Harris allows this too, expanding well-being to "all conscious creatures." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't know that. I think better of him for it.

But are you saying that the basis of virtue ethics is not "fulfilling the human good"? I thought that was the first principle for humans. That's what I doubt can generate the ethical "ought".

Interestingly, I think this is right -- finding a basis for ethical values does indeed do these things -- but at the same time it can't settle the question. Because . . . if we accept all this and find that our anxiety is indeed quelled, and our routine preserved, we may still find ourselves asking, "But is this enough? Is this what 'doing good' really means?" That the question can be meaningfully asked at all seems to put it in a different category from, say, "OK, I've demonstrated the Pythagorean theorem, but is that enough? Do I really understand what a right triangle is?" I'd say that question was meaningless, but the ethical question doesn't seem to be like that. — J

Yes, it's a piece of the puzzle, and I'm unsure how it fits. What I've not been addressing much is the social aspect. You acquire your moral values while growing up: you construct them out of observations when people punish or praise, when people pay attention to you and ignore you, and so on. There are rules or rules of thumb you know. You learn the when and where and who of it. People get divvied up into insiders and outsiders. And so on.

An insider can explain local morals to an outsider:

a) purely discriptive: This is how we do it here.
b) prescriptive, territorial: This is how we do it here; I will not tolerate deviance.
c) prescriptive, superiority: This is how it's done, but you barbarians don't know this.
d) prescriptive, universalist: This is how it's done; it's obvious; since you do it differently, you're evil.
e) prescriptive, exceptionalist: This is how we do it, because we're special.
And so on.

These sort of differences in attitude make a difference in how morals spread and change. Morals are socially "alive" - what we do is... "cell activity"? That is whenever we invoke a local moral, we interpret it in this specific interpretation, have an attitude towards its validity, feel it's biographical relevance more or less strongly, etc. All the while we evaluate how it turns out, etc. Our actions, attitudes, etc. are part of the social life flow of morals. In terms of moral conflicts, we go from intrapersonal to interpersonal. Interpersonal can occur within a sub-culture, within a culture but between subcultures, between cultures and so on. Intrapersonal conflicts can be the result of conflicts between two subcultures, both of which the person in question identifies with. Being part of multiple subcultures that don't overlap often can allow to "regionalise": if you wish for a superregional right in that case, you need to "climb up the abstraction ladder" - find a principle that accounts for both.

The result is that there are sentences like "murder is wrong," that say nothing at all if not interpreted. You'll rarely find people saying "yeah I murdered him; but I did so in self-defence," you'll hear "yeah, I killed him, but it wasn't murder, it was self-defense." The shared abstraction could be something like "some killing is wrong." This can be a problem when traditional values clash with more widely accepted values (and often enshrined in law). Think "honour killings", as an example.

Within any sort of social conflict, any act or utterance is taking a stance (or refusing to, or hesitating to...). Anxiety, in this context, will adversly affect your "power to influence the outcome". So I'd expect people who are more certain to contribute more to the moral landscape, by sheer force of conviction.

Basically, I view morality as a process, and what it's "based" on is a bit chicken/egg.

You and J both have denied goodness as a possible principle for ethics, but then turned to "fairness," "harmonious relationships," and "justice." I am not really sure what the difference here is supposed to be, such that the latter are more acceptable, since these are also very general principles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, but I would choose "fairness" and "Justice" as they are understood intersubjectively.

An anti-realist says there are absolutely no facts about fairness, consistency, consequences, or human flourishing that have any bearing on which ends ought to be preferred. How exactly do you propose "facts and reasoning" to guide ethics if there are no facts that have a bearing on which ends are choice-worthy? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't it the case that an anti-realist denies that there are objective moral facts that determine which ends ought to be preferred? However, an anti-realist might still acknowledge that there are facts about fairness, consistency, consequences, or human flourishing, they just hold that these facts do not have objective normative force.

I might appeal to fairness or facts as dependent on contingent human attitudes or practices, rather than being intrinsically normative.

However, an ethics based on facts about human flourishing is not anti-realism. Sam Harris, for instance, is not an anti-realist. He has an ethics based on knowledge about Goodness — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure Sam is not an anti-realist but his position seems different to what I was describing - he maintains that that moral truths exist and can be known through science.

"I'm not going to read your posts past the first sentence or actually engage with any arguments at all. But my position is very strong. No, I can't positively articulate it either. I will write posts consisting of just the word 'wrong' though." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I may well not be responding to you again if this is your response to someone pointing out that your entire premise is wrong in their view, and so did not literally waste their time reading what (and now I have read it, this is true) amounts to a rehashing of the same wrong-headed position (from my view). Why would I do that? Why would you want me to do that? Not something I want to be dragged in to. I suggest, if you have any interest in engaging with me in future, to seriously rethink how you've responded to this. If you don't, that's fine. I am merely giving you my terms.

Now, that aside...

Afterall, what possible arguments or explanation could I offer that could constitute "good" arguments? — Count Timothy von Icarus

On the upside, I also cannot possibly have "bad" arguments either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

1. One which actually goes any length toward establishing an ethical truth, if that's your goal**. You have not even begun to do so, as pointed out (and exactly why there's not a lot of reason for me to pursue your posts beyond that). That you think (perhaps?) that you have done so doesn't butter bread for me my guy.

2. You are, again, failing to delineate between "that which will result in X" and "that which ought to be done". You are arguing about something I am both (in this thread, anyway) not interested in, and don't really disagree with you about. The words "bad" and "good" have multiple meanings. You are not using an Ethical meaning. You are using a practical, empirical meaning. That you are not noticing this, despite it being pointed out several times is odd. That you are then, insulting and childish, instead of trying to clarify, is also odd. Why not actually figure out what I'm saying here? You clearly don't get it. There's nothing wrong with that - but then coming at me with immature retorts isn't helpful.

And thus, when you make your moral pronouncements (which seems to be in most posts) about all the flaws of "Wokeness," I take it that this is just meant to articulate something like "boo-hoo for Wokeness." It cannot mean that it is truly bad to accept such beliefs at least. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Putting aside this incredibly silly and unfounded side-swipe, yes. That's correct. What's your problem with that? I make arguments as anyone else does. They are either effective, or they're not. Has it helped you understand my positions? Then it might be good. If all I've done is make people think less of me, there are two options:
1. They are bad arguments (or my positions are insensible); or
2. You hold positions that don't allow for you to be generous to certain other positions.

**Arguments being 'good' is not ethical. They are effective, or they are not. A good (i.e effective) argument for racism doesn't make it ethically good. This is not complicated, I don't think. Can you let me know what's not landing here? I think i've been sufficiently clear and patient.

I actually don't know what that is. Could you explain the context? Thanks. — J

Divine Command theory holds that ethical statements are beholden to a revealed truth about a creator deity, essentially. Not always exactly that, but it means there is a prescriptive ethical system which cannot be jiggered with. Its easy, simple and does not require any kind of deliberation.

Oh, I see. No, when I said that an obviously irrational ethical system would have been "dismissed" long ago, I meant, and perhaps should have said, "dismissed by serious philosophers who understand the conversation." If we require such a system to be dismissed by absolutely everyone, we'll have a long wait!

That said, Divine Command makes an interesting case. Is it irrational, exactly? Should it be dismissed? I could imagine a nuanced version that might pass muster. But if it refers to what some in the States call "God said it, I believe it, that settles it" religion, then no, not intellectually respectable.

Basically, I view morality as a process, — Dawnstorm

The descriptions you give seem pretty accurate to me, as a kind of sociology of moral behavior. As a philosopher, I'm not really entitled to an opinion about it, as I haven't studied these questions.

. . . and what it's "based" on is a bit chicken/egg. — Dawnstorm

Here, however, we enter philosophical territory, starting with the scare-quotes around "based"! Why the quotes? Do you mean to question whether there is a true basis for moral behavior, apart from social upbringing and norms? A fair question, but say more about the chicken/egg aspect.

2. You are, again, failing to delineate between "that which will result in X" and "that which ought to be done". You are arguing about something I am both (in this thread, anyway) not interested in, and don't really disagree with you about. The words "bad" and "good" have multiple meanings. You are not using an Ethical meaning. You are using a practical, empirical meaning. That you are not noticing this, despite it being pointed out several times is odd. Why not actually figure out what I'm saying here? You clearly don't get it. There's nothing wrong with that - but then coming at me with immature retorts isn't helpful.

The post you are replying to specifically addresses this vis-á-vis the question of ultimate ends/ends that are sought for their own sake. Ends are ordered to other ends. They either go on in an infinite regress, bottom out in irrational desires, or they are ordered to something sought for its own sake (e.g. happiness).

Can you explain what it would mean for something to be "ethically good" on your understanding of the term? Under what conditions can something be good in this sense?

That you are then, insulting and childish, instead of trying to clarify, is also odd.

Putting aside this incredibly silly and unfounded side-swipe, yes. That's correct. What's your problem with that? I make arguments as anyone else does. They are either effective, or they're not. Has it helped you understand my positions? Then it might be good. If all I've done is make people think less of me, there are two options:
1. They are bad arguments (or my positions are insensible); or
2. You hold positions that don't allow for you to be generous to certain other positions.

Do you not find it ironic that simply explicitly calling out what your own statements imply about your own words seems like an insult or "side-swipe" to you? Those are your conclusions, I don't see how it is untoward to point them out.

In particular, I don't see how it is any more rude than simply responding: "Wrong." to posts.

**Arguments being 'good' is not ethical. They are effective, or they are not. A good (i.e effective) argument for racism doesn't make it ethically good. This is not complicated, I don't think. Can you let me know what's not landing here? I think i've been sufficiently clear and patient.

Wouldn't a good argument be one that leads to truth? This definition of "good argument" reduces philosophy and science to nothing more than a power struggle or popularity contest. A "good argument" in science, or "good evidence" would then be simply "whatever combination of argument and evidence convinces people of a position, regardless of its truth."

Now to be fair, I would agree that we can sometimes speak of arguments being better or worse in terms of their efficacy, but this isn't primarily what makes arguments or evidence good or bad.

Can you explain what it would mean for something to be "ethically good" on your understanding of the term? Under what conditions can something be good in this sense? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A very good question. I am not convinced it's a coherent concept. It's like something being "factually Good". Just seems a nonsense to me. To me, I guess "good" would, in an ethical sense, be a relative term. "good for..." makes more sense than "good" bare to me.
Perhaps we need to invoke something like Coherence theory to allow this to not be a total nonsense in practice, rather than on paper. This way, several views could be totally reasonable on an ethical issue and several actions could be acceptable (even as between conflicting views, holistically speaking).

Do you not find it ironic that simply explicitly calling out what your own statements imply about your own words seems like an insult or "side-swipe" to you? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, because that's not what you did. You made insinuations which I did not either say, or imply elsewhere. That passage spoke more to what you make of my views than anything else. I was probably too harsh, but it was well out of place. Further insinuating that all you did was report on my views seems... well, i'm just going to say it: dishonest. I'm not fussed as to whether you'd cop to that or not.

Wouldn't a good argument be one that leads to truth? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Unless you have a succinct, universal definition of Truth I wouldn't think so. PLenty of arguments aren't geared toward truth anyway, and persuasion instead. So, no, i'd disagree.

A "good argument" in science, or "good evidence" would then be simply "whatever combination of argument and evidence convinces people of a position, regardless of its truth." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This seems to be the case, yes. In the real world - not particularly my view. A good argument works. It doesn't have to be 'true'.

Sure. Something I think is misguided. But I understand that this doesn't sit perfectly. — AmadeusD

Okay.

You've done nothing to support this. — AmadeusD

So you are claiming that things which enable us to survive, such as food, are not generally considered to be good? When I say that people call food good in part because it allows them to survive, and you disagree, I don't see that I am the one making the controversial claim. It seems obvious that one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive. I'm wondering if you sincerely disagree with that claim.

No. I'm telling you it was non sequitur. Feel how you want to about that. But it was loaded and I wanted clarification as to what you had loaded into it. If you don't want to give it, that's fine. I wont engage. — AmadeusD

No, I asked a simple question and you've avoided answering it twice now. The question is, "If so, are those rhymes and reasons altogether different than those which guide other people's acts?" If you need clarification on any of the words in the question, feel free to ask. I need an answer to that question.

I don't even know quite what you were getting at mate. — AmadeusD

It's not necessary to know what someone is getting at before answering their question. If that were the case then no one would have answered any of Socrates' questions whatsoever.

Not in the strict sense of those words. — AmadeusD

Right, and given that we can talk about true and false without an arbiter, I see no reason why we can't talk about good and bad without an arbiter.

Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4? — Leontiskos

I'm sorry, are you trying to suggest that Ethics is a mathematical function? If so we have no basis for discussion. Otherwise, I can't tell what you're getting at in this reply. — AmadeusD

I'm sorry, but this is another avoided question. Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4?

-

why would [and arbiter] be needed in ethics? — Leontiskos

It isn't. But if you want 'good' and 'bad' to mean much of anything, you need one. I don't claim they do, so I don't need one. — AmadeusD

So does it then follow that we also need an arbiter of the terms in "2+2=4" if they are to mean anything? Again, if we don't need an arbiter to interpret or know the claim that 2+2=4, then it's not clear why we need an arbiter to know that food is good. The whole "arbiter" argument requires some explanation.

In the first section, he outlines almost exactly what I've suggested Ethics functions 'as'.

"The prudential ‘ought’ rests for its force on the facts about the contingent desires and interests people have, and just tells one what one ought to do if one is to satisfy them."

I find nothing further on which would counter this position. It's arbitrary. Obviously. If you'd like to point me somewhere in the article, more than happy to review and adjust. — AmadeusD

Right, that's why I pointed you to the article. He captures your position very clearly before arguing against it. You've recognized how accurately he captures your position, and that's a good start.

So you are claiming that things which enable us to survive, such as food, are not generally considered to be good? — Leontiskos

No, no, no, no. LOL. I haven't said or intimated this. You probably need be a bit more precise in how you're reading me:
Obviously that's how things are generally considered. What I am saying, is that what people are doing is saying that "X is good for..." So, "food is good" is not what's being conveyed. "the good" is what we're talking about, so a different arena. If you mean to say you think when people say something like "food is good" that this is tout court; no qualification, then I disagree. I don't think people have that type of view.

one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive — Leontiskos

This is literally all i had said. People call food good because it performs a necessary function towards a certain goal. If that's your definition of "good" cool. It's not any common one. "Good" tends to require reason. "I will survive" is a fact, not a reason. "Surviving is good, to me" is perfectly acceptable response, though, so maybe you actually mean to say something like this? Not making a lot of sense otherwise...

No, I asked a simple question and you've avoided answering it twice now. — Leontiskos

I can only repeat my previous reply. It's not a reasonable question, because I didn't intimate it was in question. You're not getting an answer. The question is ridiculous. What people? What acts? What reasons? Probably I eat for hte same reasons as other people, but there's very little chance I do some of my more personal things for the same reasons as others. The answer you want is a fugazi imo. "yes" tells you nothing whatsoever except that I think I know why everyone does everything they do, and "No" tells you nothing but "I am special". These are not part of our discussion and I am telling you, point blank period, the question is not helpful for what you want to know. Given that I am the source of what you want to know, I'm happy to just not respond if you re-ask this one. Take that as you wish.

It's not necessary to know what someone is getting at before answering their question. — Leontiskos

Then, I did answer it. You just didn't appreciate my response, i take it. That's fine.

Right, and given that we can talk about true and false without an arbiter, I see no reason why we can't talk about good and bad without an arbiter — Leontiskos

Then you think "true" and "false" are synonymous with "good" and "bad". I both disagree and find it silly.

So does it then follow that we also need an arbiter of the terms in "2+2=4" if they are to mean anything? — Leontiskos

We have infinite arbiters of that equation, given we accept the definitions. two items, and two other items make four items. If you want to change the words that's fine, but they arbitrate the same issue.

The whole "arbiter" argument requires some explanation. — Leontiskos

It doesn't, as I see. You've not provided an objection to it. We cannot talk about truth and falsity (in situ) without an arbiter. We can only speculate, or talk conceptually. something must indicate that whatever proposition is, in fact, true or false, if we are to take those views (well, without conceding assumption, lets say, which is usually how its done). We can talk about good and bad, but to actually ascribe that to anything is a matter of personal view. There is nothing in this thread that goes against that, other than reaches for versions of Divine Command.

He captures your position very clearly before arguing against it. — Leontiskos

Perhaps you've missed, but I addressed this. He fails (on my view). YOu pointed me to an article. I read it. It was woefully inadequate to counter what I'm positing (on my view). There we are... You seem to want everything you put forward to result in a change of my mind. You'd need to present something which affects my views to do so rather than discussing them (which is much fun - and you're good at it). I am not complaining, but there's nothing in any of this exchange that would go toward giving me areason to adjust the priors involved. I am all ears, even if you have to assume I am not. I am getting a very interesting, and appreciated understanding of your views. Nothing to sneeze at. It's good stuff.

Here, however, we enter philosophical territory, starting with the scare-quotes around "based"! Why the quotes? Do you mean to question whether there is a true basis for moral behavior, apart from social upbringing and norms? — J

Sort of. Talking about the morality of social groupings rather than the morality of a person has had my hyper-aware of the metaphor I use. A base is something you build on. A person's morality has its base in the earliest learning process. Here "base" is adequate. But I view the morality of a social grouping more like a flow, metaphorically a river maybe, and under that perspective each person turns into a spring that feeds into a river (and those rivers run together - I wonder if, given enough time, I can extend the metaphor to include the sea?). But even that is a problem, because the flow is bi-directional, as people is all that there are: you learn, imperfectly, from your parents, but by the time you grow up you've made it your own. So the flow-metaphor isn't quite right either... Basically, I just got confused by the metaphors we use.

but say more about the chicken/egg aspect. — J

You take your morality from society and in turn become part of the morality-distribution-sytem of a society. From a simple-to-complex point of view, what you want has to come first, but by the time you're developed enough to want things, you've also already aquired some of the morality of your parents. Then transfer this to a historical point of view: was there ever a "first" moment, really? How far back can we go and still recognise morality in an interaction? When does an I-want-this-and-you-want-this-and-we-can't-both-have-it situation gain moral overtones? When do we have something to pass on to the next generation? It's hard to imagine a morally "naive" situation. And it's hard to imagine a grouping who *didn't* learn morality from their parents' generation, given they necessarily live at the same time (or babies don't survive). It's hard to imagine a first moral generation.

What I am saying, is that what people are doing is saying that "X is good for..." — AmadeusD

So even though people call food good without any explicit qualification, you are reinterpreting everyone to be saying something else, namely that "food is good for such-and-such"?

one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive — Leontiskos

This is literally all i had said. — AmadeusD

It's literally not all you had said. In fact you contradicted that claim. Here is the exchange:

You did not respond to the claim that food is (deemed) good by all. — Leontiskos

It was an unreasonable claim in teh discussion. That is simply not how food is characterized. It is necessary to survive. Colloquially referring to this as 'good' is a psychological trick and not an ethical claim. Come on now. — AmadeusD

...you literally said that, "Food is good," is an unreasonable claim, that this is not how food is characterized, and that what we should say is that it is necessary to survive. It seems like you've done a 180 degree turn on most of these previous claims.

I can only repeat my previous reply. It's not a reasonable question, because I didn't intimate it was in question. You're not getting an answer. The question is ridiculous. What people? What acts? What reasons? Probably I eat for hte same reasons as other people, but there's very little chance I do some of my more personal things for the same reasons as others. The answer you want is a fugazi imo. "yes" tells you nothing whatsoever except that I think I know why everyone does everything they do, and "No" tells you nothing but "I am special". These are not part of our discussion and I am telling you, point blank period, the question is not helpful for what you want to know. Given that I am the source of what you want to know, I'm happy to just not respond if you re-ask this one. Take that as you wish. — AmadeusD

If you can't give truthful answers to questions posed to you, I'm not sure why you're on a philosophy forum. Your desire to understand where a question is going before answering it is a form of post hoc rationalization, where instead of simply giving a truthful answer you tailor your answer in a defensive manner in order to try to achieve some ulterior goal within the conversation. Consider your response:

I would want to know your motivation from 2 to 3 there - or perhaps, what you would expect one to say and what you think that might mean. — AmadeusD

...That's a bit like playing chess and then saying, "I'm not going to move until you tell me your strategy, so that I know where I should move." That's not how chess or philosophy works, and avoiding giving truthful answers for fear of being wrong is a great way to never be wrong, and to never learn anything. If you think someone will draw a false inference from an answer then you give the answer, see if a false inference is drawn, and then address the false inference. You don't refuse to answer.

These are not part of our discussion — AmadeusD

. Besides, who made you the arbiter of what is and is not part of the discussion? The reason you won't answer the question is because it shows your claim about the arbitrariness of the good to be false. If we all call food good for the same reason then your claim that predications of goodness are arbitrary is clearly seen to be false. One only refuses to move when they are at a loss. :razz:

Then you think "true" and "false" are synonymous with "good" and "bad".
I both disagree and find it silly. — AmadeusD

This is a good example of a false inference. It simply does not follow from what I've said that true/false must be synonymous with good/bad, and "I find it silly" is in no way an argument for that odd claim.

something must indicate that whatever proposition is, in fact, true or false, if we are to take those views — AmadeusD

But you are unduly stretching the meaning of the word "arbiter." The claim here that whatever it is that indicates that 2+2=4 is true is an arbiter is simply a misuse of the word "arbiter." I take it that we both know, if we are using words accurately, that it is not an arbiter that makes 2+2=4 true.

Perhaps you've missed, but I addressed this. He fails (on my view). YOu pointed me to an article. I read it. — AmadeusD

You've given no indication whatsoever that you read beyond the first page of the article. You haven't addressed or presented any of the arguments or points in the article.

In general, your fiat declarations of victory are not convincing, to say the least. If you are short on time, then delay the post. Don't make unsubstantial posts lacking argumentation and then declare victory.

So even though people call food good without any explicit qualification, you are reinterpreting everyone to be saying something else, namely that "food is good for such-and-such"? — Leontiskos

100%. Not just this, It is actually what people mean. Ask them. "It's tastes good". "It will keep me alive". Only in a romantic moment of poetics would someone claim food was "good" tout court. Are you suggesting that is actually what they mean? It would be bizarre if that tradition ("good food") related to something other than what is referred to in the various instances it is uttered (well-cooked, tasty, healthy etc..). This is a pretty ubiquitous way of speaking about things (i.e not completing a commonly-intuited phrase to save time - an extreme modern version is "I can't..." in the face of a difficult conversation).

It's literally not all you had said. In fact you contradicted that claim. Here is the exchange: — Leontiskos

The quote you exchange shows exactly the opposite of what you are claiming.

It is necessary to survive. — AmadeusD

Exactly what I claimed, is exactly what I said. This is going to make the rest of this reply pretty ridiculous...

If you can't give truthful answers to questions posed to yo — Leontiskos

Quite frankly, sit the whole way down. This type of charge is utterly beneath you. You are wrong and I've just shown that clearly.

...That's a bit like playing chess and then saying, "I'm not going to move until you tell me your strategy, so that I know where I should move." — Leontiskos

I knew you'd say this, instead of answering. Ironic.

you give the answer, see if a false inference is drawn, and then address the false inference. — Leontiskos

You lie about such. Why would I bother?

is because it shows your claim about the arbitrariness of the good to be false. — Leontiskos

If you think this, not only is it clear you've not paid attention, it is clear you are just giving up because nothing I've said leads to the conclusion you drew before we even exchanged. Not my circus.

One only refuses to move when they are at a loss. — Leontiskos

False. If this is your position, I don't care. People refuse to answer shitty questions. As they should.

It simply does not follow from what I've said that true/false must be synonymous with good/bad, and "I find it silly" is in no way an argument for that odd claim. — Leontiskos

It does (give it a few days, and re-read the entire exchange. I dare you). It wasn't an argument. I find it silly and clearly wrong.

I take it that we both know, if we are using words accurately, that it is not an arbiter that makes 2+2=4 true. — Leontiskos

If you had paid any attention to my response, you'd know I don't agree with that. what the hell is going on dude - you're responding to my comments as if they are something other than what i've said.

I've not declared anything. I simply think you've failed to do what you are claiming to have done (and, in fact, you are just claiming that I must, secretly, accept your position)... It's sort of the opposite of what's being claimed, and its not something that can be 'gotten on with' as it were. I think this may be the end of this conversation if so. I imagine if we spoke in person or over the phone, this wouldn't be the case.

Ends are ordered to other ends. They either go on in an infinite regress, bottom out in irrational desires, or they are ordered to something sought for its own sake (e.g. happiness). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I may pluck this statement out of its somewhat cantankerous conversational context :wink: . . .

You seem to be saying that, if something is sought for its own sake (by me, let's say), then I ought to seek it -- that this generates the moral ought. Or is it that, if I am seeking it for its own sake, then I ought to continue to seek it? This appears definitionally obvious to you, I'm guessing, but clearly others don't understand why. Nor do I. Why does it follow? Where does the obligation come in?

(just to cut in, as I think that's a great question) The only instance in which I think such a brute reading of "ought" could be used is where one is "living" and wishes to continue "living". There are no other options, but death, which is no option at all unless we take a 'further fact' type view of ourselves. So, I think when Timothy runs from something as base as this, up to "You ought to not kick puppies, because you don't want to" the mistake is just missing the "don't want to" part in relation to a choice which could be otherwise.

Let's see what the Count has to say. I'm not sure I've understood him correctly. Then I'll respond to you more fully. But for now . . . I don't think the only other option is to add "because I don't want to" to explain a choice seen as obligatory. Suppose instead I added "because I think it's wrong." Does that generate an ought for anyone but me? In other words, the "ought" problem is bigger even than objective vs. subjective understandings of ethical values. It concerns universalizability.

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief.

Which beliefs are matters of faith and which are not, cannot be rendered in black and white terms.

Suppose instead I added "because I think it's wrong." — J

That amounts to the same thing**. We don't want to do things we feel are wrong. "I felt I had to" would present an issue. Is that's a more interesting avenue?

**after a bit of regression. Why do you think it's wrong? Because you don't want/like the outcome, i suppose.

That amounts to the same thing . . .after a bit of regression — AmadeusD

I realize it would do, from your point of view, but I'm saying that even if one accepted the idea of a genuine, non-subjective sense of "wrong," it doesn't help generate an ought. As it happens, I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them. But I don't agree with @Count Timothy von Icarus and others that this creates a moral obligation simpliciter that can be expressed as "you ought to do X."

"I felt I had to" would present an issue. Isn't that a more interesting avenue? — AmadeusD

Yes, that's a different case. Is it clear to you that it's even an ethical statement? I'm not sure. It sounds like a psychological description that could apply to many things, ethical or not. But I understand what you're trying to capture -- the sense that doing the right thing feels compelling, at a level below (or above) rational justification. Would an ethical subjectivist need to challenge that, do you think, and argue that the feeling is just that, a feeling, and doesn't point beyond itself?

A very good question. I am not convinced it's a coherent concept. It's like something being "factually Good". Just seems a nonsense to me. To me, I guess "good" would, in an ethical sense, be a relative term. "good for..." makes more sense than "good" bare to me.

Ok, that's fair. Now, I have been trying to present a largely Aristotlian ethics for the sake of simplicity, but I think it's worth noting that Aristotle's notion of goodness is ultimately quite compatible with Platonism and medieval Christian and Muslim philosophy, as well as most earlier Pagan ethics. It is, as far as I am aware, not that far off the notions underpinning the dominant historical ethics of India and China. All of these look at goodness in terms of ends, and look to ethics as the study of ends, particularly human ends (happiness/flourishing), and human excellences (virtues) which enable the individual and social attainment of such ends.

Your complaint has been that this is not "real ethics" because it doesn't deal with "ethical/moral good," a concept which you say you cannot define or provide a single example of, and which you say seems "incoherent." You fault the Aristotelian view for dealing in "empirical goods" which suggests to me that you also think that "real ethics" must deal with some sort of a priori innate knowledge.

Either way, is this a fair demand? "For an ethics to be compelling and to be real ethics, it must match my definition of a sui generis moral good which I cannot define, nor give examples of, and which I have no clear notion of, given that I think my concept is itself wholly unintelligible."

Wouldn't it rather be the case that Aristotle, Confucius, Aquinas, Cicero, Al Farabi, etc.'s possession of an actually intelligible notion of goodness and the human good is point in their favor, not a knock against them?

You seem to be saying that, if something is sought for its own sake (by me, let's say), then I ought to seek it -- that this generates the moral ought.

How about this, why don't you try defining "moral ought" and "moral good" in the sense you are using them?

This appears definitionally obvious to you, I'm guessing, but clearly others don't understand why. Nor do I. Why does it follow? Where does the obligation come in?

I think you should probably take Alasdair MacIntyre's thesis as much more plausible after exchanges like these. Apparently, you think "moral goodness" doesn't necessarily depend on ends and that the will doesn't seek goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable) but rather that "if something is 'morally good,' there is a unique 'moral ought' that denotes that some end should be sought as an end for no reason (e.g. it being desirable) except that it is 'morally good.'

Since you think the egoist has very strong, rational arguments for not pursuing this "moral good," I can only assume that you think such a good isn't "good" in virtue of being ordered to truly desirable ends, but rather that we have some sort of "moral ought" to desire things that are "morally good," or else some duty to perform them even though they aren't actually desirable.

I struggle to conceive of what "good" is even supposed to denote in this context except the sort of bare, inscrutable "thou shalt" that underpins voluntarist divine command theories. It's obviously not the normal use of the word "good," which denotes orientation towards some (desired) end. When we say "this is a good car," we do not mean "thou shalt desire/choose this car" for instance. When someone is a "good guitar player," we also don't tend to mean "they play guitar in accordance with the 'thou shalt.'"

That is, you seem to be saying: "things are not good because they are truly desirable, but rather 'because something is 'morally good' the will has a sui generis 'moral ought' to seek it.'"


Here is my challenge: explain in virtue of what something is "morally good" in this way in a non-circular manner. Explain why something ought to be sought as an end because it is "morally good."

To me the questions:
Why ought men try to be happy instead of miserable?
Why ought we prefer truth to falsity?
Why ought we prefer the better to the worse?
Why ought organisms try to survive and reproduce (i.e. fulfill their natural ends)?

...just make me want me to ask: "what do you think 'ought' means/derives from?" Because it starts to look a lot like "you ought do what is 'morally good' and something is 'morally good' because it is what ought be done."

I realize it would do, from your point of view, but I'm saying that even if one accepted the idea of a genuine, non-subjective sense of "wrong," it doesn't help generate an ought. As it happens, I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them. But I don't agree with @Count Timothy von Icarus and others that this creates a moral obligation simpliciter that can be expressed as "you ought to do X."

Can you explain any derivation of such a "moral ought?"

I've had occasion to say this before, but it bears repeating: I really appreciate your willingness to consider these questions with the care and thoroughness that you do.

I realize it would do, from your point of view, but I'm saying that even if one accepted the idea of a genuine, non-subjective sense of "wrong," it doesn't help generate an ought. As it happens, I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them. But I don't agree with Count Timothy von Icarus and others that this creates a moral obligation simpliciter that can be expressed as "you ought to do X."

Can you explain any derivation of such a "moral ought?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, not as an absolute, non-hypothetical obligation. I don't think that can be done. When I say to you (anyone), "I think you ought to do X," what I mean is, "If you accept the values A, B, C, which you tell me you do, then you ought to do X." A lot of the unclarity around this discussion comes from denying the difference, epistemologically, between knowing what is of value, and knowing what one ought to do. You believe they involve the same process -- rationality, broadly -- and I do not. I think that recognizing moral (and aesthetic) values is non-rational -- people can't be shown them rationally -- and involves techniques that are at base experiential. However, once there is agreement on such values, the question of what one ought to do, given those values, becomes tractable.

Is this any help?

That is, you seem to be saying: "things are not good because they are truly desirable, but rather 'because something is 'morally good' the will has a sui generis 'moral ought' to seek it.'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, there's a third alternative, as I tried to outline above. There's nothing sui generis about the moral ought. It's a good old hypothetical imperative.* Where all the confusion comes in, is when we also try to claim that values are transparent to the rational mind in this way. This inevitably leads to the idea that values themselves could be "derived" in some way, from first premises. As I understand the question, they can't -- but that doesn't mean that everyone's perception/intuition/experience of values is equally correct. It's quite possible to perceive incorrectly. This is not a brief for ethical relativism.

Explain why something ought to be sought as an end because it is "morally good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm afraid that the whole set-up with "ends" is part of the rationalist tradition about values which I find suspect. I hold "compassion" to be one of the key virtues. Do I believe that acting compassionately is an end in itself? In a way; it can't be rationally justified, anyway. But does that mean that no further ethical dilemmas can be posed -- that it will always be obvious what the compassionate choice is? Certainly not. So, in your terms, would you want to say that this represents an "end"? I honestly don't know how we should think about that.

I think you should probably take Alasdair MacIntyre's thesis as much more plausible after exchanges like these. Apparently, you think "moral goodness" doesn't necessarily depend on ends and that the will doesn't seek goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable) but rather that "if something is 'morally good,' there is a unique 'moral ought' that denotes that some end should be sought as an end for no reason (e.g. it being desirable) except that it is 'morally good.' — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe I understand you here. But doesn't MacIntyre say that Classical terms like "goodness" have lost their original meanings, in the modern context? And that therefore we shouldn't use them, unless we use them as the Greeks did? But that presupposes that conceptual development is precluded by a fixed vocabulary. Let's say I deny that "the will seeks goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable)." Wouldn't MacIntyre say that I am simply wrong about the will and about goodness, based on the only coherent meanings the words can have, i.e., their Classical roots? I don't find that thesis plausible, no, but I agree with him, and with you, that a thorough understanding of the conceptual development of key philosophical terms is important.


* I'm deliberately ignoring the Kantian categorical imperative in this discussion, since I don't think it represents the kind of "ought" you're interested in. I think there's a lot to be said for the cat. imp., but that's because it is procedural. It doesn't claim to generate the content of ethics. Anyway, a whole other discussion.

Either way, is this a fair demand? "For an ethics to be compelling and to be real ethics, it must match my definition of a sui generis moral good which I cannot define, nor give examples of, and which I have no clear notion of, given that I think my concept is itself wholly unintelligible." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ergo:

The reason the "morality" of "non-naturalism" cannot affect choices is because this "morality" is by definition undefined. For Michael a "non-naturalist" is just someone who has no idea what the word "moral" is supposed to mean. Anyone who has a definition of the word "moral" thereby fails to be a "non-naturalist." It's basically, "If you have an answer to my question, then you don't have an answer to my question. I'm only accepting answers from those who don't have answers."

So this is one of those cases where someone who doesn't know what a word means can't do things with that word. There is nothing strange about this. — Leontiskos

(Michael consistently does this same thing. He argues against morality, but when you ask him what he means by "morality" he admits that he has no definition. And yet when you offer a definition he says, "That's not the definition of morality." @J is in much the same boat, but he doesn't even have a grasp of logical argumentation in the first place and therefore his plight is a bit more pronounced.)

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross

A good approach. :up:

The quote you exchange shows exactly the opposite of what you are claiming. — AmadeusD

You are wrong and I've just shown that clearly. — AmadeusD

I find it silly and clearly wrong. — AmadeusD

This is the sort of thing you do, and it has nothing to do with argumentation or philosophy. These are not arguments. You need to learn to give arguments for your claims. Obviously I am not the first to tell you this, nor will I be the last.

Honestly, I would suggest that you study the question of what an argument is, and then begin discerning whether your posts contain any (or how many they contain, and of what quality). There are a very large number of people on TPF who don't know what an argument is, so this is not specific to you. Understood aright, that question is not elementary; it is vastly interesting.

From the point of view of moral realists like you and me... — J

Here's the sober truth: You are not a moral realist. Here is SEP:

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism... — Moral Realism | SEP

Wake up, dude. Time to stop asserting things you know to be false. The reason you are constantly arguing against moral realism is because you don't believe it. You don't believe that there are factually true moral claims. Why pretend otherwise? Why deceptively play both sides and pretend to be what you are not? You will do yourself and everyone else a huge favor if you simply admit that you are not a moral realist. Until that happens the whole conversation is built on a pretense/lie, and that lie will continue to color all of the strange edifice built atop it.

I just did, lmao. If you don't think my assessment was accurate, then please provide a substantial rebuttal.

By "black and white" I was not referring to text. :roll:

I know, Janus: I know.