That you think "ought" must imply "obligation" is perhaps indictive of the problem I mentioned about an ethical tradition that ultimately grows out of voluntarism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. From earlier:

"Ought to be chosen" != "Obligatory" — Leontiskos

-

I am pointing out that the objections in this thread are based on no definitions at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It happens too often on TPF.

And then to the question: "what is this x that real tiger possess?" the answer is: "I don't know, it probably doesn't exist" or "x exists but it is inaccessible to reason." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This road has been traveled in the past and @J doesn't seem to have an answer.

It's perhaps indictive of the voluntarism underpinning the ethics (and metaphysics) of command (law) and obedience (duty). I think this is why anti-realists so often claim that divine command theory is a good theory of ethics, and what any "real ethics" would look like, if only God existed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Michael certainly resonates with this Anscombian genealogy, but I think J may be better characterized by Simpson's genealogy. I think Kant is really the antecedent to J's skepticism. The ice of Kantian morality is not thick enough to support those living in the 21st century. But it's certainly possible that J's views are more theologically informed.

Duty and natural law aren't situated in anything broader here — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep.

In general the moral anti-realists of TPF don't know what to do with the modern subjective/objective distinction, but I think you are also right that there is something one-dimensional and brittle about the way they conceive of the possibility of morality. Morality in the modern period is like a tree which lost all its antifragility as its roots dried up. Morality became this autonomous being, sequestered from everyday life and incompatible with mundane decisions. It atrophied and died in quarantine.

With that said, there are more productive ways to approach such difficulties. First we define morality as that which pertains to rational action, at which point we can try to relate various subdivisions: categorical/exceptionless moral norms, non-hypothetical ought-judgments, weighted moral values or "ceteris paribus rules," and hypothetical imperatives. The tendency among our moral anti-realists is to reduce moral norms to the first subdivision: categorical/exceptionless norms, probably because this is the most potent kind of moral norm. Its potency also makes it the hardest to justify, and therefore it is understandable that someone who reduces all of morality to the most potent variety of morality also comes to the conclusion that morality itself is impossible to justify, and that morality is therefore little more than a pipe dream.

But there may be a second reason we tend to focus on that first subdivision. Presumably liberalism and individualism make us very sensitive to impositions, and this is why we have become even more sensitive to categorical/exceptionless norms. Modern man is like the prey whose only predator is the categorical/exceptionless norm, and therefore he has a tendency to be overattentive to it, over-scrutinizing it (and then, unsurprisingly, depriving it of existence). Morality thus becomes a defensive game rather than a comprehensive approach "permeating all aspects of life." The question J is always ultimately asking is, "What right have you to impose your rationality/morality on others?" If he were to yield to realism and real definitions he would have to forfeit that schtick, and of course if tigers are real then they might eat you.

Perhaps the pedagogical approach in these dialogues is to abandon the categorical/exceptionless subdivision for a time and develop the natural roots of morality. (I think this is the direction you are taking things.) Absent divine commands, that subdivision cannot be sustained without deeper roots of the more natural and pragmatic forms of morality.

(This is to say that the definition which eludes J and AmadeusD is bound up with categorical/exceptionless moral norms. The idea is that morality is really about rules which admit of no exceptions (and this flows simultaneously from both Kant and divine command theory). The exceptionless character of the rules makes them autonomous, sovereign, untethered to any ulterior considerations, particularly prudential ones. To give a reason for an exceptionless rule is almost inevitably to undermine the exceptionlessness of the rule itself. It's not an unworthy puzzle, and I think it comes down to the same issue of ratiocination vs intellection. ...And nevermind the fact that J's pluralism will balk at the idea of intellection, even though his mystical "metanoia" is quite similar to it.)

What you need to do is recognize that religious people are human beings, that human beings are not merely irrational, and then you need to generate a sincere interest in understanding why they believe the things they do. — Leontiskos

I don’t recall saying religious people aren’t human beings. I thought you disliked rhetorical stunts like this.

I was simply asking that we consider evidence in regard to the difference between faith and belief.

Because suppose you ask the question, "There are 2.4 billion people in the world who are Christians. Why are they Christians?" The answer, "Because they are emotional and irrational," is just plain stupid. — Leontiskos

I was saying that atheists find 'faith' used to justify a belief in god as irrational — the concept we are discussing. I did not make the argument that, beyond this, all Christians are emotional and irrational.

People who think 2.4 billion humans basically form beliefs in the absence of evidence or contrary to evidence simply don't understand the first thing about human psychology. They are so biased against religion that they adopt psychologically absurd theories. They are conspiracy theorists. — Leontiskos

This may be true, but we weren’t talking about human psychology, nor have I argued what you’ve written here, so it’s a bit of a red herring.

I have read Aquinas on faith, Avery Dulles' historical survey of faith, Pieper's essay on faith, Martin Laird's dissertation-derived book on faith, Ratzinger's treatment, and various academic encyclopedias on the topic. — Leontiskos

Not sure if this is an appeal to authority or if you’re saying that you only read writers who are Christians, mostly Catholics. Either way, this does not mean that you are right about faith. It just means that you have a very specific frame you wish to prosecute here. But I have already said you may be right about this, I wanted to have the conversation and not be shut down with "I know better". Nor is it helpful to be told what kind of atheist I am, or who would laugh at me, since these are just rhetorical tricks, which are worthy of David Bentley Hart — entertaining though he is.

Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists would get a good laugh out of that sort of intellectual unseriousness. — Leontiskos

My background is in sociology, and my staff teams have psychologists, anthropologists, health science graduates. Most of them would agree with me on faith. It comes up. But I wouldn’t presume to offer this as justification for my own position.

If we have no common point of departure, then we will just talk past each other by using different definitions of 'faith'. — Leontiskos

Maybe this is the case. Perhaps our differences are too great.

Thank you, I've enjoyed the discussion immensely and am interested to learn more about the use of and limitations of the word faith. I'm just not sure it's you who can assist right now.

I'd be interested to know what a good secular philosopher would say about this discussion.

Are there any atheists you respect, or do you think the position is irredeemably unjustifiable?

I would just clarify that faith is about trust in the strict sense of "in an authority". I could trust in the chair in that "this chair will hold me if I sit on it" because I believe it is made of strong materials and bolts by my inspection; but this kind of 'trust' is not the same as if I were to trust the chair craftsman that made it and this is why I believe it will hold me. Of course, both of these kinds of trust are in play with most of our beliefs; but it is worth separating them out for this discussion. I would say the only legitimate, strict sense of 'trust' is this kind that is in an authority. — Bob Ross

So, at the risk of becoming boring, if I trust that a plane will fly me somewhere safely because of empirical evidence that they do, almost without fail, would it be fair to call this 'faith' in flying? How does this compare to faith that God is a real?

So, at the risk of becoming boring, if I trust that a plane will fly me somewhere safely because of empirical evidence that they do, almost without fail, would it be fair to call this 'faith' in flying? How does this compare to faith that God is a real? — Tom Storm

I feel the framing is geared towards conflict from the get go. We're invited to emphasise the difference. What, in ongoing social praxis, does it even mean to "trust that a plane will fly me somewhere safely"? That's certainly the expectation I have when I get on a plane, but it's rarely topical in the moment. I don't worry that the plane will crash: I get on it, and then, if I don't plummet with it, I get off it again.

Similarly, the focus on "faith that god is real" seems off, too. That's just the point of departure for atheists, but that's usually not what faith is about for Christians (at least not those I know, most of whom are Roman Catholic). Faith in God comes with a sense of being taken care of, I feel. God knows what's best. So, in the context of flying, if I get on a plane, and I have faith in God, that's going to cover both landing safely (thanks), and crashing (if that's the divine plan...). So as an atheist, I know that planes can crash, and I know that planes can crash with me in them, so if I am in a plane that crashes I have no more resources. If it becomes clear that the plane will not land safely, the only way is down. A theist may have a slightly better time in the last moments, via praying.

So what are we comparing here to begin with? I'm aware that this is a common talking point of apologists. See? I have faith, too. But there's something very real I don't have here. What, despite being frightened, would an apologist expect of me while in a crashing plane? What do I invoke? That - I think - is what we'd need to target. "Bad luck?" "Cursing the neglectful maintanence staff? The suits who don't want to invest?" What sort of narrative do they think we have here?

Clearly, both theists and atheists don't expect to crash when they get on a plane, and clearly both can find themselves in a crashing plane, and not quite as clearly but still somewhat transparently, both know that they can find themselves in a crashing plane before they get on. When the expectation isn't met, then what? If faith in God has an effect in such a situation, what do I have in its place, and what is its effect? What would the apologist expect here?

For me, it'd likely be a mix of fear and air sickness; I wouldn't be surprised if airsickness would be at the forefront of my mind ("Air sickness sucks, but at least it won't last long," is also a type of humour that I can see asserting itself in such a situation.)

What, in ongoing social praxis, does it even mean to "trust that a plane will fly me somewhere safely" — Dawnstorm

Theists often say to atheists, “You guys live by faith too—every time you fly.” I wouldn’t have thought to compare those two ideas myself.

I raised it because it seems like an equivocation.

The point is you don’t need faith that planes fly; the empirical evidence of their capabilities is so strong that to doubt this would be irrational.

Similarly, the focus on "faith that god is real" seems off, too — Dawnstorm

Evangelicals I sometimes converse with tell me, “God is real.” I ask how they know that. They say, 'my faith tells me it's true." It’s not my argument; I’m just responding to it.

So what are we comparing here to begin with? — Dawnstorm

We are comparing faith in the truth of a particular God with a reasonable expectation and belief in successful plane flight and, particularly, the role of evidence in both.

Clearly, both theists and atheists don't expect to crash when they get on a plane, and clearly both can find themselves in a crashing plane, and not quite as clearly but still somewhat transparently, both know that they can find themselves in a crashing plane before they get on. — Dawnstorm

The discussion has nothing to do with how anyone feels while on a plane or if, in rare instances, one may crash.

The point is you don’t need faith that planes fly; the empirical evidence of their capabilities is so strong that to doubt this would be irrational. — Tom Storm

Similarly, there's evidence that planes sometimes crash. How many people check statistics to make an informed decision? So what's rational here? Your motivation? The act when analysed later?

I don't think you're wrong here; I just think that emphasising rationality like that feels wrong. So:

Theists often say to atheists, “You guys live by faith too—every time you fly.” I wouldn’t have thought to compare those two ideas myself.

I raised it because it seems like an equivocation. — Tom Storm

Yes, I know. The version I'm familiar with is "...that the ceiling won't crash down on you." Same thing.

If this is an equivocation, I think, it's one that arises when theists and atheist meet on the topic of God, and that situation isn't an ideal frame, because the ideal self-image of both parties tends to remain implied. I think it needs to be put on the table.

The discussion has nothing to do with how anyone feels while on a plane or if one may crash. — Tom Storm

Yes, I know. But I think that including this could maybe tease out what the evangelist means when he says you have faith, too. If I have faith that a plane won't crash, but I find myself in a plane that does crash: how does he think I would behave? Denial? The plane doesn't crash, I'll be fine. Confusion? "My plane, my plane, why have you forsaken me?" A faith that isn't tested in a situation of crisis doesn't seem to amount to much, so invoking a crisis situation (and one I'm fully aware of when I board a plane) might help understand where their coming from - at least in a way that insisting on your rationality won't.

So:

We are comparing faith in God with a reasonable expectation of successful airplane flight and, particualry, the role of evidence in both. — Tom Storm

Yes, but it's divvied up as "theists have faith in God," and "atheists have faith that planes won't crash". So rather than insisting on me having "reasonable expectations", I'd rather question if theists don't also have "faith that planes won't crash" in the sense that atheist do. If they're honest interlocutors you could maybe tease out if they'd use the word on themselves, or if "faith in God" somehow supersedes here and makes a difference. If you make the comparison uncritically, you're ending up with a lopsided comparison.

Or differently put: is there a difference in reasonable expactions of succesful airplane flight between theists and atheists? If no, whey invoke the comparison. If yes, what is it? Can they explain, or is it an intuitive half-understood thing.

Basically, you're comparing a circumstance that only has a place in the self-image of one of you with a situation that, I would imagine, has a place in the self-image of both (that is both theists and atheists can imagine themselves in a crashing plane, but only theists can imagine themselves believing in God.)

If it turns out that the theist, once contemplating this, thinks what you really have faith in isn't "flying" but, say, "luck" (anything closer to the abstraction level of "faith in God") then it seems to me that the evidence-question could take the backseat, and it's really about different modes of ordering and interpreting experience.

My background is in sociology — Tom Storm

This is just an aside: I've got a degree in sociology, but have been out of the loop for 25 to 30 years, now, but the theoretical background that fit me the most back then would have been Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. If you're familiar with this, I'm probably leaning towards looking at a conflict situation from the point of view of routine and a personal need for ontological security. Where do your time-space paths intersect, and where do they diverge? What motivates the comparison here for either of you? Do you generally leave these situations with predictable outcomes? A typical social situation with typical outcome for both parties. Rarely any surprise. A game of metaphysical ping pong.

I am referring to AmadeusD's contention that the "good" and "ought" of most ethics is not a true "moral good" or "moral ought" (which you seemed to be agreeing with?), while nonetheless being unable to describe or give examples of what such a "moral good" or "moral ought" would even entail. — Count Timothy von Icarus

OK, this helps. I don't know if I've got @AmadeusD right, but I think the position you're describing would be something like: When we say "ought" in an ethical context, we mean "I ought to do this if I hold certain values and wish to achieve them." I took him to mean that asking for a further, special "moral ought" -- which would be categorical, and which would also specify the values -- is a mistake. If that's what he meant, then clearly he can't give any examples because he thinks there aren't any. Is that absurd? Or am I still not getting it?

Turning to my own thoughts: I don't think you can generate a moral ought from an "is" -- or a definition, or a first premise. I'm not sure how that fits into the situation you describe. Perhaps you think it must be absurd to claim to be a moral realist and yet not base values on rational premises? I don't see that, but please say more about it, if that's what you mean.

It's strange to me that someone would accept facts about values, and facts about human flourishing, but not ethics on the grounds that the aforementioned are not properly "moral." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure they're properly moral. But they don't generate an ought. Being moral is not rationally obligatory.

What's the idea: "There are facts about what is good and evil, but this tells us nothing about what one ought to do?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ought to do if what?

this seems bizarre to me. "This car is better in every way, and cheaper," doesn't provoke the response "ok, so this one is clearly better, but I don't know which I ought to pick, the better or the worse?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm afraid it's still not categorical, because you're assuming a desire for a car. What would be bizarre would be this: "I want a good car, and this car is better in every way, but I don't know which to pick." Again, the difference between a value and an "ought."

Obligation and duty are one reason why it might be good to do something. That you can find no connection between "x is best" and "you should choose x," would seem to lie in this idea you have that any "ought" must be in the context of some sort of command, a "thou shalt." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is good. It's true that a deontological approach will tend to emphasize the obligatory concepts involved in ethics. But I don't think knowing "what is best" in ethics (which, from the standpoint of a non-Aristotelian, doesn't at all resemble knowing what a good car is) can result in the statement, "Therefore, you should do what is best."

Let's stay with your car example. You agree, I'm sure, that it's reasonable for a person to say, "Yes, I quite see that this is the best car, but as I don't want a car, I won't buy it." However, you don't think it's reasonable for a person to say, "Yes, I quite see that this action X is the best thing to do, ethically, but as I'm not interested in the ethical good, I won't do it." That's probably where our conceptions differ. You think that to be a human generates an automatic interest in a single best way to live -- or, perhaps, that it's impossible for a human not to want the best way to live, however misguided they may be. Would that it were so!

One of us has a definition. The Good is "that at at which all things aim." I am not dogmatically rejecting any other definitions (indeed, I asked for them), I am pointing out that the objections in this thread are based on no definitions at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the dogmatism -- though that may be too strong -- lies in your insistence that only "providing a definition" will further the discussion, which in turn implies that the entire subject is capable of such definitions. Some of your interlocutors don't believe it is. I'm not that skeptical, but I do think the "dueling definitions" method is not the only way to approach a deep philosophical subject. For instance, my reply to your request for a definition of capital-G Good would be, "There is no single definition. The term is used in a variety of contexts and intentions, especially within ethics. Let's look at some of them and see what we can learn." Is that really such an illegitimate starting point?

The other issue of dogmatism here -- and forgive me if this is too harsh -- is that I often get the sense that you think any position that contradicts Aristotle or the Scholastics must be wrong -- that this is your starting point. I'm sure you try to be fair, but the (strong) preference is apparent. You believe Aristotle & Co. discovered all the important philosophical truths long ago. But please correct me if this is ungenerous.

Tigers being "aquatic reptiles" might be "absurd," but there is certainly a dialogue to be had about why it is wrong, and why "tigers are large stripped cats" is better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course, as I said. Reasons can always be compared and judged.

This conversation seems more to me like "tigers aren't large striped cats because real tigers are x." And then to the question: "what is this x that real tiger possess?" the answer is: "I don't know, it probably doesn't exist" or "x exists but it is inaccessible to reason." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, the quest for definitions. I really wouldn't approach such a conversation by trying to find some essence that a real tiger possesses. I might say, "Here are the problems I see with your concept of a tiger [if I saw any]. Let's see if we can work our way toward a better understanding."

What is your definition of "faith"? So far, it sounds like it is "believing something despite the evidence".

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason.

To be fair, I do think that there is a prominent sense colloquially where confused theists will explain faith in this manner; but I think if we are iron manning the position then what they really mean is that some propositions that they believe as true they could not completely verify themselves but, rather, they trusted some authority, in this case God, to tell them. This isn’t really what it strictly means to “have no good reasons”, but people will describe it that way colloquially (sometimes).

It is also worth mentioning, to @Bannos point, we do see instances of religious people that may find that there good evidence that proposition X is false but yet they believe it is true because God has revealed it to them; but it is important to note that this is still trust in God which is based in some sort of evidence, of which they at least believe is good and sufficient, that God is trustworthy to reveal it.

My original issue with faith is that Christians often tell me that choosing to fly in a plane is an act of faith equivalent to belief in God
…
So, at the risk of becoming boring, if I trust that a plane will fly me somewhere safely because of empirical evidence that they do, almost without fail, would it be fair to call this 'faith' in flying? How does this compare to faith that God is a real?

If you believe, even in part, that the airplane will not crash because you trust the pilots to do their job (e.g., without drinking on the job, without making an improper turn, etc.); then that belief is in part faith-based: it has an element of faith mixed up in it. However, if you believe that the airplane will fly just fine because you are in expert in airplane manufacturing and you inspected the plane beforehand, then this is a non-faith-based belief.

It is important to note that this distinction doesn’t appear cleanly in practical life: odds are, e.g., even if you are an expert on airplane manufacturing that your beliefs accredited from your learning and experience which make you an expert have faith mixed up in them since you probably are not capable of verifying, all the way down (so to speak), those beliefs without appealing to trust in some authority.

First, we can demonstrate that planes exist.

Of course, a theist is going to say we can demonstrate God exists: you are just begging the question. If we are talking about faith as trust in an authority for our belief about a proposition, then IF God exists then certainly God would have the authority to tell us quite a bit about reality (if He so chooses)---right? You don’t have to accept that God exists to accept that God WOULD BE a credible source of information BUT THAT one would have to trust in God as the source, at least in part, of the truths which they believe because God revealed it to them.

Second, they almost always fly safely.

I am assuming you are referring to statistics here; but statistics are faith-based. You have to trust that the people that conducted the stats did it in an unbiased, professional, honest, and proper way to determine them.

Forget the New Atheists - that was a publishing gimmick. I think this definition of faith has been used by freethinkers for many decades. It was certainly the one Russell used, long before Hitchens and company were being polemicists. I was using it back in the 1980's.

I am not familiar enough with Russell to comment; but in common life it seems like New Atheism is to blame for people commonly thinking of faith as belief without or despite evidence: this has never been the common understanding in the literature of faith (by my lights) if we are iron manning theism that depends on divine revelation.

It is also worth mentioning that not all forms of theism are faith-based, just like how not all forms of theism are religions, since someone might not believe that God has revealed anything to them; so they don’t have any faith in God even though they believe God exists.

I don’t recall saying religious people aren’t human beings. I thought you disliked rhetorical stunts like this. — Tom Storm

When your first move is to just to assume that 2.4 billion people are irrational, you've obviously implied that 2.4 billion people are not rational human beings.

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god.

Faith in airplanes is not irrational because we can demonstrate that they exist and that people fly safely every second of the day.
Therefore, faith in airplanes is not unwarranted. — Tom Storm

"I think religion is irrational therefore everyone who is religious is irrational; and I think faith in airplanes is rational therefore everyone who is afraid of flying is irrational."

Talk about thinking the world revolves around you! What about the billions of people who disagree with you on both scores? Just because you think something is irrational doesn't make it irrational. Heck, you couldn't even make it through a popular level treatise on the lexical nature of the word 'faith'. Maybe you need to dial down the faith you have in yourself?

I was simply asking that we consider evidence in regard to the difference between faith and belief. — Tom Storm

Again, to think that the billions of people who disagree with you on both scores are uninterested in evidence is wildly naive and bigoted. I'm not sure how else to put it.

I was saying that atheists find 'faith' used to justify a belief in god as irrational — the concept we are discussing. I did not make the argument that, beyond this, all Christians are emotional and irrational. — Tom Storm

Why are you giving the atheist view if you don't agree with it? It's pretty clear that you yourself agree with that view. Your earlier definition of faith was similarly pejorative and irrational. (And in any case, I have no idea what atheism has to do with flying.)

If you are going to define faith as believing things without reason/evidence, then you've implicitly called all those who engage in faith irrational.

This may be true, but we weren’t talking about human psychology, nor have I argued what you’ve written here, so it’s a bit of a red herring. — Tom Storm

So you want to imply that 2.4 billion people are foundationally irrational while prescinding from the facts of human psychology, because "we weren't talking about human psychology"? :roll: :zip:

I wanted to have the conversation and not be shut down with "I know better". — Tom Storm

But that's all you've been doing the whole time, saying, "I know better." I've asked you to be serious, objective, look at dictionaries, philosophy of religion, history, and I even provided an essay that delves into all of these aspects.

I'd be interested to know what a good secular philosopher would say about this discussion.

Are there any atheists you respect, or do you think the position is irredeemably unjustifiable? — Tom Storm

Faith in atheists is a rather odd approach. What sources do you trust? Are there encyclopedias that you trust? Publishing houses? Dictionaries? That's how you should proceed. For example, if you trust SEP then you should consult it. If you trust Oxford University Press then you should consult it.

As far as self-proclaimed atheists qua atheists, Austin Dacey is the only one I have read in this vein. Dacey is not irrational enough to believe that 2.4 billion people are just believing things without evidence, but the same is true of any atheist with half a brain.

But consulting atheists about religious faith is like telling your wife that she believes X and X is irrational, and then when she objects, instead of consulting her about her beliefs you go consult someone who fundamentally dislikes her. There are probably people who fundamentally dislike her and yet remain objective, but that would still be a weird-ass approach to assessing your wife's beliefs. She would probably slap you, and you would probably deserve it.

When you define religious faith as belief without evidence, you are saying that it is a form of irrationality. When you say that religious faith is a form of irrationality, you are committing yourself to the claim that the billions of religious believers are foundationally irrational in a central part of their life. And now combine this with a remarkable ignorance of religious traditions and theology.

That's a mind-boggling level of bigotry. Off the charts. I recognize that there are some unfortunate areas of the world where this level of anti-religious bigotry is not only socially acceptable, but is actively fostered. In those locales anti-religious bigots can pass themselves off as polite, respectable, reasonable, etc. Nevertheless, the level of bigotry which glibly states that billions of people are foundationally irrational is not polite, respectable, or reasonable. It is problematic; it is insulting to religious people; and it is insulting to all rational human beings who are opposed to bigotry. I am not impressed.

OK, this helps. I don't know if I've got @AmadeusD right, but I think the position you're describing would be something like: When we say "ought" in an ethical context, we mean "I ought to do this if I hold certain values and wish to achieve them." I took him to mean that asking for a further, special "moral ought" -- which would be categorical, and which would also specify the values -- is a mistake. If that's what he meant, then clearly he can't give any examples because he thinks there aren't any. Is that absurd? Or am I still not getting it?

"In order to be truly x, x must belong to category y."

"In virtue of what can any x be y? What makes x a member of y?"

"No clue. Membership in y is unintelligible."

That doesn't seem problematic to you?

Being moral is not rationally obligatory.

You seem to be saying that people can positively, correctly identify x as "truly, monstrously evil," but that this says absolutely nothing about whether one should or should not do x. What exactly do you think "goodness" or "evil" consists in then? (apparently nothing related to practical reason, which you seem to be rejecting).

What I find especially strange though is the contention that if one hypothetically accepts values, then oughts can be generated. So "if you hypothetically value y, and x is y, you should do x because it is y," works. And this is paired with the realist claim that things can be "truly good." But then you also claim that x being truly good can never generate an ought (yet accepting that x is good hypothetically can). What's the difference?

I'm afraid it's still not categorical, because you're assuming a desire for a car. What would be bizarre would be this: "I want a good car, and this car is better in every way, but I don't know which to pick." Again, the difference between a value and an "ought."

I can't even parse what you're trying to say here to be honest. Obviously the example involves car shopping. I chose it instead of something like "prudence is better than recklessness," to foreclose on the question "but is prudence really better?" which would be beside the point. An example about prudence being better than recklessness would be more general. It's the same thing thought. "Better" implies "you should choose this over what is worse."

Your claim is that "x is best" never implies "do x," and then you also seem to be saying that it is perfectly "rational" to choose the worse over the better. "Better" and "value" apparently have nothing to do with what should be chosen.

I'd just ask "in virtue of what is anything good?" Define what makes something good? What makes something better or worse?

In virtue of what is a practical judgement "rational" when one chooses the worse over the better?

What is "practical reason" given that facts about values have no bearing on how one should act?

I am not dogmatically sticking to Aristotle here, I am pointing out that your particular position is incoherent and you don't seem to understand what you mean by terms like "good," "better," "moral," or "ought."

I don't know why you think of yourself as a Kantian because from the Kantian perspective claiming that "x is good and y is evil, but this tells us nothing about whether we should do x or y" is gibberish. A Kantian does not say "it is good to treat everyone as an ends and not a means," and then scratch their head as to whether or not this can "generate an ought" whereby they should treat people as ends. Likewise, when Buddhists say it is better to avoid attachments and desire, they do not also mean "but the doesn't (cannot) suggest that you should avoid these things." Nor does Confucius, when he lauds filial piety, think that what he says indicates nothing about how people should treat their fathers.

There are good criticisms of Aristotlian ethics that have helped it develop. I am aware of none, however, that grant Aristotle facts about what is truly best, but then rely on the notion that the one cannot move from "x is better then y," to "so choose x," or that it is perfectly "rational" to choose the worse over the better. This is like claiming that "x is true and y is false," tells us nothing about which we should affirm (indeed, it seems to imply this is so).

…the level of bigotry which glibly states that billions of people are foundationally irrational is not polite, respectable, or reasonable. It is problematic; it is insulting to religious people… — Leontiskos

If it is not reasonable , would you then say that it is without evidence, and therefore irrational?

Ah well, we'll muddle on then. Your reply isn't quite what I had in mind by "achieving a critical center."

I can't tell whether your righteous indignation is genuine or just a performance. We're simply having a conversation about faith here. If that's enough to make you throw around insults and accusations so conspicuously, it suggests you might be struggling with the subject matter more than you're letting on. Is this a case of attack being the best defence?

I always assumed that engaging in philosophy means being open to challenging discussions and differing viewpoints. If disagreement feels like a personal attack to you, perhaps it's time to reflect on your commitment to philosophical inquiry. If you feel the need to twist other people’s arguments to justify such antipathy, perhaps you need to draw on your Christianity more deeply and find some compassion for those unlike yourself who are only asking questions. It’s not all about you, Brother.

To be fair, I do think that there is a prominent sense colloquially where confused theists will explain faith in this manner; but I think if we are iron manning the position then what they really mean is that some propositions that they believe as true they could not completely verify themselves but, rather, they trusted some authority, in this case God, to tell them — Bob Ross

Ok, well that seems a more reasonable explanation.

If you believe, even in part, that the airplane will not crash because you trust the pilots to do their job (e.g., without drinking on the job, without making an improper turn, etc.); then that belief is in part faith-based: it has an element of faith mixed up in it. — Bob Ross

So this is probably at the nub of our difference here. I generally hold that “faith” isn’t a useful term outside of the religious use. But I see that perhaps my position here is unorthodox. For me it’s about a reasonable confidence given empirical results of flight. There is no need for faith.

But thank you for helping me rethink my position. As I said to Leon much earlier, I may well be wrong about this; I’m just trying to talk this through.

I don't think 2.4 billion people are believing things without evidence. And we'd need to include other religions like 1.9 billion Muslims and 1.2 billion Hindus too. My view is that people believe in God for many reasons (faith not being the best of them), but mostly people hold the religion and values of their culture and upbringing.

I recall talking to some apartheid-era South Africans who had it on faith that black people were inferior to white people. That’s the problem with an appeal to faith – there is nothing that can't be justified using an appeal to faith, since it is not about evidence. As per Hebrews 11: 'Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.'

As far as self-proclaimed atheists qua atheists, Austin Dacey is the only one I have read in this vein. Dacey is not irrational enough to believe that 2.4 billion people are just believing things without evidence, but the same is true of any atheist with half a brain. — Leontiskos

Cool. Thanks, I will check him out.

I don’t think we should continue a conversation about faith since you’ve determined that I’m an unreasonable interlocutor, and so this can only go, even further, to shit.

What is your definition of "faith"? So far, it sounds like it is "believing something despite the evidence". — Bob Ross

This didn't come up on my notifications. Odd.

Starting a discussion with a definition is usually a mistake. It turns the conversation into a fight over whose definition is right. No stipulation will capture all the uses and implications of an interesting term. And for any stipulation, a counterexample is easy to find. Better to map the ground the term covers—by setting it alongside related ideas—than to try to trap it in a formula.

So instead I've been doing some mapping. "believing something despite the evidence" is part of that, since it sets out one extreme of faith - that one demonstrates great faith if one continues to believe despite what is evident.

We could do more along those lines, but the adversarial tone of these threads does not lend itself to that sort of thing.

- I am just appalled at your bigotry; at your unwillingness to openly consider the idea that 2.4 billion people might not be foundationally irrational. That sort of nonsense is appalling, after all. Maybe consider the idea that your whole approach to this topic is absurd, and that this is why you are being insulted.

I think the dogmatism -- though that may be too strong -- lies in your insistence that only "providing a definition" will further the discussion, which in turn implies that the entire subject is capable of such definitions. — J

The fact of the matter is that when you pretend to use a word, but you have no idea what you mean by that word, you are engaged in a form of sophistry. When you say something and someone asks, "What do you mean by that?," and you answer, "I don't know what I mean," then the onus is on you to backpedal and rework your argument. You can't just pretend to say things; you can't just use words that have no meaning, even to you. That's the point about (nominal) definitions.

Beyond that and as I've noted before:

When people on TPF and elsewhere contradict others for pages on end without giving any alternative account of their own, they are engaged in a dubious practice. — Leontiskos

If you really want to further the conversation you should set out your own account of morality, or your so-called "moral realism." Merely contradicting and opposing things that Count says isn't yet philosophy in any meaningful way. It's the Monty Python argument skit.

Are we able to talk without personal attack?

If so, then let's step this out.

It's hardly surprising that an atheist would consider religion to be wrong about reality and the world, just as you would consider the millions, perhaps a billion atheists to be wrong (possibly irrational) too.

But why stop at your precious 2.4 billion folks? Why not all the other billions of people from all the other religions?

I assume many Christians would hold that the 1.9 billion Muslims and 1.2 billion Hindus hold erroneous if not irrational beliefs.

So what?

I think faith is a bad pathway to truth. I'm talking about faith, not faiths. So we differ on this, and you appear to think you have transcendence and scholarship on your side. Isn't this what philosophy is about—conversations about positions that are different from our own?

If I'm wrong, there is nothing at stake here. I'm grappling with this material like anyone else.

As I said to Mr Ross -

I don't think 2.4 billion people are believing things without evidence. And we'd need to include other religions like 1.9 billion Muslims and 1.2 billion Hindus too. My view is that people believe in God for many reasons (faith not being the best of them), but mostly people hold the religion and values of their culture and upbringing. — Tom Storm

I hold a rather complex view on why people follow religions, and I spend a significant amount of time with theists (mainly Catholics). I am partial to Father Richard Rohr (no doubt a heretic to some) and to Thomas Merton. I consider spirituality to be a significant part of many people's lives.

But that doesn't mean I won't attempt to test views and thinking on a philosophy forum to see what works and what doesn't.

It's raining, so I'll play with the notion of faith a bit more.

An exercise from J. L. Austin is to look up a key term in a dictionary, then look up each main word in the definitions given, so as to build up a list of the sorts of concepts relating to the key term.

Here's "Faith" from dictionary.com.

noun
confidence or trust in a person or thing:
faith in another's ability.
belief that is not based on proof:
He had faith that the hypothesis would be substantiated by fact.
belief in God or in the doctrines or teachings of religion:
the firm faith of the Pilgrims.
belief in anything, as a code of ethics, standards of merit, etc.:
to be of the same faith with someone concerning honesty.
a system of religious belief:
the Christian faith;
the Jewish faith.
the obligation of loyalty or fidelity to a person, promise, engagement, etc.:
Failure to appear would be breaking faith.
the observance of this obligation; fidelity to one's promise, oath, allegiance, etc.:
He was the only one who proved his faith during our recent troubles.
Christian Theology. the trust in God and in His promises as made through Christ and the Scriptures by which humans are justified or saved.

I asked ChatGPT to find the main terms here and then list them. Here's the chat.

The summary is

In short: belief, trust, duty, loyalty, God, truth, and group affiliation seem to be the most tightly recurring conceptual anchors around "faith." — ChatGPT

When I expressed surprise that "certainty" was no amongst the terms, GPTChat replied:

"Certainty" didn’t really appear much in the original definition you gave, or in the secondary terms from the standard dictionary breakdowns we just did.
Instead, terms like "belief," "trust," and "confidence" dominated — but belief and trust don't necessarily imply certainty.
In fact, if you think in an Austinian way:
— faith (in these definitions) tends to involve confidence despite lack of full proof — rather than absolute certainty.
— Faith seems to operate where certainty is absent or incomplete.
You’re catching an important gap: faith is often about commitment without certainty. — ChatGPT

Just to be clear, ChatGPT was used here in order to cut the amount of work involved in Austin's method, which he envisioned as being done by a team of nerds in the confines of a few rooms in Oxford - after his experiences during the war... There will be the usual replies disparaging GPT, with most of which I would probably agree. But this is to indulge in an ad hominem (ad LLMinem?) in order to avoid engaging with the material - and this is exactly the sort of activity where a LLM might be useful in saving us some of the drudge.

How does this help? Well, your account was that faith involves trust in an authority. If this were so then we might expect to find "trust and "authority" amongst the main words found. While "trust" is there, "authority" isn't.

Anyway, I'll stop there for a bit. Breakfast time.

Oh and just to be clear, this is the sort of activity I suggest may be of more use than simply stipulating definitions.

Just to be clear, ChatGPT was used here in order to cut the amount of work involved in Austin's method, which he envisioned as being done by a team of nerds in the confines of a few rooms in Oxford - after his experiences during the war... — Banno

Fascinating!

Well, your account was that faith involves trust in an authority. If this were so then we might expect to find "trust and "authority" amongst the main words found. While "trust" is there, "authority" isn't. — Banno

Curious. Am I wrong to want to include 'evidence'?

I asked "Tom was surprised that "evidence" was not found."

Good — very sharp of Tom.
Actually, "evidence" was present, but not as frequently repeated across the whole set.
Let’s double-check:
"evidence" appeared clearly in the definitions of:
proof ("evidence or argument establishing fact")
hypothesis ("proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence")
It also indirectly relates to "proof," "truth," and "fact" — but "evidence" as a word didn’t show up much elsewhere.
Summary:
Evidence is important when faith is defined against proof — that is, faith as belief without direct evidence.
But once the definition of faith shifts toward loyalty, duty, trust, or group belonging, "evidence" falls away and isn't part of the conceptual structure anymore.
That absence itself is meaningful.
Austin would definitely note that faith talk often refuses or moves away from the domain where "evidence" operates — depending on the act being performed (e.g., declaring loyalty, expressing religious belonging). — ChatGPT

Notice the "But once the definition of faith shifts toward loyalty, duty, trust, or group belonging, "evidence" falls away and isn't part of the conceptual structure anymore"? This begins to show our differences in emphasis with the theists hereabouts. This is probably what causes Leon such indigestion.

But why stop at your precious 2.4 billion folks? — Tom Storm

To do you a favor. :lol:

I think faith_ath is a bad pathway to truth. — Tom Storm

Faith_ath is a bad pathway to truth. The point is that if you can't stop appealing faith_ath then you're just begging the question. You are committing fallacies, over and over. Pointing to the 2.4 billion was an attempt to help someone who isn't great at spotting their own logical fallacies. If you want to rise up to intellectual seriousness you will have to consider the idea that religious faith isn't faith_ath.

Some might find this tool interesting... a meta analysis from SEP.

https://www.inphoproject.org/idea/1569.html

or here:

https://www.hypershelf.org/sep/20/?doc=faith

That’s the problem with an appeal to faith – there is nothing that can't be justified using an appeal to faith, since it is not about evidence. As per Hebrews 11: 'Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.' — Tom Storm

This is ironic, Tom. "Conviction" is here translating elenchos, which in many translations is rendered as 'evidence.'

For example, the King James Version, "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This is a standard text for Christian treatments of faith.

But you're not being very philosophical, are you? It's just insults and ad hominems, presumably because you hate atheism and see everyone in the image of Dawkins or Hitchens.

You haven’t attempted to respond to this:

I recall talking to some apartheid-era South Africans who had it on faith that black people were inferior to white people. That’s the problem with an appeal to faith – there is nothing that can't be justified using an appeal to faith, since it is not about evidence. As per Hebrews 11: 'Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.' — Tom Storm

Maybe consider the idea that your whole approach to this topic is absurd, and that this is why you are being insulted. — Leontiskos

Well, you're the only one doing the insulting. I wonder why you feel this is necessary?

Provide some arguments. Dig in and show us how it is done. Make it easy for the dumb, uneducated atheist.

This is ironic, Tom. "Conviction" is here translating elenchos, which in many translations is rendered as 'evidence.'

For example, the King James Version, "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." — Leontiskos

Good that's better - I got this off the Revised Standard Version. But no doubt there are endless arguments about which translations are correct, etc.

Notice the "But once the definition of faith shifts toward loyalty, duty, trust, or group belonging, "evidence" falls away and isn't part of the conceptual structure anymore"? This begins to show our differences in emphasis with the theists hereabouts. This is probably what causes Leon such indigestion. — Banno

That has been my instinct for much of this. Interesting.

But you're not being very philosophical, are you? It's just insults and ad hominems, presumably because you hate atheism and see everyone in the image of Dawkins or Hitchens. — Tom Storm

Well, no. For example, pointing out that your bigotry flies in the face of human psychology is both an insult and an argument. It shows that you are not taking this topic seriously and it is an argument for why faith_ath is a facile concept.

You haven’t attempted to respond to this — Tom Storm

It's nothing more than another fallacious appeal to faith_ath. In a technical sense bigotry is basically just a whole lot of question-begging assertions.

Well, you're the only one doing the insulting. I wonder why you feel this is necessary? — Tom Storm

I just told you why: because your whole approach to this topic is absurd and bigoted. That's why you're being insulted.

Good that's better - I got this off the Revised Standard Version. But no doubt there are arguments about which translations are correct, ect. — Tom Storm

I gave you a link to a Greek lexicon. We don't have to limit ourselves to Biblical translations.

(I have Banno on ignore, but he is apparently still engaged in his habit of appealing to ChatGPT. Not sure why that sub-par approach is necessary when we have dictionaries and lexical studies to hand.)

Also noticed

...group belonging... — ChatGPT

This is an unaddressed aspect, worthy of some contemplation. Faith is about community, about "us" and "them"... as can be seen in this very thread. And community links to identity, going towards the defensive offensiveness seen in the posts on this page.