Do you think such an approach is one that assumes theism and some of the philosophical scaffolding which supports it? — Tom Storm

Well, I was attempting to avoid god, but you asked.

Yep.

I don't think it's a coincidence that Tim and Leon are so adamantly disagreeing with the idea that one can coherently maintain an agnostic position.

Generally, when people hold foundational positions, they are like arrows pointing toward the place they want to arrive at. That’s as true of me as it is of anyone else. This is why I often say that our arguments are often built on top of our emotional preferences.

There are many things we 'know', but can't really explain why we act in a certain way, like say riding a bike or playing an instrument. — ChatteringMonkey

I hadn't thought of this, but it's an intriguing parallel to what counts as an intellectual "practice." On this analogy, I want to say that there are elements of just about every practice that are not theoretical, that can only be understood by doing -- and this includes the intellectual ones. And the question we might then pose is, "Is philosophy one of the exceptions here? Could it be a practice which depends for its success on theoretical/rational understanding, or even the possibility of such understanding?" I don't know. True to form, philosophy presents us with a self-reflexive puzzle about its own nature.

Generally, when people hold foundational positions, they are like arrows pointing toward the place they want to arrive at. — Tom Storm

...and everyone holds foundational positions...

As you say.

So a large part of the discussion should be about what we can agree on, despite those differences.

And that is basically a liberal stance. As against the authoritarian stance, that one way or another we must force agreement.

I thinks the questions can be separated. It's perfectly possible to take a foundationalist approach while remaining agnostic, just as it's perfectly possible to have religious beliefs without thinking they either lead to, or are engendered by, foundationalist philosophy.

I thinks the questions can be separated. It's perfectly possible to take a foundationalist approach while remaining agnostic... — J

Perhaps. I gather that would involve adopting a liberal attitude to interacting with others, accepting that they may have different foundational attitudes without actively engaging with them.

Still writing a reply to your other post.

And that is basically a liberal stance. As against the authoritarian stance, that one way or another we must force agreement. — Banno

Of course, there are many here who also take issue with liberalism so there's that. :wink:

:lol:

There's nothing in belief in god that has to lead to this sort of... antagonism (?)

And nothing in disbelief, either.

I am guessing that you would put that down to being built on top of our emotional preferences, too. But the liberal/authoritarian dimension isn't an accepted emotional fundamental, so far as I am aware - more a part of pop psychology.

SO I don't think that philosophical differences are ultimately "explained" by psychology. I suspect you do?

SO I don't think that philosophical differences are ultimately "explained" by psychology. I suspect you do? — Banno

Well, I guess it depends what that means. I do believe that people are the contingent products of circumstance. How far to push this?

My intuition is that we respond to all things through prelinguistic emotion and gradually fumble our way to articulate a response. This often consists of a post hoc rationalization of how we feel, (tempered by the influence of upbringing and culture, naturally). But over time, I think we establish a personal web of beliefs that makes many of our responses formulaic - in that they automatically match the presuppositions we have arrived at. Of course, some people are wildly inconsistent, while others are disciplined and rigid.

What is your account?

I don't think the target statement ought to be framed in terms of criteria that are different in every instance. — J

I agree.

there are certainly facts within the discipline which will suggest to us what such criteria might be, including previous success in advancing the discipline and provoking exciting new questions. — J

Yes - doesn't this amount to insisting that the discipline at least be self-consistent?

We might even supose after Feyerabend, that a practice could be successful becasue of a disagreement on first principles, of the sort that Tim has in mind; that a tension between fundamentals might well lead to progress. Think of the tension in physics concerning wave-particle duality at the beginning of last century.

Feyerabend would say this is precisely how science often works: progress through pluralism, through the friction between incompatible paradigms or first principles. Agreement can produce stability, but disagreement can produce invention.

"But how does this keep arbitrariness out?" Consistency does this work, seems to me. That together with some variant on Davidson's triangulation, keeping the community - and we are talking about groups of people, not individuals - on a common topic.

I like the method suggested here - it fits in with my own desire to find common ground quite well.

So I suggest that we allow @Count Timothy von Icarus to choose the example, as an act of good will.

What is your account? — Tom Storm

Not dissimilar, but i might place much more emphasis on the community than the individual. Not a "personal web of beliefs" - it's public, and learned, and shared.

And so available for discussion (and revision) in a way that private ideas are not.


Which is what we do, here.

Well, yes, I think that's right. I guess I see personal as an interpretive and assimilative process of the shared.

Cool.

It seems that the fundamental opinions of some are less malleable than those of others. I find that interesting and confronting. That resistance to revision one sees even in intelligent, well educated folk.

I guess it kinda grounds my OP - a moral preference for doubt.

I gather that would involve adopting a liberal attitude to interacting with others, accepting that they may have different foundational attitudes . . . . — Banno

Yes to this first part, surely -- that's just conversational civility, I would hope.

". . . . without actively engaging with them."

But is it really necessary to avoid active engagement on fundamentals, in such a case? It might be frustrating and might not produce much shift in position, but done in the right spirit, I think it could help sharpen some questions, always worthwhile.

I was more thinking about whether having very strong beliefs in philosophical absolutes and/or first-principle-type foundations has to go hand in hand with deism or theism. What about someone like Ayn Rand? -- granted, not exactly a world-class philosopher. Her atheism is rooted, according to her, in extremely fixed "objective" foundations. Or even Dennett -- I'm not sure he'd agree to being called a foundationalist, but his faith in physicalism was absolutely unshakable, and seems very much like an indisputable first principle to me.

I was more thinking about whether having very strong beliefs in philosophical absolutes and/or first-principle-type foundations has to go hand in hand with deism or theism. — J

Oh, not at all. There's a lot here about foundational beliefs and relations to hinge propositions and so on that would be fun to go through.

And there is the tu quoque reply, of course, which is irrefutable, since we all have base beliefs.

I think the issue is methodological - not about what you believe but what you do with it.

I think the issue is methodological - not about what you believe but what you do with it. — Banno

Say some more on this.

It also seems to me that some are more preoccupied by certainty or absolutes than others.

Say some more on this. — Tom Storm

Well, we might shift the philosophical weight from ontology or doxastic content to praxis and procedure.

What matters would not be the abstract truth of a belief, but how that belief functions within a system (logic, science, discourse); gets used (for justification, prediction, coercion); survives confrontation (with evidence, argument, or rival beliefs) and integrates with shared methods of reasoning or inquiry.

Ever hear of Fred D'Agostino? D’Agostino’s take: Instead of asking, “What do we all believe?” we ask, “What kind of practice allows us to live together with our differences?”

Ever hear of Fred D'Agostino? D’Agostino’s take: Instead of asking, “What do we all believe?” we ask, “What kind of practice allows us to live together with our differences?” — Banno

Ah yes… and this is a good question for this forum where we can practice this in microcosm.

What matters would not be the abstract truth of a belief, but how that belief functions within a system (logic, science, discourse); gets used (for justification, prediction, coercion); survives confrontation (with evidence, argument, or rival beliefs) and integrates with shared methods of reasoning or inquiry. — Banno

Would this not mean that some people might practice compassion even whilst holding an ostensibly intolerant belief system? Ye shall know them by their works.

But the liberal/authoritarian dimension isn't an accepted emotional fundamental, so far as I am aware - more a part of pop psychology.

SO I don't think that philosophical differences are ultimately "explained" by psychology. I suspect you do? — Banno

I've been following along even though I haven't much time to engage in depth right now. Is not the 'argument from authority' generally (and rightly) considered to be a fallacious argument in philosophy, or at least contemporary philosophy?
If this is so then debunking an argument from authority would not need to rely on psychological (ad hominem) grounds.

That said, here with Tim and Leon, we seem to be dealing with arguments for authority. Could such arguments stand without also allowing arguments from authority to stand?It seems obvious that all arguments from authority cannot possibly pass muster―which seems to leave us with the obvious and difficult question as to what criteria, in the absence of empirical or logical support, could be used to assess the soundness of any purported authority?

That the dissectors disagree with themselves is only consistent with dissection and disagreement and difference :D — Moliere

But only up to a point, because if two people have very little in common by way of approach, then they are not doing the same thing. Banno has made clear that he is interested in coherence:

My aim, in writing on these forums, and in applying the analytic tools we have at hand, is to achieve some measure of coherence. — Banno

In that sense, coherence—not completeness—is my measure of success. — Banno

Mysticism presents as a desire to leap from the aporia to a conclusion, to complete the dialogue.

But it does so at the risk of losing coherence. — Banno

So again, we might prefer coherence to completeness. — Banno

So if @Moliere contradicts/"dissects" despite his own incoherence, and @Banno contradicts/dissects for the sake of coherence, then I would say that the two of you are doing significantly different things.

-

- The errors of liberalism would eventually come to light right alongside the errors of the OP, namely as a one-sided and myopic approach. In fact folks of all different persuasions are able to recognize the one-sided individualism of liberalism (as the recent essay contest shows). But the thread isn't there yet, and championing liberalism before the thread naturally arrives at the topic would surely be premature.

That said, here with Tim and Leon, we seem to be dealing with arguments for authority. Could such arguments stand without also allowing arguments from authority to stand? — Janus

Lots of false inferences going on here. With that said:

Is not the 'argument from authority' generally (and rightly) considered to be a fallacious argument in philosophy, or at least contemporary philosophy? — Janus

See:

9. The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority or expertise. Fundamentally, the fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who is taken to be an authority but is either not really an authority or a relevant authority. This can happen when non-experts parade as experts in fields in which they have no special competence—when, for example, celebrities endorse commercial products or social movements. Similarly, when there is controversy, and authorities are divided, it is an error to base one’s view on the authority of just some of them. — The Core Fallacies | SEP

(Note too that by appealing to SEP I am already using an argument from authority, namely SEP's authority.)

The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority or expertise. Fundamentally, the fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who is taken to be an authority but is either not really an authority or a relevant authority. This can happen when non-experts parade as experts in fields in which they have no special competence — The Core Fallacies | SEP

Expertise is demonstrable within the sciences and practical matters in general. How could expertise of a purported religious authority be demonstrated?

As we see earlier Janus disagreed with my classifying Hume as a nit-picker, — Moliere

Not quite―I disagreed with an assessment (which I was not accusing you of making) that Hume was merely a nitpicker.

You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. — Banno

And that seems right. Are you claiming that we could simultaneously claim that a statement is both undecided and ruled out? It seems odd to say that an undecided statement should be ruled out.

and thirdly sometimes we can say that we don't know it's truth value, and that doing so does not, as your statement quoted above implies, lead immediately to "anything goes". — Banno

I don't see @Count Timothy von Icarus saying, "If someone says that they don't know the truth value of a statement, then anything goes."

Note the quote you identify:

Well, in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And note your interpretation:

You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. — Banno

I don't understand that interpretation (even though I think the content of it is true). What @Count Timothy von Icarus said in that quote was, "If not just anything goes, then some things are denied." Or in the second person, "If you agree that we cannot say that anything goes, then you must be denying some positions." This is back to the Square of Opposition, namely:

• Not (Every S is P)
• Therefore, (Some S is not P)

Or specifically and literally:

• Not (Every thing goes)
• Therefore, (Some things do not go)

@Count Timothy von Icarus is correct. If you deny <every thing goes>, then you must admit that <some things do not go>. This is different from saying, "if a statement is ruled out, it is denied," although that seems obvious enough. It is also different from saying, "If someone says that they don't know the truth value of a statement, then anything goes."

I see the focus on undecided propositions as needlessly complicating the picture. Even so, it introduces modal notions. What I would say is that affirming some proposition as undecided is not enough to allow you to deny <every thing goes>. If I deny <every thing goes>, then I must have decided that some thing does not go.

The only thing I can see against Count's quote is a quibble. It is that, "I might say that there are things that do not go, but that no one engages in those things, and therefore I do not deny any live positions even while denying possible positions."

Expertise is demonstrable within the sciences and practical matters in general. How could expertise of a purported religious authority be demonstrated? — Janus

Don't we have lots of threads where this question would be more on topic? It doesn't seem related to the things that have been discussed here.

Edit: It seems like your brain is still in the "What is faith" thread, where you were concerned with these exact same issues.

It is relevant because the thread has veered into the question of authoritarian versus liberal thinking.

I don't think it's a coincidence that Tim and Leon are so adamantly disagreeing with the idea that one can coherently maintain an agnostic position. — Banno

Neither of us have said that. The strawman has been chugging for so long that it must be rather bored by now. :lol:

Nevertheless:

I thinks the questions can be separated. — J

Banno is partially right, perhaps only by accident.

In order to posit overarching relations between a set of things, that set of things must have some common ground. The theistic notion of God represents a common cause, which establishes common ground among all (created) things. In other words, only if you have a reason to posit some form of common ground between all things do you have warrant to draw all things together under certain notions, relations, truths, etc. God would provide one way to do that, among others.

This is why, for instance, Newman argued that theology is the central discipline within a university (and historically it was). It is the overarching thing that relates to all other things, because it studies The One who unites all things under one heading. Without that central gravitational body the disciplines will fly off into space, unconnected and unconcerned with one another, each in their own self-contained and insular boxes. Without that central gravitational pull you end up with all specialists and no generalists, where the specialists become unable to talk to anyone outside their field.

Would this not mean that some people might practice compassion even whilst holding an ostensibly intolerant belief system? — Tom Storm

One does what one can...

...we seem to be dealing with arguments for authority. Could such arguments stand without also allowing arguments from authority to stand? — Janus

That's a fine question.

The fallacy of arguments from authority is an informal fallacy - it's not a logical fallacy as such, not false becasue of the structure of the argument. it's not a fallacy to pay attention to the thoughts of someone who has authority...

Listen to your doctor, for fuck's sake. Then question them to make sure they have paid attention to you and know your circumstances and are up to date on the research!

Authority does not grant immunity to critique. Not even for priests.

But that for and from bit needs some thinking...

So if Moliere contradicts/"dissects" despite his own incoherence, and @Banno contradicts/dissects for the sake of coherence, then I would say that the two of you are doing significantly different things. — Leontiskos

I think you're rather missing my point, but this is quite common for you -- if you can't understand why someone would say something then you conclude that they must be incoherent.

But it could be that you just don't understand someone, and they only appear incoherent to you.

Something we agree upon is that we can make inferences at this more local level. So insofar that I choose a logic for a situation and it's understood by the people for whom it's meant then we can make inferences. It just takes communication between people building a relationship rather than arguments in epistemology to do it. Or, rather, these discussions are the very same thing as doing epistemology -- but it cannot be done away from the group for whom it's meant.

I wouldn't say this is for the sake of incoherence. That's not a very hard goal to obtain.

It is relevant because the thread has veered into the question of authoritarian versus liberal thinking. — Janus

The topic is philosophical method. Your posts are bang on topic.