Amen

I’ve not pursued his work, but would you say he was one of the first in the more recent wave of anti-modernists who'd like us to return to a more enchanted world of Greek thought and classical theism?

Maybe, and then I'd duck to avoid the brickbats! :wink: More fairly, I do read him as an anti-modernist, but his tone was rarely polemical. Also, I think he challenged us to either accept the original context of the Greek virtues or come up with something that doesn't claim merely to be talk about "the same" concepts.

And BTW, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is really good, especially if you're somewhat put off by After Virtue.

After Virtue is brilliant and I keep meaning to read it again and look at his other work. I’m surprised he’s so seldom mentioned on TPF, considering how much people like to talk about ethics.

RIP

@Count Timothy von Icarus often has interesting things to say about him.

The last of an era. Almost, Charles Taylor is still alive.



He certainly has an interesting thesis in After Virtue. Arguably, the "apocalypse" thesis can be applied to a much wider area than ethics alone, really to our entire metaphysical vocabulary re substance, essence, causes, etc.

That'd be my pet radical claim. The move to "modernity," including what MacIntyre looks into in ethics, is defined by the elevation of potency over actuality (often in terms of potency as "freedom"). And if one says: "hey now, my preferred modern area thought doesn't even have a clear conception of actuality or potency," or "but potency is covered differently in each system these days," my response will be "exactly!" QED. :cool:

Sounds like I would like reading him.

I once read an article I think he wrote where he said something like, all of modern academic philosophy is people arguing over who is restating the same ancient problems best. There is no actual content being sought, just method being squabbled over. Does that sound like him?

He is definitely worth checking out. After Virtue is the classic for a reason but I actually think folks who don't agree with After Virtue might find his later stuff (particularly "Whose Rationality?") more fruitful. His background in Marxism (and thus Hegel), as well as Nietzsche, gives him a historicism at odds with a lot of Thomism. He makes an argument that "rationality" is always embedded in tradition and that tradition is a means of knowing/being rational.

In some ways, he builds on the post-modern theorists, who he is in dialogue with (particularly Foucault). However, he remains a critic of modernity here. He points out that the Enlightenment, liberal tradition is self-undermining, and this is precisely why it has bottomed out in relativism and perspectivism and has such a deep problem with a "slide towards multiplicity." He then goes about defending his preferred tradition as a tradition (as opposed to denying it is one).

Interesting stuff, although I might modify bits of it. It seems to me that reason can be broader, more truly catholic (always relating to the whole and so always bringing itself beyond itself) and still always filtered through some particular tradition. This is perhaps a sort of form/individuating matter distinction we could make. Tradition unfolds in history according to reason, as one of its particular modes. But it can also attain this form more or less well, in the same way an animal can be healthy or sick. (For those of us Solovyev fans, perhaps this can even be the Providential unfolding towards theosis.) Modernity is sick because the Enlightenment has built in contradictions (and arguably has kept sublating new contradictions as it consumed nationalism and socialism through competition).

This element of his thought is what makes it particularly annoying to see MacIntyre occasionally lumped in with strawman of critiques of modernity that declare that they amount to simply asserting the superiority of antiquity of the middle ages, and must involve a denial of women's rights, technology, etc. At least Weaver brings this sort of response on himself (and does say some rather churlish things). Or even Schindler, who is perhaps a deeper thinker, still is partly responsible for being taken this way due to his polemical style and adages like "liberalism is the from of evil in the modern world." MacIntyre always struck me as more subtle and diplomatic, with something for most people to like.

Cheers to MacIntyre.
Eternal rest grant unto him, O Lord, and let perpetual light shine upon him.
I hadn't heard that he was declining.

MacIntyre's philosophy is great, and his death is a shame to me.

His notion of tradition is probably what is still the most influential on my own thinking. The whole notion that traditions are what give philosophy a non-arbitrary grounding is something I use in thinking through philosophy historically -- the tradition is what gives context for understanding why a philosopher is responding how they are and whom, and this in turn is what begins to reveal the concepts within said tradition.

May his rest be peaceful.

the tradition is what gives context for understanding why a philosopher is responding how they are and whom, — Moliere

Yes, I greatly appreciated this aspect of his thought -- which he shared with its other leading exponent, Gadamer, and much interesting work has been done comparing the two.

The move to "modernity," including what MacIntyre looks into in ethics, is defined by the elevation of potency over actuality (often in terms of potency as "freedom"). And if one says: "hey now, my preferred modern area thought doesn't even have a clear conception of actuality or potency," or "but potency is covered differently in each system these days," my response will be "exactly!" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Relatedly, one thing that really crystallized for me when I read AV was the historical contingency of the is-ought gap and the fact-value dichotomy. You can accept that you can’t get an ought from an is but at the same time say that this is not because it violates a universal logic, but rather because they have in fact been divorced in a society lacking a shared telos. The question then is not so much “can you derive an ought from an is” but “why does it seem impossible”.

I am a layman in terms of philosophy, and new to TPF. When Count Timothy suggested "After Virtue" to me and I got a chance to buy it cheap, I bought it and read it.

Since then, I have been thinking differently about morality, and trying to pursue the 'virtue' of gentle kindness, in honour of my mother.

To me, that's the mark of good philosophy. I assume this sounds naive, but what good is philosophy if it doesn't inform actual life?

:100: :clap:

Now that he has attained full status as dead white male, I shall have to seriously consider reading him.

He points out that the Enlightenment, liberal tradition is self-undermining, and this is precisely why it has bottomed out in relativism and perspectivism and has such a deep problem with a "slide towards multiplicity." He then goes about defending his preferred tradition as a tradition (as opposed to denying it is one). — Count Timothy von Icarus

The observant amongst you might notice why this makes him attractive to one as old-fashioned as me.

After Virtue somehow lead me to Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness for which I'll always be grateful.