclaimed before the expected event occurs, but in dynamic scenarios, we see that this can be wrong, even though one did everything possible to avoid the error—just like in Gettier cases. Smith was adequately justified, but it turns out that this alone isn’t enough to guarantee truth: the boss ends up choosing Smith instead of Jones. Your approach also resonates with “reliabilism” in the sciences. Excluding truth entirely would be dangerous, in my opinion, because then nothing would actually have to happen or exist. What would we even be talking about then? The point about standards is very important in dynamic environments, because they arise only there, not in static ones—see epistemic contextualism (e.g., the Flight or Bank Case). My proposal, JTC, offers an alternative definition that counters this through a dual conception of knowledge by introducing the crisis, which describes a branching path and includes temporal awareness. On page 29, the exact conditions are clearly defined and less implicit. I definitely see myself in your perspective, and the attempt to make things less complicated is always a good one. How would you make time and changeability visible in your definition? After all, they are—at least in dynamic conditions—definitional.

You pointed out the tension between Parmenides’ being and Heraclitus’ becoming, referencing Aristotle, who saw these opposites as irreconcilable. Your proposed solution is a dualism that separates both aspects. This is precisely where my distinction between Static Knowledge and Dynamic Knowledge comes in:
• SK refers to timeless, secure knowledge (e.g., mathematics).
• DK is tied to changing conditions (e.g., the fastest route to work today). — DasGegenmittel

This roughly correlates with the division in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, theoretical and practical knowledge. Each of those two is divided into branches and there is a differing degree of certitude expected from each different field. You'll notice though, that the two are not completely divided in reality, as practical knowledge consists of applying theory, and theoretical knowledge would be useless if there was no practical purpose for it. This is why intuition is assigned the highest position, because intuition is the type of knowledge which oversees these relations.

So in theory we divide the two, being and becoming, as fundamentally incompatible, but in reality, and in practise, the two continually intermix. If they weren't actually intermixing, we'd have "the interaction problem" commonly attributed to dualism. The reality of the intermixing creates the need for a third principle which provides the basis for describing the intermixing.

Immutable and timeless elements (see deduction) are often conflated with mutable and temporal ones (see induction), as is the case in many Gettier examples. The expectation that knowledge should work the same way in inductive contexts as it does in deductive reasoning is, as you imply, unfounded. The epistemic monism currently dominant in the field is therefore deeply problematic. That’s why I wrote my paper Justified True Crisis—because this issue often goes unrecognized. It’s reassuring to know there are people out there who think along similar lines. — DasGegenmittel

I believe that this is the issue of "understanding". Understanding requires the differentiation between the types. Conflating everything into a monism produces misunderstanding, and is itself a form of misunderstanding.

In relation to Plato’s Theaetetus, you argue that knowledge cannot be understood as “Justified True Belief” (JTB) because we can never completely rule out the possibility of falsehood. Therefore, “truth” cannot serve as a sufficient criterion, and JTB itself cannot be equated with knowledge. This interpretation reflects a typical post-Gettier skepticism, namely that the concept of truth itself remains “inaccessible.”

In my model, this doesn’t mean we discard truth altogether. Rather, the discussion around Gettier cases (e.g., the stopped clock) highlights the need to distinguish between static and dynamic knowledge. We still need “truth” as a goal and standard for knowledge, but we must accept that in DK-domains, our beliefs are constantly subject to revision, and we can never claim absolute certainty in changing environments. — DasGegenmittel

This is the complex issue, what directs the intermixing, the guiding light, the intuition. Notice that you say "we still need 'truth' as a goal". That itself, may not be true. The goal is the end, that for the sake of which, what Plato called "the good", and goals are freely chosen. So knowledge appears to have a deep pragmatic base, the practical side driving its advancements and evolution toward what is deemed as "good". You can see how modern science has developed toward prediction as its goal, and the capacity to predict does not require truth. Modern mathematics and other theoretical principles are designed toward statistics and probabilities, and the truth about what is going on behind the scenes of the things being predicted is unimportant.

The result is a separation between 'the good" which is the goal of knowledge, and "the truth" which is merely a possible goal. So epistemology may set out JTB as the goal for knowledge, an ideal, what knowledge ought to be in theory, but knowledge in reality is not an immutable eternal thing, it is actually evolving with practise. Because of this, "Truth" is replaced by other goals, and justification is relative to those goals, and there is a difference, or separation between knowledge as it ought to be, and as it really is.

Personally, I find no issue between JTB and change. That's what proper indexing/timestamps are for.

Gettier exposed much less familiar and/or commonly recognized issues. One main issue(by my lights) was the notion of belief Gettier worked with. Western convention shares this problem as well. One consequence of that misguided/incomplete notion of belief is that the belief under consideration in many(arguably all) Gettier cases, as well as many other traditional conventional considerations, is not equivalent to the belief of S(whomever that may be). Salva Veritate applies.

The first case, S believes he himself will get the job. "The man with ten coins in his pocket" when severed from a speaker who is only referring to themself has a very different set of truth conditions than when we keep in mind that the speaker was referring to himself. "The man with ten coins in his pocket" was referring to S himself, and no one else. Severed from S, "The man with ten coins in his pocket" refers to any man. A change in truth conditions is a change in meaning, and as such that alone serves as adequate ground to reject that example outright. S never believed anyone other than himself would get the job. We know that. S did not get the job. Therefore, S's belief was false. The lesson: Not all belief is equivalent to propositions. The problem: We treated(and still treat) belief as if it/they were equivalent to propositions.

The second example has Gettier incompletely reporting on S's belief. Belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is believed to be true because S believes Jones owns a Ford. The proper accounting practice keeps this in mind. Convention/Gettier does/did not. Again, the problem is severing the belief from the person and then treating it as a proposition without attachment to a believer. He believed that the proposition "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because Jones owned a Ford. It was not true because of that. Therefore, S's belief was false and misrepresented by Gettier/convention. Same lesson. Same problem.

:wink:

Carry on.

Personally, I find no issue between JTB and change. That's what proper indexing/timestamps are for. — creativesoul

Timestamps are not sufficient, because what is at issue is the fundamental difference between a describable state-of-being, and the activity of becoming. What Aristotle demonstrated is that we cannot adequately describe any activity as a succession of states-of-being because there is a basic incompatibility between these two.

If state A changes becomes state B at a later time, then the change has occurred in the time between A and B. If we describe the change between A and B as state C, then changes have occurred between A and C, and also between C and B. If we continue to describe changes in terms of intermediary states, we'd posit D as between A and C, and E between C and B, and we are on our way to an infinite regress of states-of-being, without ever describing the activity which is the change which occurs in the time between distinct states. Therefore we cannot ever adequately describe active change, or becoming, in terms of states-of-being.

@creativesoul

When belief is detached from the believer and treated purely as a proposition, the truthmaker relation shifts. The truthmaker is no longer embedded in the subject’s intentional context but tied to an abstract sentence whose reference becomes contingent. This shift is central to nearly all Gettier-style cases: there are atypical cases like the fake barn case. The Fake Barn case is atypical among Gettier cases because the subject’s belief is based on accurate perception and seems justified internally. The epistemic flaw arises not from faulty reasoning, but from an unreliable environment the subject is unaware of.

In my framework, I describe this as a Conceptual Coincidence: the belief appears justified and aligns with a true outcome, but the alignment is accidental. It’s like inserting a puzzle piece from a different set—formally, it fits, but the image is wrong. The outline matches, but the content does not.

A key factor here is time. In dynamic contexts, justification, truth, and belief do not remain synchronously aligned. What was once justified can lose its validity as new information arises—while the belief itself may still turn out to be true. Time, therefore, does not merely order beliefs chronologically; it introduces epistemic instability. Indexing or timestamping can document this shift, but they do not prevent it.

Dynamic Knowledge (DK) addresses such situations by treating knowledge as processual and time-dependent. Justified True Crisis (JTC) refers to the kind of knowledge asserted under these conditions—temporarily matching, but potentially revisable. The “correct” piece may later need to be replaced when more of the picture is revealed.

⸻

@Metaphysician Undercover

You’re pointing to an important distinction: knowledge operates between the poles of stability and change. In DK domains, propositional truth alone is insufficient because meaning and justification shift with time and context. That’s why I introduce Justified True Crisis (JTC) as the epistemic format suited to DK. It replaces the static notion of belief (doxa) with the structurally unstable moment of krisis.

Intuition plays a mediating role. It signals when assumed stability gives way to transformation—similar to Plato’s atopon, the strange or out-of-place. This is when a weiji-jump becomes necessary: a decision under uncertainty, justified in the moment, but open to revision.

In practice, knowledge does not always aim at truth alone. It often aims at orientation, prediction, or action. This makes truth one normative value among others. In dynamic contexts, epistemic justification becomes relative to goals, not absolute. The Rashomon Effect is one example: multiple perspectives coexist without convergence on a single, stable truth.

Timestamps, while not sufficient, are nevertheless necessary for any attempt to articulate change. The shift from being to becoming cannot be described adequately through a chain of static states. As Aristotle argued, change is not captured by a succession of positions; rather, it exists between them. It’s a different kind of phenomenon—continuous, processual, and epistemically elusive. Yet without temporal markers, we would lack the coordinates needed to locate, compare, or even recognize shifts in state. Timestamps provide the necessary structure within which the insufficiency of static snapshots becomes visible. They do not capture becoming, but they allow us to trace its outline.

In this context, DK is not a lack of certainty, but an ideal in its own right. Knowledge is modeled as a limit process: not something one has, but something one approaches. The limit in the DKa and DKh formulas represents the asymptotic approach to ideal knowledge in dynamic contexts. It shows that knowledge evolves step by step, reducing uncertainty over time, but never fully reaches absolute certainty: see as well bayesian epistemology as complementary approach. It models the continuous refinement of justified beliefs under changing conditions. I distinguish two complementary dimensions:

• DKa (Adaptability): How a concept (K) adjusts to a given context (C) at a specific time (t). Textually:
DKa(K, t, C) = the limit of f(JTC(K, t), Adaptation of K to C at t) as ε approaches zero.

• DKh (Historicity): How a concept (K) maintains coherence across different time points. Textually:
DKh(K, t) = the limit of f(JTC(K, t), Adaptation of K over time) as ε approaches zero.

DKa and DKh function similar to a time-change diagram, much like the way blood sugar is monitored in diabetics. DKa reflects momentary adaptations—like daily glucose levels—while DKh captures the overall trajectory, akin to the HbA1c value. This illustrates a key insight: to meaningfully understand a state over time, two components are required—its immediate responsiveness (adaptability) and its long-term continuity (historicity). Only together do they define a coherent identity through change (and time).

JTC mirrors the structure of JTB—justification, truth, and belief remain essential—but reinterprets them dynamically. Truth is no longer static but contextualized within time. Justification adapts, and belief becomes a crisis-aware assertion. Together, these preserve the functional core of JTB while enabling knowledge to operate under uncertainty. JTC is not a rejection but a temporal simulation of JTB—an epistemic snapshot in motion, like Zeno’s arrow suspended mid-flight.

Timestamps, while not sufficient, are nevertheless necessary for any attempt to articulate change. The shift from being to becoming cannot be described adequately through a chain of static states. As Aristotle argued, change is not captured by a succession of positions; rather, it exists between them. It’s a different kind of phenomenon—continuous, processual, and epistemically elusive. Yet without temporal markers, we would lack the coordinates needed to locate, compare, or even recognize shifts in state. Timestamps provide the necessary structure within which the insufficiency of static snapshots becomes visible. They do not capture becoming, but they allow us to trace its outline. — DasGegenmittel

I agree with this, and this use of time stamps to understand change is commonly found as cause and effect, which is a temporal ordering. In physics, the matter gets complex because special relativity employs the principle of the relativity of simultaneity. This allows that spatially separated events can have different temporal ordering depending on the frame of reference used. I believe it is common practise in cosmology for example, to choose the frame of reference according to principles of giving the proper temporal order to events which are known to be causally related. That is the "light cone" principle.

In this context, DK is not a lack of certainty, but an ideal in its own right. Knowledge is modeled as a limit process: not something one has, but something one approaches. The limit in the DKa and DKh formulas represents the asymptotic approach to ideal knowledge in dynamic contexts. It shows that knowledge evolves step by step, reducing uncertainty over time, but never fully reaches absolute certainty: see as well bayesian epistemology as complementary approach. It models the continuous refinement of justified beliefs under changing conditions. I distinguish two complementary dimensions: — DasGegenmittel

To me, this is equally problematic, because it sets out what knowledge ought to be as an ideal, without properly addressing what knowledge really is, in its actual existence, the ontology of knowledge. The fact that it "never fully reaches absolute certainty" indicates that knowledge never is the way that it is shown to be. So we are still stuck with the same problem that Plato demonstrated with JTB, we do not have a good understanding of what "knowledge" actually is, in its real existence.

Unless we address the issue of what knowledge actually is, how it exists as the property of particular individuals, we still have that ought/is separation between what knowledge ought to be, and what it really is. And, if we keep focusing on the ought, without addressing the is, the knowledge which is the property of individuals, might actually be progressing in a different direction and we wouldn't even know it. So for example, we may be allowing our criteria for justification to be getting more and more lax, so that the knowledge which individuals have may be actually getting a lower and lower degree of certainty, and moving away from the ideal, though we claim we are moving toward the ideal.

The "uncertainty principle" is an example of how we are inclined to allow ourselves to move away from the goal of certainty, allowing uncertainty right into our knowledge, as an acceptable part of it. The matter/form division of Aristotle relegated unintelligibility to matter, ensuring that only the aspects of reality which were designated as intelligible were allowed to be part of our formal knowledge. The unintelligible aspects were segregated, and excluded.

Elsewhere, I've argued that the inclination toward "formalism" is a cause of this trend, to allow aspects known to be unintelligible, to enter into knowledge. In its quest for absolute, ideal principles, (which is really impossible) formalism allows elements of uncertainty right into the basic premises, the axioms. This contaminates the entire formal structure, allowing uncertainty to lurk everywhere instead of excluding it from the formal structure, which ensures that valid logic produces certainty and relegates uncertainty to the truth or falsity of the premises. The formalist axioms already incorporate uncertainty.

JTC mirrors the structure of JTB—justification, truth, and belief remain essential—but reinterprets them dynamically. Truth is no longer static but contextualized within time. Justification adapts, and belief becomes a crisis-aware assertion. Together, these preserve the functional core of JTB while enabling knowledge to operate under uncertainty. JTC is not a rejection but a temporal simulation of JTB—an epistemic snapshot in motion, like Zeno’s arrow suspended mid-flight. — DasGegenmittel

This appears like you are trying to justify uncertainty. This would be a step in the wrong direction, as explained above, a movement away from certainty.

@Metaphysician Undercover I really enjoy writing with you.

I’ll definitely take a closer look at the light cone principle; it sounds very interesting, especially given how it frames causality and temporal order across different reference systems. That kind of relativistic nuance seems highly relevant when thinking about knowledge in dynamic, time-sensitive contexts.

As for formalism, I would see its value not as a denial of epistemic complexity, but as a strategic abstraction that helps us handle that complexity more clearly. Bertrand Russell emphasized formal logic as a way to bring rigor and transparency to philosophical analysis, especially in contexts where intuition alone can mislead. Similarly, Wittgenstein, particularly in the Tractatus, showed how formal language structures can outline the limits of what can meaningfully be said—and, by implication, where silence (or contingency) begins.

So while formalism may abstract from the flux of real experience, it also provides a frame within which uncertainty can be recognized and discussed, rather than hidden or mystified. In this sense, it remains a useful epistemic tool—even, or especially, in the face of contingency.

Knowledge is not always the same—its nature depends crucially on the kind of objects we are trying to understand; see your remarks on ontology. The structure of what we know determines the structure of how we can know it. The classical model of knowledge as Justified True Belief works especially well when we are dealing with static objects: things that are timeless, invariant, and independent of any observer. Mathematical truths, logical principles, or geometrical forms fall into this category. They do not change; they hold universally, and their truth is not context-dependent. In such cases, knowledge can be fixed and absolute. There is no room for contingency—no possibility that things could have been otherwise.

But many of the things we seek to understand are not static—they are dynamic. They unfold over time, they shift depending on context, and they are deeply tied to perspective. Political decisions, medical diagnoses, ethical judgments, historical interpretations—these are not states of being, but processes of becoming. Their truth is often provisional, subject to change as new information emerges. These are contingent realities: things could easily have turned out differently. And that is precisely where JTB begins to falter. It presupposes a stable truth, a single fixed point that can be justified and believed. But when the object of knowledge itself is in motion, this model fails to account for the epistemic dynamics involved.

Take, for instance, a medical diagnosis. Based on today’s data, it may be fully justified and considered true. Tomorrow, with new symptoms or better tests, it may need revision. Was the original diagnosis wrong? Not necessarily—it was true within its temporal and evidential context. The same applies to a weather forecast, a military decision made in the fog of war, or a policy shaped by incomplete data. These are not cases of error but of epistemic contingency. They demand a different kind of epistemology.

That’s where Justified True Crisis comes in. JTC keeps the structure of JTB—justification, truth, belief—but interprets it dynamically. Truth is no longer eternal, but indexed to time and circumstance. Justification becomes adaptive rather than static. And belief is no longer naïve conviction, but an assertion made in full awareness of crisis and fallibility. In this way, JTC does not abandon epistemic rigor—it deepens it by incorporating the ontological instability of dynamic objects.

JTC does not celebrate uncertainty—it makes it visible and manageable. It does not collapse into relativism, but recognizes that epistemic responsibility looks different when the object of knowledge is itself in flux. Those who insist on static certainty in dynamic contexts risk dogmatism. JTC, by contrast, models an epistemology of humility—one that knows that not all knowledge can be possessed; some knowledge must be navigated.

In this context, I’ve introduced the distinction between philosophía and philoprosdokía to articulate two complementary orientations within epistemology—and, more broadly, within philosophy as the love of wisdom (theory & practical orientation in one). Philosophía, the “love of (certain) knowledge,” seeks clarity, permanence, and formal structure; it reflects a top-down, analytical approach aiming at timeless truths and secure foundations. Philoprosdokía, the “love of expectation,” is attuned to temporality, contingency, and the unfolding of meaning; it aligns with the continental tradition’s interpretive, historical, and speculative character. Rather than opposing each other, these modes trace the spectrum between static and dynamic knowledge and echo Plato’s divided line: the former oriented toward the intelligible and unchanging, the latter toward the sensible and becoming. Together, they offer a more complete account of philosophical wisdom—one that integrates both structure and orientation, certainty and anticipation.

This distinction is not meant as a hierarchy, but as a hermeneutic tool—a way to understand different epistemic approaches in relation to the nature of their objects and aims. In this sense, it also mirrors the broader divide often drawn between analytic and continental philosophy: the former aligning more closely with philosophía in its emphasis on logical structure, language, and conceptual precision; the latter resonating with philoprosdokía, in its engagement with historicity, lived experience, and the open horizon of meaning.

Rather than reinforcing the gap between these traditions, the JTC framework—and the underlying distinction between philosophía and philoprosdokía—offers a shared space, in which both orientations find their place: one grounding, the other opening; one structuring, the other navigating. Together, they reflect the dual necessity of seeking understanding where stability is possible, and of maintaining responsiveness where contingency prevails.

Knowledge, in such cases, is not a state—it is a stance; see the quote at the beginning of the paper.

This dynamic interplay between philoprosdokía and philosophía also sheds light on the enduring challenge posed by Gettier cases. These thought experiments expose the fragility of knowledge when static definitions are applied to dynamic, time-sensitive scenarios. From the perspective of philosophía, Gettier cases appear as epistemic anomalies—exceptions to be patched. But through the lens of philoprosdokía, they are not failures, but symptoms of a deeper truth: that knowledge, when tied to contingent realities, resists fixation. JTC embraces this tension by reframing Gettier-style coincidence not as a flaw in the structure of knowledge, but as a sign of its temporality—an indication that some beliefs (credences) can only be justified within their moment, not beyond it. In this way, the Gettier problem becomes less a refutation of knowledge and more a doorway into a more flexible, temporally aware epistemology.

P.S. If you’re curious how this dual perspective plays out visually, take a look at the diagram in the JTC paper—it maps Static Knowledge and Dynamic Knowledge; Page 25.

Thanks Das, I'm going to hold off on any further reply right now and take a look at your essay.

there's no oracle who can tell us if that belief satisfies the T or not. — flannel jesus

Can this be rounded off, though? Are there not cases where you would say, given there is literally no possible further indicator, that something can be secured in it's T-Truth? Say "It is raining right now"? I don't think brain in vat arguments do much to this. We could all be dreaming - so what? Without an indication that's happening, and plenty that it's not, why question?

when you say "no possible further indicator", you're saying "nothing further than the justification we currently have", so it's still the J doing all the work. The T is redundant.

I mean, what does J mean? Obviously justified, but justified in what? Justified in thinking the belief is true.

So what work is T doing in JTB, since the only access to truth you just laid out is a matter of justification, and not truth itself?

Maybe knowledge should be SJB, sufficiently justified belief.