Which beliefs are matters of faith and which are not, cannot be rendered in black and white terms. — Janus
Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross
No, not as an absolute, non-hypothetical obligation. I don't think that can be done. When I say to you (anyone), "I think you ought to do X," what I mean is, "If you accept the values A, B, C, which you tell me you do, then you ought to do X." A lot of the unclarity around this discussion comes from denying the difference, epistemologically, between knowing what is of value, and knowing what one ought to do
You believe they involve the same process -- rationality, broadly -- and I do not. I think that recognizing moral (and aesthetic) values is non-rational -- people can't be shown them rationally -- and involves techniques that are at base experiential. However, once there is agreement on such values, the question of what one ought to do, given those values, becomes tractable...
No, there's a third alternative, as I tried to outline above. There's nothing sui generis about the moral ought. It's a good old hypothetical imperative.* Where all the confusion comes in, is when we also try to claim that values are transparent to the rational mind in this way. This inevitably leads to the idea that values themselves could be "derived" in some way, from first premises. As I understand the question, they can't -- but that doesn't mean that everyone's perception/intuition/experience of values is equally correct. It's quite possible to perceive incorrectly. This is not a brief for ethical relativism.
Second, in both the “Neo-Platonic” and rediscovered Aristotelian traditions Dante was exposed to, there are elements of the conception of truth that hew closer modern “identity theories” of truth. The human mind is capable of “becoming all things.”1 When man comes to know something (when the potential to know is actualized) the form of the thing know is, at least in part, present in his mind. This is not a representation of form. The intellect dematerializes the thing known, resulting in the mind becoming identical with the object of knowledge.
Of course, this does not imply that when we know an apple our minds “become apples,” for the two exist in distinct modes.2 However, it does mean that many of the epistemic issues that dominate modern thought and tend to impose a sense of unbridgeable distance between knower and known are absent from Dante’s conception. For instance, in the medieval understanding of signs, the Doctrina Signorum, the symbol that joins the knower and the known is not an impermeable barrier between the two, but the very means by which they are bound together in a nuptial union. The sign relation involves distinct elements, but it is not reducible to these; rather, the elements are what they are only in virtue of their participation in an irreducible triadic whole.
The importance of this sort of “union in knowing,” which is both a “being penetrated” by what is known and an ecstasis, a “going out beyond the self to the known,” for Dante cannot be overstated. The most erotic passage of the entire Commedia occurs at the end of Canto X of the Paradiso, in the Heaven of the Sun, where Dante meets the souls of the wise theologians who progressed furthest in knowledge of the divine:
Then, as the tower-clock calls us to come
at the hour when God's Bride is roused from bed
to woo with matin song her Bridegroom's love,
with one part pulling thrusting in the other,
chiming, ting-ting, music so sweet the soul,
ready for love, swells with anticipation
Paradiso, Canto X, lines 139-142
Indeed, the antiquated term “carnal knowledge,” with all its erotic connotations, gets far closer to the older view than the sterile formulation of “justified true belief.” The goal of Dante’s pilgrimage, and of all mankind, is ultimately to know God, which is also to love and be in union with God. Modern conceptions that make both love and knowledge an entirely internal affair cannot capture this erotic element of knowing the other as other. As Byung-Chul Han notes in The Agony of Eros, the modern “crisis of love… derives from… the erosion of the Other... Eros concerns the Other in the strong sense, namely, what cannot be encompassed by the regime of the ego.”3 The beatific vision at the climax of the Commedia is fundamentally an encounter with the other, not the conquest of the other by the self. It is not the “grasping” and “possession” of the other that Han finds in the modern ethos, but rather a union, an offering of the self to the other as a gift.i,ii
Yet this knowing does involve an internal dimension, a penetration of the self by the other. To know God requires “knowing by becoming.”iii As Dante rises higher into the Heavens in the Paradiso, and comes closer to God, he is increasingly able to bear the overwhelming brightness of Beatrice’s (revealed truth’s) smile, due to a continuous internal transformation (as opposed to cumulative acquisition). In this conception, the world is not held at arm’s length while we inspect our own mental representations of it. Rather, there is a sense in which we become what is known. Thus, to know God is “to attain the very best,” to become “like onto God” as much as we are able—the theosis or deification that is man’s ultimate telos in the Christian tradition...
...For Dante, as for most pre-moderns, man has a natural desire to know Truth.“Man's mind cannot be satisfied unless it be illumined by that Truth beyond which there exists no other truth.”1 This is another desire that unifies, just as it also purifies. As noted above, contemplation of this truth involves both a union and a becoming. Just as Plato thought that the “whole person” must be turned towards the Good before a person could properly know it, the Christian tradition sees asceticism, good works, the sacraments, and other aspects of the spiritual life as necessarily preceding such a contemplative vision.2
Dante’s use of the imagery of man’s“wings” is apt here. Man cannot ascend on damaged wings. Healing and repentance, a self-aware turning away from evil as evil and towards Goodness as good, must come prior to successful flight. The mastery (and eventually, regeneration) of the passions and the harmonious orientation of man’s conditioned “rational love” with his “natural love” for the Good must come prior to beatitude. Hence, it is precisely in pursuing his highest joy that a man will also be led to be a better father, neighbor, and citizen. First, because he is no longer ruled over by his appetites and passions, nor dependent on finite goods that diminish when shared. Second, because greater knowledge of the Good is transformative, such that the knower comes to love creatures as signs and manifestations of the Divine.3
↪J (just to cut in, as I think that's a great question) The only instance in which I think such a brute reading of "ought" could be used is where one is "living" and wishes to continue "living". There are no other options, but death, which is no option at all unless we take a 'further fact' type view of ourselves.
Maybe I understand you here. But doesn't MacIntyre say that Classical terms like "goodness" have lost their original meanings, in the modern context? And that therefore we shouldn't use them, unless we use them as the Greeks did? But that presupposes that conceptual development is precluded by a fixed vocabulary. Let's say I deny that "the will seeks goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable)." Wouldn't MacIntyre say that I am simply wrong about the will and about goodness, based on the only coherent meanings the words can have, i.e., their Classical roots? I don't find that thesis plausible, no, but I agree with him, and with you, that a thorough understanding of the conceptual development of key philosophical terms is important.
To the first, every philosopher is entitled to their own bedrock definitions, if they're not absurd, and this is not. All we can say in response is, That is not how I define the term. There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition.
Doesn't it seem problematic that your conception of "ought" makes it impossible to develop a single example of it? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think I arrived at this view through Bertrand Russell, who said: "...We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence." — Tom Storm
Is a definition of "ethics" and "good" that makes it impossible to demonstrate a single example of such an "ethical good" or to even explain under what conditions something could be said to be "ethically good" or a "moral ought" not absurd? — Count Timothy von Icarus
you seem to think that in ethical matters "any definition is as good as any other." — Count Timothy von Icarus
If someone wants to define a tiger as "an aquatic reptile," there would be an impasse so long as the person can defend "tigers are an aquatic reptile" with a straight face and some standard of "rationality." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Realism implies that not all definitions are equal. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Only after a reflective appropriation of the subject is it possible to evaluate philosophical differences in a manner that is neither dogmatic nor skeptical. The goal of dialectical criticism is not the elimination of philosophical conflict, but the achievement of a critical center from which to judge the merits and limitations of the opposing philosophical traditions. — McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, 294
I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. — J
Of course they aren't. That's why I said, "There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition." It might well turn out that one set of reasons is the more convincing. — J
what do you think of this definition? — Tom Storm
Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross
I'd prefer to call it a propositional attitude rather than a disposition.
While that might involve some authority, there is no reason to suppose that it must. And indeed, faith in a friend or faith in love look to be counter instances, were authority is not involved.
Taking his own example, I would not characterise a belief that smoking causes cancer as being faith-based. Sure, we are putting some trust in the experts who study such things, but we can go and look at their results for ourselves if we have doubts.
The evidence is there. Contrast this with the priest who insists that the bread is Jesus's flesh.
Much of what we call our knowledge consists in beliefs which are culturally accepted as facts so there is an element of faith of course. The assumption is that if had the time we could check the sources of such facts ourselves, that we have good reason to accept the findings and observations of experts, of scientists and scholars, and thus have good reason to believe in their truth. So there is also reasoning to the most plausible conclusion in play and such knowledge is not merely faith-based. — Janus
Hence my earlier suggestion that faith is seen most clearly when one believe despite the evidence.
There is a rhetorical ploy at play here, where faith is used to account for belief both in something evident - that smoking causes cancer - and also for something contrary to the evidence - the bread is flesh; and these as if they were of a kind. As if the faith in transubstantiation were no more than a variation on the scientific method. There simply a fair amount of such bull in this thread.
The appeal to authority doesn't cut it for me. — Banno
I'm not seeing that this is useful, nor how it makes a difference, nor indeed how it might count against what I wrote.By authority, I don’t mean only entities which have power or rights to judge another; but, rather, entities, namely agents and institutions, that are considered properly equipped to do or divulge something. — Bob Ross
But I do not grant your definition of faith. While the belief that smoking causes cancer need not be faith-based, the belief that a piece of bread is flesh must be faith based. Again, the marker for faith is belief despite the evidence, not because of it. Hence,2. If you concede there is trust in the experts involved in your belief that “smoking causes cancer” and you grant my definition of faith, then your belief that “smoking causes cancer” is at least in part a matter of faith. This doesn’t mean it is invalid or on par with every other belief that is faith-based. — Bob Ross
is mistaken.Whether or not a belief has an element of faith in it is separate from whether or not the evidence for believing is credible or sufficient to warrant that belief. — Bob Ross
No. I said the marker of faith is holding on to a belief - that your friend will pick you up or that the bread is flesh - despite the evidence.so you are defining "faith" as "belief despite the evidence" — Bob Ross
I don't think faith historically has ever referred to "belief despite the evidence" and that kind of usage is almost exclusively done by "new atheism" as a straw man. — Bob Ross
Yep.So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm
So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm
I think this definition of faith has been used by freethinkers for many decades. It was certainly the one Russell used, long before Hitchens and company were being polemicists. I was using it back in the 1980's. — Tom Storm
I'm trying to rethink mine based on feedback from theists. — Tom Storm
Do you see that this is also pejorative? — Leontiskos
Have you looked at Pieper's essay? If you want to know what a group means by faith, you have to look at sources from that group. In this case the way that group (Christians) use the word is entirely consonant with historical and lexical usage. — Leontiskos
As a theist, you would of course see it as pejorative. — Tom Storm
But you and other theists also use polemics and pejorative language when talking about atheists, so as far as that goes, it seems to be open season. Both camps often convinced that the other is obtuse, irrational and wrongheaded. — Tom Storm
I started it but struggled with it. It's prolix, and I would need some hours to step out the argument with notes, which I don’t have time for. But I appreciate the piece being included and may get around to it. — Tom Storm
We've ended up in a debate about whose usage is correct, and, unsurprisingly, we've landed where the theist thinks their usage is correct, and the freethinker thinks theirs is. — Tom Storm
No, not really. I've pointed to dictionaries, philosophy of religion, historical usage, etc. You've appealed to members of your echo chamber. That's a rather big difference. — Leontiskos
Note that the pejorative argument looks like this:
1. Religious faith is irrational
2. Faith in airplanes is not irrational
3. Therefore, faith in airplanes is not religious faith – there is an equivocation occurring
That’s all these atheists are doing in their head to draw the conclusion about an equivocation, and this argument is the foundation of any argument that is built atop it.
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We can actually parallel the two propositions quite easily:
Lack of faith, lack of assent
1a. “I do not have faith that the airplane will fly, and I do not assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly.”
1b. “I do not have faith that God exists, and I do not assent to the proposition that God exists.”
Lack of faith, presence of assent
2a. “I do not have faith that the airplane will fly, but I assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly.”
2b. “I do not have faith that God exists, but I assent to the proposition that God exists.”
Presence of faith, presence of assent (where assent flows solely from faith)
3a. “I have faith that the airplane will fly, and I assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly (and my assent is based solely on my faith).”
3b. “I have faith that God exists, and I assent to the proposition that God exists (and my assent is based solely on my faith).”
Presence of faith which is not necessary for assent (overdetermination)
4a. “I have faith that the airplane will fly, but I would assent even if I did not have faith.”
4b. “I have faith that God exists, but I would assent even if I did not have faith.” — Leontiskos
If you have the patience, could you say more about the absurdity?
But I said just the opposite! "This is not a brief for ethical relativism."
I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. There is no standard of rationality that either one of us would acknowledge which could make this straw definition non-absurd.
You might be right - although I don't recall appealing to an echo chamber. — Tom Storm
What seems missing from your summary of this discussion is exploration of evidence. Doesn't that leave out the key element? — Tom Storm
All of the work I did in <this post> is based on Pieper's definition, which is empirically derived via actual usage. Pejorative definitions preclude true philosophical work like that. — Leontiskos
Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god. — Tom Storm
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