Sorry, I wasn't placing us before Season 3. I meant roughly as we have things in the real world, with 5 books and however many seasons of the tv show. You could think of the tv series as a simulation of the books that diverges; in the first season and a half, what characters on the tv show do and say is a reasonable guide to what happens in the books and vice versa. But after the divergence, what happens in the books and on the tv show no longer "happens" to be a guide to what happens in the other.

it doesn't matter what people use to teach others. if they just teach by demonstrating, in learning how to use the term they will have learned how to refer to a material with such a melting pt. again, your mistake is thinking that every facet of the use of the expression must be transparent to its users, or contained in the processes of teaching the word (as if the uses of the word had nothing to do with anything beyond what one said in getting someone to use it, for example, in a classroom!), and this as i've argued is wrong. it's a myopic view of use, as if all there were to use was contained in something you could finitely summarize in a 'teaching session.' on the contrary use has many facets that language users don't know how to summarize and extends beyond their knowledge.

put another way, to judge whether gold is used correctly, one only has to see whether one has referred to gold, i.e. that very substance – but to see this is to see whether one has referred to a substance with such and such a melting pt. and it is irrelevant whether the language users know this fact, or can know it.

Thanks for replying. I'm always interested in your posts.

Let's say that gold has whatever properties it has, whether we know it or not, whether we could know it or not, and obeys whatever physical laws whether we know it or not, whether we could know it it or not. Then gold being the way it is and acting the way it does will play a role in the way we think and talk about gold, even if we don't completely understand it. The situations in which there's gold to talk about -- it's never floating through the air or growing on trees, it never melts at room temperature, etc. -- what we can do with it and what we can't, etc.

Given all that, I'm not sure that our hypothesis makes sense, namely that there is some property of gold we are unable to learn. What would that property be like? If it's a property that has no effect at all on the way we interact with it -- say, it was God's favorite when he was creating the universe -- then obviously it can never make any difference to how we think and talk about gold. If it does show up somehow, however indirectly, why wouldn't we be able to learn this?

Given all that, I'm not sure that our hypothesis makes sense, namely that there is some property of gold we are unable to learn. What would that property be like? If it's a property that has no effect at all on the way we interact with it -- say, it was God's favorite when he was creating the universe -- then obviously it can never make any difference to how we think and talk about gold. If it does show up somehow, however indirectly, why wouldn't we be able to learn this? — Srap Tasmaner

say gold is god's favorite metal, but we could never figure that out. then someone says, 'gold is god's favorite metal!' maybe they were guessing, or had a vision of some sort, that convinced them of this. did they say something true? i submit, yes.

whether you know something is in principle distinct from whether it has any effect on you – suppose god sends people to hell who waste gold, but no one knows about this. will god's unknowable attitude affect you? yes, it'll send you to hell – your ignorance doesn't change that. likewise, gold will have all the props. it has whether you can figure them out or not, and they will all affect you, even if you can't figure out how or why. likewise for your language – you will in fact be referring to god's favorite metal by using linguistic expressions, whether you know this or not, saying true things when you claim it's god's favorite metal, whether you know it or not, etc.

I wonder if what the author means by realism and anti-realism is different to want Dummett means. From the article, "if representationalism is rejected as incoherent or empty, the stakes in affirming either realism or antirealism go down considerably, if not completely." He understands the debate as one over whether or not sentences "represent" reality-as-such, with anti-realism treating truth as a convenient fiction, whereas Dummett turns this around into debate over whether or not truth is bivalent, and so doesn't depend on this notion of representation at all. Truth isn't a fiction under anti-realism, according to Dummett; it's just that truth-conditions are not recognition-transcendent. I think this claim is consistent with Wittgenstein's account of meaning, and even entailed by it if Dummett's argument is valid. — Michael

Whether truth conditions are recognition-transcendent or not assumes an impossible viewpoint from outside our language games (and outside our recognition!). In the words of the article, this is an attempt "to represent outside all representation." It may be consistent with Wittgenstein's account of meaning (possibly), but it is not consistent with Wittgenstein's philosophy.

truth conditions have nothing to do with representation or 'viewpoints.' they have to do with whether sentences are true, i.e. whether certain things are so.

also, of course language games get outside of language games! they make reference to all sorts of things totally indifferent to language. this fetishization of language as a self-contained, self-perpetuating masturbatory game is ridiculous. oh, no, that something might be outside our recognition! boy, that's just a reductio, isn't it?

Is there an internet forum in the outside world that appears on my computer monitor with the same scribbles on it that I experience? Do I experience the scribbles as they really are? If not, then am I really reading what you typed and posted to the outside world? Isn't the fact that I can read what you typed and understand it evidence that we can know the outside world as that is where your words reside for me to log in to the forum and read them.

Do I experience the scribbles as they really are? — Harry Hindu

What do you mean by "as they really are"? The scribbles are just patterns of light displayed by your screen.

If not, then am I really reading what you typed and posted to the outside world?

And what does that mean? I just press keys on my keyboard. Me pressing keys on my keyboard isn't anything like the patterns of light displayed by your screen.

An excellent response!

I'm okay with distinguishing whether a sentence is true from whether someone happens to know it. Guesses can be right, sure.

whether you know something is in principle distinct from whether it has any effect on you – suppose god sends people to hell who waste gold, but no one knows about this. will god's unknowable attitude affect you? yes, it'll send you to hell – your ignorance doesn't change that. — The Great Whatever

This is a little odd though.

God clearly knows that gold is his favorite metal. If I end up in hell and don't know why, isn't it because he has chosen not to tell me? It still feels like a contingent matter that I don't know this, not that I am unable to. If a lot of us end up in hell and have eternity to compare notes, what would stop us from figuring out why we were there? Something contingent, like eternal torment.

Against my previous post, it could be claimed that, in each case we think of, it is only contingent that a given truth could be known, that I haven't shown the knowability of the truth is necessary.

We are now essentially debating verificationism, which isn't to @Michael's question: whether LW's approach to meaning leads, as it did for Dummett, to some form of anti-realism. I'm still not sure; it depends on how you take the connection between meaning and truth conditions.

I'm still not sure; it depends on how you take the connection between meaning and truth conditions. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, my original account missed off an important premise of Dummett's argument, which I clarified here. It includes Frege's claim that to understand a sentence is to know its truth conditions.

Statements about the future look like they would be a clearer test case, since we're not inclined to allow knowledge of the future. But then there's a question about when such a statement is true: at the time of utterance, or at the time of evaluation?

I think that's exactly the issue that you brought up with your question regarding Game of Thrones. Given that the script for the next season hasn't been written, would it be correct to say that "Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne" has a determinant truth value? Nothing in the world satisfies the requirements to be a truth-maker (whether to make it true or to make it false). Obviously we can make the conditional claims "If the script will be written to have Jon Snow sit on the Iron Throne then 'Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne' is true" and "If the script will be written to not have Jon Snow sit on the Iron Throne then 'Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne' is false", but given the conditional nature of these claims (similar perhaps to counterfactual claims), I don't think it then follows that the sentence "Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne" does in fact have a determinant (bivalent) truth value. Rather all we're doing is describing hypothetical truth-conditions.

Dummett never accepted Davidson's view that truth conditions give you an account or an explanation of meaning. But they do run together, "agreement in judgements" and all that.

If, as Dummett says, the meaning of a sentence is exhaustively determined by its use, I think you conclude that recognition-transcendent truth conditions can play no part in determining the sentence's meaning. That feels like it's allowing truth conditions to determine meaning, but only if you ignore the bit about recognizing that they obtain or not, which gets you back to how a population uses the sentence.

Does that make sense? If that's right, then the answer is "yes".

I'm not sure it's a sound doctrine though.

Dummett never accepted Davidson's view that truth conditions give you an account or an explanation of meaning. — Srap Tasmaner

I know that he didn't accept Davidson's view, but he accepted a similar kind of view. As explained here, "However, [Dummett] distinguishes between a strong and a weak sense in which truth can be the central notion of a meaning-theory. In the strong sense, meaning is to be explained in terms of truth-conditions, as above [Davidson], and it is simply taken for granted that we know what truth is. If truth is central to the meaning-theory only in the weak sense, then although knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is equated with knowledge of its truth-conditions [my emphasis], some further explanation is offered of what it is for a sentence to be true (Dummett, 1991b 113, 161-163). "

Also, I took the argument, with the Fregean premise, verbatim from here, so maybe the author of that is mistaken in his summary of Dummett?

Given that the script for the next season hasn't been written, would it be correct to say that "Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne" has a determinant truth value? Nothing in the world satisfies the requirements to be a truth-maker (whether to make it true or to make it false). — Michael

If GRRM had that as part of his outline for how the series ends, then yes. Otherwise, the truth value becomes determinate in the future.

I wouldn't say "equated". There's an "if and only if" between knowing one and knowing the other ...

He does explicitly reject what's here called the "strong" view, and that means rejecting the idea that truth conditions explain meaning. I know one of the various arguments he tries is, roughly, that you can't possibly know whether the truth conditions of a sentence obtain if you don't already know what the sentence means. (Recognition again.)

But then he himself has to come up with these sort of Quinean feature report sentences to get the linguistic ball rolling -- to learn the first words of your language there have to be sentencelets you can count as true ("true"?) like "Grass!" "Ball!" and so on that depend only on recognizing salient features of your environment. Otherwise you can never break into language.

I've only muddied the waters, haven't I?

Game of Thrones — Michael

As I clarified, I didn't mean to make an argument about statements about the future, but maybe I should have!

Now to more muddiness ...

Dummett may very well reject bivalence, if not across the board, then at least for this domain, statements about the future. He will not say, " 'Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne' is either true or false." But Dummett also rejects truth-value gaps, so he will not say, " 'Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne' is neither true nor false."

Well?

You might conclude that "Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne" is not really a statement, somewhat like a logical positivist. It's normally meaningful words put together to look like something you could assert but it isn't really.

I don't think Dummett actually says that sort of thing anywhere, and Wittgenstein sort of quit saying it, and instead suggested wrapping it in a context where it could make sense -- making predictions among your friends or placing a wager on the outcome of the show is not the same sort of activity as stating facts. A prediction or a wager is not an assertion. Something like that anyway.

I think Dummett's view must be near there, but it's never been clear to me.

It does relate to the issue of how the meaning of a sentence is determined, and whether recognition-transcendent truth conditions can play a part. If the truth conditions of the assertion "Jon Snow will sit on the Iron Throne" are inaccessible, I think you conclude that this sentence cannot be used as an assertion in the usual way -- that you must be doing something else. And "what you mean" is tied to that.

If GRRM had that as part of his outline for how the series ends, then yes. Otherwise, the truth value becomes determinate in the future. — Marchesk

I think the most that could get you is "GRRM planned to have Jon Snow sit on the Iron Throne" but that can be followed by all sorts of stuff -- who knows what the producers actually end up doing. Jesse was not supposed to be a major character in "Breaking Bad".

If GRRM had that as part of his outline for how the series ends, then yes. — Marchesk

Except it isn't a given that the TV show will follow the books. There's already been deviations. Maybe there will be big ones.

Besides, if it helps with the example, assume it's a TV show that isn't based on a book. Do claims about what will happen have a determinant truth value?

making predictions among your friends or placing a wager on the outcome of the show is not the same sort of activity as stating facts — Srap Tasmaner

And here's the thing: everything else I've been doing around here lately is pushing me toward thinking these actually are very similar activities. But all that's still up in the air ...

It still feels like a contingent matter that I don't know this, not that I am unable to. — Srap Tasmaner

construct the example such that there's no way for you to know

whether LW's approach to meaning leads, as it did for Dummett, to some form of anti-realism. — Srap Tasmaner

if that is the question (i don't think it is: i think michael is interested in tools to prop up anti-realism, & is essentially debating verificationism), then the answer is negative, because witty doesn't have an approach to meaning coherent or concrete enough to have an authoritative interpretation as to what it is or what its philosophical consequences are. the LI are just a bunch of aphorisms.

construct the example such that there's no way for you to know — The Great Whatever

I think statements about the future might fit the bill.

Thoughts?

sounds plausible, but controversial opinions about such matters aren't relevant to the point. just imagine any situation where you can't know something, & it will still be able to affect you whether you can know it or not.

if you have trouble imagining such a situation, then the problem is you doubt the coherency of something being unknowable for reasons independent of anything having to do with verificationism. even so, having a notion of verification / lack of 'transcendence' in our notion of truth doesn't help us understand anything (tho if you really doubt anything can be unknowable, verificationism would be true de facto, for uninteresting reasons – also, you will want to look at fitch's paradox, and square the fact that universal knowability leads to collective omniscience).

I don't find Fitch's persuasive at all.

just imagine any situation where you can't know something, & it will still be able to affect you whether you can know it or not — The Great Whatever

Does that rule out talk about the future as our example?

If there are or are not such possibilities, how would we figure that out? Examples don't seem to be doing the trick.

Besides, if it helps with the example, assume it's a TV show that isn't based on a book. Do claims about what will happen have a determinant truth value? — Michael

Yes, in the future.

I don't find Fitch's persuasive at all. — Srap Tasmaner

there's no persuasion to be done, it's a proof. so you must either disagree with the premises or find some flaw in the logic.

Does that rule out talk about the future as our example? — Srap Tasmaner

i don't care what the example it is - use whatever you'll accept.

If there are or are not such possibilities, how would we figure that out? Examples don't seem to be doing the trick. — Srap Tasmaner

they do for me - if you can't imagine that there might be something you can't know, then as i said, verificationism is probably true but de facto, in an uninteresting way, and we still need not make any appeal to it in discussing truth anyway. it'll just be an interesting fact that it's impossible for something to be unknowable.

there's no persuasion to be done, it's a proof — The Great Whatever

I'll say two things about Fitch's:

1. If you use intuitionist rules of inference and interpret the logical constants along intuitionist lines, you might be okay, as Dummett is, saying "p→~~Kp" but that's not saying "everyone is omniscient."

2. I put it in the same box with the slingshot argument and Gettier cases. They're fascinating, but I am far from alone in feeling that a logical fast one is being pulled.

if you can't imagine that there might be something you can't know, — The Great Whatever

I don't really know what to say about this, so I'm going to go away and think about it for a while. It's an interesting question I honestly haven't thought about, so you have my thanks for raising the issue.

2. I put it in the same box with the slingshot argument and Gettier cases. They're fascinating, but I am far from alone in feeling that a logical fast one is being pulled. — Srap Tasmaner

what you feel is simply not relevant.

1. If you use intuitionist rules of inference and interpret the logical constants along intuitionist lines, you might be okay, as Dummett is, saying "p→~~Kp" but that's not saying "everyone is omniscient." — Srap Tasmaner

the conclusion that knowers are collectively omniscient, i.e. that there are no truths that aren't known.

i think there's some confusion in thinking the way logical systems work is that you can simply 'choose' to use whichever system you like to validate or invalidate any proof. of course you can just make up a system of inference rules that make any argument, appropriately symbolized, either valid or invalid. so pointing this out is irrelevant as well. if you like, just convert the argument into english, it doesn't matter. english validity isn't contingent on decisions of formal apparatus.

i think there's some confusion in thinking the way logical systems work is that you can simply 'choose' to use whichever system you like to validate or invalidate any proof. — The Great Whatever

Then it's a good thing this is not what Michael Dummett did.