Trouble is of course that if something is beyond discursive thought then it cannot be said. We could not have an argument that reached such a conclusion. And indeed the ending of elenchus is often aporia - the method of dissection ends without resolution. — Banno
There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject [of metaphysics]. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself...~ Plato, Seventh Letter — Count Timothy von Icarus
Philosophical type activity moves from naive common sense, to the analytic dissection Banno enjoys, to the metaphyisical more constructive type (building more things to be dissected), then to more mystical transcending type... — Fire Ologist
"Something in particular," not "some particular thing." Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have some determinant content or else philosophy, the love of wisdom, would be the "love of nothing in particular." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy.
Now, that's just co-occurrence to demonstrate a dyad between the two to the standards you laid out. But I think that "...is true" and "...is false" presuppose one another to be made sense of. That is, there is no "...is true" simpliciter, but rather its meaning will depend upon the meaning of "...is false", and vice-versa.
So there is no prioritizing one over the other.
I asked you what a critic is supposed to criticize if there is no builder, and in response you pointed to a critic who criticizes a builder. Do you see how you failed to answer my question?
This began when I said that if there are no builders then there can be no critics, and you responded by saying that in that case the critics would just criticize themselves. So again, your example of a critic who criticizes a house-builder is in no way an example of critics criticizing themselves, sans builders. — Leontiskos
I'm just asking you to give me an example of an assertion of falsehood which presupposes no truths. Can you do that?
"John wrote 2+2=5 on his paper. Bill said that his answer was false. But no truth needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false."
Something like that. Something straightforward. An example. — Leontiskos
While they are contrary opposites, on the view of truth as a transcendental property of being, falsity is parasitic on truth for the same reason that evil is parasitic on good—it is an absence. If truth is the adequacy of the intellect to being then its lack is a privation. Likewise, without ends, goods, the entire concept of evil makes no sense, since nothing is sought and so no aims are every frustrated. — Count Timothy von Icarus
There's a stream that might be called 'analytical mysticism' in Catholic philosophy. At least, it has its mystical elements, from its inhereted neoplatonism and the presence of mystics in the Church (You've mentioned that you're Catholic). Jacques Maritain, Bernard Lonergan, William Desmond - all great philosophers in that tradition. There are many more. — Wayfarer
I just don’t give analytic dissection the priority. We need to assert, and then dissect. Whatever is left is truth about the world.
There is very little truth about the world that has survived the dissection. But I see it. — Fire Ologist
Banno and Count seem to be arguing what wisdom is.
Well it is not error or nonsense, and it is not a ham sandwich. So it is something. And I see it is worth scrutinizing to try to define better.
Indeed it is. But we agreed:It's a question. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And yourI won't respond to the rest, because it's all based on this misreading.
is just such a misreading. Indeed, I gave an example of how truth might work, following Kripke's formal example, to @J earlier in this thread....you are also ruling out: "I have truth"
Let's look at that, then.You are once again conflating "something" and "some thing." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Here you have it again. I don't see that you have explained how "wisdom" (our present example) is a vacuous term. I haven't said that it is vacuous - far from it. You appear to think that something I have said leads directly to that conclusion, but what?Yet my point is merely that a vacuous term (or one that is indeterminately mutable) cannot be the criteria for "what goes," (i.e. which "narratives" are accepted) else "anything goes." — Count Timothy von Icarus
To which I objected, because it makes assumptions that I think are unreasonable. It presumes that for some notion to be coherent or meaningful, the object of its love (wisdom) must be determinate—a particular something. It presumes that “wisdom” must function like a referential term—picking out an object in the way that “the tree” or “the number 2” does. It presumes that this object must exist in some way that justifies the pursuit.If philosophy is the love of wisdom, it is presumably the love of something in particular — Count Timothy von Icarus
Do you see how it's correct for the critic to still say that they don't know? — Moliere
So you want a circumstance where bill said some statement is false, and there is no truth that needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false.
Correct? — Moliere
Sorry, I chose it for a reason last time and it's still the one that fits now. — Moliere
While they are contrary opposites, on the view of truth as a transcendental property of being, falsity is parasitic on truth for the same reason that evil is parasitic on good—it is an absence. If truth is the adequacy of the intellect to being then its lack is a privation. Likewise, without ends, goods, the entire concept of evil makes no sense, since nothing is sought and so no aims are every frustrated. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But then what is wisdom
— Count Timothy von Icarus
And again, asking this supposes that there is a sequence of sentences such that their conjunct sets out all and only what is wise and excludes all that is not wise. — Banno
"This sentence is false" seems to fit to me, but I'm not allowed to use it. :D — Moliere
If you have to resort to the extremely controversial example of the Liar's Paradox then your answer is going to be highly implausible and controversial. — Leontiskos
I've already given you my thoughts on the Liar's Paradox and I obviously think your analysis is incorrect.
Yep. I am saying that, "If you claim that something is false, then you must already hold to some truth in order to say so." The counterexample would be, "Here is an example where someone claims that something is false even though they do not hold to any truth in order to say so." — Leontiskos
With the exception of poetry allegedly written while on Alexander’s expedition (which, as far as we can tell, did not survive that expedition), Pyrrho wrote nothing; we are therefore obliged to try to reconstruct his philosophy from reports by others.
Sure, but I never contested that and it doesn't intersect with what we were discussing in that line of the conversation. My question to you was literally, "Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize?" Do you have an answer to that question? — Leontiskos
We can't just paper over your invalid objection to my claim that without builders there can be no critics. That is the central and older part of the conversation, and it is the part that an auto-didact will have an easier time with. I focused on it for a reason. — Leontiskos
I agree.Aporia can be seen as precisely the points where dialectic ends and noetic insight is required. — Wayfarer
Well, sometimes. True.(especially by you!) — Wayfarer
Aristotle has a distinction that I think holds up:
-Asytheta: truth as the conformity of thought and speech to reality (whose opposite is falsity); and
-Adiareta, truth as the grasping of a whole, apprehension (whose opposite is simply ignorance)
We can also consider the "three acts of the mind:"
1. Simple Apprehension, "What is it?" (produces terms - deals with essence)
2. Judging, "Is it?" (produces propositions - deals with existence)
3. Reasoning, "Why is it?" (produces arguments - deals with causes, or we might say "reasons" today because "causes" has been butchered). — Count Timothy von Icarus
yeah, not a bad reply at all.I don't really think of falsity as a privation of being. — Moliere
The whole architecture is authoritarian in form. The style of philosophising is structured to preclude objection. Each term is defined into place. Every disagreement is downgraded to a misunderstanding of the system. There’s no space for a counter-example, because nothing is allowed to count as one unless it already fits the scheme. That is the problem of the “grand theory”: not that it's false, but that it's closed.
So the come back will be that you haven't understood... becasue the monolith protects itself.
The question arrises, how this is to fit with J's idea of not critiquing until the whole is understood, when the act of understanding closes of critique. — Banno
Of course this doesn't mean that we can't make use of rules at all in our explanations, only that we be willing to revise them
When you say apprehension comes prior to judgment I can't help but think of Kant whose whole project can be read as "Judgment is the single fundamental unity to Reason in all matters philosophical" :D -- I'm not sure there's such a thing as apprehension prior to judgment at all.
More that our ideas give us an idea about what's important to consider, and this is a learned kind of judgment, and there was no such thing as apprehending before learning how to judge -- it was just ignorance.
In the state of ignorance we lack any sort of notion of either truth or falsity.
Indeed it is. But we agreed:
Of course there are truths, and we can "have" them.
Here you have it again. I don't see that you have explained how "wisdom" (our present example) is a vacuous term
I'm not sure there's such a thing as apprehension prior to judgment at all. Hence theory-ladenness, though I wouldn't put it at the level of structuring our perceptions very frequently. — Moliere
The whole architecture is authoritarian in form. That style of philosophising is structured to preclude objection. — Banno
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